JUDGMENT : B.L.Yadav, J. 1. Whether the proviso added by State of U. P. to sub-rule 2 of Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (for short the Code), is inconsistent with the provisions of the Principal Act or the Code as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 ; whether the Labour Organization of Rural Poor registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926, is a "society" within the meaning of sub-clause (d.) of proviso to sub-rule (2) of Order 39 of the Code, and no temporary injunction can be granted in respect of such society ; and whether under the circumstances of the case the order of the trial court dated 4-4-88 passed by the Civil Judge, Ghazipur, granting temporary injunction to the plaintiff, the petitioner, in a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the working of the aforesaid Organization could have been set aside by the order dated 30-5-88 passed by the IIIrd Additional District Judge in appeal filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3, are the short questions that fall for determination in the present petition filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a relief of a writ of Certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 30-5-88 passed by the IIIrd Additional District Judge, allowing the appeal and rejecting the application for temporary injunction filed by the petitioner. 2. The portrayal of essential facts are these. A suit for permanent injunction was filed by the petitioner alleging himself to be the President of the Labour Organization of Rural Poor, a registered society under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The Constitution of the aforesaid Organization provides the mode of activities and functions. A communication was made that the petitioner has been elected as President of the Organization and one Sri Vishwanath Singh was elected as Acting President and Sri Kumar K. Manglik was elected as General Secretary. But incorrectly the defendant respondent nos. 2 and 3 got a news published in the newspaper 'Dainik Jagran' to the effect that respondent no. 3 was the President and respondent no. 2 was the General Secretary of the aforesaid Organization, and started interfering with the petitioner's work as President of the aforesaid Organization. Hence the necessity arose for filing of the aforesaid suit. 2 and 3 got a news published in the newspaper 'Dainik Jagran' to the effect that respondent no. 3 was the President and respondent no. 2 was the General Secretary of the aforesaid Organization, and started interfering with the petitioner's work as President of the aforesaid Organization. Hence the necessity arose for filing of the aforesaid suit. An application for temporary injunction was also filed for restraining the defendants respondent nos. 2 and 3 from interfering with the work of the petitioner as President of the aforesaid Organization during the pendency of the suit. A written statement was filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 alleging that they were elected as Secretary and President in the election held on 26-11-87 wherein Sri S. N. Tripathi (Respondent No. 3) was elected as President and Sri Shameem Ahmad Abbasi respondent no. 2 was elected as General Secretary and the petitioner, as plaintiff ceased to function as such and that Sri Kumar K. Mangalik or Sri Vishwanath Singh were never elected as General Secretary and Acting President. Respondent nos. 2 and 3 have sent a communication to the relevant authorities about their election as President and General Secretary. In reply to the application for temporary injunction filed by the petitioner it was averred that the petitioner was not elected nor he was working as President, the balance of convenience, prima facie case was not made out in favour of the petitioner, the plaintiff, nor there was any irreparable injury to the petitioner as he was not elected as President of the Organization. Consequently, the application for temporary injunction was liable to be dismissed. 3. The learned Civil Judge granted ex-parte temporary injunction in favour of the petitioner and the same was confirmed on 4 -4-88. The appeal filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 against the order granting temporary injunction was allowed by the impugned order dated 30-5-88 and the order of the learned Civil Judge granting temporary injunction was set aside. Against that order the present petition has been filed. 4. The appeal filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 against the order granting temporary injunction was allowed by the impugned order dated 30-5-88 and the order of the learned Civil Judge granting temporary injunction was set aside. Against that order the present petition has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the amendment made by the State of U. P. adding a proviso to Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code, was inconsistent with the provisions of the Principal ' ode or the Act, particularly Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, (for short the Amendment Act), and in view of Section 97 of the Amendment Act, such amendment by the State of U. P. adding the proviso would stand repealed. Reliance was placed on Ganpat Giri v. Ilnd Additional District Judge, Ballia, 1986 AWC 181 and on two Full Bench decisions of this Court in Smt. Chandra Rani v. Vikram Singh, 1979 AWC 4747 (FB) and M/s. Premier Motors (P) Ltd. v. Jaswant Prasad, by a Full Bench of this Court (to which I had the