JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - By the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 8th April, 1980 (Annexure-3 to the petition), orders dated 11-6-80 (Annexure-4) 12-4-84 (Annexure-11) and 23-8-85/12-8-85 (passed by this Court in administrative side rejecting the representation of the petitioner and its effect being given). 2. The matter pertains to the claim of petitioner for his seniority as Reader to the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Civil Court), Bijnor, as a consequence of separation of executive and judiciary and the effect of the Government Order dated 30-6-78 for the absorption of employees of the Collectorate in the cadre of Civil Court employees (Annexure-1 to the petition). 3. The petitioner was appointed in 1949 on probation in subordinate services in the Collectorate, Bijnor. He was confirmed on 5-3-1954. But on account of the notification issued on 2-10-67 separating the Executive Magistrates from those of the Judicial Magistrates in Uttar Pradesh in view of Article 50 of the Constitution and consequential changes in the service conditions of the subordinate ministerial establishment, particularly the employees of the Collectorate, who opted to serve in Civil Court under the control of the Distt. Judges. On 17-10-77 one Bhagwat Saran Khanna (not a party to this petition) was allowed to join in the Collectorate from Civil Court. The petitioner submitted his option to be absorbed in the combined-cadre of the Civil Court employees consisting of the employees of the Collectorate who opted to be absorbed in the Civil Court in pursuance of the Government Order dated 30-6-78 and the U.P. Subordinate Civil Courts (Merger of Collectorate Staff) Rules, 1980, (for short the Rules). The petitioner alleged that in view of para 3 of the Government Order dated 30-6-78 the seniority of the petitioner was to be fixed in the clerks' cadre of the Civil Court employees, particularly in relation to respondent 3 to 13. The seniority was to be determined from the date of substantive appointment, or in any case from the date of permanent appointment (vide para 3 of the G.O. dated 30-6-78), and also on the basis of R. 5 of the Rules. It is worth mention that the petitioner was accepted on deputation in place of Sri Bhagwat Saran Khanna by order dated 17-10-77. It is worth mention that the petitioner was accepted on deputation in place of Sri Bhagwat Saran Khanna by order dated 17-10-77. The dispute was about the fixation of gradation list, and place and seniority of the petitioner in it. The petitioner was to be merged with the employees of Civil Court in the same grade which was admissible to him at the time of going on deputation. On the date of substantive appointment in that grade the petitioner was working in the Reader's Grade of Rs. 230-385. In his representation (Annexure-5) to the Registrar of this court, the petitioner has given the date of his confirmation in the grade of Rs. 200-320 as 5- 3-54end that of K. G. Bharadwaj, respondent . 13 as 1-8-55, Ram Singh, respondent 12 as 4-1-56, Krishan Nand, respondent 11 as 14-1-56, B. S. Khanna in whose place the petitioner was absorbed, his date of confirmation was 2- 10-67, Jagdish Prasad Goel, respondent 10 as 17-7-56, Laxmi Chand Verma, respondent 9 as 12-12-56, Ramesh Chand Gupta, respondent 8 as 1-4-58, Ram Kumar Bhatnagar, respondent 7 as 29-12-68, Hori Lal, respondent 6 as 29-1-59, Ramesh Chand Verma, respondent No. 5 as 29-1-59, Om Prakash Verma, respondent 4 as 29-1-59 and R.D. Pathak, respondent 3 as 18-4-61. All these dates of confirmation were not challenged. 4. The seniority in the Civil Court Cadre was fixed by the District Judge by order dated 8-4-80 and the petitioner was shown to be placed just below Krishna Nand. The petitioner preferred an objection against that seniority list, but the same was rejected by order dated 11-6-80 (Annexure-4), passed by Sri Prakash Chandra, the then District Judge, Bijnor, and the petitioner was ordered to be placed after R.D. Pathak, who was confirmed on 18-4-61. Thereafter the petitioner made a representation to the Registrar of this Court which was finally rejected by the order of the Hon'ble Administrative Judge dated 12-8-85 and the same was given effect to by order dated 23-8-85. Records have been summoned from the office and have been perused by us. The petitioner has prayed that these orders may he quashed by issuing a Writ of certiorari and his seniority may be fixed according to the G.O. dated 30-6-78 and the Rules of 1980. 5. Sri. A.K. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that para 3 of the G.O. dated 30-6-78 was relevant. The petitioner has prayed that these orders may he quashed by issuing a Writ of certiorari and his seniority may be fixed according to the G.O. dated 30-6-78 and the Rules of 1980. 