Hansaria, J. — This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assails an award passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gauhati, by which the dismissal of the petitioner from the post of Store-Clerk has been held to be justified. Being however of the view that the petitioner was deprived of his promotion to the post of Head Clerk without any reason, the learned Labour Court has awarded a sum of Rs. 17,000.00 as compensation. 2. The event which led to the dismissal of the workman is his refusal to maintain a Store Register which was recommended by ;the internal auditor of the Company. The workman's refusal rests on the ground that he was over worked to which effect he had written some letters to the management but to no effect. The further case of the workman is that he has been victimised as he was the Unit Secretary of the Trade Union and as such had incurred the wrath of the management because of his taking up the various causes of the workman. One such cause related to non-payment of over-time wages relating to which a reference was pending at the relevant time. 3. Shri Pathak appearing for the petitioner has first submitted that the materials on record would justify the view taken by the workman that he was over worked which stood in his way of maintaining the register in question. It is because of this that the workman had desired a helper. This plea of the workman has not been accepted by the learned Labour Court which view has been taken after going through the relevant materials on record. This is a question relating to finding of fact and sitting as a writ Court we have not re-appreciated the evidence in this regard. We would; therefore, accept the finding arrived at by the Labour Court that the petitioner had willfully disobeyed the order of the management. 4. The important question on which we have been addressed at length by the learned counsel of both tides is whether punish­ment of dismissal was justified for the lapse in question. Shri Pathak has urged that this penalty is absolutely unjustified and has strongly pleaded that we should substitute this punishment for some other reasonable penalty. 4. The important question on which we have been addressed at length by the learned counsel of both tides is whether punish­ment of dismissal was justified for the lapse in question. Shri Pathak has urged that this penalty is absolutely unjustified and has strongly pleaded that we should substitute this punishment for some other reasonable penalty. In this connection, our attention has been invited to section 11-A which found place in the Industrial Disputes Act, hereinafter the Act, with effect from 15.12. 71. The important question is whether this Court can exercise the power given, inter alia, to a Labour Court by section 11-A of the Act. Shri Pathak has urged that it is open to this Court as well as to exercise this power whereas the submission of Shri Choudhury is that if this Court be of the view that the punish­ment awarded is disproportionate all that it can do is to remit the matter to the Labour Court leaving it to its Presiding Officer to decide about the proper punishment for the proved misconduct. In support of the rival contentions both the learned counsel have referred to different decisions rendered by the Apex Court. 5. Before examining the decisions placed before us, it would be. worthwhile to mention that the introduction of section 11-A in the Act has in a way revolutionised the power and scope of interference in such matters by the Tribunal or the Labour Court as the case may be. Reference may be made in this connection to the well known case of the Workmen of Firestone and Rubber Company vs. The Management, AIR 1973 SC 1227 , in para 32 of which it has been stated that the earlier view which had gained ground after the judgment in the Iron and Steel Company, AIR 1958 SC 130 , that the conduct of disciplinary proceedings and the punishment to be imposed were all considered to v be a managerial functions got changed by the introduction of section 11-A of the Act. As per the rendering in Firestone, the Tribunal is now clothed with the power to re-appreciate the evidence in the domestic enquiry, satisfy itself whether the evidence relied on by an employer establishes the misconduct alleged against the workman. As per the rendering in Firestone, the Tribunal is now clothed with the power to re-appreciate the evidence in the domestic enquiry, satisfy itself whether the evidence relied on by an employer establishes the misconduct alleged against the workman. The result of this is what was originally plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an employer form the evidence has now given place to satisfaction being arrived at by the Tribunal that the finding of miscon­duct is incorrect. Thus what was largely in the realm of satisfaction of the employer has ceased to be so ; and now it is the satisfaction of the Tribunal that finally decides the matter. Section 11-A has given the further power to the concerned adjudicating authority to apply its mind whether the punishment of discharge or dismissal was justified and if it were to think that the aforesaid punishment is not justified, it can 'award a larger punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. The question is if the Labour Court or the Tribunal does not discharge this function, can this Court substitute its own view relating to the quantum of punishment, Shri Patbak has urged, as already noted, that this Court can do so. In support of his submission the learned counsel has referred to Gujarat Steel Tubes ltd. vs. Mazdoor Sabha, 1980 (2) SCC 593 ; Rama Kanta vs. State of U.P., 1982 (3) SCC 346 ; Jaswant Singh vs. Pepsu Roadways Transport Corporation, 1984 (1) SCC 35 ; Management of Hindustan Machine Tools vs. Md. Osman, 1984 (1) SCC 152 ; Ved Prakash vs. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd, 1984 (2) SCC 569 ; and Rajendra Kumar vs. Delhi Administration, 1984 (4) SCC 635 . 