JUDGMENT : K.C.Agrawal, J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Smt. Indira Pathak for quashing the order of II Additional District Judge dated 19-8-1988, allowing the review application of plaintiff-respondent no. 3, Parmarth Prakash, the landlord. 2. Briefly stated the facts are these Suit no. 393 of 1981 was filed by Parmarth Prakash through his father, Dr. Gyan Prakash, Advocate, for the following reliefs : (i) that a decree be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant directing eviction of the defendant from the accommodation in suit and delivery of its actual vacant possession to the plaintiff. (ii) that a decree be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant for recovery of Rs.199.17 being the amount of rent due from the defendant. (iii) that a decree be passed in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs.8.33 per day since 13-9-1981 as compensation for use and occupation till the date of eviction of the defendant from the suit accommodation-requisite court fee on which shall be paid in the execution side. He claimed the premises 22-C, Sardar Patel Marg, Allahabad was constructed and completed on 1-4-1973 within the meaning of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, therefore, the said Act had no application. His claim was that tenancy was although at will, but the plaintiff gave a notice by registered post dated 11-8-81, as a result of which the tenancy stood terminated on 18-9-1981. He claimed that the defendant was liable to pay at the rate of Rs.8.33 per day since 18-9-81 as compensation for use and occupation till the date of her eviction. The suit for recovery of Rs.1699.17 was filed on 18-9-1981. 3. The defendant-petitioner filed a written statement claiming that U. P. Act XIII of 1972 since applied, on decree for ejectment could be passed without a ground mentioned in Section 20 of the said Act being fulfilled or established. On 15-7-83, the plaintiff applied for amendment of the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming water tax. Paragraph 1 (c) of the amendment application reds as under :- "That thus the U. P. Act XIII of 1972 became applicable to the accommodation in suit with effect from 16-2-83 and the defendant is liable to pay water tax also, which is 12% of the assessed rental, i. e. Rs. Paragraph 1 (c) of the amendment application reds as under :- "That thus the U. P. Act XIII of 1972 became applicable to the accommodation in suit with effect from 16-2-83 and the defendant is liable to pay water tax also, which is 12% of the assessed rental, i. e. Rs. 6 p. m. from 16-2-83." 4. The suit was decreed ex-parte on 21-7-84 by the Judge Small Cause Court for eviction as well as for the recovery of damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs.250/- per month with effect from 18-9-1981. The defendant, Smt. Indira Pathak, preferred a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, which on being transferred, was allowed by Additional District Judge on 18-5-1987, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Vineet Kumar v. Mangalsen Badhera, 1984 AWC 128. In this case, the Supreme Court held : "The premises, which was not ten years old on the date of the suit and was exempted from the operation of new Rent Act, can be governed by it after ten years expired during the pendency of the litigation. The moment a building becomes ten years old to be reckoned from the date of completion the Rent Act would become applicable. ". 5. The Supreme Court distinguished the decision given in O. P. Gupta v. Drigvijendrapal Gupta, 1982 AWC 226, in which the rights of the parties were decided on the basis of law as it stood on the date of the institution of the suit. The Supreme Court while distinguishing Vineet Kumar v. Mangalsen Badhera (supra) Held : "It was not at all necessary in that case to deal with the question whether the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of Section 39 as the building had not become ten years' old on the date when the revision petition was heard. In the instant case, however, the building had become ten years' old during the pendency of the suit, therefore, the question assumes importance in the present case." 6. Relying on that decision, the learned Additional District Judge allowed the revision by setting aside the decree for ejectment and recovery of arreas of rent. Plaintiff-respondent no. 3, thereafter, moved an application under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the review of the judgment of the Additional District Judge. Relying on that decision, the learned Additional District Judge allowed the revision by setting aside the decree for ejectment and recovery of arreas of rent. Plaintiff-respondent no. 3, thereafter, moved an application under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the review of the judgment of the Additional District Judge. The review was allowed by the order and judgment dated 19-8-1988. Against this judgment, the present writ petition has been filed by the defendant, Smt. Indira Pathak. The first question that was raised by the counsel for the petitioner was about the applicability of Section 39 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Section 39 provides that upon the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum with costs of the suit being deposited, no decree for eviction shall be passed on any ground, mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (1) of any clauses (b) to (g) of subsection (2) of Section 20. The authorities relied on by Sri B. D. Mandhyan are reported in Vineet Kumar v. Mangalsen Badhera (supra) and Shiv Kumar v. Jawahar Lal, 1988 AWC 1245. Respondent no. 3 contested the proposition canvassed by the petitioner and urged that rights of the parties had to be decided in accordance with law, as it was in force on the date of filing of the suit and since on that date, Act No. XIII of 1972 did not apply, Section 39 could not be taken advantage of by the defendant-petitioner. For the submission made, reliance had been placed on the following decisions :- (i) Om Prakash Gupta v. Drigvijendra Pal Gupta, 1982 AWC 226 (ii) Nand Kishore Marwah v. Smt. Sundari Devi, 1987 AWC 1261 (iii) Atma Ram v. Ishwari Devi, AIR (?) SC 2031. 