Mohd. Aleem v. Mohd. Abrar — 1988 DIGILAW 1078 (ALL)

JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This is tenant's petition arising from a suit for ejectment from accommodation and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The petitioner has lost before both the Courts below who have upheld the claim of the landlord for eviction on different grounds. 2. The landlord opposite party claimed eviction from accommodation on two grounds; (1) the tenantpetitioner had committed default in payment of rent and (2) he had made material alterations in the tenement. Neither Court has passed the decree of eviction on the alleged material alterations in the tenement & the same is no longer the subjectmatter of dispute Facts relating to the surviving disputes may only be stated now. 3. The dispute in the petition pertains to a house situate at Idrisganj tahsil and district Hardoi. The suit which has given rise to the present petition was filed by Mohammad Abrar opposite party no. 1. He claimed to be the owner and landlord of the said suit land & alleged the petitioner to be his tenant. His plea was that the petitioner had fallen into arrears of rent from January, 1981 to December, 1982 and the said arrears were demanded through notice dated 221983 which was served upon the petitioner on 1721983 but no payment was made. On this basis, the landlord claimed that the tenantpetitioner had committed default in payment of rent. Tenancy of the petitioner was also terminated through the said notice 4. The petitioner did not dispute the fact that he was tenant in the accommodation in question. He also did not dispute that opposite party no. l was the landlord of the accommodation in question. His plea however was that opposite party no. 1 was not the sole landlord of the house but he was one of the landlords. According to him, the house previously belonged to Ali Husain, father of opposite party no. 1 and he had taken the house on rent from him. It was asserted that on the death of Ali Husain, his rights in the house were inherited by his sons Mohammad Mukhtar and Mohammad Abrar and his widow. On this basis, it was asserted that the suit on behalf of opposite party Mohammad Abrar alone was not maintainable. The petitioner challenged the validity of the notice also. 5. It was asserted that on the death of Ali Husain, his rights in the house were inherited by his sons Mohammad Mukhtar and Mohammad Abrar and his widow. On this basis, it was asserted that the suit on behalf of opposite party Mohammad Abrar alone was not maintainable. The petitioner challenged the validity of the notice also. 5. In order to save himself from eviction on the basis of default in payment of rent, the tenantpetitioner deposited amount in the trial Court under Section 20 (4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (U P Act No. 13 of 1972). 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed as many as 7 issues, issue no. 1 related to default in payment of rent and issue no. 2 related to the rate of rent Issue no. 3 related to liability regarding payment of Jal Kar. Issue no. 4 covered the petitioner's plea that the suit was not maintainable as it had not been filed by and on behalf of all the landlords. Issue no. 5 touched the validity of notice. Issue no. 6 related to the alleged material alterations in the building. The last issue no. 6 was general regarding the relief, if any, to be granted to the plaintiff. 7. Under issue no. l, the trial Court upheld the plaintiffopposite party's plea of default. Under issue no. 4, it was held that opposite party no. l alone was entitled to maintain the suit. The validity of the notice was upheld under issue no. 5. Issue no. 6 was answered in favour of the tenantpetitioner by holding that the alleged alteration did not amount to material alteration. 8. As already mentioned, the petitioner deposited amount under Section 20 (4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and, therefore, decree for eviction could not be passed against him despite the finding of default in payment of rent being in favour of the landlordopposite party. However, the trial Court observed that the petitioner's plea that opposite party no. 1 was not the sole landlord of the accommodation in question amounted to denial of his title and decree for eviction could be passed on this basis. He accordingly proceeded to pass decree for eviction on the basis of denial of title of opposite party no. 1 by the petitioner. 9. 1 was not the sole landlord of the accommodation in question amounted to denial of his title and decree for eviction could be passed on this basis. He accordingly proceeded to pass decree for eviction on the basis of denial of title of opposite party no. 1 by the petitioner. 9. Against the above judgment and decree of the trial court, the petitioner preferred revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act before the learned District Judge, Hardoi which came to be heard by the Vth Additional District Judge who upheld the trial Court's findings of default in payment of rent and denial of landlord's title by the tenantpetitioner. Accordingly the decree for eviction from accommodation was confirmed. However, the revisional Court was of the opinion that the deposit made by the petitioner under Section 20 (4) was not made at the first hearing of the suit and, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit conferred under the said Section Thus, while the trial Court based its decree for ejectment on denial of landlord's title alone, the revisional Court based it on denial of title as well as on default in payment of rent which default was not saved by the deposit purportedly made by the petitioner under Section 20 (4). 