5. Sri. A.K. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that para 3 of the G.O. dated 30-6-78 was relevant. In view of this para seniority of the permanent employees in the ministerial cadre was to be fixed from the date of substantive appointment or from the date when the employee was kept on probation. in case he was made permanent subsequently. But where he was not kept on probation, but was made permanent, from the date he was made permanent. In respect of temporary employees the seniority was to be fixed on the basis of continuous period of service. Rule 5 of U.P. Subordinate Civil Courts (Merger of Collectorate Staff) Rules, 1980, provides as under: "5. Seniority in combined cadre :- The seniority of permanent employees of the Collectorate in the relevant combined cadre vis-a-vis the civil court employees shall be determined on the basis of date of their substantive appointments in the Civil Court cadre or, as the case may be, in the erstwhile Collectorate cadre." 6. In view of the aforesaid provision it was urged that as the petitioner was confirmed on the substantive post in the Collectorate. Bijnor on 5-3-54, much prior to the confirmation of the respondent 3 to 13, in view of R. 5 the seniority was to be fixed on the basis of the date of their substantive appointment in the Civil Court's cadre or, as the case may be, in the erstwhile Collectorate cadre. Much emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the interpretation of R. 5 and according to him the date of substantive appointment in the Civil Court's cadre or in the erstwhile Collectorate cadre were to be emphasised in determination of the seniority. It was urged that the word 'or' in R. 5 (five) was disjunctive and not conjunctive, inasmuch as in case the word 'or' was interpreted as conjunctive, in that case the last clause, i.e. 'as the case may be in the erstwhile Collectorate cadre shall become otiose. 7. Learned Standing Counsel Mr. Vinai Malviya on the other hand, urged that it is the date of substantive appointment in the Civil Court's cadre that was decisive. 7. Learned Standing Counsel Mr. Vinai Malviya on the other hand, urged that it is the date of substantive appointment in the Civil Court's cadre that was decisive. As respondent 3 to 13 were substantively appointed in the Civil Court's cadre prior to absorption of petitioner on 17th Oct. 1977 in the Civil Court, hence the petitioner cannot become senior. It was next urged that the petitioner's merger with the Civil Court employees was to be in the same grade which was admissible to him at the time of deputation. The expression 'or as the case may be in the erstwhile Collectorate cadre' would not apply. By the impugned orders the petitioner's objection to the seniority list has correctly been dismissed, particularly by the Hon'ble Administrative Judge by his order dated 12-8-85. 8. The point that falls for our determination in the present petition is as to whether in order to determine the seniority of the petitioner in the combined cadre after his absorption in the Civil Court his substantive appointment in the Collectorate can be taken into account, or the seniority can be decided only on the basis of confirmation in Civil Court. The next point, although germane to the first point, is as to what ought to be the correct interpretation of R. 5. 9. The elementary principles of interpretation would apply to the interpretation of service rules. One of such elementary principles is that the interpretation of service rules has to be made so that it gives effect to the intention underlying the Rules. In order to have correct interpretation, the words have to be assigned the meaning, as is conveyed by the language employed. It is equally well established that the construction which advances the remedies and suppresses the mischief, to thwart which it has been enacted, should be accepted. The least that can be done is that Rule 5 has to be interpreted in such a manner that it cannot operate as Rogue's Charter. See Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, AIR 1984 SC 505 : 1983 Lab IC 1509. 10. It is to be noticed that the expression used under R. 3 (c) and R. 5 are 'combined cadre', Civil Court's cadre and Collectorate cadre, and not Civil Court employees or Collectorate employees. It is better to have some dictionary meanings before coming to definition clause. 10. It is to be noticed that the expression used under R. 3 (c) and R. 5 are 'combined cadre', Civil Court's cadre and Collectorate cadre, and not Civil Court employees or Collectorate employees. It is better to have some dictionary meanings before coming to definition clause. According to Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary word 'cadre' means a small group of people specially chosen, trained and organised for a particular purpose. