JUDGMENT : S.D.Agarwala 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The property in dispute is premises no. A-90, Prince Road, Gandhi Nagar, Moradabad. Kumar Chand Pant, respondent no. 3 is the landlord. The petitioner Om Prakash Sharma was the tenant at the rate of Rs.400/- per mensum. Om Prakash Sharma died during the pendency of this petition and his heirs have been brought on record and they are prosecuting this petition. Kumar Chand Pant, the landlord respondent no. 3 filed an application under section 21 (1-A) of the Act for release of the premises in question on the ground that he was employed in the Education Department of the State of Uttar Pradesh. He has retired on 30th June, 1983. He had to vacate the public building allotted to him and as such, he was entitled to the benefit of section 21 (1-A) of the Act. 3. This application was contested by the tenant. One of the main grounds taken by the petitioner tenant was that the landlord is occupying a. tenanted accommodation at Allahabad and as such, the provisions of section 21 (1-A) of the Act were not applicable in the instant case. It was further urged on behalf of the tenant petitioner that infact, the landlord wanted to sell the house and in order to obtain good price, he wanted to evict the petitioner so that the vacant possession may be handed over to the purchaser. 4. The prescribed authority did not accept the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner tenant and ultimately, held that the provisions of section 21 (1-A) of the Act was applicable and granted the release application by an order dated 28th May 1985. Aggrieved by this decision, the tenant filed an appeal under section 22 of the Act in the court of the District Judge, Moradabad. The District Judge, Moradabad by his judgment dated 13th January, 1986 dismissed the appeal. Three months time was granted to the petitioner to vacate the premises. 5. Aggrieved by the judgments dated 26th May 1985 and 13th January, 1985, the present petition has been filed in this court challenging the same. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The District Judge, Moradabad by his judgment dated 13th January, 1986 dismissed the appeal. Three months time was granted to the petitioner to vacate the premises. 5. Aggrieved by the judgments dated 26th May 1985 and 13th January, 1985, the present petition has been filed in this court challenging the same. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri V. Sahai has contended that since the landlord had a tenanted accommodation with him at Allahabad, consequently, the provisions of section 21 (1-A) of the Act were not applicable and the view taken by both the courts below that section 21 (1-A) of the Act was applicable to the facts of the present case is a view manifestly erroneous. In order to examine this question, it is necessary to state the facts as found by the prescribed authority as well as appellate authority. The Prescribed Authority has found that in 1978 the landlord was posted at Allahabad. A Government accommodation was not allotted to him and, consequently, he took on rent two small rooms 9 feet x 9 feet plus a store room in order to enable him to live at Allahabad. In 1981 the landlord was transferred from Allahabad to Pithoragarh. At Pithoragarh, a Government accommodation was allotted to him. It has been further found that at Allahabad, the wife of the landlord continued to stay along with her son who was studying. After retirement on 30th June, 1983, since he did not have any other house he came to Allahabad and started residing in two rooms apartment which he had taken in the year 1979. It is this apartment, which according to the petitioner, disentitled the landlord from the benefit of section 21 (1-A) of the Act. Section 21 (1-A) of the Act is quoted below :- " Notwithstanding anything contained in section 2, the prescribed authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy, if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment. Provided that an application under this sub section may also be given by a landlord in occupation of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employment, but the order of eviction on such application shall take effect only on the date of his actual cessation. " The above sub clause (1-A) of section 21 of the Act clearly provides that the prescribed authority shall on the application of a landlord, order the eviction of the tenant from any building under tenancy if it is satisfied that the landlord of such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes, which he had to vacate on account of cessation of his employment. 7. Both the prescribed authority and the appellate authority have found that the landlord was a Government servant. He was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes and that on 30th June, 1983, when he retired, he had to vacate the said accommodation on account of the fact of his retirement. 8. In the circumstances, so far the terms of section 21 (1-A) of the Act are concerned, all the conditions laid down in the said sub-clause quoted above are fully complied with in the present case and, consequently, the benefit of section 21 (1-A) of the Act is available to the landlord. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, in support of his submission relied on a decision of this court in Kalyan Rai v. Ilnd Additional District Judge, 1982 (I) ARC 363 = 1982 AWC 100 . He has, in particular relied on paragraphs 14 and 15 of the said decision of this court. The main reliance has been placed on the observations made by this Court that if the landlord has already in his possession some accommodation, which he can occupy or is occupying in his own right after vacating the public building, then there would be no reason why the preferential right should be given to the landlord as contemplated under section 21 (1-A) of the Act of getting the accommodation under tenancy vacated by the mere fact that the landlord had to vacate a public building. 9. In the opinion of the Division Bench, the words 'in his own right' are very significant. 9. In the opinion of the Division Bench, the words 'in his own right' are very significant. A person occupying a tenanted accommodation cannot be said to be occupying an accommodation in his own right. He definitely has a right available as a tenant but in his own right here, in my opinion, was meant that he must have a propriety right in the premises in dispute. This, in my opinion, would apply to a case where a landlord owns two properties. If he is already occupying one property, then the benefit of section 21 (1-A) of the Act cannot be available to him in respect of the other property. If by the mere fact that a landlord occupying the property as a tenant could be held to debar him from taking the benefit of section 21 (1-A) of the Act, then the very purpose of enacting section 21 (1-A) would be defeated. After retirement when the public building has been vacated by the landlord, he has to stay some where. He cannot stay on a street. He has to take a property on rent to live till the house owned by him is vacated. He will have to continue to live also in the same house taken on rent so that till his own house is vacatad, he may continue to live there. 10. In the instant case, as I have already mentioned above, the landlord's case has been accepted by both the courts below that in 1979 he was posted at Allahabad. He did not get a Government accommodation. He took a two room apartment at Allahabad. He was transferred to Pithoragarh in the year 1981. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that at Pithoragarh there are no educational facilities and, consequently, if the landlord has left his wife and son at Allahabad to enable his son to carry on his studies, it cannot be said to be a case where there was any intention on the part of the landlord to maintain this tenanted accommodation even after his retirement. The landlord when he retired and since his property had not been released, came back and is staying at Allahabad in that small two room accommodation. The landlord when he retired and since his property had not been released, came back and is staying at Allahabad in that small two room accommodation. In my opinion, the fact that the landlord has been staying in this two room tenanted accommodation at Allahabad by force of circumstances, cannot debar him from getting the benefit of section 21 (1-A) of the Act. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the view taken by the authorities below does not suffer from any legal infirmity. I consequently, do not agree with the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner. In the result, the petition fails and, is dismissed. The interim order dated 24-3-86, is, hereby vacated, parties are directed to bear their own costs. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner prays for time to vacate the premises. He further states that the petitioner shall give an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority for the said purpose. 12. In view of the above, I grant three months' time to the petitioner to vacate the premises provided he gives an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within a month from today that immediately after expiry of three months, he will vacate the premises and hand over vacant possession of the same to the landlord respondent no. 3. I further direct that the petitioner shall pay all the arrears of rent plus three month's rent in advance within this period of one month. In case of default, the release order shall be enforced forthwith. Petition dismissed.