The respondent has filed an application under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereafter the ‘Code’, on the ground that on assurance by the petitioner that he would marry her, she had staffed living with him and came to be in family way and then were married. A child was born but died soon afterwards, The petitioner ill treated her, drove her out of the house and had neglected to maintain her. The respondent accordingly, claimed maintenance from the petitioner. 2. The petitioner had resisted the claim and had denied .that the respondent was never married to him or that he was liable for her maintenance. 3. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order dated 14-12-81 directed the petitioner to pay Rs. 100/-per month as maintenance. 4. Aggrieved, the petitioner has come in revision and -Shri B. Banerjee, learned counsel appearing on his behalf, has submitted that the opposite party-respondent was not the wife of the petitioner, and hence. The impugned order is illegal. On the other hand, Shri H.A. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent opposite party had supported the impugned order. 5. The provisions’ of section 125 of the Code are meant for the protection of children, parent and wives who have no means to support themselves and having been neglected need maintenance. It should be obvious that the provision is available to a ‘wife’ which means that the person who claims to be the wife has the legal status as such, under the law. The matrimonial status of the person may be acquired by any form of marriage recognised by law. ,6. In view of the denial of the petitioner that he was-ever married to the respondent, it is necessary to see whether the respondent was married to the petitioner so that the respondent has the necessary, status of the wife of the petitioner. 7. Mr. H. A. Sarkar, learned counsel for the respondent, has argued that this Court in exercise of its power in revision should not enter into question of fact, that the question of marriage between the parties being a question of fact, this Court cannot go into the same. 7. Mr. H. A. Sarkar, learned counsel for the respondent, has argued that this Court in exercise of its power in revision should not enter into question of fact, that the question of marriage between the parties being a question of fact, this Court cannot go into the same. I am unable to accept the argument for the reason that this Court in revision may under sub section (1) of section 401 of the Code also exercise the powers in appeal, for section 401 provides : "In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Sees. 386, 390, and 391 or on a Court of Sessions by Sec. 3Q7 and, when the Judges composing the Court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by Sec. 392." 8. The respondent in her deposition stated that after he had assured her marriage she had lived with the petitioner for some time and that when she was in a family way they got married, that during her pregnancy the marriage between them was solemnised. Thereafter the second party (that is the petitioner) and the members of the family started torture towards her which became intolerable. She also stated that she had married acceding to Hindu Shastra that one Brahmin administered the oath of marriage and ‘saptapadi’ was performed. 9. The respondent thus asserts that the marriage had taken place according to the Hindu rites and that ‘saptapadi’ had been performed, and that when she was in a family way, the marriage had taken place. However later she said that a child was born, in the house of the second party, before solemnisation of the marriage, which means that she was married after the child was born. It may be seen that this statement is sharply inconsistent with the earlier statement, in regard to the point of time, the marriage had taken place. 10- PW-2 who claimed to be the Brahmin and to have administered marriage oath to the parties said in cross-examination that "on I7th Falguu 1386 B.S. there was no marriage ‘Lagna’, that he only administered the mantra and nothing else, which means that ‘saptapadi’ was not performed. 10- PW-2 who claimed to be the Brahmin and to have administered marriage oath to the parties said in cross-examination that "on I7th Falguu 1386 B.S. there was no marriage ‘Lagna’, that he only administered the mantra and nothing else, which means that ‘saptapadi’ was not performed. This aspect of the matter is clear from the statements of FW-3 Norendra Das and PW-4 Harendra Chandra Das who said that "as the first party was pregnant the ‘saptapadi’ was not held and Kripesh promised to perform that formality after delivery of the 1st party". It is thus clear from the above statements of the respondent’s own witnesses that ‘saptapadi’ was not performed, even though the respondent had said that ‘saptapadi’ was performed. The petitioner has in his statement dented the allegations. 11. On careful, anxious consideration of the above evidence, I am unable to accept the respondent’s contention that she was married to the petitioner, because firstly there is so sharp contradiction, in the statement of the respondent as noted earlier in regard to the point of time of the alleged marriage, and also the performance of ‘saptapadi’ ceremony and secondly because the respondent asserted that she was married according to Hindu Shahstras and ‘saptapadi’ was performed, but in the absence of any satisfactory evidence it is not proved that ‘saptapadi’ was performed. Apart from the statement of PW-2, the statements of PW-3 and PW-4 are quite categorical that ‘saptapadi’ was not performed. The contradiction is by no means insignificant as may be ignored, on the contrary I think that the contradictions are so sharp and material that it is not possible to accept that any marriage had taken place. 12. Shri H. A. Sarkar, learned counsel for the. respondent, has submitted that it is not necessary that ‘saptapadi1 should be performed. It is true that under section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 no specified form of marriage is prescribed. 