Karachi Wine Store v. Shri Mohammed Rafiq — 1988 DIGILAW 101 (RAJ)

JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal filed by the defendants arises out of a suit for eviction from a show-room which is situated at Mirza Ismail Road, Jaipur. The said show-room originally belonged to Noor Mohammad and the sons of his brother Rahim Bux. It was mortgaged with Radha Kishan and Badri Narain by that aforesaid owners. Under a rent note executed on 23rd May, 1964, it was let out to Satyapal, appellant No. 2 and Suganmal (deceased) who were partners of M/s. Karachi Wine Store, appellant No. 1 with effect from 1st June, 1964 on a monthly rent of Rs. 80/-. The case of the plaintiff respondents is that after the death of Rahim Bux a partition took place between Noor Mohammed and the sons of Rahim Bux and as a result of the said partition the show room fell in the share of Noor Mohammad and that thereafter Noor Mohammad redeemed the mortgage and sold the show-room to the plaintiff-respondents under a registered sale deed dated 3rd July, 1961. An intimation about the said sale in favour of the plaintiff-respondents was given to the defendants by the respondents by their notice dated 31st July, 1968 whereby tenancy of the defendants was terminated and they were asked to handover the vacant possession of the premises on or before 31st August, 1968. Thereafter, on 7th Sept. 1968, the respondents filed the suit giving rise to the present appeal in the court of Munsiff Jaipur City (West) for the eviction of defendants from the premises and for recovery of Rs. 240/- towards rent for the period 1st June, 1969 to 31st August, 1968. The said suit was contested by the defendants and one of the pleas raised by them was with regard to the rights of the plaintiff respondents to maintain the suit for the reason that the alleged partition where under the premises were said to have been given to Noor Mohammad was inadmissible in evidence as it was not registered and that Noor Mohammad could not become owner of the property on the basis of the said partition and be had no right to redeem the property and be could not sell the same to the plaintiffs. 2. 2. On the basis of the aforesaid plea of the defendant's the trial court framed issue No. 1 as to whether the plaintiffs had purchased the property under sale-deed dated 1st June, 1968 and they are sole owners of the same and are entitled to maintain the suit. The said issue was decided against the plaintiffs by the trial court and the said finding was affirmed, on appeal, by the Additional District Judge No. 5, Jaipur City. This Court, on second appeal by its judgment and decree dated 23rd February, 1979 (in S B. Civil Second Appeal No. 175 of 1973) set aside the said finding recorded by the trial court and the first appellate court and held that there was no reason to disbelieve the statement of Noor Mohammad P. W. 3 that there was a partition in the family and the said property had come to the share of Noor Mohammad and the mortgage debt was also paid off by him and that the conduct of the mortgagees Radha Kishan and Badri Narain, as well as the sons of Rahim Bux in not claiming any rent from the defendants for such a long period and the fact that the plaintiff: served a notice on 31st July, 1968 immediately after the sale of the property on 1st June, 1968 and its registration done on 3rd June, 1968, shows that those persons had acquiesced, if not agreed to the a transaction of sale in favour of the plaintiffs. This Court also relied upon the conduct of the defendants and they held that they had attorned in favour of the plaintiffs and were estopped from challenging the title of the plaintiffs. This Court, therefore remanded the matter to the trial court for deciding the case on merits on the remaining issues in accordance with law. Thereafter the suit was tried by the Additional Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate first class No. 3, Jaipur City. 3. In the suit as originally filed the plaintiffs had sought ejectment of the defendants only on the ground of the bona fide and reasonable persona: necessity of the plaintiffs for the premises to carry on business in precious stones. After the matter had been remanded by this Court they amended the plaint and raised an additional ground for ejectment, viz., denial of title of the plaintiffs by the defendants. After the matter had been remanded by this Court they amended the plaint and raised an additional ground for ejectment, viz., denial of title of the plaintiffs by the defendants. On the basis of the aforesaid plea, an additional issue, issue No. 3, with regard to denial of title was framed. Issues Nos. 2 and 4 related to the plea of bona fide and reasonable personal necessity of the plaintiffs as well as comparative hardship of the parties. The Addl. Munsif by his judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1981 decided issues Nos. 2 and 4 with regard to bona fide and personal necessity of the plaintiffs and comparative hardship against the plaintiffs, but he decided issue No. 3 with regard to denial of title in their favour and in view of his finding on issue No. 3, he passed a decree for eviction against the defendants. The said decree was affirmed, in appeal, by the Additional District Judge No. 4. Jaipur City by his judgment and decree dated 23rd February, 1987. The Additional District Judge rejected the cross objections raised by the plaintiffs against the findings recorded by the Addl. Munsiff on issues No. 2 and 4 Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, the defendants have filed this second appeal, wherein the appellants have challenged the findings recorded by the courts below on issue No. 3 relating to denial of title. The plaintiff-respondents have filed cross objections wherein they have challenged the finding recorded by the courts below with regard to the premises being required reasonably and bona fide by the plaintiff for their own use. 4. By order dated 27th October, 1987 it was directed that the appeal will be finally disposed of at the stage of admission Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties have been heard on that basis. 