ORDER Ravi S. Dhavan, J. - Ramji Lal Sharma, the petitioner is a lawyer. Ordinarily the vocation of a litigant is irrelevant. In the present case it is relevant. The facts cannot be better noticed than as placed by the petitioner in the very first paragraph of the writ petition which reads : "That the writ (should be 'suit') No. 191 of 1970 was filed by the opposite parties for the ejectment of the petitioner from the premises 1-D/14 Band Road, Allahabad and the aforesaid suit was decreed by an order dated 114-1980. 2. The suit was filed 18 years ago. Even the ex parte decree took ten years. The rest is a case of a host of applications for the recall of the ex parte orders. The record reveals that the ex parte orders were permitted by the petitioner and the recall of them was the style set to the litigation by the petitioner. The background of the litigation, its origin and history and skiagram and cardiogram of its progress at times intermittent and on occasions a dead stop and then a rejuvenation resulted in the petitioner remaining, in possession in the premises where he was a tenant. The ingenuity of the pattern of the litigation, is clearly of a lawyer's game. If this is the pattern of general litigation then people should be losing faith in the system which imparts public justice. 3. The chronology of the litigation has been set on record by Hon'ble D.S. Sinha J. when the petitioner tried the modality of seeking transfer of the case from the jurisdiction of the trial. court which was executing the decree. This Court cannot help but express that it cannot notice facts in better perspective than the Hon'ble Judge has noticed them. This judgment would not be complete without facts as noticed by Hon'ble D.S. Sinha, J. in Civil Misc. Transfer Application No. 661 of 1987 decided on May 5, 1988 Ramji Lal Sharma v. Civil Judge. This decision is reported in 1988 All U 812. 4. A certain passage from the judgment of the aforesaid decision is relevant. This is: "46. Behind the cover and cloak of every move of Sri Sharma there has been and there is sinister motive and foul design not to allow the decree for his ejectment to be executed and he has, hitherto, succeeded in his mission. 4. A certain passage from the judgment of the aforesaid decision is relevant. This is: "46. Behind the cover and cloak of every move of Sri Sharma there has been and there is sinister motive and foul design not to allow the decree for his ejectment to be executed and he has, hitherto, succeeded in his mission. The tactics adopted by Sri Sharma, which have resulted in grossest abuse of the process of the Court and are destructive of judicial system itself, cannot be allowed to debase the process of the court any further". 5. Thereafter the Hon'ble D.S. Sinha, J. passed the following directions for the trial court; these were : "47. For what has been stated above the application of Sri Sharma dated 11-3-1988 fails and is hereby dismissed with compensatory costs which are quantified as Rs. 2000/- only. He is directed to pay to the decree holder opposite parties the said sum of Rs. 2000/- together with a sum of Rs. 380/- by way of costs imposed upon him by the Civil Judge, Allahabad, on various dates while granting him adjournment, within a period of three weeks from today. 48. As a consequence of the dismissal of the application dated 11-3-1988 the interim order Dated 11-3-1988, staying further proceedings in Execution Case No. 38 of 1984, Rajendra Kumar and others v. R.I. Sharma pending in the Court of Civil Judge, Allahabad stands discharged. 49. Further the Civil Judge, Allahabad is directed to proceed with the Execution Case No. 38 of 1984, Rajendra Kumar and others v. Ram Ji Lal Sharma, without any further delay and ensure that the decree under execution, is executed within a reasonable period but in no case later than four months from today. Application dismissed". 6. This writ petition was well timed. The brief was ready on July 10, 1988, sworn often July 11, 1988, presented for reporting before the registry on July 12, 1988. It was filed before Hon'ble V.N. Khare, J. on July 13, 1988 entertaining fresh writ petitions in the jurisdiction concerned. Hon'ble V.N. Khare, J. directed the matter to be placed before another Judge. The same day, a Hon'ble Senior Judge before whom the matter was presented directed that it be laid before this Court. This was during the post lunch session and close to the rising of the Court. Hon'ble V.N. Khare, J. directed the matter to be placed before another Judge. The same day, a Hon'ble Senior Judge before whom the matter was presented directed that it be laid before this Court. This was during the post lunch session and close to the rising of the Court. On that day this court passed the following Order : "This matter has been presented before this Court as a consequence of one of the Hon'ble Judges directing the matter to be presented before another Court today. The petitioner, has presented this matter in person. In effect the order against which stay is sought is of 30 May 1988 appended as Annexure 11 to the writ petition. The court enquired whether again the order of 30 May 1988, aforesaid any application has been moved before the Civil Judge, Allahabad. On this aspect there is no information available on the record of the writ petition. Upon enquiry of the Court the petitioner intimated that Yesterday i.e. 12 July 1988 an application was moved before the learned Civil Judge, aforesaid, accompanied by an affidavit seeking recall of the order dated 30 May 1988. It is unfortunate that a copy of this application-affidavit was not appended to this writ petition. In these circumstances it would not be appropriate to grant an ad interim order in this writ petition which otherwise has been presented almost at the time of the rising of the Court. The application seeking an ad .interim order is thus rejected. Placed as unlisted tomorrow". 