JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. 1. Brief facts giving rise to this writ petition are that the petitioners allegedly took loan from opposite party no. 3 Shiv Shankar Tiwari on 5-7-1971, but according to the plaintiff-opposite party the petitioners did not pay up the loan hence the suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 476/- was filed before Nyaya Panchayat, Sonvarsa, Pargana Doaba, district Ballia. Copy of the plaint is Annexure 1' attached with the writ petition. The claim of the plaintiff-opposite party no. 3 in the present writ petition was contested by the defendants-petitioners with the allegations that the suit was filed with false allegations and that the petitioners had executed a pronote in favour of the plaintiff's father and no loan was taken from the plaintiff with a view to exercise undue pressure upon the petitioners and to harass the petitioners the suit was filed against them (see Annexure ' 2 attached with the writ petition). 2. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit as is evident from Annexure 3' attached with the writ petition. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial court i.e. Nyaya Panchyat, Sonvarsa, district Ballia the defendants-petitioners preferred a revision petition before the Munsif, Ballia (East). The revision petition bears No. 10/73 Smt. Rajo Devi v. Shiv Shankar Tiwari. The aforesaid revision petition was dismissed in default on 10-4-1976. Thereafter an application for restoration of the revision petition was moved. Since there was some mistakes in the memo of revision petition an application for amendment was moved. The learned Munsif on 27-8-1977 dismissed the amendment application as well as the application for restoration of the revision petition as is evident from the judgment dated 27-8-1977 contained in Annexure ' 9 attached with the writ petition. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Munsif the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before us that the learned Munsif patently erred in dismissing the restoration of the revision petition on the ground that there was no provision for restoring the revision petition dismissed for default under the Panchayat Raj Act. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before us that the learned Munsif patently erred in dismissing the restoration of the revision petition on the ground that there was no provision for restoring the revision petition dismissed for default under the Panchayat Raj Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners there was no provision under the Panchayat Raj Act for dismissing the revision petition for default and when the learned Munsif dismissed the revision petition for default he patently erred in not restoring the revision petition on the ground that there was no provision for restoration of the revision petition. 3. No one appears on behalf of the contesting opposite party. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and we have examined the impugned judgments. The learned Munsif has expressed himself as below :- ".........Since there is no provision for restoration of revision in Panchayat Raj Act and section 83 P. R. Act bars the application of C.P.C. hence this application for restoration of revision is misconceived and it is dismissed in limine ". The perusal of the impugned judgment indicates that the judgment of the learned Munsif is somewhat contradictory. While dismissing the amendment application in the impugned judgment the learned Munsif has observed that section 79 of the Panchayat Raj Act would not apply to the proceedings before him but while dismissing the revision petition he has placed reliance upon the provisions of section 83 of Panchayat Raj Act which also applies to the proceedings before Nyaya Panchayat only. The aforesaid section 83 would be relevant only with regard to the proceedings before the Nyaya Panchayat. Therefore, we think that the learned Munsif has patently erred in applying the provisions of section 83 of the Panchayat Raj Act while dismissing the restoration of the revision petition moved by the defendants-petitioners, 5. We find force in the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners that when there was no provision for dismissing the revision petition in default, the learned Munsif could not dismiss the revision petition in default. If he had dismissed the revision petition in default it was his duty to restore the revision petition to its original number after examining the explanation given by the petitioners for the absence on the date fixed. 6. If he had dismissed the revision petition in default it was his duty to restore the revision petition to its original number after examining the explanation given by the petitioners for the absence on the date fixed. 6. In 1961 AWR 151, Bhagwati v. Sadri a learned Single Judge of this Court has indicated that the dismissal of the application for revision in default is a very extra-ordinary order. Therefore, the revising authority should decide the revision petition on merits either of its own motion or when it is moved by the party aggrieved. Viewing from this angle we find that the learned Munsif has patently erred in dismissing the application for restoration of the revision petition. In AIR 1969 Bom. 393 , Diwalibai Damjibhai Bhatti v. Jaikumar Gopaldas Jain a learned Single Judge of that court while dealing with the provisions of C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 has made the following observations in paragraph 6 of the judgment :- "In my opinion, the Rent Control authorities have entirely missed to appreciate the principle on which this Court held that an application dismissed in default was liable to be inquired into and registered if the Rent Control Authority was satisfied that there was good cause for non-appearance. As pointed out by the Division Bench of this Court by which I am bound, the jurisdiction to dismiss an application for default of appearance or to proceed ex-parte against a party who fails to enter appearance is implicit in the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the claims made before it by the parties in proceedings under the Rent Control Order. This jurisdiction is not traceable to its inherent powers but is implicit in the power to decide the case itself. If there is a power to dismiss an application for non-appearance of the applicant, it hardly needs any emphasis to point out that there is a co-ordinate power to proceed ex-parte against a party who fails to appear, but this power to dismiss in default or to proceed ex-parte also implies equally a duty to restore an application dismissed for default or to set aside ex-parte order if the defaulting party satisfies the authority that there was good cause for non-appearance. This right and this duty is a sine qua non of judicial procedure ". 7. This right and this duty is a sine qua non of judicial procedure ". 7. Placing reliance upon the above quoted observation we think that the learned Munsif has committed patent error in dismissing the restoration of the revision petition in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The provisions of U. P. Panchayat Raj Act do not permit the dismissal of a revision petition in default, but when the learned Munsif had dismissed the revision petition in default it seems that he had exercised his implicit power to decide the case himself. Therefore, he had equally implied duty to restore the application dismissed for default when the defaulting party showed good cause for nonappearance. In the present case the learned Munsif has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him in not examining whether there existed a good cause for restoration of the revision petition or not. 8. In 1969 AWR 305, Diwalibai Damjibhai Bhatti v. Jaikumar Gopaldas Jain a learned Single Judge of this Court has expressed thus : " In my opinion, the same principle would apply where there is no prescribed procedure for a quasi-judicial proceeding. It may be that Order 9 CPC will not itself be applicable. But the principle that the power to pass an ex-parte order of dismissal for default was linked and integrated with the power to set aside such an order when sufficient cause for the default is shown, should govern all judicial proceedings, else the administration of justice will be retarded rather than achieved. So, if a power to dismiss an application for default of appearance is deemed to be in the Rent Control Officer, the reverse power would go with it. From this point of view, the Rent Control Officer had the requisite authority to set aside his earlier order. " In the present case we think that when in the absence of provisions for dismissing a revision petition for default the learned Munsif had dismissed the revision petition for default it was his bounden duty to examine that explanations given by the defendants-petitioners for their absence on a particular day. In not examining the cause for default of appearance the learned Munsif has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law ; therefore, the impugned judgment is patently, erroneous and deserves to be quashed. 9. In not examining the cause for default of appearance the learned Munsif has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law ; therefore, the impugned judgment is patently, erroneous and deserves to be quashed. 9. For the foregoing discussions we think that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners have force and the writ petition deserves to be allowed. We accordingly allow the writ petition and quash the impugned judgment of the learned Munsif, Ballia (East) contained in Annexure ' 9 attached with the writ petition and direct him to consider the petitioner's application for restoration of revision on merits strictly in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Since no one has appeared for the contesting opposite party we make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.