5. I will first deal with the contentions urged by Shri B.P. Agrawal, the learned counsel for the appellants in support of the appeal which relate to the question as to whether the appellants are liable to be evicted from the suit premises on the ground mentioned in clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act'). The said clause reads as under : "13 (1) (f)-That the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant;" 6. In the present case both the courts below have found that in pare No. 3 of their written statement (Ex. 60) filed in the subsequent Suit No. 23/1976, filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants for their eviction from the suit premises on the ground of default in payment of rent, the defendants had denied a title of the plaintiffs. 7. Shri B.P. Agrawal has urged that the principle of estoppel with regard to denial of title of the landlord by the tenant as contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act is applicable only to the title, f the original landlord and the said principle is not applicable to the title of a person who claims to be owner of the premises from the original landlord on the basis of a derivative title and, therefore, it cannot be said that the defendants were estopped from disputing the derivative title of the plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged possession of the premises from Noor Mohammad, one of the co-owners. Shri Agrawal has also urged that in any event the averments contained in para 3 of the written statement (Ex. 60) cannot be regarded as a denial of the title of the landlord and that the courts below have erred in construing the said averments as denial of title. 8. Shri S.M. Mehta, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents has supported the findings recorded by the courts below on this issue and has urged that since the defendants by their conduct had attorned in favour of the plaintiffs they were estopped from challenging the title of the plaintiffs. Shri Mehta has also urged that after having attorned in favour of the plaintiffs the defendants, in their reply (Ex. A. 14) dated 30th August, 1968 to the notice (Ex. 5) dated 31st July, 1965 and in para 3 of the written statement (Ex. Shri Mehta has also urged that after having attorned in favour of the plaintiffs the defendants, in their reply (Ex. A. 14) dated 30th August, 1968 to the notice (Ex. 5) dated 31st July, 1965 and in para 3 of the written statement (Ex. 60) in subsequent suit No. 23/76 as well as in para 3 of the written statement in the present suit, have disputed the title of the plaintiffs over the premises and in view of the said denial of title of the plaintiffs by the defendants, they are liable to be ejected in view of section 13(1) (f) of the Act. 9. In view of 'he aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the following substantial questions of law arise for consideration in this appeal: 1. Whether the defendants are estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff-respondents? 2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case it can be said that the defendants have denied the title of the plaintiffs ? 10. Section 116 of the Evidence Act lays down that no tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had at the beginning of the tenancy a title to such immovable property. In Kumar Krishna Prasad Lal Singha Deo v. Baraboni Coal Concern, Ltd. and others, AIR 1937 PC 25 , the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has laid down that the principle of estoppel contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act does not apply to disentitle a tenant to dispute the derivative title of one who claims to have since become entitled to the reversion, through in such cases there may be other grounds of estoppel, e.g., by attornment acceptance of rent etc. In view of the said decision it must be held that though the principle of estoppel contained in section 116 of the Evidence Act does not apply to a case where a person claims to be a landlord on the basis of derivative title, but in such a case the principle of estoppel would be attracted if the tenant has attorned to the new owner of the premises. 11. As pointed in Halsbury's Laws of England, (Fourth Edition) Vol. 11. As pointed in Halsbury's Laws of England, (Fourth Edition) Vol. 27, page 10, para 3, a person in occupation of property may establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and another person by attornment, that is by acknowledging that he is tenant to that other person An attornment estops the tenant from disputing the landlord's title. In V. Satyamarayanaraju and another v. J. Hanumayamma and another, AIR 1967 SC 174 , it has been laid down that attornment is one mode of recognising a person as one's landlord, just as payment of rent is another mode for the purpose. In that case the Suprem. Court has referred to Para 745 of Foa's General Law of Landlord and Tenant, wherein it is stated that recognition as landlord by the tenant may be by express agreement by attornment or other formal acknowledgement (as by paying a nominal sum of money), by payment of rent, or of a nominal sum as rent, or by submission to a distress. 