6. In reply, Shri Choudhury's contention is that it is not within the realm of this Court's jurisdiction to substitute its own views relating to the quantum of punishment. According to the learned counsel all we can do in this regard is to send the matter back to the learned Labour Court with a direction to apply its specific mind to the question of quantum of punishment. In support of this submission, our attention has been invited to Jitendra Singh vs. Shri Baidyanath Aynrved Bhawan, 1984 (3) SCC 5 . In support of this submission, our attention has been invited to Jitendra Singh vs. Shri Baidyanath Aynrved Bhawan, 1984 (3) SCC 5 . Shri Choudhury has also submitted that what can be done by the Supreme Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution cannot be done by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of, for that matter, Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. Let us start with Gujarat Steel (1980-2 SCC 593.) This was a case where hundreds of workmen were involved and it is, there­fore, contended by Shri Choudhury that what has been observed in this decision should not be taken to be a precedence to govern all cases including that of dismissal of a single workman. We do not think if we would be justified in not applying the ratio of Gujarat Steel merely because only one workman is involved in the present case. What has been stated in Gujarat Steel can, according to us, definitely be taken as a beacon light specially relating to the scope and ambit of the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has been observed in para 73 of the judg­ment that wide words of Article 226 are designed for service of the lowly numbers in their grievances if the subject belongs to the Court's province and the remedy is appropriate to the judicial process. In para 79 it was observed that the limitation woven round the prerogative writs may have to be disregarded because while Article 226 was inspired by the royal writs its sweep and scope exceed its hide-bound British processes of yore. It was further stated in this paragraph that so broad are the expression designedly used in Article 22f that "any order which should have been made by the lower authority could be made by the High Court”. Finally, we may note what was stated in para 146. This if what finds place therein :- ".........the first thing we decide is that Article 226, however restrictive in practice, is a power wide enough, in all conscience, to be a friend in need, when the summons comes in a crisis from a victim of injustice, and, more importantly this extraordinary reserve power is unscathed to grant final relief without necessary recourse to a remand. What the Tribunal may, in its discretion do the High Court too under Article 226, can, if facts compel do". Shri Choudhury has, however, strongly placed reliance in denying the aforesaid power to this Court on Jitendra Singh (1984-3 SCC 5). The following observation in para 5 of the judgment is sought to be relied on by Shri Choudhury :- "We reiterate that ordinarily it is not for the High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction of superintendence to substitute one finding for another and similarly one punishment for another. We may not be understood to have denied that power to the High Court in every type of cases. It is sufficient for our present purpose to hold that on the facts made out, the approach of the High Court is totally uncalled for and the manner in which the compensation was assessed by vacating order of reinstatement is erroneous both on facts and in law".(Emphasis supplied). Earlier, it had been observed in para 4 that the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 227 could quash the award of the learned Tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for a fresh disposal in accordance with law and directions, if any. It was then stated in this para that the High Court was not entitled to exercise the power of the Tribunal and substitute an award in place of the one made by the Tribunal as in the case of an appeal where it lies to it. In Jitendra Singh what had happened was that the Tribunal had directed reinstatement and the High Court vacated the direction and awarded compensation of Rs. 15,000/- in lieu of restoration of service. The important point to note is that the Supreme Court in appeal did not set aside the judgment of the High Court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to do so ; indeed, from what has been stated in para 5 it is apparent that no such final view was sought to be expressed by the Apex Court in relation to the matter at hand ; but what weighed with the Supreme Court was that it was not impressed by the reasoning of the High Court that reinstatement was not justified when the 'Tribunal in exercise of its wide discretion thought that relief of reinstatement Would meet the ends of justice. The Supreme Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the High Court had no justification to interfere with the order of reinstatement to service and in proceeding to substitute the direction by quanti­fying the compensation at Rs. 15,000.00. In doing so, the High Court acted without any legitimate basis, observed the Supreme Court. Thus, if we read closely paras 4 and 5 whose purport has been noted above, we cannot take a view that in no case this Court can substitute one punishment by another. 8. The decision in Rama Kanta (1982-3 SCC 345) is important for our purpose inasmuch as the Supreme Court had examined the width pf. section 11 -A. in a case which had gone to it under Article 136 of the Constitution from a judgment rendered by the Allahabad. High Court in a writ petition. The Supreme Court stated that to avoid the charge of vindictiveness, the punishment must always commensu­rate with the gravity of the offence charged which would also be the demand of justice, equity and fair play. It was observed that with the development of Industrial relations the Courts have mqye4-far from the days when quantum of punishment was considered a managerial function with the Courts having no power to substitute their own decision in place of that of the management. Being of this view and having noted that the charge against the appellant was use of indiscreet, indecent or threatening language to the superior only once in the course of long unblemish service, the punishment of dismissal was regarded as an extreme penalty which was, therefore, set aside and instead withholding of two increments with future effect was regarded as more than adequate punishment for a low paid employee as the appellant was. This decision clearly shows that a Court can also substitute its own views on the question of punishment. It is important to note that the Supreme Court had substituted punishment in a case which had reached it under Article 136 from a judgment rendered by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The substitution of the punishment by the Supreme Court in such a situation shows that the Supreme Court had thought that the High Court should have itself done something in this regard though the approach to it was under Article'227 of the Constitution. 