10. The defendantpetitioner has challenged all the above findings of the revisional Court. 11. I have heard Sri Umesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri H.P. Srivastava learned counsel for the defendantopposite party. 12. I will first take up the question of deposit under Section 20(4). 13. For considering the validity of deposit under Section 20 (4), certain dates fixed in the case and proceedings drawn on the said dates are relevant and they may immediately be stated. The learned counsel for the landlordopposite party has placed before me certified copies of order sheets of relevant dates. From these copies, it appears that the plaint, after it had been filed, was put up before the Presiding Officer on 1751983 who directed it to be registered, fixing 25111983 as the date of final hearing. Summon was directed to be issued, for date fixed viz. 25111983. The ordersheet of 15111983 records the fact that the judicial power of the Court was suspended and the defendant had been served by affixation of summons. Summon was directed to be issued, for date fixed viz. 25111983. The ordersheet of 15111983 records the fact that the judicial power of the Court was suspended and the defendant had been served by affixation of summons. Thus on this date, the Presiding Officer of the Court did not have judicial powers to deal with the case. 1211984 was the next date fixed with direction to the plaintiff to take steps both ways for service of summons. The summons sent by registered post for 1211984 was received back with the endorsement of refusal. This was treated by the trial Court as sufficient service of summons. This is apparent from the order sheet of 1211984. On this date, the plaintiff was present but the defendant was absent. The Presiding Officer continued to be lacking in judicial powers Therefore, the case was adjourned to 2421984. Between 1211984 and 2421984, judicial powers became available to the Presiding Officer. The order sheet dated 2421984 records the fact that the defendant had been served by refusal of the summons issued by registered post for 1211984 and he was absent. Suit was directed to proceed ex parte and 1431984 was fixed for ex parte hearing. On 1431984, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant appeared before the Court with the consequence that the suit was dismissed in default of appearance of the parties. Thereafter, it was restored to its original number on 2591984 & 23101984, was fixed for final hearing. Much before 23101984, the tenantpetitioner made deposit purportedly under Section 20 (4). The petitioner filed written statement and contested the suit. The suit was decreed by judgment and order dated 1121986. Thereafter, it was restored to its original number on 2591984 & 23101984, was fixed for final hearing. Much before 23101984, the tenantpetitioner made deposit purportedly under Section 20 (4). The petitioner filed written statement and contested the suit. The suit was decreed by judgment and order dated 1121986. Section 20 (4) reads as follows: In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of subsection (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under subsection (1) of Section 30, the court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on the ground pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground. Provided that nothing in this subsection, shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential buildings in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. Explanation For the purposes of this subsection (a) the expression first hearing means the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on she defendant; (b) the expression cost of the suit includes onehalf of the amount of counsel's fee taxable for a contested suit. Under the above provision, a tenant can save himself from the liability of ejectment, when ejectment is claimed on the basis of default in payment of rent, only if he deposits the amount mentioned therein at the first hearing of the suit. The term first hearing has been defined in the Explanation. It is the date mentioned in the summons served upon the defendant. If the summons mentions two or more dates, it is the first of such dates. This follows from the use of the expression the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons. The term first hearing has been defined in the Explanation. It is the date mentioned in the summons served upon the defendant. If the summons mentions two or more dates, it is the first of such dates. This follows from the use of the expression the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons. It is also the requirement of Explanation (a) that the summons should have been served upon the defendant. | Therefore, a date mentioned in a summons which has not been served upon the defendant is irrelevant. In the Full Bench Decision of this Court in Sia Ram v. District