12. In the present case it has been urged by Shri Mehta that the defendants had attorned in favour of the plaintiffs by offering rent for the premises for the months of June and July, 198, after receipt of the notice dated 31st July, 1968 from the plaintiffs. The submission of Shri Mehta is that the fact that the slid rent which was sent by money order was not accepted by the plaintiffs is of no consequence because what has to be seen is the conduct of the defendants. It has also been urged by Shirt Mehta that apart from sending the aforesaid amount as rent, the defendants had also entered into negotiations with the plaintiffs for enhancement of the rent and it has been admitted by the defendants that they tad offered to increase the rent from Rs. 80/- to Rs. 100/- per month and further that during pendency of this suit the defendants had deposited a sum of Rs. 1,280/- on account of tent of the premises vide receipt dated 10th September, 1969. Shri Mehta has urged that on the basis of the aforesaid conduct of the defend ants, namely, in offering to the plaintiffs rent for the months of June and July, 1968 entering into negotiations with the plaintiffs for increase of the rent and depositing of Rs. 1,280/- on account of tent of the premises vide receipt dated 10th September, 1969. Shri Mehta has urged that on the basis of the aforesaid conduct of the defend ants, namely, in offering to the plaintiffs rent for the months of June and July, 1968 entering into negotiations with the plaintiffs for increase of the rent and depositing of Rs. 1,280/- vide receipt dated 12th Sept., 1969, this Court, in its judgment dated 23rd Feb., 1979, has held that the defendants had now attorned in favour of the plaintiffs and were estopped from challenging the title of the plaintiffs. In my view on the basis of the judgment of this Court dated 23rd Feb, 1979 referred to above it must be held that the defendants had attorned in favour of the plaintiffs and for that reason they were estopped from challenging the title of the plaintiffs. The first question, therefore, must be answered against the appellants. 13. I may now come to the second question as to whether the defendants can be said to have denied the title of the plaintiffs. In this regard it may be mentioned that in clause (g) of Section III of Transfer of Property Act a provision is made for forfeiture of the lease in a case where the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. In the context of the aforesaid provision in the Transfer of Property Act, the question has arisen before the courts as to what are the requirements of a disclaimer which may entail forfeiture under section 111 (g) of Transfer of Property Act. 14. In Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmani Pattomahdevi, AIR 1919 PC 1 , the Judicial Committee of Privy Council have referred to the rule of English law that a tenant will forfeit his holding if lie denies his landlord's title in clear and unmistakable terms, whether by matter of record or by certain matters in pais and it has been held that the qualification that the denial must be in clear and unmistakable terms has not infrequently been applied by the Courts of India. 15. 15. In Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur and another, AIR l965 SC 1923 , the Supreme Court has laid down that the disclaimer or repudiation of the landlord's title must be clear and unequivocal and that unless there is a disclaimer or repudiation in char and unequivocal terms, whether the same be in a pleading or in other documents, no forfeiture is incurred. In that case the tenant had filed a claim before the Land Acquisition Officer wherein he had asserted that the "land acquired is part of Jali Kothi or Bungalow Merrett Sahib belonging to me". The Supreme Court held that the words "belonging to me ' did not amount to disclaimer of the tenancy and a repudiation of the landlord's title and that though the word "belonging" no doubt was capable of denoting an absolute title, the word was nevertheless rot confined to connoting that sense and that word could signify even possession of an interest less than that of full ownership. According to the Supreme Court there was no disclaimer or repudiation of landlord's title by the tenant and, therefore, he had not incurred forfeiture of his tenancy. 16. In Smt. Bela Das and others v. Samarendra Nath Bose, AIR 1975 SC 398 , the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of Bihar Buildings ,Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act, 1947 and the question was whether the tenant had disputed the title of the landlord In that case the tenant had raised a plea that the plaintiffs, bring landlord of the suit premises for a moiety of share, could not alone claim a decree for eviction against him. The Supreme Court held that the said plea could not be treated as a denial of title of the plaintiffs and setting up a title in himself and that it was appeal set up by the defendants to resist the suit for eviction qua tenant and not de hors it. 17. The Supreme Court held that the said plea could not be treated as a denial of title of the plaintiffs and setting up a title in himself and that it was appeal set up by the defendants to resist the suit for eviction qua tenant and not de hors it. 17. In Shiv Narain v. Bal Kishan ILR (1978) 28 Rajasthan 1091 , decided by a learned Judge of this Court, the principles laid down with reference to Section 111(g) of Transfer of Property Act have been applied to S.C. 11(1)(f) of the Act and it has been held that in order to constitute denial of title which may afford a ground for eviction under section 13 (1)(f) of the Act the disclaimer must be clear and unequivocal. In that case the tenant, in the written statement to the suit for eviction, had raised the plea that the plaintiff had not produced the rent note and therefore it is not known as to who are the owners and that the plaintiffs had not impleaded legal representatives of Raghunath Das and ether owners as party to the suit and therefore the suit was not maintainable. This Court held that from the said plea it could not be inferred that there was direct relationship of landlord and tenant and that the said plea could not amount to repudiation of plaintiff's title and it could not be construed as denial of land- lord's title in clear and unequivocal terms. 