ORDER Dr. T. N. Singh, J.- 1. By an order passed under National Security Act, 1980, for short, the 'Act', on 15-10-1987 by District Magistrate, Morena, the petitioner came to be detained for a period of 12 months on that order being confirmed by the State Government after the petitioner was heard by the Advisory Board. 2. True it is, one of the important and unfortunate aspect of the case is that the petitioner could not file representation contemplated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and indeed, it appears from the writ petition filed in this Court that he is illiterate, subscribing his thumb impression to the writ petition. In the Return, it is admitted that the petitioner did not file any representation and as such, neither the Advisory Board, nor the State Government had any occasion to consider his representation. In this context, our attention is invited to a decision of this Court in Bharat and others, 1986 Cri. L. J. 1976= 1986 MPLJ 420 wherein one of us (Dr. T. N. Singh, J.) took the view on the basis of Apex Court's decision in A. K. Roy, AIR 1982 SC 710 , Abdul Zabbar, AIR 1983 SC 505 that the constitutional requirement of reasonable opportunity being provided to the detenu for making effective representation before the Board also obligates the Board in terms of Section 11 (1) of the Act to consider even oral representation of the detenu made with a "friend's assistance". Indeed, it was observed that when the detenu appears before the Board and he is to be heard without a "representation", it becomes the duty of the Court to question him if he would require assistance to submit any representation. 2-A. In the instant case, we have examined the proceedings of the Advisory Board which only discloses that "grounds of detention were communicated to the detenu giving him an opportunity to make a representation against the detention order". 2-A. In the instant case, we have examined the proceedings of the Advisory Board which only discloses that "grounds of detention were communicated to the detenu giving him an opportunity to make a representation against the detention order". It is also noted that the detenu was heard, but there is nothing to be read in the proceedings of the Advisory Board to suggest that any representation of the detenu was before the Board or that the defendant was asked whether he was in any manner handicapped in making representation and whether he required any assistance in that regard On these facts, in the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the petitioner's constitutional right under Article 22 (5) has been infringed because at no stage he was given any assistance to make an effective "representation" contemplated under Article 22 (5). Indeed the Board also failed to act under Section 11 of the Act by which the petitioner was deprived of his valuable constitutional right to opt for a written representation. 3. We come now to the grounds because Shri Suresh Gupta, whom we appointed as State Defence for the unrepresented petitioner, addressed us on other legal contentions bearing on the "Grounds", Though counsel's main contention was based on one of the aspects of the decision in the case of Kamal Kishore Saini, AIR 1988 SC 208 we found it impossible to deal with that contention in the absence of foundational facts. He draw our attention to para 7 of the decision to submit that the several facts stated in the "grounds" indicate that the criminal offences mentioned in several "Grounds" were registered for investigation and we must assume that the investigation culminated in submission of charge sheet. Therefore he submits non-supply to the petitioner of the statements under Section 161 Cr. P. C in respect of those offences has infringed petitioner's constitutional right under Article 22 (5). Unfortunately, we have no material before us either to conclude that in each case in respect of criminal activities of the petitioner mentioned in each of the grounds, charge-sheet was submitted or when it was submitted. Unless it is known to us that on the date of the preparation of the "Grounds" any chargesheet had been submitted on the basis of statement recorded under Section 161, Cr. Unless it is known to us that on the date of the preparation of the "Grounds" any chargesheet had been submitted on the basis of statement recorded under Section 161, Cr. P. C., it is not possible for us to hold that those "statements" formed integral part of the "grounds" and those had to be supplied, therefore, to the petitioner to pre-empt infraction of his constitutional right. We do not, even for a moment, entertain any doubt about the settled position that such documents as form integral part of the grounds must be supplied to the petitioner to ensure fulfilment of the constitutional requirement (See Narendra Purshotam, AIR 1979 SC 420 , Iccbu Devi, AIR 1980 SC 1983 , Shalini Soni, AIR 1981 SC 431 , Ummusaleema, AIR 1981 SC 1191 . However, in the instant case, as already pointed out, that grievance of the petitioner, we are not in a position to investigate. 