9. The substitution of the punishment by the Supreme Court in such a situation shows that the Supreme Court had thought that the High Court should have itself done something in this regard though the approach to it was under Article'227 of the Constitution. 9. In Jaswant Singh ( 1984-1 SCC 35), the Labour Court after holding that the driver was drunk while on duty felt that the dismissal from service was on the higher side and therefore directed reinstat­ement of the appellant but by denying back-wages. The High Court however took the view that dismissal from service was the proper punishment. In appeal it was felt by the Supreme Court that the view taken by the Labour Court was right but along with denial of back-wages it was ordered that three increments of the delinquent would also be stopped. The important thing to note in this case is that the High Court judgment was not set aside on the ground that the High Court had no jurisdiction to substitute one punishment for another, but on merits it was felt that in view of the conduct of the appellant which appeared to be his first offence, the punishment of dismissal was regarded rather heavy and not called for and therefore the Supreme Court reduced the punishment. The views expressed in Hindustan Machine Tools (1984-1 SCC 152) are not very helpful to us to decide the controversy at hand inasmuch as the decision was rendered in an appeal which has been filed directly to the Supreme Court against the award of the Labour Court. There is, therefore, no discussion in this decision about the power of this Court in a matter like the one at hand, for the same reason Ved Prakash (1984-2 SCC 569) is not very helpful, as the writ petition which had been filed in the High Court had been withdrawn by the Supreme Court whereafter the judgment was rendered. So, this decision has not dealt with the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 10. So, this decision has not dealt with the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 10. Rajendra Kumar (1984-4 SCC 635) is however important for our purpose inasmuch as the refusal of the High Court to examine the finding which was arrived at by the Inquiry Officer as well as by the Arbitrator, which was wholly perverse and as such unsustainable, on the ground that the matter depended on appraisal of evidence was not accepted by the Supreme Court. The refusal of the High Court was regarded as wholly untenable because of which the order of the High Court was set aside. This shows that in appropriate cases the High Court can interfere even with the finding of an Arbitrator appointed under section 1C-A of the Act. We would think that for some reason the High Court can review the stand taken by the Labour Court or Tribunal relating to the question of punishment. This is what has been opined by the Supreme Court in Christian Medical College Hospital Employees' Union vg. Christian Medical College, 1987 (4) SCC 691 . In this case, the validity of section H-A of the Act was challenged on the ground that the section conferred arbitrary, unguided and uncanalised power. In rejecting the contention, it has been stated, inter alia, that the Tribunal or Labour Court has to give reason for its decision as to why the punishment imposed by the Manage­ment has been regarded as highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. It was then observed in para 14 that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court is again "subject to judicial review of the High Court and this Court"-This would clearly imply that the decision rendered by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal in the matter is not final, and if the same be subject to judicial review by the High Court and the Supreme Court, the High Court, can regard a particular punish­ment given by the Labour Court as not justified on the facts and circumstances of the case and to say what punishment it regards as justified. 11. In view of what has been stated above, we are satisfied, that in appropriate cases it would be open to this Court to substitute its views even on the question of quantum of compen­sation. 11. In view of what has been stated above, we are satisfied, that in appropriate cases it would be open to this Court to substitute its views even on the question of quantum of compen­sation. Shri Choudhury has strenuously urged that even if it were open to this Court to exercise this power, the present is not a fit .case to do so inasmuch as there is not enough evidence on record to sustain the plea of the workman that the present was a case of victimisation. It is urged on the strength of Bharat Iron Works vs. Bhagubhai, AIR 1976 SC 98 , that a proved misconduct is antithesis of victimisation as observed in para 11 of tnis judgment. It is also impressed upon us by referring to 0. D. Cement Ltd vs. Murari Lai, AIR 1971 SC 22 ; D. T. F. Mills vs. labour Court AIR 1972 SC 277 , and Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Co. vs. Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Workers' Union, AIR 1966 SC 1731 , that punishment of dismissal can be awarded even for a solitary misconduct. This proposition cannot be disputed and have not been so done by Shri Patnak, Whether dismissal should be regarded as proper punishment even for one misconduct would apparently depend Upon cue nature of the misconduct. In the present case, the misconduct was refusal to maintain a register. We cannot accept that dismissal is the proper punishment even for disobedience of, this nature. On the facts of the case, we would regard the punish­ment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate inasmuch as the same has vitally affected the livelihood of the petitioner, a poor workman, in our view the proper punishment to be awarded in a case of the present nature is withholding of some increments with future effect. 12. In the result, while upholding the finding of the learned Labour Court that the misconduct in question was established, we would set aside its order justifying dismissal and would instead award punishment of withholding of three increments with cumulative effect. The petition stands allowed accordingly.