7. The matter was then taken up the next day by which time counsel for the opposite party got wind of the present writ petition and gave a brief resumed of facts otherwise not mentioned in the context of the petition; he asserted that there had been material suppression of facts. He further intimated the Court that the petitioner has not paid rent. On the last submission the Court made an enquiry from the petitioner. The answer of the petitioner was that there were certain arrangements between him and the landlord by which the property where he resides was meant to be sold to him. The court told the petitioner that until there is a sale no law gives him dispensation not to pay.rent and that rent had not been paid is not in issue but an accepted fact. The court told the petitioner that until there is a sale no law gives him dispensation not to pay.rent and that rent had not been paid is not in issue but an accepted fact. Exercising equity in favour of the landlord the court directed the petitioner that he will not be heard until and unless he deposits the entire rent due before the trial court to satisfy that part of the decree. This Court on that day passed the following order : "Before any other matter is considered one aspect discernible from the record is that rent for use and occupation of the premises has not been paid as a consequence of which Suit No. 191 of 1970 had been filed. That rent has not been paid has been accepted, but in defence it is explained that it was not payable as there was a promise to sell the accommodation in dispute to the petitioner. There is neither any agreement to sell and the existence of a sale deed does not arise. On record the status of the petitioner is that of a tenant. He is otherwise an Advocate. The decree is a money decree representing arrears of rent, damages. etc. and also seeks dispossession of the petitioner from the suit premises. A reference to the amount which is due in pursuance of the decree as in September 1985 can be had from Annexure 2 to the writ petition, a copy of the decree holder application before the execution court. Even after September 1985 to date the rent has not been paid. In order that the respondents do not suffer further damages, it will be equitable that rent be paid to them. Before this Court permits the petitioner to submit on any other matter on merits, in the face of arrears of rent and a consequential decree seeking its realisation, the money decree must be paid to date. Thus, in addition to the amount under the decree the petitioner shall deposit rent till September 1988 before the Court of the Civil Judge, Allahabad, on or before 17 August 1988. The amount under the decree and rent up to August 1988 may be withdrawn by the respondents without furnishing security. The amount deposited before the Court of Civil Judge, Allahabad, shall be under intimation to the learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Ratnakar Chaudhary, Advocate, who had entered appearance today. The amount under the decree and rent up to August 1988 may be withdrawn by the respondents without furnishing security. The amount deposited before the Court of Civil Judge, Allahabad, shall be under intimation to the learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Ratnakar Chaudhary, Advocate, who had entered appearance today. When the petition is listed next the certificate showing proof of payment before the Court below is to be placed before this Court. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent seeks ten days' time to file a counter affidavit in reply to the writ petition. A rejoinder affidavit may be filed within ten days after the receipt of the counter affidavit. Till 23-8-1988 the dispossession of the petitioner from the premises in dispute shall remain stayed. List as part heard on 22-8-1988. If for any reason the case is not listed either party has been given the liberty to mention that the matter may be taken up for consideration. List with the record of Writ Petition No. 7704 of 1986: Ramji Lal v. Civil Judge & others) and Transfer Application No. 66 of 1987: Ramji Lal Sharma v. Civil Judge, Allahabad, decided on 5-5-1988. A certified copy of the order may be issued to learned counsel for the parties on payment of requisite charges within twenty four hours." On the contention of material suppression of facts not mentioned in the text of the petition, the submission of the learned counsel for respondent was noticed and parties were directed to exchange affidavits so that the matter could be decided on merits. 8. On merits the arguments on behalf of the petitioner were (a) That the respondent leandlord had agreed not to execute the decree or dispossess the petitioner upon an arrangement that the premises would be sold to him and the decree was satisfied outside the Court and (b) an amendment sought by the landlord to update the decree on the quantum of arrears of rent was misconceived. 