4. Still, reliance of Shri Gupta on Kamal Kishore Saini (supra) would avail him in respect of his other contention that none of the five Grounds can, in any view of law and fact, be related to the objective of "Public Order" because the activities speak merely of problems of "Law and Order". 5. That apart, we also find much substance in his contention that some of the grounds are stale as well. 6. Let us first recall that in the instant case, the detention order was passed on 15-10-1987 and Grounds were drawn up on 17-10-1987. The first ground speaks of an incident that took place on 23-9-1985 at 3.15 p.m. This Ground, in our opinion, is both, stale and irrelevant. Indeed, as appears from one of the enclosures of the "Grounds", that an offence under Section 307/34, I.P.C. was registered against the petitioner and another for assault with a knife to one Ramsanehi. The mere fact that the assault was made in the public place as stated in the Ground would not, in our view, bring it within the purview of "Public Order". 6-A. True, the second incident of 22-2-1986 as also the third incident of 4-1-1987 are said to have taken place at the public place. Those also, in our opinion, would not bring those Grounds within the purview of "public order". 6-A. True, the second incident of 22-2-1986 as also the third incident of 4-1-1987 are said to have taken place at the public place. Those also, in our opinion, would not bring those Grounds within the purview of "public order". Because, in the first case, the allegation is that the petitioner brought out a Katta to intimidate one Ramesh in front of his shop after abusing him in filthy language, while in second case, the petitioner is said to have made an assault in the same manner to extort Rs. 5,000/- from one Mayaram and in doing so he was assisted by one Pancham. 6-B. In so far as Ground No.3 is concerned, there is nothing in that as it speaks of an occurrence of 28-6-1986 in which 5/6 persons are said to have made a plan to commit a dacoity of whom dacoit Bhagwansingh and Anwar were apprehended and it is said that petitioner and his companion Pappu succeeded in escaping the Police-net. As to the last and surviving Ground No.5, suffice it to say that the occurrence which is said to have taken place at 8.30 p.m. on 8-8-1987 at a time when one Darshanlal is said to be returning home after easing himself, cannot have any impact on public life and tranquility undoubtedly in a simple case of an individual Darshanlal being attacked with a knife, making the crime punishable under Section 341/324/506-B, I.P.C. as appears from the enclosure, aforesaid. Therein, it is mentioned that Crime No. 196/87 was registered in respect of that offence. Indeed, in respect of other offences too, mentioned in the different grounds, numbers of crimes are given in the same enclosure. 7. In Kamal Kishore Saini (supra), their Lordships examined the earlier decisions of the Court to bring out in clear focus the distinction between "Law and Order" and "Public order" albeit beginning with the earlier decision in Ram Manohar Lohiya's case, AIR 1966 SC 740 and tracing the development of law to Gulab Mehra's case, AIR 1987 SC 2330. We had occasion recently to discuss ratio of the decision cited in Brajrai, M. P No. 57 of 1988; decided on 6-5-1988. We had occasion recently to discuss ratio of the decision cited in Brajrai, M. P No. 57 of 1988; decided on 6-5-1988. We have taken the view in that case, referring also to earlier decisions of this Court, that the mere fact of the criminal offence being committed at the public place would not upgrade the criminal activity to make the same an incident of "public Order" because of the holding in Kamal Kishore Saini (supra) and other decisions of their Lordships that offensive act or activity of detenu must have wide-spread effect so as to dislocate the even tempo of life of the community. 8. In the instant case, after examining each of the five Grounds, which we have summed up in the preceding paragraph, we entertain no doubt at all that several activities of the detenu mentioned therein are not referrable to "Public Order". Each of the grounds is, in our opinion, irrelevant to the statutory objective and the detaining authority did not, therefore, have jurisdiction to detain the petitioner on the basis of those grounds. Indeed, we have also expressed the view that Grounds No. 1, 2 and 3 which refer to incidents as old as of 2/3 years are to be regarded as stale as well. 9. For all the foregoing reasons, we are constrained to hold that the petitioner's continued detention is illegal and unconstitutional. The detention order Annexure R/1 dated 10-10 -1987 and the confirmation orders dated 9-12-1987 and 15- I 2-1987 Annexures R.8 and R/9 respectively are accordingly quashed. The petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in any other case. Though the petition is disposed of, the matter concerning the contempt in respect of an interlocutory order passed in this matter prohibiting the petitioner and other similar detenue being hand-cuffed survives consideration and disposal. The same question arises in some of the petitions already disposed of and also in some pending petitions. We propose to deal with that question cummulitively on a later date.