JUDGMENT D.S. Bajpai, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree passed in Civil Appeal No. 280 of 1977 Btiawani Pher v. Narbada Devi and others dated 2578; by which the lower appellate court modified the judgment and decree passed in Regular Suit No. 165 of 1972 Smt. Narbada Devi v. Gaon Sabha and others. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this second appeal are that Smt. Narbada Devi filed a suit against the Gaon Sabha, State of U.P. and Bhawani phef praying for a decree of declaration in her favour as against defendants to the effect that the plaintiff was owner of the trees standing on plots of land as detailed at the foot of the plaint. The allegation, inter alia, was to the effect that one Sartaji, widow of Kunj Behari was the owner of the trees exclusively and she executed a registered saledeed in 1936 in favour of Bhagwat in respect of these trees, who in turn executed a registered will in 1944 in favour of his sister Smt. Sluv Dulari and in this way the trees came down to Smt. Shiv Dulari, who in her own rights, executed a saledeed of these very trees in favour of the plaintiff's husband Rama Shanker, who was the original plaintiff in suit and consequent on his death Smt. Narbada Devi, being his sole surviving legal heir and representative became the owner. The plaintiff alleged that it was on account of regular interruptions on her right to enjoy the frees that she filed the suit. The defendants contested the suit on numerous grounds; amongst them the main ground was, as submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, in this Court then even if it was a grove land, the suit could not be maintained and the decision in Consolidation Courts became final and the matter could only be adjudicated before the Consolidation Authorities. On the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed undernoted six issues; 1. Whether the plaintiff is owner of the trees in dispute detailed at the foot of plaint as alleged in the plaint? 2. Whether the suit is barred by section 49 of C.H. Act? 3. Whether the suit is barred by section 34 of S.R. Act? 4. Whether the suit is undervalued and court fees paid is insufficient? 5. Whether the plaintiff is owner of the trees in dispute detailed at the foot of plaint as alleged in the plaint? 2. Whether the suit is barred by section 49 of C.H. Act? 3. Whether the suit is barred by section 34 of S.R. Act? 4. Whether the suit is undervalued and court fees paid is insufficient? 5. Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? 6. To what relief, if any, is plaintiff entitled? 3. The trial court, however, recorded a finding on issues 2 and 5 and held that the suit was not barred under section 49 of the C. H. Act arid that the Court had jurisdiction to decide the case. On issue BO, 3 the finding returned was that the suit being one for declaration, section 34 of the Specific Relief Act did not come into play. On issue no. 1 the Court found after consideration of documents on record and the evidence of the parties that the plaintiff was owner of the trees in dispute detailed at the foot of the plaint as alleged. Issue no. 4 was not pressed. On these findings the suit of the| plaintiff was decreed by the trial court with costs. 4. In appeal, after considering all these questions in detail the lower appellate court on a consensus held as follows: In this court after thorough thrashing of the material on record the learned counsel for the parties arrived at a consensus that as far as nonfruit bearing trees are concerned they cannot be deemed to be the property of Smt. Sartaji and ultimately that of the plaintiff. Rest of the trees were selfgrown (khundara) which were not planted by the human hands. There is no dispute as to the ownership of the land where these trees in dispute stand. 5. It was on the basis of the findings recorded by the lower appellate court with consensus that the trial Court's decree was modified to the| extent that the plaintiff was to get a decree as prayed, in respect of fruit bearing trees only, as mentioned in the body of the judgment, and rest of the trees in suit were to be the property of the Gaon Sabha concerned. The parties were directed to bear their own costs. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The parties were directed to bear their own costs. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Learned counsel for the plaintiffappellant strenuously contended that the suit could be filed to cover the trees standing on a grove land and in any case the definition of a grove as in U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 does not stand repealed by the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as, the Act). A bare perusal of provisions of Section 339 of the Act would indicate that the enactments mentioned in list I of Schedule III stood repealed in an application to the areas where the Act was enforced and U.P. Tenancy Act, as a whole, finds place at serial no. 16 on the said list. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been in a position to point out any provision in section 339 of the Act and any other provision in the Act to indicate that the definition of grove finding place in U.P. Tenancy Act is for that purpose, and that any other provision in the U.P. Tenancy Act remained in force after promulgation of the Act. It is equally not disputed by the learned counsel that the Act was applicable to the area where the disputed land is situate. The only definition of a grove finding place in the Act is in subsection (XIII) of section 3 of the Act which defines an intermediary's grove and is stated to be a grove land held or occupied by an intermediary as such. Definition of an intermediary in subsection (XII) of section 3 of the Act has been defined to cover grove land of an intermediary as held by this Court in Avadhesh Kumar v. Board of Revenue (1975 A. W.C. (High Court)94). It has been categorically laid down by this Court in Rama v. State of U.P. and others (1971 R.D. 520) that scattered trees standing over banjar land cannot be termed as grove and the Consolidation Courts lack inherent jurisdiction in adjudicating upon rights of parties in respect of them. The Court has further gone on to say that rights can be adjudicated by a Civil Court alone. In their view of the matter there appears to be no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and the said contention is negatived. 7. The Court has further gone on to say that rights can be adjudicated by a Civil Court alone. In their view of the matter there appears to be no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and the said contention is negatived. 7. For the reasons recorded above the appeal is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is affirmed. No order is made as to costs. (Appeal dismissed)