18. In Ali Mohammad v. Kailash Nath, (S. B. Civil Second Appeal No. 466 of 1975 decided on May 6, 1984) , the premises were originally owned by two brothers jointly and after the death of one of the brothers there was a family settlement between the other brother and the heirs of the deceased brother under which the suit premises fell to the share of the surviving brother and the recant in that case had pleaded that details of partition had not been given and the plaintiff' who had filed the suit was not the only landlord. This Court, after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Bala Das and others v. Samarendra Nath Boase , held that this could not constitute denial of title. 19. In Narsingh Das v. Mst. This Court, after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Bala Das and others v. Samarendra Nath Boase , held that this could not constitute denial of title. 19. In Narsingh Das v. Mst. Amar Kanwar, 1963 RLW 222 , it has been observed that a tenant from whom rent is demanded by a transferor or an assignee may not be convinced that the letter had the right to demand the rent and, therefore, in order to safeguard his own interest so that be may not have to pay rent to a wrong person he may dispute the title of the assignee and put him to proof. In that case, however, the Court found that original landlord of the defendant had informed him, by a notice about his having transferred the house to the plaintiff and he also directed or desired the defendant to pay rent there-after to the plaintiff and this Court observed that the written notice by the defendant's previous landlord was sufficient to safeguard his legitimate interest regarding payment of rent and in the circumstances he had no business to deny the payment of rent to the plaintiff. 20. I may now examine the fats of the present case. The averment with regard to the plea of denial of title is contained in para 4(Ka) of the plaint wherein it has been alleged that the defendants have wilfully denied the title of the plaintiff and have also denied that they are tenants of the plaintiff and for that reason the plaintiff is entitled to obtain a decree. In the aforesaid averment in the plaint no particulars have been given with regard to the alleged denial of title by the defendants. During the course of his examination as PW-5 Mohd. Rafiq Respondent No. 1 has deposed that he had filed a suit against the defendants for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent as well as personal necessity and in that suit they had denied his title. In other words the case of the plaintiffs with regard to denial of title is based on the written statement of defendants in the subsequent suit for eviction which was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants. In other words the case of the plaintiffs with regard to denial of title is based on the written statement of defendants in the subsequent suit for eviction which was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants. Both the courts below have also found that the defendants have denied title of the plaintiffs on the basis of averments contained in paragraph 3 of the said written statement which has been exhibited as Ex. 60. 21. Shri Mehta, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs has however, submitted that apart from the said written statement (Ex. 60) the denial of title of the plaintiffs by the defendants is also established from the reply (Ex. A. 14) dated 30th August, 1968 sent by Shri Sharma R.Chandra, Advocate, to the notice dated 31st July, 1968 sent on behalf of the plaintiffs by Shri P.D. Mathur. Advocate, as well as the averments contained in para 3 o the written statement in the present suit. 22. I will first refer to the aforesaid two documents on which reliance has been placed by Shri Mehta before I deal with the written statement (Ex. 60). 23. Ir the reply (Ex. A. 14) dated 30th August, 1968 sent on behalf of the defendants the execution of the rent note by the defendants in favour of M/s. Radha Kishan and Badri Narain on 23rd May, 1964 has been admitted. With regard to the redemption of the mortgage by Noor Mohammad and sale by Noor Mohammad in favour of the plaintiffs, it has been stated that the defendants have no personal knowledge about those facts. It has, however, been stated in the said reply chat the owners of the premises were Noor Mohammad Thekedar, Mohammad Ibrahim Mohd. Ismail, Mst. Hazara, Abdul Razaq and Abdul Sattar and that the defendants were unable to understand as to bow the mortgage was redeemed by Shri Noor Mohammad and further how Noor Mohammad had sold the entire premises because Noor Mohammad, being one of the co-sharers, could legally sell only his share in favour of the plaintiffs. By the said reply the defendants requested the plaintiffs to clarify the position so that they may accept the plaintiffs as landlords of the entire premises. By