A. P. RAVANI, B. S. KAPADIA, J. ( 1 ) THE Petitioner has been detained as per order of Preventive Deten- tion dated 22/06/1988 passed under the provisions of Section 2 (2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act 1985 (for short the Act ). The petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of her detention by filing this petition. ( 2 ) THE grounds of detention disclose that there were about 24 cases under the provisions of Bombay Prohibition Act against the petitioner-detenu. The petitioner was involved in all these cases and the quantity of contraband liquor seized by the police in all these cases ranged from 5 litres to 80 litres. The grounds of detention also disclose that on 10/06/1988 when one person was passing through the locality in which the petitioner was carrying on her activities as bootlegger that is to say storing and selling of contraband liquor in public places he was called and asked to lift a bag But that per- son refused to do so and thereupon he was abused and beaten. On account of this incident there was chaos in the locality and the orderly life was distur- bed. Another person has in his statement supported the say of the person who was asked to lift the bag. It is also stated in the grounds of detention that on 13/06/1988 a girl aged about 20 was teased and molested by people who had consumed liquor from the adda of the petitioner This inci- dent is also supported by another witness. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the aforesaid four cases have been included in Annexure I which is the list of cases pending against the petitioner-detenu. It is also stated in the grounds of detention that all the ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submits that in the grounds of deten- tion the detaining authority has mentioned that 24 cases under the provisions of Bombay Prohibition Act 1989 instituted against the petitioner are pending while as a matter of fact in four cases the petitioner has been acquitted. The details of four cases in which the petitioner has been acquitted are as follows:-24 cases are pending against the petitioner. The details of four cases in which the petitioner has been acquitted are as follows:-24 cases are pending against the petitioner. In view of this position it is submited that the detaining authority has not applied his mind to the fact that petitioner has been acquitted in four cases and hence the satisfaction arrived at by him is vitiated and the order of detention should be quashed and set aside. ( 4 ) THE aferesaid submission cannot be accepted. Section 6 of the Act inter alia provides that when an order of detention under Section 3 of the Act has been made on two or more grounds such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each ground and such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or more grounds is/ are (i) vague (ii) nor-existent (iii) nonrelevant (iv) not connected or not pro- ximately connected with such person or (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever. It is further provided that despite any of the ground being held co be not available on account of the vice being attached to it for any of the reasons mentioned hereinabove it shall be held that the Government or the Officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in Sec- tion 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and would have made the order of detention. Provisions of Section 6 (b) make the position clear. It provides that the Government or the officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention after being satisfied as pro- vided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. ( 5 ) IF the provisions of Section 6 of the Act are applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case at the most four criminal cases in which the petitioner-detenu was acquitted when the order of detention was passed may be excluded either on account of same being nonexistent not relevant or the ground being invalid for any other reason whatsoever. Even if one excludes all these four cases from consideration there remain other 20 criminal cases which are admittedly pending against the petitioner-detenu. The grounds of detention also disclose two other incidents one of 10/06/1988 and another of 13/06/1988 which relate to bootlegging activities of the petitioner-detenu. Even if one excludes all these four cases from consideration there remain other 20 criminal cases which are admittedly pending against the petitioner-detenu. The grounds of detention also disclose two other incidents one of 10/06/1988 and another of 13/06/1988 which relate to bootlegging activities of the petitioner-detenu. These two incidents and other 20 criminal cases in all constitute as many as 22 grounds of detention. As far as these 22 grounds are concerned it is not even submitted that any one of them is either vague non-existent not relevant not connected or not proximately connected with the detenu or that any one of them is invalid for any other reason whatsoever. Thus at least there are 22 other grounds on which separate order of detention could have been passed by the detaining Authority. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been detained on the ground that she is bootlegger. Therefore her activities as bootlegger alone can be said to be the ground for detention and different cases and different incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention cannot be treated as separate grounds. We are afraid that this submission has its roots in some misconception as regards the meaning of ground and the object of the Act. The object of the Act is to provide for preventive detention of boot- leggers dangerous persons drug offenders immoral traffic offenders and pro- perty grabbars for preventing their antisocial and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Thus analysing the aforesaid general objects one of the specified objects of the Act is to prevent the bootlegging activities by providing for preventive detention for certain anti-social elements. But that does not mean that bootlegging property grabbing and immoral trafficking ate different grounds on which the anti-social elements may be preventively detained. These are the objects to be achieved by invoking the device of preventive detention as provided for in the Act. But that does not mean that bootlegging property grabbing and immoral trafficking ate different grounds on which the anti-social elements may be preventively detained. These are the objects to be achieved by invoking the device of preventive detention as provided for in the Act. The definition of term bootlegging given in Section 2 (b) of the Act means in the following activities of a person in respect of liquor intoxicat- ing drug or other intoxicant in contravention of any provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act 1949 and the rules and orders made thereunder or of any other law for the time being in force: (i) Distillation (ii) manufacture (iii) storage (iv) transporting (v) inporting (vi) exporting (vii) sale (viii) distribu- tion (ix) knowingly to expend or apply any money or to supply any animal vehi- cle vessel or other conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatso- ever in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the things described herein above by or through any other person and (x) abetment in any other manner the doing of such thing which is described hereinabove. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid definition of the term bootlegger covers many activities. There may be criminal cases against the detenu in respect of one or more activities of storing and selling contraband liquor. Since both the activities may be forming part of one and same activity it may be considered to be one ground. Again if there is another case it would be another ground. There need not be confusion with regard to the object of the act that is to prevent the bootlegging activities and the ground of detention. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Chamanlal reported in AIR 1881 Supreme Court page 1480 similar question arose as regards the provisions of Section 5-A of COFEPOSA. Section 5-A of COFEPOSA is pari materia with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. In the case before Supreme Court the detenu was detained with a view to prevent smuggling of contraband goods. One of the grounds was held to be irrelevant by the High Court and the High Court held that since that irrele- vant ground also entered into the process of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority the order of detention cannot be sustained. One of the grounds was held to be irrelevant by the High Court and the High Court held that since that irrele- vant ground also entered into the process of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority the order of detention cannot be sustained. The Supreme Court inter alia observed in para 2 of the judgment that the detention order under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA is only for the purpose of preventing smuggling and all the grounds whether there are one or more would be relatable only to various activities of smuggling The Supreme Court further observed that the act of smuggling covers several activities each for being a separate ground of detention. After quoting the passage from the judgment of the High Court and stating that the reasoning of the High Court was not acceptable the. Supreme Court has observed as follows:the process of reasoning adopted by the High Court is absolutely uninte- lligible to us. It is manifest that whenever the allegations of smuggling are made against a person who is sought to be detained by way of preventing further smuggling there is bound to be one act or several acts with the com- mon object of smuggling goods which is sought to be prevented by the Act. It would therefore not be correct to say that the object of the Act consti- tutes the ground for detention. If this is so in no case there could be any other ground for detention except the one which relates to smuggling. In our opinion this is neither the object of the Act nor can such an object be spelt out from the language in which Section 5-A is couched. What the Act provides is that where there are a number of grounds of detention covering various activities of the detenu spreading over a period or periods each activity is a separate ground by itself and if one of the grounds is irrelevant vague or unspecific then that will not vitiate the order of detention. (Emphasis supplied.) ( 8 ) THE Supreme Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle in its later deci- sion in the case of Prakash Chandra v. Commissioner and Secretary. Govt. (Emphasis supplied.) ( 8 ) THE Supreme Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle in its later deci- sion in the case of Prakash Chandra v. Commissioner and Secretary. Govt. of Kerala reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court page 687 This High Court in the case of Smt. Manjulaben v. State of Gujarat reported in 24 (2) G. L. R. page 1505 has taken the same view as regards the expression ground occurring in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and the relevant provisions of the statute. ( 9 ) FOLLOWING the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court and of this High Court same view is taken by us in Special Criminal Application No. 408 of 1988 decided on 19/09/1988 and in Special Criminal Application No. 395/88 decided on 26/09/1988. Moreover another Division Bench of this High Court consisting one of us (G. T. Nanavati and B. S. Kapadia JJ.) has also taken similar view in Special Criminal Application No. 527 of 1988 decided on 13/10/1988 ( 10 ) IN view of the aforesaid settled legal position as regards the meaning of expression grounds occurring