JUDGMENT : L. Rath, J. - The Appellant, a convict, has preferred this appeal from jail having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life u/s 302 IPC for having murdered one Surumani Majhi on 3.10.81 at 6.00 p.m., assaulting him on his head by a pole, M.O. I. It is prosecution case that while Surumani, hereinafter referred to as "the deceased" was standing at the time of the occurrence in front of his house, the Appellant came out of his house and blamed him of having stolen his Kumuda (pumpkin) and so saying dealt a blow by M.O. I. as a result of which the deceased fell down and thereafter the Appellant gave two more strokes and throwing away the M.O. I. filed away. The incident was witnessed by P.Ws.4 and 5 whose evidence has been relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge besides the extra-judicial confession deposed to by P.Ws. 6 and 7 to find the charge established against the Appellant. The information with the police was lodged the next day, i.e. 4.10.81 at 7.00 a.m. by P.W. 1 who belongs to a different village and had been addressing the deceased as uncle (KAKA) though the deceased was not in actuality his paternal uncle. P.W. 1 stated to have been informed by P.W. 4 regarding the death having been caused by the Appellant. 2. So for as the evidence of P.Ws. 4 and 5, the eye-witnesses, is concerned, it is highly discrepant improbabilising their character as witnesses to the occurrence. It is the statement of P.W. 4 that he witnessed the entire occurrence sitting on his verandah and while the Appellant gave the last two blows, the wife of the deceased came out of her house and P.W.5 also arrived there in cross-examination he stated that both he and P.W. 5 reached the spot together after the deceased had fallen down receiving the blows. It is however the evidence of P.W. 5 that he was taking gruel in his house when the wife of the deceased came to call him. P.W. 4 was also taking gruel in his house and he called P.W. 4 therefrom and also informed him that the wife of the deceased had called him to see her husband in front of his house as something had happened. P.W. 4 was also taking gruel in his house and he called P.W. 4 therefrom and also informed him that the wife of the deceased had called him to see her husband in front of his house as something had happened. Such evidence of P.W. 5 completely belies the statement of P.W. 4 of his having witnessed the occurrence. P.Ms. 4 and 5 are relations of the deceased P.W. 5 has admitted the deceased to be his cousin while P.W. 5 has admitted to be a relation of P.W. 5 having married his cousin's daughter. Both P.Ws. 4 and 5 have been found to be not truthful in substantial parts of their evidence and hence it is difficult to rely on the evidence of such persons as eye-witnesses. 3. Excluding the eye-witness account, the remaining evidence against the Appellant is that of the extra-judicial confession to which P.Ws. 6 and 7 are the witnesses. Their evidence is almost identical to the effect that P.Ws. 4 and 5 individually informed them of the Appellant having assaulted the deceased by means of a pole and that on going to his house they found him lying unconscious with bleeding injuries on his head. Both of them individualy went to the Appellant and asked him as to if he had assaulted the deceased and that he replied to have done so since the deceased had committed theft of his pumpkin. While P.W. 4 stated of having informed P.Ws. 6 and 7 about the occurrence, P.W. 5 does not state so, 4. In considering the evidentialy value of an extrajudicial confession, a caution which is well worth of being kept in view is that such confession is not a formal routine affair for an accused and that on the contrary it is against normal human instinct to voluntarily acknowledge a criminal act with the inevitable consequence of being subjected to penal actions including capital punishment. In case of criminal prosecutions in recent times, extra-judicial confessions of accused are noticed as a regular feature and it is for such very reason that the Courts must be on guard against words being planted in the mouth of the accused masquerading as his voluntary statement when in reality it is far removed from truth. It is for such reason that a rule of strict caution is invariably applied before relying upon such evidence. It is for such reason that a rule of strict caution is invariably applied before relying upon such evidence. Here in this case absolutely no reason has been assigned regarding the motive for the confession. The very words used by the Appellant for confession have not been reproduced. P.W. 6 has admitted of having not informed about the extra-judicial confession of the Appellant to anybody in the village and not even to P.W. 1. In the normal circumstances it would have been expected of him to have disclosed the fact to others. P.W.7 though stated of having informed P.Ws. 1, 4 and 5 of the confession or the Appellant before him, yet nothing about it is said by those witnesses, Viewing as a whole, the evidence of both these witnesses does not inspire confidence and does not pass the test on the touch-stone of credibility so as to form the sale basis of his conviction. In the result, I am of the view that the prosecution has not been able to establish the charge against the Appellant as the perpetrator of the crime and for such reason, the conviction and sentence against the Appellant are set aside. The Appellant be set at liberty forthwith. G.S. Patnaik, J. 4. I agree.