7. Sri B. D. Mandhyan, counsel for the petitioner, admitted that there is a conflict in the decisions given by the Supreme Court, but Shiv Kumar v. Jawahar Lal, being the latest, has to be followed by this Court. 8. Having given serious consideration to the submission made by the counsel for the parties, I may refer to a decision of the Full Bench of Patna High Court reported in Amar Singh v. Shanti Devi, AIR 1987 Pat. 8. Having given serious consideration to the submission made by the counsel for the parties, I may refer to a decision of the Full Bench of Patna High Court reported in Amar Singh v. Shanti Devi, AIR 1987 Pat. 191 , where it was said : "Where there is a direct conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by equal Benches, the High Court must follow that judgment which appears to it to state the law more elaborately and more accurately." While taking that view, the Patna High Court did not agree with the decisions of the Allahabad High Court reported in U. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U. P., AIR 1977 All. 1 and Gopal Krishna Pandey v. V Additional District Judge, 1981 AWC 321 . Allahabad High Court Full Bench held that : "It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court's decision in Mysore State Transport Corporation, is latter in time. Even if there is some conflict in two Supreme Court's decisions, we have to follow the law as declared in the latter case of Mysore State Transport Corporation." I am bound by the Full Bench of our Court. 9. The decision given in Shiv Kumar v. Jawahar Lal Verma, 1988 AWC 1245 is latter in point of time. 10. Respondent no. 3 argued that the observations made in Shiv Kumar v. Jawahar Lal are obiter inasmuch as the facts did not justify the Court going to the question whether section 39 applied or not. Be that as it may, even obiter of the Supreme Court is binding, as held by a Full Bench of our Court in Chobey Sunder Lal v. Sonu, 1967 AWR 426. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the decision of the Supreme Court is binding even if some aspects have not been taken into account in its judgment. In T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1973 SC 974 . The Supreme Court held : "Merely because the aspect presented in the present appeal was not expressly considered or a decision given, that will not take away the birding effect of those decisions of the Supreme Court." Vide Somwanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 . The Supreme Court held : "Merely because the aspect presented in the present appeal was not expressly considered or a decision given, that will not take away the birding effect of those decisions of the Supreme Court." Vide Somwanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 . In G. C Gupta v. N. K. Pandey, AIR 1988 SC 654 the Supreme Court says : "It is sufficient for invoking the rule of Stare decisis that a certain decision was arrived at on a question or was argued, no matter on what reason the decision rests or what is the basis of the decision." 11. IT cannot be said that the decisions relied upon by me for the view taken could apply only to the parties before the Supreme Court. IT has been stated, in this connection, by the Supreme Court in Amit Kumar Neotia v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1353 at page 1361 : ".........That to contend that the conclusion therein applied only to the parties before this Court was to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the judgment to make the mandate of Article 141 illusory." 12. The next question is about the applicability of Section 39 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 to the present case. The I Additional District Judge, allowing the revision, held that Section 39 had been complied with whereas the learned Judge allowing the application for review took a contrary view. Much reliance bad been placed on behalf of the tenant about adjustment of the amount paid as premium to the representative of the landlord respondent no. 3. The fact of having received the premium was denied by Dr. Gyan Prakash in his deposition made in the Court of Small Causes by saying : " Prativadi ka yah kahna galat hai ki unhono mujhe 10,000/- bataur premium diya. Jin kirayedaron se premium liya tha unhe raseed di thee. " The aforesaid controversy raises a question of fact. The defendant had not since participated in the proceedings, he did not adduce any evidence on the same. The plea was taken by her in the written statement. Anything said in the written statement without being established or proved could not be taken into consideration. " The aforesaid controversy raises a question of fact. The defendant had not since participated in the proceedings, he did not adduce any evidence on the same. The plea was taken by her in the written statement. Anything said in the written statement without being established or proved could not be taken into consideration. The Court dealing with application under Section 25 and, thereafter, the review should have, in the interest of justice, permitted the parties to have adduced evidence on the same. In the absence of the evidence, the controversy could not be resolved. Consequently, what 1 think appropriate is to set aside the orders dated 21-7-1984 and 19-8-1988 and to send the revision back for a fresh decision on the controversy of Section 39 by permitting the parties to adduce evidence on the same. 13. Counsel for the respondent no. 3 had submitted that firstly no premium was received by respondent no. 3 and secondly, that the same could not be adjusted towards rent. This controversy will have to be decided by the court below when the matter goes back. It will also find whether compliance of Section 39 had been made or not. 14. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the orders dated 21-7-84 and 19-8-88 are set aside. The revision is sent back for a fresh decision in the light of the observations made above. Petition allowed.