Judgment :- 1. This is a petition under S.482 of the Code to quash the charges framed in C.C. 65/85, on the file of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences) Ernakulam. 2. Petitioner and three others, are alleged to have exported 5.9118 Kgs. of Heroin under the guise that it was canned crab meat and canned shrimps. Offences alleged are under S.7 and 38 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930, S.135 of the Customs Act, 1982 and S.120B, 420,465 and 477A IPC. Value of the commodity exported is approximately Rs. 25 lakhs. Consignor was named T.P. Moideenkutty, Panicker's Road, Calicut, a fictitious character. Customs Authorities at Manchester examined the cargo of 192 cans of what was described as crab meat and shrimp oa landing, analysed and found it to be Heroin. U. KL. Customs Authorities sent photostat copies of airways bill etc. to Cochin Customs. Pws.1 and 2, Assistant Collector and Investigating Officer were examined, and Exts. P1 to P108 were produced. 3. Prosecution case very briefly stated is that petitioner acting under a fictitious name T.P. Moideenkutty, went to M/s Harrison & Crosefields Ltd. who are shipping agents and agents for Swiss Air and booked the consignment. M/s. Sunilkumar, Fernandez and Ms Shirly Johnson of M/s. Harrison & Crosefields are cited to prove this. According to Investigating Officer, T. P. Moideenkutty the consignor named, is a fictitious name. Exts. P18, P18(a), P18(b), P19 and P19(a) to (d) are produced to prove this. Ext. P13 is the shipping bill, on the reverse of which is a declaration that the cargo conforms to specification, quality and description in the shipping bill, signed by 'Moideenkutty'. One V. Narayanan Pillai, Proprietor, Jaya Enterprises is cited to prove, chat petitioner and another hired his machine for sealing cans, and to prove that a brownish powder packed in polythene bags, was put in tin containing crab meat. One Ms. Elizabeth Cherian is cited to prove that petitioner and another approached her to bribe customs officers. Several exhibits are produced. During the course of hearing, an affidavit dated 29-1-88 was filed by the 1st respondent stating that Department had initiated steps to secure presence of Mr. Tomliason and Mrs. Susan Irene May Johncock of U. K. to prove the documents received from U. K. Customs and produced at trial. Attested or notarised copies of the documents were appended to the affidavit. Tomliason and Mrs. Susan Irene May Johncock of U. K. to prove the documents received from U. K. Customs and produced at trial. Attested or notarised copies of the documents were appended to the affidavit. I do no not propose to rely on these. Prosecution could have examined these witnesses before charges were framed. It was faintly suggested that the then learned magistrate did not consider it necessary. Anyway, this petition mast be decided on the material already on record. 4. On the evidence of Pws.1 and 2, Assistant Collector and Investigating Officer, and on perusing the documents Exts. P1 to P108, court below framed charges. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that though a large number of documents were produced, not one of them was properly proved is accordance with S.78(6) of the Evidence Act. It is also alleged that without examining officers of U. K. Customs, charge cannot be framed. There is a further case that statements recorded under S.108 of the Customs Act from various witnesses cannot be accepted in evidence. 6. Counsel for respondents contended that for the purpose of framing charges, there is enough material. According to counsel, Exts. P1 to P108 have been properly proved under S.78 (6) of the Evidence Act. He also relied on S.139 of the Customs Act. 7. In support of the contention that there is no proof as required under S.78, Evidence Act, counsel referred to Badnt & Co. v. East India Trading Co. (AIR 1964 SC 538). S.78 (6) deals with proof of certain 'class of public documents in a foreign country'. Section embodies a general rule. A special rule is enacted in S.139 of the Customs Act. S.139 of the Customs Act raises a presumption in respect of a document 'received from any place outside India in the course of Investigation of any offence alleged to have been committed by any person under that Act'. The section further states (S.139(ii)(b)) that'court shall admit the document in evidence...'. 8. The section creates a special rule of evidence. In proceedings under that Act, court shall presume that signature and every other part of such document was executed or attested by the person, purporting to have signed or executed it. Special rules of evidence outside the Indian Evidence Act raising presumption are well known. 8. The section creates a special rule of evidence. In proceedings under that Act, court shall presume that signature and every other part of such document was executed or attested by the person, purporting to have signed or executed it. Special rules of evidence outside the Indian Evidence Act raising presumption are well known. For example, like S.139 of the Customs Act, a rule of presumption is contained in S.4 of the Prevention of the Corruption Act, 1947. The contention that there is no proof under S.78 (6) of the Evidence Act, has no relevance and has only to be rejected. Examination of witnesses from U. K. Customs and consideration of the value of the statements under S.108 can be at later stage. 9. What arises for consideration is the scope of S.245 and 246 of the Code. The quality of consideration postulated by these section must be appreciated. Neither side dwelt on this aspect. 