9. While this Court goes into the merits of the matter, the facts as are noticed by Hon'ble D.S. Sinha, J., 1988 All U 812. (supra) a decision between the same parties has been kept in mind and must not be lost sight of. In fact the facts as noticed by Hon'ble D.S. Sinha, J. are facts on record before this Court and before the Court below. (supra) a decision between the same parties has been kept in mind and must not be lost sight of. In fact the facts as noticed by Hon'ble D.S. Sinha, J. are facts on record before this Court and before the Court below. This judgment would not be complete without note of the narration of facts in the decision, aforesaid. 10. In the counter affidavit the contesting respondents have taken a plea of material suppression of facts. Respondents have placed on record the background of the litigation. Respondents also mention that this is the fifth time that the petitioner has approached High Court to thwart the decree seeking arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation of the premises and the dispossession of the petitioner. The facts as set on record in the counter-affidavit are no different than those noticed in the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble D.S. Sinha, J. Indeed the petitioner has been to this Court five times with the ultimate purpose of stalling the execution of the decree seeking his dispossession from the premises in question. Cases which the petitioner filed before this Court are(1) Writ petition No. 19480 of 1985: Ramji Lal Sharma v. Civil Judge and others; (2) Writ Petition No. 7704 of 1986; Ramji Lal Sharma, Advocate v. Civil Judge, Allahabad and others; (3) Civil Misc. Transfer application No. 13 of 1987; Ramji Lal Sharma, Advocate v. Civil Judge, Allahabad and others; (4) Civil Misc. Contempt application No. 607 of 1987; Ramji Lal Sharma, Advocate v. D. S. Sinha and another and (5) Civil Misc. Transfer application No. 66 of 1987; Ramji Lal Sharma, Advocate v. Civil Judge and others. The first four cases are noticed in paragraph 2 of the judgment (supra) and the last case is noticed in paragraph 19 of the judgment. These are not mentioned in the text of the writ petition being considered by this Court. 11. If the respondent's counsel had not entered appearance a day after when the writ petition was presented and accepted notice on August 14, 1988 then notices could possibly have been issued on the writ petition, permitting it to remain pending. On its face value the writ petition may have been admitted and this Court would have been responsible for frustrating the execution of the degree. On its face value the writ petition may have been admitted and this Court would have been responsible for frustrating the execution of the degree. Withholding information from a Court on adverse orders having been passed in the same litigation and between the same parties and enjoying the protection of yet another ad interim order under the circumstance of yet another case, makes a mockery out of the process of the judicial system. What is more disturbing is that this material suppression of facts has taken place by a litigant who belongs to the fraternity of the legal profession. The petitioner has been angling with the court procedures and baits to stay orders by concealing vital information that litigation between him and his landlord is over. 12. Grossest disrespect which can be shown to the Court is suppression of facts. Keep away the facts from the Court and the decision will be upon facts as are available. Put all the facts together the decision may be different. If the Court were to consider the facts as have been placed in the writ petition, indeed the Court would have been misled into entertaining a petition against a non- existent injustice. But upon arrival of the facts in the counter-affidavit the entire sequence of events changes. A lawyer's ingenuity and familiarity with Court procedure has made the Court room a venue to play roulette. The stay order could have been granted upon facts as presented. 13. No further enquiry needs to be made by this Court in the manner in which facts have been suppressed in the writ petition. A reading of the writ petition, the counter-affidavit, the rejoinder affidavit and the judgment (supra) of Hon'ble D.S. Sinha, J. bear out that facts after facts were kept away from this Court. Material suppression of facts, in the present writ petition is a matter on record. This circumstance alone is enough to disentitle the petitioner from any relief in this extraordinary jurisdiction. The petitioner as a lawyer is also a litigant. While Courts feel free to express against ordinary litigants when their conduct is wrong, should there be a different yardstick when the litigant happens to be a lawyer? 'Suppressing facts from a court repels equity which breaks shackles of law, if otherwise favourable to a citizen seeking redress before a court. The court must accept this proposition for its own protection. 