the said reply the defendants requested the plaintiffs to clarify the position so that they may accept the plaintiffs as landlords of the entire premises. It would thus appear from the aforesaid document that the defendants only wanted clarification with regard to the title of the plaintiffs in view of the fact that originally the premises belonged to a number of persons and Noor Muhammad was only a co-sharer and did not own the entire premises. There is a nothing in the said reply which may indicate that the defendants were denying title of the plaintiffs or were renouncing their character as tenants of the premises. On the other hand the said reply shows that the defendants were accepting that they were in occupation of the premises as tenants and only wanted a clarification on certain matters so that they may accept the plaintiffs as their landlord in respect of the entire premises. 24. As regards the written statement in the present suit, the relevant paragraph on which reliance has been placed by Shri Mehta is paragraph 1. In the said paragraph the defendants have denied the partition between Noor Mohammad and the children of Rahim Buz and have stated that from the children of Ibrahim the defendants have learnt that no partition deed had been executed and registered and that any partition effected by an unregistered partition deed is inadmissible in evidence and does not confer any rights on Noor Mohd. and since Noor Mohd. was not the sole owner of the property, he was not entitled to redeem the mortgage and that even if he was entitled to redeem the mortgage, the children of Rahim Bux were also the owners of the premises and Noor Mohammad alone did not have the right to sell the property. In the said paragraph the defendants stated that so long as plaintiffs do not give a clarification in this regard and establish that partition had taken place between Noor Mohammad and children of Rahim Bux, through a properly registered partition deed, no proprietary rights could be acquired on the entire premises by the plaintiffs on the basis of the sale-deed executed by Noor Mohammad alone and the plaintiffs were, therefore, not entitled to maintain the suit. In the aforesaid paragraph the defendants have referred to the reply to the notice sent by the plaintiffs' advocate dated 31st July, 1968 whereby they had sought clarification from the plaintiffs and have stated that in spite of said reply no clarification had been made by the plaintiffs. In the said paragraph the defendants have also stated that if the clarification on those matters had been given to them, the defendants would not have raised an objection challenging the right of the plaintiffs to maintain the suit and that even now if the aforesaid matters are established, the defendants would not challenge the title of the plaintiffs over the property in dispute. It has also been stated in the said paragraph of the written statement that till date of filing the written statement, the defendants had not received any notice from the heirs of Ibrahim that Noor Mohammad had become the sole owner of the property In the said paragraph the defendants have also stated that they are not raising any objection with regard to title of the plaintiffs nor they say that the title of the said property was of somebody else and that the objection that was being raised by them was in order to protect their tenancy rights because the defendants had been tenants from the very beginning of Shri Noor Mohammad and Ibrahim and that if the plaintiffs establish that Noor Mohammad alone was entitled to sell the property and for that reason the plaintiffs are owners of the entire property, the defendants do not raise any objection that they are tenants of the plaintiffs. The defendants in the said paragraph have further asserted that the objections are being raised by them bona fide and not with a view to disclaim title of the plaintiffs. 25. It would thus be seen that the whole tenor of the aforesaid averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement in the present suit is to make sure about the title of the plaintiffs with regard to the entire property and in the said averments the defendants have very clearly indicated that they do not dispute their character as tenants in respect of a property and they also do not wish to disclaim the title of the plaintiffs over the same or to deny their title in that regard. In my view neither the reply (Ex.A.14) nor the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement in the present case can be held as a clear and unequivocal disclaimer or repudiation of the title of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property by the defendants. In this connection it may also be stated that the plaintiffs themselves did not treat the reply (Ex.A.14) and the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement in the present suit as amounting to denial of title of the plaintiff by the defendants. This would be apparent from the judgment of this Court dated 23rd February, 1979 wherein this Court has set out the contention urged on behalf of the plaintiffs before this Court to the effect the plaintiffs while referring to the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement in the prevent suit, had urged that defendants had no courage to deny the title of the plaintiffs in the written statement and that they were tactly accepting the plaintiffs to be their landlord. This Court has also observed in the said judgment that half-hearted manner in which the defendants have challenged the title of the plaintiffs in the written statement leave no manner of doubt that the defendants had accepted the plaintiffs to be their landlords. In these circumstances, I am unable to accept the submission of Shri Mehta that in their reply (Ex.A.14) to the notice as well as in paragraph no. 3 of the written statement in the present suit, the defendants have denied the title of the plaintiffs. 