This is a defendants second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment of the appellant from an accommodation as well as for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation for the period subsequent to the determination of the tenancy. Both the courts below having decreed the suit, the defendant tenant has filed this second appeal. 2. Shortly stated the plaint case was that the plaintiffs were trustees of the Maharaja Kashiraja Dharmakarya Nidhi and the premises in suit of which the defendant is the tenant were owned by them. The defendant was a tenant on behalf of the plaintiff on a monthly rental of Rs. 110/- under a registered lease dt/-6-11-1960. The defendant fell in arrears of rent for more than 19 months. He also made material alterations in the building under tenancy without the consent of the plaintiffs where upon a registered notice was served on the defendant on behalf of the plaintiffs terminating the tenancy asking him to clear the arrears of rent demanded thereby as well as to remove the unauthorised constructions and to vacate the premises. Despite the fact that the notice was served on the defendant on 26-02-1964 he neither vacated the premises nor paid the arrears and hence the suit. 3. The appellant resisted the suit on a variety of grounds including that no notice was served on the defendant nor had he made any material alterations nor illegally occupied any room as alleged in the plaint. The validity of the notice was also challenged on the ground that Raghubansh Sahai who had given the notice on behalf of the trustees had no power to give that notice. 4. Relevant issues were framed by the trial court which answered all the material issues against the appellant. It held that the aforesaid notice had been duly served on the defendant. In spite of that the defendant committed default. It further held that the defendant had made material alterations in the building and illegally occupied the room which did not form part of his tenancy. The trial court also upheld the validity of the notice. On these and other findings the suit was decreed. The findings of the trial court were affirmed in appeal. 5. Sri. It further held that the defendant had made material alterations in the building and illegally occupied the room which did not form part of his tenancy. The trial court also upheld the validity of the notice. On these and other findings the suit was decreed. The findings of the trial court were affirmed in appeal. 5. Sri. R. N. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant mainly concentrated his submissions on the validity of the notice given by Raghubans Sahai under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The argument was that in view of the provisions of S. 47 of the Trust Act, the decision to terminate the tenancy could not be delegated by the trustees to Raghubansh Sahai. It is another matter that the ministerial act of issuing the notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act could be delegated to Raghubansh Sahai. That being so, Raghubansh Sahai acting by himself could not validly determine the tenancy of the appellant. 6. I find no substance in the above argument. The notice states that it is being given on behalf of the trustees of the aforesaid Trust through their Mukhtarnama (Power of attorney) Sri Raghubansh Sahai. S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not require that the notice must be given by the lessors themselves. Such a notice can be given by any one authorised in that behalf by the lessors. Under the Mukhtar-nama Raghubansh Sahai was specifically authorised inter alia to give notice on behalf of the trustees. The power of Raghubansh Sahai, therefore, to give notice on behalf of the trustees, hence could not be challenged. 7. The question then that next arises is whether the notice was given by Raghubansh Sahai on his own or at the instance of the trustees. On the face of it the notice specifically purports to be on behalf of the plaintiffs. Significantly, in the written statement the plea taken by the defendant by way of amendment was not that the trustees had not as a matter of fact taken a decision to determine the tenancy and authorised Sri Raghubansh Sahai to give the notice. The objection on the contrary taken in para 46-A of the amended written statement was that Raghubansh Sahai had no right to give notice for determination of the tenancy and that consequently the suit was not maintainable. The objection on the contrary taken in para 46-A of the amended written statement was that Raghubansh Sahai had no right to give notice for determination of the tenancy and that consequently the suit was not maintainable. That plea is obviously unsustainable, in view of the express right conferred on Raghubansh Sahai under Mukhtar- nama executed in his favour by all the trustees authorising him not only to institute legal proceedings but also to give all notices on their behalf. Whether the trustees had taken the decision to determine the tenancy or whether Raghubansh Sahai had determined the tenancy on his own are undoubtedly questions of fact and the same not having been raised by the defendant in his written statement nor even made the subject of any issue, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be permitted to be raised in the second appeal. In any case, if there was any doubt whether Raghubansh Sahai had given the notice on his own or at the instance of the trustees, the same stood completely dispelled by the fact that relying on that very notice the trustees have filed the present suit. The action of Raghubansh Sahai in determining the tenancy of the appellant, therefore, clearly seems to have had the assent of the trustees. 8. The same conclusion is reached by another process of reasoning. The lease under which the appellant was inducted into the premises in suit was not executed by the trustees but by Raghubansh Sahai. It is a bilateral document signed both by Raghubansh Sahai as well as the appellant. The appellant hence cannot be heard to challenge the authority of Raghubansh Sahai to give notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for the determination of the tenancy. 9. There is also substance in the submission made by Sri K. N. Dayal that S. 47 of the Trusts Act has in any case no application to the present case inasmuch as the Trust in question is excluded from the purview of the Indian Trusts Act being a religious and charitable endowment as is apparent from the very title of the Trust. Indian Trusts Act has no application to public or private religious and charitable endowments. 10. Indian Trusts Act has no application to public or private religious and charitable endowments. 10. The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the notice under S. 106 of the T. P. Act served on the defendant is perfectly valid in law. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant in the end made an extremely feeable attempt to challenge the correctness of the findings of the courts below on other issues such as default and material alterations etc. but was not able even to point out a single factual error much less a legal one in the conclusions reached by the courts below. I have examined these findings and find myself in complete agreement with the conclusions recorded by the courts below against the appellant. 12. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed but I make no order as to costs. The record of the case shall be sent down to the trial court forthwith. The execution of the decree for eviction shall however be stayed for a period of three months from date subject to the condition that the appellant deposits the entire amount which may still be due against him under the decrees challenged in second appeal after adjusting any deposits which may have been made by the appellant in the courts below during the pendency of this appeal within a period of one month from today failing which the stay of execution granted herein shall stand automatically discharged. Appeal dismissed. .