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary word 'cadre' means a group of key officers and enlisted men assigned to a new unit as a nucleus for its formation, administration and training. According to Reader's Digest Great Encyclopaedic Dictionary, word 'cadre' means framework, scheme. 11. The necessity for enacting the present Rules arose on account of the constitutional mandate under Article 50 of the Constitution which enacts that State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in public services of the State. These Rules of 1980 have been framed in view of the powers of the State under Article 309 of the Constitution laying down the conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and post in connection with the affairs of State of U.P. 12. The legislature has regulated the principles of seniority by laying down rules, particularly R. 5. The determination of seniority of each individual employee of the combined-cadre is no doubt a matter to be considered in the light of definition of the expression 'combined cadre' and 'substantive appointment's as given under the rules. Ex abundanti cautela, the expression 'combined cadre' as defined under R. 3(c) is set out below : "Combined cadre means civil court's ministerial cadre and class IV cadre consisting of employees of Civil Court before absorption of Collectorate employees and the employees of Collectorate absorbed in the concerned Civil Court's cadre." 13. The expression 'substantive appointment' has also been defined under R. 3(g) as follows : "Substantive appointments" for the purposes of these rules, mean appointment on probation followed by confirmation and where the person has been appointed and confirmed without being placed on probation, means such appointment.'" 14. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions would indicate that the determination of seniority is-not a matter of abstract law, but will depend upon the provision of R. 5 & G.O. and scheme of the rules under construction. A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions would indicate that the determination of seniority is-not a matter of abstract law, but will depend upon the provision of R. 5 & G.O. and scheme of the rules under construction. It is to be remembered that there were two sources from which the combined cadre was created. This was necessitated on account of bifurcation of judiciary from executive in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of the Constitution. Consequently, the employees in the ministerial cadre of the Collectorate and also of the Civil Court were permitted to join at their option and were to be absorbed in a single combined cadre. The Legislature would not have intended that even the employees of the ministerial cadre of the Collectorate would lose their seniority earned by them while they were serving there, before being absorbed in the Civil Court, irrespective of the pay scale. What is to be highlighted is, that it is the option of the employees of the Collectorate to express their desire to he absorbed in the Civil court in view of the provisions of R. 4. The necessity to frame these rules arose on account of the constitutional mandate. The petitioner expressed his willingness to be absorbed, in the civil court. The legislature has not intended that the employees of Collectorate have to lose their seniority and they shall have to start their services afresh and they can be treated to be permanent employees of the Civil Court only on the basis of their services rendered in the Civil Court after absorption. In order to avoid all these doubts the Legislature has couched the provisions of R. 5, dealing with the seniority in combined cadre, in such a language which has got a very wide sweep and the same has to be interpreted in that light. The court has the power to interpret a particular provision consistent with the language employed. What requires emphasis is that the bifurcation of judiciary and executive was effected in the State by a notification dated 2-10-67. The court has the power to interpret a particular provision consistent with the language employed. What requires emphasis is that the bifurcation of judiciary and executive was effected in the State by a notification dated 2-10-67. To enable the ministerial employees Collectorate expressing their willingness for being absorbed in the Civil Court with the corresponding cadre, a G.O. dated 30-6-78 (Annexure-1) was issued and that also contemplated under para 3(3), the relevant portion is quoted below, that inter se seniority of