Judge, Kheri 1984 (1) ARC 410, it has been held that the date of first hearing referred to in Section 20 (4) is the date mentioned in the summons and not any adjourned date. In Smt. Vimla Tripathi v. The Vth Additional District Judge Writ Petition No. 3752 of 1983, decided on 881983, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that if on the date mentioned in the summons, the Presiding Officer of the Court concerned is absent or the Court is not available for taking up the case on that date, then, the date mentioned in the summons will not be treated to be the date of first hearing. The Full Bench did not agree with this view and observed the only exception would be cases where the Court is closed, either formally or for all practical purposes though not formally, and even in those cases, the deposit should be made on the very next date on which the Courts open or are able to function. If this principle is applied to the facts of the present case, the deposit made by petitioner cannot be said to have been made at the date of first hearing of the suit or before it. According to the defendantpetitioner the date of first hearing of the suit was 23101984, the date fixed for final hearing after restoration of the suit to its original number on 25 91984. 14. The summons served upon the petitioner contains only one date viz. 1211984. This is, therefore, the date of first hearing. On this date, the Court was not closed either formally or for all practical purposes. 14. The summons served upon the petitioner contains only one date viz. 1211984. This is, therefore, the date of first hearing. On this date, the Court was not closed either formally or for all practical purposes. The hearing was merely adjourned and another date was fixed because the Presiding Officer did not possess judicial powers to deal with the case. But lack of judicial powers was not an impediment in the compliance of Section 20 (4) by the petitioner. This provision uses 3 expressionspays, tenders and deposits in Court. Compliance of any of the three requirements entitles the tenant to the protection afforded by Section 20 (4). In complying with the first two requirements, the Court does not come in picture at all. It is not the requirement of Section 20 (4) that payment or tender of the amount must be made in the presence of the Presiding Officer. It is not the case of the petitioner that he tendered the amount to the landlord but the latter refused to accept the same. 15. Lack of judicial power in the Presiding Officer was also not an impediment in the deposit of amount in Court. For deposit under Section 20 (4), no permission is required from the Court. It is a statutory right conferred upon the tenant. Accordingly, when a tenant submits treasury challan to the Court, the Presiding Officer has merely to append his signature thereon, He cannot refuse to append his signature. He accordingly does not perform any judicial act when he appends his signature. Signature of the Presiding Officer on the challan is an administrative requirement. From the order sheets, it is apparent that the Presiding Officer was lacking merely in judicial powers; administrative powers he possessed. There was thus no impediment in petitioner's way of depositing the amount contemplated under Section 20(4) in Court at the first hearing of the suit. 16. Let me assume that signing of treasury challan is judicial act and the challan could not have been signed by the Presiding Officer lacking in judicial powers. The filing of challan in Court can be no stretch of imagination be said to be a judical act. A challan is not required to be filed in Court. In fact, in the subordinate Courts, challans are mostly filed in offices and thereafter, they are put up before the Presiding Officer alongwith the office report. The filing of challan in Court can be no stretch of imagination be said to be a judical act. A challan is not required to be filed in Court. In fact, in the subordinate Courts, challans are mostly filed in offices and thereafter, they are put up before the Presiding Officer alongwith the office report. If the petitioner had filed challan on the date of first hearing or earlier and the same had been returned to him after two months duly signed by the Presiding Officer and the petitioner had then deposited money on that challan, the deposit would have related back to the date on which the challan was filed. The Full Bench has observed in paragraph 15 of the report ''normally the presence of a Presiding Officer on a particular date of hearing should not act as an impediment in the way of the defendant filing his tender for deposit under Section 20(4). The Presiding Officer of the link Court can pass suitable orders on that application. Indeed it is well settled that of tender his been submitted within time but the Court itself does not accept the tender immediately, any deposit made on the tender when accepted should relate back to the date when the tender was submitted......... Thus, from whatever angle the matter may be looked at, the conclusion is in capable that the blame in not complying with the requirement of depositing the amount at the first hearing of the suit attaches to the petitioner himself and not to the Court. The petitioner cannot get advantage of his own fault or blame. Referring to the principles (i) lex non cogit ad impossibilia and (ii) actus curiae naminen gravabit, the Full Bench observes that the said principles cannot be extended to cases where failure to make the deposit is not relatable to Courts' working but to some cause personal to the defendant or his counsel. In the present case the failure of the petitioner to deposit the amount is not relatable to Courts' working. Accordingly, the delayed deposit of the amount under Section 20(4) gives no benefit to the petitioner. 