in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and in Section 6 of the Act we are of the opinion that bootlegging as such can- not be considered to be the ground for prevention of which the order of deten- tion has been passed. As stated hereinabove it is one of the objects of the Act to see that bootlegging activity is prevented so that such activity may not disturb the public order as defined under the provisions of the Act. Boot- legging is not the expression which take within its sweep of different grounds. The grounds of detention consist of different act and activities of the detenu which relate to bootlegging. In view of the settled legal position as enun- ciated by the Supreme Court and in view of the fact in that series of deci- sions the same principle have been followed by this High Court we do not think that it is permissible to us to take a different view. On the contrary in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all the courts in the country including this High Court. On the contrary in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all the courts in the country including this High Court. Not to follow the decision of the Supreme Court would be highly improper and it would be to say the least dereliction of duty and in a given case it may even amount to contempt of court. The learned cousel for the petitioner detenu has not been able to point out any distinguishing feature in this case so that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and foll- owed by this High Court in the decisions referred herein above may not apply. In fact no such argument is advanced before us. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid settled legal position even assuming that the detaining authority had not taken into consideration the judgments of acquittal rendered in four criminal cases (referred to in para 3) the detention of the peti- tioner cannot be held to be illegal or void. At the most the ground or grounds based on the aforesaid four criminal cases will not be available to the deta- ining authority and the order of detention passed on the basis of the grounds will be invalid. But applying the deeming provisions of Section 6 of the Act there would be as many as 27 detention orders because there are at least 27 grounds of detention in the instant case. Out of these 27 grounds of detention if four grounds are excluded there would be 23 grounds and the order of deten- tion has got to be upheld on other 23 grounds. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions of this High Court in the following matters :1 Special Criminal Application No. 900/88 decided on 25/01/1989 2 Special Criminal Application No. 1019/88 decided on 2/02/1989 3 Special Criminal Application No. 1080/88 decided on 7/02/1989in all the aforesaid three decisions it is held that since the detaining auth- ority had not taken into consideration the judgment of acquittal passed in certain criminal cases referred to in the grounds of detention the order of detention was illegal and therefore it has been quashed and set aside by this High Court. Hence it is submitted that this Court should follow the aforesaid decisions and quash and set aside the order of detention passed by the detain- ing authority. The submission cannot be accepted for the following reasons. 1 It is an admitted position that in none of the aforesaid decisions attention of the Court was drawn to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. 2 The attention of the court was not drawn to the decisions of the Sup- reme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Chamanlal reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1480 and in the case of Prakash Chandra v. Commissioner and Secy. Government of Kerala reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court 687. 3 The attention was also not drawn to the following decisions of this High Court : 1 In the case of Smt. Manjulaben v. State reported in 24 (2) G. L. R. page 1505. 2 Special Criminal Application No. 409 of 1988 decided on 19/09/1988 (Coram: A. P. Ravani and B. S. Kapadia JJ.) 3 Special Criminal Application No. 527 of 1988 decided on Octobar 13 1988 (Coram: G. T. Nanavati and B. S. Kapadia J: 4 Special Criminal Application No. 395 of 1988 decided on 26th September 1888 (Coram: A. P. Ravani and B. S. Kapadia JJ.)IN above view of the matter it can be said that no argument whatsoever was urged before the Court on the basis of provisions of Section 6 of the Act and the law laid down by the Supreme Court and followed by this High Court in the aforesaid decisions. Therefore it is obvious that the deci- sions rendered by this High Court and referred to relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are per in curiam. In fact in fairness to the learned counsel for the petitioner it should be stated that he himself has declined before us that when he had requested the court taking up detention matters to decide this very matter as a matter covered by the aforesaid deci- sions relied upon by him he was told by the court that the attention of the Court was drawn to the Supreme Court decisions and the decisions of this High Court and therefore the Court declined to follow the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Thus it is obvious that the point was never urged before the Court and law laid down by the Supreme Court was never pointed out to the Court. The Court had no occasion to deal with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act and the decisions of the Sup- reme Court and this High Court on the point. In this view of the matter and particularly in view of the fact that we are bound to follow the law laid down by the Supreme Court we are unable to pursuade ourselves to take a different view. ( 13 ) NO other contention is raised. We see no reason to interfere with the order of detention passed against the petitioner. Hence petition fails and rejected. Rule discharged. (RPV) Petition rejected. .