the Collectorate employees being absorbed in the Civil Court in Clerical cadre (Lipik Vergiya cadre) was to be determined from the date of their substantive appointment and that was to be determined either from the date they were kept on probation and in case they were not kept on probation from the date of confirmation. " la;qDrdkMj esa dyDVsV ls fy, x;s LFkk;h deZpkfj;ksa ,oa nhokuh U;k;ky;ksa ds fyfid oxhZ; dkMj ds LFkk;h deZpkfj;ksa dh ikjLifjd T;s"Brk mudh ekSfyd fu;qfDr dh frfFk ls fu/kkZfjr dh tk;sxhA ekSfyd fu;qfDr dh frfFk dk vFkZ ifjoh{kk ij j[kus dh frfFk ls gS ;fn deZpkjh vkxs pydj LFkk;h dj fy;k x;k gS ogkWa LFkk;hdj.k dh frfFk gh ekSfyd fu;qfDr gksxhA la;qDr dkMj ls vLFkk;h deZpkfj;ksa dh ikfjLifjd T;s"Brk mudh fu;qfDr :ils yxkrkj dk;Z djus dh frfFk ls fu/kkZfjr dh tk;sxh vLFkk;h deZpkfj;ksa dh n'kk esa fiNys O;o/kkuksa ( czsDl) dks ;k mu O;o/kkuksa ls iwoZ dh lsok dks /;ku esa ugha j[kk tk;sxA dsoy fu;fer yxkrkj fu;qfDr dh frfFk gh vk/kkj ekuk tk;sxkA dysDVjh dk deZpkjh mlh osrueku esa Dyhu fd;k tk;sxk tks mls izfrfu;qfDr ij vkus ds le; vuqeU; Fkk] vkSj mlh osru eku ls fu;qfDr dks frfFk vFkkZr ekSfyd fu;qfDr dh frfFk ;fn LFkk;h gks vFkok fu;fer fu;qfDr dh frfFk ;fn vLFkk;h@LFkkukiUu gks] fu.kkZ;d gksxhA bl chp ;fn fdUgh deZpkjh dks rnFkZ :i ls izksUufr nh xbZ gksxh rks mUgs mDr fu.kZ;ksa ds dk;kZfUor esa izHkko ugha ekuk tk;sxkA " 15. We are conscious that the legislature would not have intended a law to work a hardship or to bring out an oppressive result. It is well known principle of interpretation that, that construction should be avoided which would render a statute productive of unnecessary hardship, abuse or harmful consequences which would arm one person with a weapon to impose hardship on the r other (See Burnet v. Guggenheim, (1933) 288 US 280: Baltimore & P.S.B. Co. It is well known principle of interpretation that, that construction should be avoided which would render a statute productive of unnecessary hardship, abuse or harmful consequences which would arm one person with a weapon to impose hardship on the r other (See Burnet v. Guggenheim, (1933) 288 US 280: Baltimore & P.S.B. Co. v. Norton (1931) 284 US 408 : 76 Law Ed 366; Farmers Loan & T. Co. v. Minnesota, (1929) 280 US 204. 16. What is to be highlighted is that the language of Rule 5 is self explicit and of a very wide sweep. Just a bare reading of it would indicate, the expression is seniority of the permanent employees of the Collectorate in the combined relevant cadre would be determined on the basis of date of their substantive appointment in the Civil Court cadre, or as the case may be, in the erstwhile Collectorate cadre.' As the petitioner was already substantively appointed in the Collectorate since 5-3-54 and thereafter he was absorbed in the Civil Court. it is the date of substantive appointment in the Collectorate that would decide the seniority. Every part of Rule 5 has to be read together. In case the submission of the learned Standing Counsel was accepted, the expression 'or as the case may be, in the erstwhile Collectorate cadre, would become otiose, which was not the object of legislature in enacting that part. With considerable ingenuity this expression or as the case may be in the erstwhile Collectorate cadre' has been used. At the time of bifurcation of executive and judiciary, the petitioner was already a permanent employee of Collectorate. Exclusion of last clause of R. 5 would render the system unworkable. It would not be inapt if we say that in that event R. 5 would be rendered a 'Rogue's Charter. Respondents Nos. 3 to 13 were made permanent subsequent to the date on which the petitioner was confirmed in Collectorate as indicated above. 17. The word 'or' under Rule 5 has been used disjunctively and not conjunctively. Unless the object of legislature indicates otherwise or the context so requires 'or' is used disjunctively. It is well known that 'and' is an antithesis of 'or'. 17. The word 'or' under Rule 5 has been used disjunctively and not conjunctively. Unless the object of legislature indicates otherwise or the context so requires 'or' is used disjunctively. It is well known that 'and' is an antithesis of 'or'. In our considered opinion this construction is consistent with the legislative intent as manifested with the scheme and object of the Rules, which was to facilitate the absorption of the employees of the Collectorate already confirmed there in the combined civil court ministerial cadre as defined under R. 3(c). This could not be the intendment of the legislature to provide absorption of the. Collectorate employees, after they are stripped off their confirmation and substantive appointment in Collectorate. (See Vidarbh Mills Berar Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1255 ; Ishwar Singh Bingra v. State of UP, AIR 1968 SC 1450 ; Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy Slate Co., (1928) 1 KB 561 at p. 568. In case the expression or as the case may be in the erstwhile Collectorate cadre' is ignored from consideration, that would make that expression otiose, but legislature never uses an expression or clause as surplusage. At the same time legislature never legislates by making a provision which is not required to be legislated. We are of the considered opinion that this clause or expression means that in case an employee of the Collectorate has been substantively appointed there, his seniority would be counted from that date (i.e. 5-3-54, as on that date the petitioner was confirmed in the Collectorate). 18. The dates of confirmation of respondents Nos. 3 to 13 have been given in Annexure-5, the representation of the petitioner to the Registrar of this court and those dates are not denied. It is obvious that all the respondents were confirmed to the date of confirmation of the The expression substantive appointment has been defined under R. 3(g) as indicated above, which means that in case an employee was placed on probation by confirmation, that date of confirmation, and where the person has been appointed and confirmed without being placed on probation, as the petitioner was, in that event it is the date of confirmation that would be the date of substantive appointment. As the petitioner was confirmed on 5-3-54, was prior to the date of confirmation of respondents 3 to 13, consequently it cannot assumed that the petitioner was junior to 3 to 13. 19. It is to be noticed that even in the representation submitted by the petitioner to this Court in the administrative side, (we have summoned the record and perused the same), page 1 it is indicated that the petitioner two years senior to B. S. Khanna in whose place the petitioner was absorbed. The petitioner was confirmed according to the report submitted by the office and the facts ascertained in the pay scale of Rs. 200-320 on 5-3-54 and was given officiating appointment in the pay scale of Rs. 230-358 on 1-5-76 when he was absorbed in the Civil Court. The District Judge dismissed the representation by his order dated 11.6-80 and it was held that the petitioner would be merged in the Civil Court and placed below to those who were working in the grade of Rs. 230-365 from before 1-5-76. The District Judge appears to be obsessive in the order dated 11-6-80 (Annexure-4) that the seniority was to be determined on the basis of pay and the petitioner was working in the grade of Rs. 230- 385 since 1-5-76 and he appears to have been given substantive appointment on that date (i.e. 1-5-76). Later on he has taken the view that as Jagdish Prasad Goel, respondent 10(ten) was working in the grade of Rs. 230- 385 continuously since 23-1-71, hence the petitioner cannot be made senior to him. It appears that the pay scale and the grade was taken to be the decisive factor by the District Judge and not the principle of confirmation and substantive appointment in the Collectorate as envisaged by R. 5 of the Rules and para 3(3) of the G.O. dated 30-6-78 (Annexure-1). 20. A perusal of the record of this Court summoned by us for perusal manifests that a was submitted to the then Hon'ble report Administrative Judge. In that report it was evident that the pay scale appears to have been taken as the decisive factor for determining the seniority. That report of the office was approved by the then Hon'ble Administrative Judge on 12-8-85 and was given effect to on 23-8-85. In that report it was evident that the pay scale appears to have been taken as the decisive factor for determining the seniority. That report of the office was approved by the then Hon'ble Administrative Judge on 12-8-85 and was given effect to on 23-8-85. When there are service rules, i.e. Rule 5 read with definition clause under R. 3(c) and 3(g), the seniority has to be determined determined on the basis of these rules. We are reminded of a Latin Maxim 'Actus Legitimi Non Recipiunt Modum' which obviously when the doing of a thing in a means that particular manner is sanctioned by the Law, then the thing cannot be done in a different way. A bare reading of para 3(3) of the G.O. dated 30th June, 1978 and the Service Rules (Annexure-2), , particularly Rr. 5. 3(c) and 3(g) would obviate that in order to determine the seniority of the combined cadre of the Civil Court's Ministerial Cadre and the employees of the Collectorate the date of substantive appointment of the employees of Collectorate would he the decisive factor. 