26. I may now come to paragraph No. 3 of the written statement (Ex. 60) in the sub sequent suit for eviction filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants. A perusal of the said written statement would shore that in the said paragraph the defendants have actually reiterated the plea that was raised by them in paragraph No. 3 of their written statement in the present suit and while doing so the plaintiffs have also referred to the judgment dated 29th April, 1971 of the Addl. Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Jaipur City in the present suit whereby the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed and the judgment of the Addl. Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Jaipur City in the present suit whereby the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed and the judgment of the Addl. District Judge No. 1, Jaipur City dated 20th December, 1971 whereby the said judgment of the Addl Munsiff was affirmed in appeal and, on the basis of those judgments. it has been asserted that the said judgments show that the plaintiffs are not owners of suit premises and they have not been able to establish their proprietary rights over the same and in these circumstances they are not the owners of the suit property. This would show that in paragraph 3 of the written statement (Ex. 60) the defendants have not raised a new plea except that raised by them in paragraph 3 of the written statement in the present suit and they had merely reiterated the said plea which, at that time, stood reinforced by the judgments of Addl. Munsiff and Addl. District Judge in the present suit I have already considered the plea raised in paragraph 3 of the written statement in the present suit and have found that the said plea cannot be construed as a denial of title of the plaintiffs and for same reasons the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement (Ex. 60) cannot be construed as a denial of title of the plaintiffs because here also the defendants have indicated that they do not challenge the title of the plaintiffs over the suit property and are only bona fide raising objections in their capacity as tenants and the said objections are not by way of disclaiming the rights of the plaintiffs. The present case thus falls within the ambit of the principle laid down by this Court in Narsingh Das v. Mst. Amar Kanwar wherein it has been held that the tenant from whom rent is demanded by a transferor or an assignee may not be convinced that the latter had right to demand rent and therefore in order to safeguard his own interest so that he may not have to pay tent to a wrong person, he may dispute the title as assignee and put him to proof. In this connection it may also be mentioned that in the present case it is not disputed that no notice was given by the heirs of Rahim Bux to the defendants about Noor Mohammad having become the sole owner of the property under a partition and in the absence of any such intimation from the heirs of Rahim Bux, who was admittedly a co-owner, the defendants could feel a legitimate doubt about the right of Noor Mohammad alone to sell the entire property to the plaintiffs. 27. Shri Mehta has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Smt. Barkat Bai v. Bhanwar Lal, 1974 WLN 217 . In that case it was found that the premises originally belonged to Rajmata of the erstwhile State of Jhalawar who had gifted the same to the plaintiff under a registered gift-deed dated 15th April, 1958 and it was found that after the said gift the defendant had paid rent for a few months to the plaintiffs. In the circumstances this Court held that in view of the conduct of the defendant in paying the rent to the plaintiffs an inference of attornment by the defendant in favour of the plaintiffs could be raised and the defendant must be estopped by her act, conduct or acquiescence from challenging the title of the plaintiffs. That decision has bearing on the first question referred to above relating to the applicability of the principle of estoppel. The said question has already been considered by me and it has been answered in favour of the plaintiffs The said decision does not touch upon the second question as to whether the plea raised by the defendants in their written statement can be construed as denial of title. 28. As pointed out earlier in the present case immediately after the receipt of the notice dated 10th July, 1968 the defendants in their reply (Ex. A. 14) dated 30th August. 1968 had indicated their doubts with regard to title of the plaintiffs and sought clarification in certain matters but no clarification was given by the plaintiffs and, on the other band, the plaintiffs filed the present suit shortly after the said reply was sent. A. 14) dated 30th August. 1968 had indicated their doubts with regard to title of the plaintiffs and sought clarification in certain matters but no clarification was given by the plaintiffs and, on the other band, the plaintiffs filed the present suit shortly after the said reply was sent. Since no clarification was given by the plaintiffs the defendants again raised their doubts with regard to title of the plaintiffs in their written statement in the present suit and the objections which were raised by the defendants in their written statement were accepted by the trial court as well as by the first appellate court when they dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs on the view that the plaintiffs had failed to establish their right in the suit property. The written statement (Ex. 60) in the subsequent suit was filed after the aforesaid judgments had been given in this suit and the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement are founded on the said judgments. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that the plea raised by the defendants in paragraph 3 of the written statement (Ex. 60) in the subsequent suit was not raised bona fide any by doing so the defendants have denied title of the plaintiffs and have incurred the liability of being evicted under section 13 (1) (f) of the Act. The offering of the rent for the months of June and July, 1968 by the defendants to the plaintiffs only shows that they were not disputing their status as a tenant in respect of suit premises and were prepared to accept the plaintiffs as their landlord subject to the clarification which they had sought in their reply (Ex. A. 14) to the notice sent by the plaintiffs The conduct of the defendants in negotiating for an increase in the rent also proceeds on the same understanding and only on the basis of the said conduct it cannot be said that the defendants were not justified in giving expression to their doubts with regard to the title of the plaintiffs in their written statement (Ex. 60) in the subsequent suit especially when the said doubts had received judicial sanction in the judgments of the Addl. Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate and Additional District Judge in the present suit. 60) in the subsequent suit especially when the said doubts had received judicial sanction in the judgments of the Addl. Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate and Additional District Judge in the present suit. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances referred to above the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the written statement (Ex. 60) cannot be construed as a clear and unequivocal disclaimer of the title of the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property or renunciation by the defendants about their being tenants of the suit premises owned by the plaintiffs. The findings recorded by both the courts below in this regard cannot, therefore, be upheld and must be set aside and it must be held that the suit of the plaintiffs for eviction of the defendants cannot be decreed on the ground of denial of title by the defendants under section 13 (1) (f) of the Act. 29. I may now come to the cross-objections that have been raised by the plaintiff respondents with regard to the findings recorded by both the courts below with regard to the plea that the premises are required reasonably and bona fide by the plaintiffs for their personal use, namely, for the purpose of carrying on the business in precious stones. In this connection it may be stated that the plaintiff-respondents, in support of the said plea, have relied upon certain, vouchers which have been marked as Ex. 6 to Ex. 52 to show that they are carrying on business in precious stones. In respect of the said documents the trial court has observed that they purport to refer to the period 19-8-69, but they contain Pin Code No. 30,003 of Jaipur City. The trial court has observed that' Pin Code in Jaipur City was introduced for the first time on 15th August, 1972 and it was not in force in the year 1968-69 to which period these documents refer. The trial court has, therefore, observed that the said documents have been prepared subsequently after 15th August, 1972 and they have been ante dated to show as relating to the year 1968-49. In these circumstances the trial court has held that no reliance could be placed on the evidence, both oral and documentary, produced by the plaintiffs in support of their case that they are carrying on business in precious stones. In these circumstances the trial court has held that no reliance could be placed on the evidence, both oral and documentary, produced by the plaintiffs in support of their case that they are carrying on business in precious stones. The trial court has also observed that if the plaintiffs were coming on business in precious stones, as claimed by them, they would have mentioned the sales tax number on the documents, but no such sale-tax number is mentioned on the documents. The trial court has also found that the plaintiffs own other property in Jaipur City and. therefore, it cannot be said that they require the premises reasonably and bona fide for the purpose of carrying on business. The Additional District Judge has agreed with the aforesaid finding recorded by the Addl. Munsiff. In my view no ground is made out for interfering with the said concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts below and for taking a different view in second appeal. There is thus no merit in the cross objections filed by the plaintiff-respondents. 30. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the Addl. District Judge No. 4, Jaipur city dated 23rd February, 1187 affirming the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1981 passed by the Addl. Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jaipur city decreeing the suit for ejectment filed by the plaintiff-respondents against the appellants is set aside and the said suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents for ejectment of the appellants from the suit premises is dismissed. The cross-objections filed by the plaintiff-respondents in this appeal are also dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.Appeal allowed. *******