'Suppressing facts from a court repels equity which breaks shackles of law, if otherwise favourable to a citizen seeking redress before a court. The court must accept this proposition for its own protection. Should facts be suppressed in a plaint the trial court must throw out the plaint. The principle is no different if this happens in a writ petition before the High Court. Courts are not meant to suffer falsehoods. The Allahabad High Court was one of the first to lay down the pre-conditions for entertaining petitions to the High Court, in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, popularly known as writ petitions. This was a decision given close on heels of the enactment of the Constitution of India. This is a case decided by a Full Bench in Asiatic Engineering v. Achhru Ram reported in AIR 1951 All 746 (FB).. The judges in the Full Bench were conscious of the salutary principle to be applied by courts when parties seek the help of the extraordinary powers on a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The word 'salutary' is significant. This is what the Full Bench said : "51. In our opinion, the salutary principle laid down in the cases quoted above should appropriately be applied by Courts in our country when parties seek the aid of the extraordinary powers granted to the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. A person obtaining an ex parte order or a rule nisi by means of a petition for exercise of the extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution must come with clean hands, must refrain from making misleading statements and from giving incorrect information to the Court. Courts, for their own protection, should insist that persons invoking these extraordinary powers should not attempt, in any manner, to misuse this valuable right by obtaining ex parte orders by suppression, misrepresentation or misstatement of facts. Applying this principle to the present case, we feel that, in this case, the petitioner Company has disentitled itself to ask for a writ of prohibition by material suppression's, misrepresentations and misleading statements which have been found by us above.......... The Full Bench further went on to observe : "56......... Applying this principle to the present case, we feel that, in this case, the petitioner Company has disentitled itself to ask for a writ of prohibition by material suppression's, misrepresentations and misleading statements which have been found by us above.......... The Full Bench further went on to observe : "56......... The issue of this writ is entirely discretionary with the Court and this being so, it is, in our opinion, open to a Court to refuse it in cases where for example a Court of equity would, in the exercise of a sound discretion, refuse to lend its protection. Essentially the purpose for which a mandamus exists is to ensure that justice is done in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy exists......" 14. After all the petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari so that the Court may discern from the record injustice which the petitioner claims and remedy the situation in accord with law, by granting retributive justice. The parameters of a writ of certiorari were also given in this Full Bench decision : "58. Certiorari originated in Britain as an original writ issuing out of Chancery or the King's Bench, to Judges or officers of inferior Courts, commanding them to return the records of a cause pending before them. Initially it was a writ for the rectification of errors on the criminal side. It later became a remedial measure in civil cases at common law. At the present moment what certiorari or what the Court by the writ of certiorari does is to require the record of proceedings in some cause or matter pending before an inferior court, judicial tribunal or quasi- judicial tribunal to be brought before it so that it may deal with it and ensure speedy justice. It has to be observed that the writ of certiorari can only be used with respect to judicial as distinguishable from ad-ministrative acts." 15. The decision of the Full Bench laid in perspective the power of the Court to interfere in granting justice in satisfying itself from the record that an inferior court or tribunal needs to be corrected on an error of law or procedure. As a matter of fact unless a special order is made the record does not come before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. As a matter of fact unless a special order is made the record does not come before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. Parties are put on trust by the High Court to faithfully disclose the record. Faithful disclosure of the record implies that what is set on record of any proceedings is the record. Litigants are put upon faith to disclose the truth and nothing but the truth. It is for this reason that the Full Bench was laying down the proposition that should a litigant be guilty of material suppression of facts, justice be denied straightway. The petitioner is not an ordinary litigant. He is a lawyer by profession and practices at the Bar of the High Court. This Court has no hesitation in certifying that his conduct is one unbecoming a member of the Bar. If the same comment would have been reserved for an ordinary litigant there is no reason why the Court should not express this in strong terms to criticise the conduct of a lawyer. If every litigant were to do what the petitioner has done, faith in the judicial system of this nation will be eroded. The court will never permit itself to be reduced to the status of an imbecile and suffer the shock of questioning the credibility of a system which imparts public justice. 16. The petitioner cannot be permitted to rehash issues again and again simply because he suppressed facts every time he brings issues to this Court and the Court is led to entertain a petition only to discover subsequently that the matter has already been decided upon the same facts in the same proceedings and between the same parties. 