JUDGMENT : R.P.Singh, J. 1. This Writ Petition is directed against an order passed by the XIth Additional District Judge, Agra, dated 18-4-1985, allowing the revision and remanding the case to the Judge Small Causes Court, Agra to decide the issue regarding the question of jurisdiction of the Judge Small Causes Court to pass the decree which was sought to be executed in execution proceedings. 2. Brief facts of the case are that suit no. 1108 of 1976 was filed by the petitioner in the court of Judge, Small Causes Court, Agra, for ejectment and arrears of rent against the contesting respondents which was decreed in terms of the compromise between the parties on 10th of March, 1981, under which the plaintiff was to make construction at the cost of defendant no. 1 in accordance with the plan given by the defendant no. 1, approved by the Agra Development Authority and on completion of the construction the defendant was to occupy a portion of the said construction and on failure of the defendant to vacate the portion in his possession, the plaintiff was entitled to eject the defendant from the portion in his possession. According to the petitioner since the defendant failed to comply with the terms of the compromise, he applied for execution of the decree by ejectment of the defendant. Various objections were raised by the defendant under section 47 CPC and the Judge, Small Causes Court, respondent no. 2, however, rejected the objection and allowed the decree to proceed for execution vide his order dated 17-1-1985. Feeling aggrieved the respondents no. 3 and 4 went up in revision before respondent no. 1 where it was urged that since the tenancy of the defendant was, according to the amendment in the plaint, in respect of a big open courtyard with a 'phatak', it was not in respect of any building as contemplated by U. P. Act XIII of 1972 and hence the Judge, Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass the decree which was thus a nullity and passed without jurisdiction on the own showing of the plaintiff in the plaint. It was further urged on behalf of the respondents nos 3 and 4 that the compromise decree was nullity as the compromise for the eviction of the tenant was in violation of the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 and the compromise does not indicate that the tenant expressly or impliedly allowed the decree to be passed for his eviction because the landlord in the circumstances was entitled to have such a decree under the law. The respondent no. 1 being satisfied that the point raised by the Respondents no. 3 and 4 went to the root of the jurisdiction, the objection to its validity could be allowed to be raised in an execution proceeding and hence remanded the case to the Judge Small Causes Court, respondent no. 2, to apply its mind and decide these issues after setting aside the order passed by the Judge Small Causes Court. It is this order of remand that is challenged in the present writ petition. 3. Heard Sri Swami Dayal, Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Sri B. D. Mandhyan, Senior Advocate for the contesting respondent. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the revisional court could not go behind the decree in execution proceedings. He also submitted that the question regarding the jurisdiction of the decree sought to be executed having not been raised earlier, it could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in revision. It was further contended that the compromise decree could not be challenged except on the ground of fraud. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the decree sought to be executed being a nullity and without jurisdiction, the objection regarding the jurisdiction of the court which goes to the root of the matter, has rightly been allowed to be raised by the revisional court. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the decree sought to be executed being a nullity and without jurisdiction, the objection regarding the jurisdiction of the court which goes to the root of the matter, has rightly been allowed to be raised by the revisional court. It was further submitted that since the compromise decree does not indicate either on its face or in the background of other material that the contesting respondents expressly or impliedly agreed to suffer the decree for their eviction because the landlord was entitled to have such a decree under the law, and further that the compromise decree was passed in violation of the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 as it was not passed on one of the grounds mentioned under section 20 of the Act, the decree was a nullity, and hence when the question raised goes to the root of the jurisdiction, it has rightly been allowed to be raised in revision. It was further submitted that it is a case of remand only where the case has been remanded to the Judge Small Cause Court to apply his mind and decide the issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Judge Small Causes Court to pass the decree which was sought to be executed, it is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission that the executing court cannot go behind the decree relied upon V. D. Modi v. R. A. Rahman, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1475 where it was observed thus :- "A court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representative ; it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts." Again it was observed by the Supreme Court thus : "Again, when the decree is made by a court which has no jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record ; where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction." The learned counsel thus strenuously argued that it was not open for the contesting respondents to raise the question of jurisdiction in execution proceedings and hence the order of remand passed by the revisional court is liable to be set aside. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent in reply submitted that the jurisdiction of the court depends on the allegations made in the plaint. The learned counsel for the respondent drew ray attention to paragraph 7 of the plaint of suit no. 1108 of 1976 the relevant portion of which reads thus : " The then tenement of the defendant no. 1 consisted of one Phatak Poli and a big open courtyard. " The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that since the plaintiffs own case is that the premises let out to the respondents was only an open courtyard with a ' Phatak ', it was not a building on the own showing of the plaintiff and hence the Judge, Small Causes Court who passed the decree had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or pass the compromise decree and hence the decree passed in the case is nullity. 6. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the suit for possession of immovable property is not cognizable by the Judge, Small Causes Court. The only suit cognizable would be a suit by a lessor for eviction of a lessee from the building after termination of the lease. Therefore, under Article (4) of the IInd Schedule of Provincial Small Causes Court Act which reads as under : " (4) A suit for possession of immovable property or for the recovery of interest in such property, but not including a suit by a lessor for eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease, and for the use and occupation of that building after such determination of lease. " It is clear that suit for possession of immovable property or recovery of interest in such property has been excepted and, as such, is not cognizable by Judge, Small Causes Court. The only suit cognizable would be a suit by a lessor for eviction of a lessee from the building after determination of the lease. In the present case the allegations in the plaint are that the open court yard with the ' phatak ' has been let out. Hence the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Judge, Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree for eviction of the respondents. The revisional court has only remanded the case to the Judge Small Causes Court to see if the tenancy was only in respect of an open courtyard with ' phatak ' as alleged in paragraph 7 of the plaint and if so, whether the Judge Small Causes Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass the decree. If it is found that it was only an open courtyard with a ' phatak ' and no roofed structure was let out, in that case, obviously, the Judge Small Causes Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. However, since the case has only been remanded, the Judge Small Causes Court, I do not wish to express any opinion regarding the jurisdiction of Judge, Small Causes Court to pass the decree in the present suit. The whole thing will depend on whether the tenancy was in respect of any roofed structure along with the open courtyard or only in regard to the open courtyard with a ' phatak ' (Gate). The whole thing will depend on whether the tenancy was in respect of any roofed structure along with the open courtyard or only in regard to the open courtyard with a ' phatak ' (Gate). The objection regarding the validity of a decree may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record. In the present case the Judge, Small Causes Court will see whether the objection regarding the validity of the decree appears on the face of the record or it requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial. From the reading of the plaint of the suit it appears that the tenancy was created only in respect of the open courtyard with a phatak (Gate). However, I would not like to express any final opinion regarding the question whether the decree is nullity or not as the case has been remanded back to the Judge, Small Causes Court where the matter would be gone into and decided. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that Act XIII of 1972 has been enacted for the protection of the tenant based upon public policy and hence no decree for eviction of tenant from any accommodation can be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 20 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. In order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant whose tenancy is governed by the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972, the plaintiff must make out a case for eviction in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the court can pass a decree for eviction only if it is satisfied on the evidence that a ground for passing such a decree in accordance with the requirements of the Statute has been established. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the present case the compromise decree was not passed in accordance with the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 and hence it was a nullity and in support of his submission relied on the case of Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, reported in AIR 1975 SC 2130 . The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the present case the compromise decree was not passed in accordance with the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 and hence it was a nullity and in support of his submission relied on the case of Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, reported in AIR 1975 SC 2130 . In that case the Supreme Court observed thus :- "If, however, parties choose to enter into a compromise due to any reason such as to avoid the risk of protracted litigating expenses it is open to them to to do so. The court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise. In such a situation the only thing to be seen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirements of the law. In other words, parties cannot be permitted to have a tenant's eviction merely by agreement without anything more. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law...............If the agreement or compromise for the eviction of the tenant is found, on the facts of a particular case, to be in violation of particular rent, restriction or control Act, the court would refuse to record the compromise as it will not be a lawful agreement." 8. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that a reading of the compromise decree does not indicate that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is entitled to have such a decree under the law. The consent decree does not indicate that it is based on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 20 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 and, hence, before passing the decree there is nothing on the record that the court was justified on evidence that a ground for passing such a decree in accordance with the requirements of the Statute has been established and hence in the circumstances of the case the consent decree is a nullity. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied on Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpat Ram Iccha Ram, reported in AIR 1974 SC 471 where also it was held that the consent decree for possession could validly be passed by the court only if there was material to show in the shape of express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself which could constitute a ground for eviction under the Statute. The case has been remanded to respondent no. 1 on this aspect also. Since the points on which the case has been remanded by the revisional court go to the root of the jurisdiction, and it is only a case of remand, in the circumstances of the present case I feel that this is not a fit case for interference at this stage under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the circumstances, no grounds have been made for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution and the case has rightly been remanded to decide the questions which go to the very root of the jurisdiction and hence it is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties will bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.