JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. 1. By means of this writ petition the petitioners have challenged the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad, dated 20-1-1987 in a proceeding under Section 48 (3) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act between Sukhraj and others and Ram Sewak and others. 2. The facts given in various judgments attached with the writ petition are not disputed by the parties. The following questions of law have been urged on behalf of the petitioners. Firstly, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the judgment of the Civil Court is no judgment in the eye of law, therefore, the revisional court has patently erred in deciding the claims of the parties in pursuance of the Civil Court judgment in a partition suit. 3. Secondly, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners the shares determined by the Civil Court judgment if added together exceed the whole share owned by the parties, therefore, the judgment is no judgment in the eye of law and is incapable of execution yet the consolidation authorities have placed reliance upon such a judgment, therefore, the impugned judgment contained in Annexure 13 should be quashed. It has been demonstrated that the portion of the shares allotted to the co-sharers would come to 17/16 whereas the whole share owned by the parties will be only 16/16, therefore, the impugned judgment should be quashed. 4. Thirdly, it has been contended that the judgment of the High Court contained in Annexure IV attached with the writ petition has been contradicted by the judgment of the High Court contained in Annexure VI attached with the writ petition, therefore, the latter judgment is a nullity and should be ignored but the consolidation authorities have decided the claims of the parties in consonance with the judgment contained in Annexure VI attached with the writ petition, therefore, the impugned judgment should be quashed. Lastly, it has been contended that the judgment of the revisional court contained in Annexure V attached with the writ petition has become final against the opposite parties nos. 5 to 7 in the present writ petition who had not preferred any writ petition against that order, therefore, the impugned judgment should be quashed because it has given a share to the opposite parties nos. 5 to 7 as well. 5. 5 to 7 in the present writ petition who had not preferred any writ petition against that order, therefore, the impugned judgment should be quashed because it has given a share to the opposite parties nos. 5 to 7 as well. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has refuted the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners by submitting that the civil court judgment in partition suit was a valid judgment and the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that it is no judgment is quite incorrect in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It has also been pointed out that the share of the plaintiffs in the partition suit was enlarged by 1/16 by the appellate court, therefore, the net result would be the reduction of the share of the present petitioners by 1/16. Since there is no categorical observation by the appellate court in this regard it would not mean that the civil court judgment would be no judgment in the eye of law or it could not be enforced in execution. However, no question of executing the decision arises in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 6. It has also been submitted that the judgment contained in Annexure VI attached with the writ petition is the latter judgment between the parties which shall prevail over any former judgment between the parties. The third contention raised on behalf of the petitioners was wholly illegal and unjustified. According to the learned counsel for the opposite parties there is no contradiction between the two judgments of the High Court contained in Annexure IV and VI. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard is ill-founded. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has also submitted that the judgment of the revisional court contained in Annexure V attached with the writ petition was set aside by the High Court through the judgment contained in Annexure VI, therefore, the consolidation authorities were fully justified in recognising the claim of the opposite parties nos. 5 to 12 in the present writ petition who had not filed writ petition at the earlier occasion. 5 to 12 in the present writ petition who had not filed writ petition at the earlier occasion. It has been emphasized that the claim of the opposite parties Ram Sewak, Basudev and Jethu was similar to the claim of Kewal and others therefore, when at the instance of Ram Sewak and others in the present writ petition the judgment contained in Annexure dated 13-3-1972 was set aside by the High Court through Annexure VI attached with the writ petition, the consolidation authorities have committed no error in recognising the claim of the opposite parties nos. 5 to 12 in the present writ petition who have been arrayed as third set. 7. I have weighed the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and submissions made on behalf of the contesting opposite parties and I have gone through the judgments attached with the writ petition and in my opinion the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners have no merits. Since substantial justice has been done between the parties and only technical contentions have been raised on behalf of the petitioners, I do not consider it a fit case for exercise of my powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioners. 8. As regards the first contention I think that the judgment of the civil court in partition suit between the parties is a valid judgment and does not suffer from any infirmity. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard is technical one and cannot be accepted as correct after reading the judgment of the trial court together with the judgment of the appellate court. No doubt, in partition suit the trial court allotted 9/16 share to the petitioners and had allotted only 3/16 share to the plaintiff but in appeal the share of the plaintiff was enhanced to l/4th, therefore, the corresponding reduction would be in share of the petitioners. Thus there would be no mistake if the shares owned by the co-sharers are clubbed together. It would be only 16/16 and not 17/16 as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. However, on any technical or clerical mistake the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the impugned judgment in writ jurisdiction. To my mind, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in this regard is misconceived and deserves rejection. It would be only 16/16 and not 17/16 as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. However, on any technical or clerical mistake the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the impugned judgment in writ jurisdiction. To my mind, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in this regard is misconceived and deserves rejection. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners also fails in view of the discussion mentioned above in connection with the first contention. In the facts and circumstances of the present case it has been wrongly contended that the judgment of the civil court in partition suit would be no judgment in the eye of law because it suffered from a clerical or technical mistake. To my mind, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is too technical and if the judgments of the trial court and the appellate court are read together, it is evident that there is no mistake in the judgment of the Civil Court in the partition suit. 9. In my opinion, the third contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is wholly illegal and wrong. The very perusal of Annexures IV and VI would indicate that there is no contradiction in the two judgments. In the former judgment it has been indicated that the effect of the preliminary decree should be considered whereas in the latter judgment the preliminary decree has been accepted as binding between the parties, therefore, no alleged contradiction urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner (?) assets. Moreover, it is well known that the latter decree always prevails over the former, therefore, I do not find any merit in the third contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. 10. With regard to the last contention on behalf of the petitioners, my attention has been drawn to the ruling reported in 1981 ALJ 350, Mohan Lal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation Kanpur, wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court has made the following observation in paragraph 22 :- ".........According to the preliminary decree, therefore, each of the petitioners would have been entitled to 1/6 share in the Khata in dispute while Raghubir Prasad and Bansidhar would also have been entitled to 1/6 share each. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation), however, held that in view of the fact that Raghubir Prasad had not questioned the correctness of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer, he must be held to have impliedly relinquished his rights in the Khata in dispute, and that, therefore, each of the remaining sons of Kesri Prasad or their successors-in-interest must be deemed to have 1/5 share. As, however, Raghubir Prasad had not challenged this order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), it would not be possible to vary the shares of the parties as determined by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). '' Relying upon the above observation it has been contended before me that Kewal and others (opposite parties nos. 5 to 12 in the present writ petition) had not filed any writ petition against the order dated 13-3-1972 (Annexure V attached with the writ petition) therefore, the consolidation authorities could not recognise the claim of the opposite parties nos. 5 to 12. It is note-worthy that the claim of the opposite parties nos. 5 to 12 is similar to the claim put forward by the opposite parties nos. 2 to 4 in the present writ petition who had preferred writ petition against the order (contained in Annexure V attached with the writ petition) and have succeeded in getting the order dated 13-3-1972 (Annexure V) set aside by the High Court through the judgment contained in Annexure VI. In the aforesaid circumstances, opposite party no. 5 would be entitled to 1/4 share as recognized by the impugned judgment. According to the pedigree given in paragraph 2 of the writ petition itself, it is evident that opposite parties nos. 5 to 7 are daughters' sons of Raghunath and Ram Sewak and others are also daughter's sons of Raghunath who have been arrayed as opposite parties nos. 2 to 4 in the present writ petition and they succeeded in getting the order contained in Annexure V set aside by this Court through the judgment dated 22-2-1977 contained in Annexure VI. Therefore, I think that by the impugned judgment substantial justice has been done between the parties and the consolidation authorities have not at least patently erred in recognizing the claim of Kewal and others. In this way the last contention raised on behalf of the petitioners also fails. 11. Therefore, I think that by the impugned judgment substantial justice has been done between the parties and the consolidation authorities have not at least patently erred in recognizing the claim of Kewal and others. In this way the last contention raised on behalf of the petitioners also fails. 11. Even the case, cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners does not help the petitioners because in para 19 of the aforesaid ruling the following observation has been made : - ".........The mere fact that Raghubir Prasad did not file an appeal against the order of the Consolidation Officer could not effect either the finality of the preliminary decree or even the rights of the other parties. The grounds upon which the Deputy Director of Consolidation ignored the preliminary decree are, therefore, clearly wrong and unsustainable in law. " 12. Viewing from this angle, when Kewal and others did not file writ petition against the order contained in Annexure V to the writ petition, their legal rights would not be ignored specially when the order contained in Annexure V has been set aside through Annexure VI at the instance of Ram Sewak and others who are sons of a daughter of Raghunath. During the course of arguments my attention has been drawn to a decision of a learned Single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3055 of 1974 Shitla Prasad v. Deputy Director of Consolidation wherein the learned Single Judge did not accept a technical contention and allowed the writ petition, therefore, it was submitted before me that assuming that the impugned judgment suffered from technical defect it is not a fit case where interference should be made with the impugned judgment. I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party in this regard in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.