17. Now the merits of the matter. material suppression of facts apart. 18. The petitioner resists the decree of dispossession on the plea that there is an arrangement between him and the landlord to confer upon him the status of being an owner. A lawyer litigant makes such a submission, but the formality of the arrangement otherwise known as a contract, open the petitioner has not seen. If an illiterate person were to talk of a contract resting on an arrangement without formalisation required by law, the Court would be slow to lend its ears. Here a lawyer talks of a contract of shifting his status from a tenant to an owner. If an illiterate person were to talk of a contract resting on an arrangement without formalisation required by law, the Court would be slow to lend its ears. Here a lawyer talks of a contract of shifting his status from a tenant to an owner. There is no documentation in writing of any agreement to sell, and the best part is that the petitioner concedes that there is none available. Parties have not reduced their terms in writing, the question of which being registered does not arise and no consideration has passed between them. There is no free consent to even this so-called arrangement as the landlords have always been hostile to the petitioner as their tenant. Contracts are not made in an atmosphere of belligerence; and belligerent the petitioner has been. A so-called arrangement of the petitioner cannot withstand any test under law which would govern it, and otherwise known as the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 19. This writ petition is a ruse of a tenant who continues to occupy an accommodation consequent upon a litigation which is terminal after judgment, and the decree is put into execution to seek dispossession. The bailiff has been knocking on the petitioner's door, and the only thing the petitioner can think of to repel the writ of dispossession, is an arrangement by which he feels he had become owner. For tenants to become owners under the law, the foundations of such an assertion must be based on unshakable assertions. 20. The last contention of the petitioner was that the amendment application of the decree-holders, the contesting respondents, dated September 29,1985 was misconceived. The objections of the petitioner, as judgment-debtor are dated 22-5-1986. The argument is itself misconceived. The amendment sought by the decree holders under Order VI, Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, was wholly consistent with the judgment and decree. Every time the decree frustrated in not being executed, the value of the money decree was changing. It was, after all, a decree realising rent and damages for use and occupation of a premises. Every month which passed would add the amount representing the rent or damages to the decree. Bringing the monetary value of the decree upto date was consistent with the judgment upon which the decree rested. It was, after all, a decree realising rent and damages for use and occupation of a premises. Every month which passed would add the amount representing the rent or damages to the decree. Bringing the monetary value of the decree upto date was consistent with the judgment upon which the decree rested. The petitioner as a judgment-debtor evades the decree, but has no hesitation in raising an objection that it must not be brought up to date. Every month the decree will see a change in the amount unless the rent and damages are paid. The contention of the petitioner that a decree for eviction and consequently for realisation of arrears of rent and damages for use or occupation cannot be amended to bring it up to date by incorporating unpaid damages which add up every month when not paid is an absurd proposition. The petitioner disturbs the rule of mitigation of damages which accrues month after month, and then objects to its computation. This cannot be permitted. 21. There must be a finality to this litigation between the landlord and tenant, who had neither paid rent and had frustrated every attempt to execute the decree. This is the sixth case which the petitioner brought to the High Court. It did temporarily serve its purpose in putting the decree in abeyance since the filing of the writ petition and this decision. The petitioner has neither any case nor any law in his favour and is himself responsible in turning the equity against him by material suppression of facts and playing with the procedure of the Court by misusing his position as an advocate. This Court mentions this aspect again because the petitioner himself had no hesitation in telling the execution court, the Civil Judge, Allahabad in his objection 37(c), that he is "the practising Advocate of the Hon'ble High Court". No lawyer in any Court has an immunity to abuse the process of the court and the petitioner is no exception. Deliberate withholding of facts from this Court is a matter of record, and other instances of abuse of the processes of court proceedings by the petitioner are noticed in the judgment in 1988 All U 812 (supra). The petitioner is not a person, who is entitled to any relief from this court in this writ petition and it must be dismissed. The petitioner is not a person, who is entitled to any relief from this court in this writ petition and it must be dismissed. The decree for dispossession of the petitioner and his agents and assignees must be put in motion forthwith. 22. The petition is thus dismissed with costs.