10. S.245 of the Code requires an accused to be discharged if "no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction". What the magistrate has to consider at that stage is only whether a case is made out or no case is made out. The requirement is not to prove a case but, only to consider if no case is made out. If there are "grounds for presuming that the accused has committed an offence" then, charge has to be framed. Proof is not required at that stage. Sufficiently probative allegation, will justify framing of charge. Position has been made clear by the Supreme Court in Mahant Abhey Dass v. Gurdial Singh (AIR 1971 SC 834). Court referring to the allegation is the case observed: "If the allegations are true there is no doubt that the accused have committed the offence ...it is another matter if the allegations are ultimately proved not to be true ...a prima facie case has been made out and the accused must stand trial". (emphasis supplied) Again, in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (AIR 1977 SC 2018), the court observed: "...at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged.... At that stage, the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction... At that stage, the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction... Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial .... it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not". At the stage of framing charge what is required is much less than what is required at the end of trial or to prove the charge. 11. Reference was made to earlier decisions by way of analogy In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B. (AIR 1972 SC 2639) referring to S.202 and 203 of the Code, court said: "Test was whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not, whether there was sufficient ground for conviction". What is contemplated at that stage of framing charge is not a full fledged assessment of the prosecution case. Neither is it, a preview of the case. It is a consideration, on limited material and grounds to ascertain whether the court should proceed further. The object is only to avoid unmerited harassment in a situation where material is totally lacking even to presume guilt. If the magistrate "is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that accused has committed an offence", he has to frame charges. The quality and depth of consideration at the stage of S.245 cannot be approximated to the same quality and consideration at the stage of entering conviction. Not all the prosecution evidence require consideration at that stage. Only prima facie material to presume, is enough. Proof comes later. Clear indication to that effect is available under S.246(6) of the Code. The sub-section says the evidence of any remaining witnesses for the prosecution shall next be taken. 12. It follows that all that need be shown for framing a charge is 'ground for presuming that accused has committed an offence', not evidence to prove that accused has committed the offence. Discharge need be made, only if no case is made out on the material before court, if it stands unrebutted. Rebuttal on grounds of law and facts, is for a later stage. Chapter XIX deals with trial of warrant cases. There is a dichotomy in the Chapter, cases instituted en police report and cases instituted on complaint. Discharge need be made, only if no case is made out on the material before court, if it stands unrebutted. Rebuttal on grounds of law and facts, is for a later stage. Chapter XIX deals with trial of warrant cases. There is a dichotomy in the Chapter, cases instituted en police report and cases instituted on complaint. S 239 deals with discharge and S.240 deals with framing of charge, in a case instituted on a police report. If, upon consideration of documents and examination, if any, the magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, he shall frame a charge. Accused shall be discharged, if, upon considering the police report and documents under S.173, the charge is found 'groundless'. Records under S.173 which are not necessarily admissible evidence, can be considered for purposes of framing charge. On the same principle, irrespective of the admissibility or truth of statements in Exts. P1 to P108, it is open to magistrate to frame a charge if en the basis of these and the evidence he is satisfied, that'ground exists to presume that accused has committed an offence'. 13. Petitioner's counsel, made a further submission that neither the evidence of Pws.1 and 2, nor the records of investigation, Exts. P1 to P108, disclose any offence and that the petitioner should have been discharged. The voluminous exhibits do reveal an indepth and detailed investigation into a well knit plan of action and so does the evidence. I shall not comment en the inferences to be made, lest it may cause prejudice at the trial. But, I would say as it is necessary to say that there is material to frame charges. I hasten to make clear, that this observation is limited to the question now arising for consideration. 14. So viewed, and in the light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of India, court below was justified in framing charges on the basis of the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and Exts. P1 to P108. S.482 of the Code cannot be pressed into service in these circumstances to quash the charges. For these reasons, Crl. M. C. it without merit and is accordingly dismissed.