12. Shri H. A. Sarkar, learned counsel for the. respondent, has submitted that it is not necessary that ‘saptapadi1 should be performed. It is true that under section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 no specified form of marriage is prescribed. Section 7 reads as under : "(I) A Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party thereto (2) Where such rites and ceremonies include the ‘saptapadi’ (that is, the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire), the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken." It may be clear that while no specified form of marriage has been prescribed and ‘saptapadi’ was not a sine qua non for marriage, if the same was in any other form, in the instant case the respondent asserted that marriage according to Hindu Shastras with ‘saptapadi’ was performed, hence it cannot be said that the provisions of sub­section (2) of section 7 are not attracted and accordingly the marriage could not be considered complete unless ‘saptapadi’ was performed. 13. Where a party asserts that the marriage took place in a certain form, and the said form of marriage has certain essential requisite i.e. ceremonies, it should in our opinion, be shown that the said requirements of ceremonies or rites were performed before it could be accepted that marriage had been solemnised. In the present case, I have not found it possible to accept that marriage as pleaded had tajcen place to enable the respondent to invoke the provisions of section 125 of the Code. 14. Shri B. Banerjee learned counsel for the petitioner, has cited Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhab vs. Anantrao Shivram Adhav, AIR 1988 SC 644 , where the Court observed: "The attempt to exclude altogether the personal law applicable to the parties from consideration ;also has to he repelled. The section has been exacted in the interest of a wife, and one who intends to, take benefit under sub-section (1) (a) has to establish the necessary condition,: namely, that she is the wife of the person concerned. This issue can be decided only by a reference to the law applicable to the parties. It is only where an applicant establishes her status on (or) relationship with reference to the personal law that an application for maintenance can be maintained. This issue can be decided only by a reference to the law applicable to the parties. It is only where an applicant establishes her status on (or) relationship with reference to the personal law that an application for maintenance can be maintained. Once the right under ‘the section is established by proof of necessary conditions mentioned therein, it cannot be defeated by further reference to the personal law. The issue whether the section is attracted not cannot be answered except by the reference to the appropriate law governing the parties. In our view the judgment in Shah Bano’s case ( AIR 1985 SC 945 ) does not help the appellant. It may be observed that for the purpose of extending the benefit of the section to a divorced woman and an illegitimate child the Parliament considered it necessary to include in the section specific provisions to that effect, but has not done so with respect to women not lawfully married. Lastly it was urged that the appellant was not informed about the respondent’s marriage with Lilabai when she married the respondent who treated her as his wife, and, therefore her prayer for maintenance should be allowed. There is no merit in this point either. The appellant cannot rely on the principle of estoppel so as to defeat the provisions of the Act. So far as the respondent treating her as his wife is concerned, it is again of no avail as the issue has to be settled under the law. If is the intention of the legislature which is relevant and not the attitude of the party.” 15. It may also be borne in mind that according to the admitted case of the respondent, she had started living with the petitioner and conceived when, according to her, marriage had taken place and soon afterwards she was-ill-treated and after sometime was driven out by the petitioner. In these circumstances, it is difficult to draw the inference of marriage only from the statements of the witnesses; that the respondent and the petitioner lived as husband and wife, on which the learned Magistrate has laid emphasis for his finding. In these circumstances, it is difficult to draw the inference of marriage only from the statements of the witnesses; that the respondent and the petitioner lived as husband and wife, on which the learned Magistrate has laid emphasis for his finding. The statement of the witnesses that the petitioner and the respondent had lived as husband and wife, in my opinion, is not sufficient to justify the conclusion as drawn by the learned Magistrate, firstly Because the marriage as is said to have taken place has not been proved, and secondly the respondent admittedly had been living with the petitioner even before the so-called marriage took place. The presump­tion of marriage in the absence of any evidence of marriage ceremony or even unsatisfactory evidence of marriage may justifiably be made when the persons concerned Jived together for some period of time, and had been treated as husband and wife by the family by the friends or by both or the neighbours. In the instant case, I am unable to find any such evidence and in the absence of any satisfactory reliable evidence, I have: not found it possible to accept that the respondent had been married to the petitioner and had the required legal status of ‘wife’. 16 The learned trial Court had observed that to my mind a young virgin woman cannot easily advertise herself as the wife of a man unless there would not be any attachment between then; to such effect She would not take such risk to welcome scan die in her life without matrimonial finding between them. In the circumstances of the case on record, I am unable to agree for according to the respondent herself, she had lived with the petitioner earlier without being married, and in the absence of satisfactory evidence, I am unable to accept that the respondent is the wife of the petitioner. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of the provision of section 125 of the Code and the, impugned order being erroneous, cannot be sustained. The petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 14.12.81 is set aside and the respondent’s petition under section 125 of the Code is dismissed.