21. The matter can be viewed from another angle. There appears to be a social purpose behind R. 5, inasmuch as in case an employee of the Collectorate joins the Civil court in pursuance of the creation of avenue of absorption after bifurcation of judiciary and executive, why should that employee lose his seniority on account of his appointment and confirmation in collectorate at an early date. In I.T.C. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 1985 Supp. SCC 476, it was observed as follows : "If the law by and large and in its true perspective of a social purpose if implemented in a particular manner could he valid, then the Court can and should ensure that implementation should be done in such particular manner and give directions to that effect." 22. In Om Prakash Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1276 , at p. 1277 under substantially similar facts where question of seniority of Clerks, Senior Clerks, Head Clerks and Chief Clerks of three departments (i.e. Divisional Electrical Engineer, Jhansi, Asstt. Electrical Engineer (Workshop), Jhansi and office of Asstt. Electrical Engineer. Jabalpur) was involved after merger of these departments, trifurcation and reamalgamation. Electrical Engineer (Workshop), Jhansi and office of Asstt. Electrical Engineer. Jabalpur) was involved after merger of these departments, trifurcation and reamalgamation. There also before reamalgamation some employees had been designated as seniors as they obtained accelerated promotion because of easy availability of vacancies, as in the present case before merger respondents 3 to 13 were senior in the Civil Court. The appellants had filed a writ petition No. 1415 of 1983 in this Court, but that was dismissed summarily. The appellants preferred a leave petition before Supreme Court. The decision of Division Bench of this court was reversed the appeal was allowed and it was held that after amalgamation it is the original seniority which should prevail, as in the present case the petitioner was confirmed in Collectorate on 5-3-1954, much prior to the confirmation of respondents 3 to 13 in the Civil Court. The following observations in the case of Om Prakash Sharma (supra) on page 1277, para 3 are set out below : "Consequent upon amalgamation in 1979 a fresh common seniority List was drawn up in which cadre wise respondent 3 was shown senior to appellants 1 and 2 and respondents Nos. 5, 6 and 9 were shown senior to appellant No. 3. Obviously when the amalgamation took place, respondents 3 to 6 could not score a march over erstwhile seniors on any valid principle of seniority. This would unquestionably he denial of equality under Article 16 of the Constitution. It may he that they might have enjoyed some accelerated promotion when workshop staff was amalgamated with the Bombay Office. But when they were repatriated and reamalgarnated with original two officers and brought back on the common seniority list, they must find their original place qua the appellants. This is not a case where appellants were passed over at the time of selection or denied promotion on the ground of unsuitability. In such a situation status quo ante has to be restored. Obviously respondents 3 to 6 will be below the appellants and any other view to the contrary would be violative of Article 16 as it would constitute denial of equality in the matter of promotion. Therefore, the seniority list drawn up on a principle contrary to what is discussed herein would be had in law and deserves to he quashed." 23. Therefore, the seniority list drawn up on a principle contrary to what is discussed herein would be had in law and deserves to he quashed." 23. In the premises aforesaid, the impugned orders dated 11-6-80, 8-4-60 and the order dated 12-8-85 passed by the then Hon'ble Administrative Judge and the order dated 23-8- 85 giving effect to the order dated 12-8-85 along with seniority list being manifestly erroneous, deserves to he quashed by issuing a writ of Certiorari. 24. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Let an order in the nature of Mandamus be issued against respondents I and 2 to show and treat the petitioner to he senior to respondents 3 to 13 in the relevant combined cadre of the Civil Court's Ministerial Cadre and the Collectoratc employees absorbed in Civil Court's Cadre. We further direct respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to carry out the effect of this order and seniority list shall stand re-drawn as herein indicated and accord benefits to the petitioner in the pay scale. D.A. and other admissible emoluments and further seniority, if any. In case some promotions have been given during pendency of this petition, the same shall be readjusted consistent with the directions given herein. Under the circumstances, however, we refrain from making any order as to costs.