17. In the present case the failure of the petitioner to deposit the amount is not relatable to Courts' working. Accordingly, the delayed deposit of the amount under Section 20(4) gives no benefit to the petitioner. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner however submits that the question of deposit, paying or tender arises only when there is a Court in existence and for the existence of a Court, it is essential that there should be a Presiding Officer equipped with the necessary judicial powers. A Court with a Presiding Officer not possessing such powers is no Court in the eye of law, the counsel contends. For the reasons already recorded, I am unable to accept the submission. 18. A few authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner may now be examined. 19. 1982(1) ARC 565Jagrinath and another v. Ram Chandra Srivastava and another was relied upon for the submission that before a date mentioned in the summons is treated to be the date of first hearing of the suit, it is necessary for the Court to record finding that the said summons have been duly and properly served upon the defendant, In paragraph 10 and 13 of the report, the expression summons has been duly served has indeed been used. However, in the present case, finding of service of summons is not lacking. Ordersheets of 1211984 and 2421984 record Court's opinion regarding due service. Ordersheet dated 1211984 mentions MATTER IN HINDI and the ordersheet dated 2421984 recites defendant served by refusal through registered post for 1211984. Absent ......... The word due has of course not been used by the Court below but from the language of the orders, it is apparent that the Court was satisfied about the correctness of the report made by the postman viz that the defendant refused to accept the registered article. Due service requires nothing more than this. The petitioner does not appear to have asserted before the Courts below that the report of the postman was wrong or that the acceptance of service by refusal of summons was wrong. There is no reference to it in the judgment of the revisional Court. Even in the writ petition, there is no challenge against the service of summons. This authority is, therefore, of no assistance to the petitioner. 20. There is no reference to it in the judgment of the revisional Court. Even in the writ petition, there is no challenge against the service of summons. This authority is, therefore, of no assistance to the petitioner. 20. 1981 ARC 130 Shambhoo Nath Mehrotra v. Nath Kishore Agarwal and others and 1982 (2) ARC 447 Jagdish Prasad Sharma v. Additional District Judge, Lucknow and others were also relied upon for the same proposition of due service of summons. The challenge relates to factual matter which was not raised before the Courts below and as already observed cannot be entertained at this stage. 21. In Smt. Mithlesh Kumari v. IInd Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1982 ARC 33, it was held that the presumption of service of registered article arising from the postal endorsement of refusal is rebuttable. For rebuttal a factual dispute has to be raised. In the present case, as already observed, no factual dispute regarding service of summons was raised by the petitioner. 22. As against the above authorities, the learned counsel for the landlordopposite party has cited 1982 (1) ARC 161, Babu Ram Gupta v. Daya Shanker Pandey and 1985 (2) ARC 344 Shi Kumar Sharma v. IVth Additional District Judge. Meerut and another for submitting that the date of first hearing is not altered even where after service of summons the suit is decreed ex parte and the said ex parte decree is later set aside. On the analogy of these decisions, the date of first hearing will not be altered where, after service of summons, the suit is dismissed in default of appearance and later restored to its original number, as in the present case. 23. Both the Courts below have held that the petitioner committed default in payment of rent within the meaning of Section 20 (2) (A) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. This finding has not been challenged by the petitioner. In view of this finding coupled with the finding that the deposit under Section 20 (4) was not made at the date of first hearing of the suit, the decree passed by the Courts below cannot be set aside. 24. Before taking leave of the matter relating to deposit of Section 20 (4), I may mention that both the Courts below have committed manifest error in determining the date of first hearing. 24. Before taking leave of the matter relating to deposit of Section 20 (4), I may mention that both the Courts below have committed manifest error in determining the date of first hearing. According to the trial Court, 23101984 was the date of first hearing. He has not considered 1211984 as the date of first hearing because on this date, the Presiding Officer did not possess judicial powers to deal with the case. The next date 2421984 has also not been treated as the date of first hearing because from the ordersheet, it was not clear as to who had written same and who had signed it. In other words, the entry was of doubtful genuineness and validity. For me same reason, the next date 1431984 fixed on 2421984 has also not been treated as the first date of hearing On 1431984, as already noticed, the suit was dismissed in default of appearance. Thereafter, it was restored to its original number on 2591984 when 23101984 was fixed for final hearing. The trial Court has considered 23101984 as the this date, amount had been deposited in Court, the trial Court took the view that Section 20 (4) had been complied date of first hearing and since before with. For the reasons already recorded, this view cannot be accepted. Suspicion about the ordersheet dated 2421984 cannot invalidate the date mentioned in the summons issued for the prior date 1211984. The date 1211984 was fixed on 25111983. About the ordersheet dated 25111983, or the proceedings of that date, no doubt or suspicion has been expressed by the trial Court. Therefore, the trial Court committed manifest error in holding 23101984 as the date of first hearing, 25. The revisional Court has held 2421984 as the date of first hearing and has not held 1211984 as the date of first hearing on the ground that on that day the Presiding Officer did not possess judicial powers to deal with the case. As already observed lack of judicial power was not an impediment in the compliance of the requirements of Section 20 (4). Accordingly, this was not a valid reason for the revision Court not to treat 1211984 as the date of first hearing. 26. The above findings are sufficient to dismiss this petition. However, learned counsel for the parties have advanced arguments on the question of denial of title also. Accordingly, this was not a valid reason for the revision Court not to treat 1211984 as the date of first hearing. 26. The above findings are sufficient to dismiss this petition. However, learned counsel for the parties have advanced arguments on the question of denial of title also. Both the Courts below have found that the petitioner denied the title of the landlord within the meaning of Section 20(2) (f). 27. It has already been noticed that the petitioner does not say that the plaintiffopposite party has nothing to do with the premises in question or with its landlordship. He admits the plaintiffopposite party's status as his landlord but asserts that alongwith him, his mother and brother are also the landlords. In other words, the plaintiff is admitted to be only one of the landlords and not the sole landlord. One serious objection raised on behalf of the tenantpetitioner is that no issue had been framed on this question. Another plea is that the alleged denial of title took place after the institution of the suit and during the pendency thereof which constituted fresh cause of action and on the basis of this fresh cause of action, no decree for eviction could be passed in the suit which has given rise to the present petition. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the only remedy available to the landlord was to file a fresh suit after serving fresh notice of termination of tenancy. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that on the basis of the facts available on record, the petitioner cannot be said to have denied the title of the landlord. 28. Although the trial Court framed issues, none was framed in respect of the alleged denial of title. The certified copy of the trial court's judgment does not mention the issue under which this matter and the matter of deposit under Section 20 (4) has been dealt with. It appears that both these matters have been dealt with under the general issue no. 7. The trial Court his relied on paragraph 12 of the written statement for holding that the petitioner denied title of the plaintiffopposite party. It appears that both these matters have been dealt with under the general issue no. 7. The trial Court his relied on paragraph 12 of the written statement for holding that the petitioner denied title of the plaintiffopposite party. It is observed that in this paragraph the petitioner has stated that after the death of Ali Husain, his sons Mohammad Mukhtar and Mohammad Abrar (plaintiff) and his widow became the owners of the property in question and since the suit had been filed by only one of them it was not maintainable. After referring to paragraph 12, the trial Court refers to petitioner's reply to the opposite party's notice, Ex. 2, in which he has stated that there was partition in the family of the plaintiffopposite party and the house in question fell to the share of Munshi Mukhtar Saheb and when dispute arose between Munshi Mukhtar Saheb and plaintiffopposite party, the premises in suit fell to the share of the latter. Reference has been made to paragraph 5 of the notice Ex. 2 in which the petitioner has specifically stated that now the plaintiff is the owner of the premises and he has been paying rent to him regularly month by month. The trial Court observes that as against the clear admission of exclusive ownership of the plaintiffopposite party contained in reply to the notice, the defendantpetitioner has in his written statement and in deposition before the Court denied the plaintiff's claim of exclusive ownership. In his deposition before the Court the defendantpetitioner has introduced the name of plaintiff's sister Afsar also as one of the owners of the property in question. This according to the trial Court amounts to denial of landlord's title within the meaning of clause (f) of Section 20(2). 29. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the allegation that alongwith the plaintiff, others are also the landlord does not amount to denial of landlords' title. In Narain Das Khanna v. Jawahar Lal Bhatia 1982 (2) Allahabad Rent Cases 1 (DB), the plea that the plaintiff was not the sole landlord of the premises in question and that apart from him others were also the landlord was treated to be denial of landlord's title within the meaning of Section 20 (2)(f). In Narain Das Khanna v. Jawahar Lal Bhatia 1982 (2) Allahabad Rent Cases 1 (DB), the plea that the plaintiff was not the sole landlord of the premises in question and that apart from him others were also the landlord was treated to be denial of landlord's title within the meaning of Section 20 (2)(f). In paragraph 7 of the report, the Division Bench has observed it may be true that the defendant had merely asserted that there were some more landlords of the premises in question, but that definitely resulted in denying the sole proprietorship or the exclusive right of the plaintiff to realise the rent. Same view was taken in AIR 1958 Allahabad 847 (DB) Hashmat Hussain v. Saghir Ahmad and others (see paragraph 18). In view of these decisions, it cannot be said that the petitioner did not deny the title of the plaintiffopposite party. 30. The question that now survives for consideration is whether the aforesaid denial of title contained in the written statement could be relied upon by the Courts below for passing a decree of eviction from the accommodation in question on the basis of material existing on record. Clause (f) of the Act which makes denial of landlord's title a ground for claiming eviction reads as follows : (f) that the tenant................... denied title of the landlord, and the latter has not waived his right of reentry or condoned the conduct of the tenant. This clause contemplates two things (1) there should be denial of landlord's title by the tenant, and (2) the right of reentry arising from such denial should neither be waived nor the conduct of the tenant be condoned. Existence of first condition alone is not sufficient to pass a decree for eviction under clause (f). Whether there has been waiver or condonation or not in a question of fact. On a question of fact, there must be pleading and evidence. In the pleading it will not be enough for the plaintiff to say that the defendant has denied his title. He will also have to say that he has not waived his right of reentry arising from such denial and that he has not condoned the conduct of the tenant. Only then the requirement of the clause will be complied with. As already observed, apart from pleading there should be evidence also in support of the second requirement. He will also have to say that he has not waived his right of reentry arising from such denial and that he has not condoned the conduct of the tenant. Only then the requirement of the clause will be complied with. As already observed, apart from pleading there should be evidence also in support of the second requirement. To bring on record evidence, the plaintiff will have to enter ihe witness box and state that he neither waived the right of reentry nor condoled the conduct of the tenant. Only then the Courts will be entitled to pass a decree of eviction on the basis of denial of title by the tenant. When this procedure is followed, the defendant also gets opportunity to put his defence in respect of the plea. Without following this procedure, he gets no opportunity to plead and prove that the plaintiff had waived the right or condoned his conduct. 31. Admittedly, the plaint was not amended. Thus, there is no pleading to attract clause (f). The defendant, therefore, got no opportunity to show that clause (f) was not attracted. The two Courts below have found the defendant liable to eviction under clause (f) on the mere finding that he denied the title of the plaintiff. No finding has been recorded in respect of the other requirement of the clause viz. that there should be no waiver of right or condonation of the conduct. In fact, there is no reference to any evidence also so far as the latter requirement is concerned. Thus] on the question of waiver or condonation, there is neither pleading nor evidence. Therefore, the requirements of clause (f) have not been complied with. Accordingly, the decree of eviction cannot be sustained under clause (f) although it is sustainable under clause (a). 32. The tenantpetitioner raised the controversy that the denial should precede the institution of suit. In view of the finding recorded above, it is not necessary to go into this controversy. 33. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed with costs of opposite party no. 1. Interim order, if any, shall stand discharged. (Petition dismissed)