occasion to be a Member), 1988 AWC 1224 FB. It was next urged that the petitioner being elected as president and the trial court having granted interim injunction, there was no justification to set aside that order in appeal. In the end it was urged that the Labour Organization of Rural Poor was not a "society" registered under the Societies Registration Act. The word 'society' in the proviso added to Rule 2 of Order 39 of' the Code refers in respect of the society registered under the Societies Registration Act and not society registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act. Consequently the learned District Judge erred in applying the proviso that as the election was in respect of "society", hence proviso (d) added to Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code would not apply, and the learned District Judge erred in allowing the appeal on that analogy. Contesting respondents have been served and they have filed counter affidavit. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 2 and 3 urged that under section 97 of the Amendment Act what was contemplated was that any such amendment or provision, if the same was inconsistent with the provisions of the principal Act or the Code, that would stand repealed. Contesting respondents have been served and they have filed counter affidavit. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 2 and 3 urged that under section 97 of the Amendment Act what was contemplated was that any such amendment or provision, if the same was inconsistent with the provisions of the principal Act or the Code, that would stand repealed. In the present case the proviso added by the State of U. P. to Rule 2 of Order 39 was not in any way inconsistent with the main provision of Order 39 Rule 1 or 2, inasmuch as circumstances have been indicated under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 under which temporary injunction can be granted, and in respect of circumstances not covered by the provisions of Rules 1 and 2, the injunction could not be granted. Hence the proviso was added indicating different situations or cases in which temporary injunction cannot be granted, as that would entail great hardship, hence the proviso cannot be said to be inconsistent. The Supreme Court case of Ganpat Giri v. A.D.J. (Supra) was not applicable to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as in that case Rule 72 of Order 21 were considered and as the amendment made by the High Court Allahabad was inconsistent with Order 21 Rule 72, (main provision of the Code) hence that was held to be deemed as repealed. In the present case the U. P. amendment could not be said to be inconsistent with Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39. It was next urged that the temporary injunction granted by the trial court and confirmed after hearing the parties, has been correctly vacated by the learned District Judge in appeal. It was further urged that the word 'society' used in proviso (d) added by the U. P. Amendment to Rule 2 of Order 39, was very comprehensive expression including a society either registered under the Societies Registration Act or under the Indian Trade Unions Act. In both the cases no injunction must be granted. 5. It was further urged that the word 'society' used in proviso (d) added by the U. P. Amendment to Rule 2 of Order 39, was very comprehensive expression including a society either registered under the Societies Registration Act or under the Indian Trade Unions Act. In both the cases no injunction must be granted. 5. AS regards the first point as to whether the proviso added by the State of U. P. by Section 13 of U. P. Act No. 57 of 1976, which came into force on 1-1-1977, was inconsistent with the main provisions of Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39, hence the same may be deemed to have been deleted in view of Section 97 of the Amendment Act, suffice it to say that the circumstances have been contemplated under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 as to when temporary injunction can be granted. Whereas in respect of cases or circumstances not covered by Rules 1 and 2, the temporary injunction cannot be granted. By the proviso different cases and circumstances have been indicated where temporary injunction cannot be granted and the said proviso has been added on the basis of public policy. That amendment including proviso (d) where no injunction can be granted in respect of internal management or affairs of any educational institution, or 'society' or any other provision under the proviso cannot be said to be inconsistent, rather it was complementary and supplementary to Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 and need not be deemed to have been repealed. 6. In Ganpat Giri v. IInd Additional District Judge, (Supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering as to whether the amendment made by the Allahabad High Court under sub-rule (2) of Rule 72 of Order 21, was valid or the same being inconsistent can be deemed to have been deleted. It is better to have in brief the provisions of Rule 72 of Order 21 of the Code. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 72 was to the effect that no decree holder, without the express permission of the court, shall bid for or purchase the property, which is sought to be sold in execution of the decree. It is better to have in brief the provisions of Rule 72 of Order 21 of the Code. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 72 was to the effect that no decree holder, without the express permission of the court, shall bid for or purchase the property, which is sought to be sold in execution of the decree. Sub-rule (2) was to the effect where the decree holder purchases with such permission of the court, in that event the purchase money and the amount due on decree may, subject to the provisions of Section, be set off against one another, and in case the decree has been satisfied by such set off, the court shall enter up the satisfaction of the decree. By the Allahabad High Court amendment sub-rules (I) and (3) of Rule 72 of Order 21 were deleted and in sub-rule (2) the provisions were made where a decree holder purchases a property and the expression 'with such permission' was also deleted, meaning thereby that the original provision of sub-rule (1) of Rule 72 contemplated that a decree holder cannot bid or purchase the property sought to be sold in execution proceedings, except with the permission of the Court was replaced by another provision. Now the permission of the court was not required in view of the U. P. Amendment. Hence the basic provision and the object behind it, that without the permission of the court, a decree holder cannot bid in respect of the property sold in execution of a decree was changed with a contrary or a different provision. Permission of the court appears to be required so that the decree holder may not defraud the judgment debtor, or there may be a number of cases where the bid by the decree holder may not be beneficial. With this idea the Legislature enacted sub-rules (1), (2) and (3) of Rule 72 of Order 21. But the High Court amendment made just a contrary provision, rather the basic structure of sub-rules (1) and (3) of Rule 72 was changed or replaced by the High Court amendment. Consequently that amendment was held to be inconsistent and deemed to have been repealed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ganpat Giri's case (Supra). But the High Court amendment made just a contrary provision, rather the basic structure of sub-rules (1) and (3) of Rule 72 was changed or replaced by the High Court amendment. Consequently that amendment was held to be inconsistent and deemed to have been repealed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ganpat Giri's case (Supra). Similar was not the position in the present case, and I am of the considered opinion that the proviso added by the State of U. P. to Rule (2) of Order 39 was neither inconsistent nor the same was deemed to have been repealed. With profound regards it may be stated that where there is inconsistency, the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Ganpat Giri v. Ilnd Addl. District Judge (Supra), would certainly apply. In Full Bench decision of this Court in M/s. Premier Motors (P) Ltd. v. Jaswant Prasad, (Supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the controversy was as to whether the provision of Order XV of Rule 5 of the Code was inconsistent with the provisions of the Principal Code as amended by the Central Act No. 104 of 1976. The similar controversy was set at rest in an earlier Full Bench decision in Smt. Chandra Rani v. Vikram Singh (Supra). But on account of the Supreme Court case in Ganpat Giri v. IInd Addl. District Judge (Supra), wherein the Allahabad High Court amendment incorporated in sub-rules (1), (2) and (3) of Rule 72 of Ordar 21 was held to be inconsistent, the dictum laid down in the earlier Full Bench case of Smt. Chandra Rani v. Vikram Singh, (Supra), was doubted and another Full Bench was constituted as a consequence to reconsider as to whether the earlier Full Bench case of Smt. Chandra Rani (Supra), was still a good law. But after considering the relevant case law on the subject it was held that the dictum laid down in the earlier Full Bench case do not require reconsideration even in view of the Supreme Court case in Ganpat Giri v. Ilnd Additional District Judge (Supra). But after considering the relevant case law on the subject it was held that the dictum laid down in the earlier Full Bench case do not require reconsideration even in view of the Supreme Court case in Ganpat Giri v. Ilnd Additional District Judge (Supra). The substance of the observation in M/s. Premier Motors (P) Ltd. v. Jaswant Prasad, (Supra), is as follows : " The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ganpat Giri v. Had Additional District Judge, 1986 AWC 181 (SC), never intended to hold that all local amendments made by the State Legislature or by the High Court whether they were inconsistent or not, would stand repealed by the Code as amended by the Central Act. The intention clearly was that the provisions of Section 97 sub-rule (1) of the Central Act be given full effect and any prior amendment made by the High Court or by the State Legislature before 1st February, 1977 would stand repealed only if it was not consistent with the provisions of the Central Act ". 7. In the present case as indicated above, considering the proviso added to Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code, it is clear that there was no inconsistency created by the U. P. amendment, rather the said amendment was just, supplementary and complementary. I am of the considered opinion that the said proviso added to Rule 2 of Order 39 by the U. P. amendment is not inconsistent. 8. AS regards the next point about the propriety of grant of temporary injunction, it was not stated in the application for the grant of temporary injunction, nor in the plaint that the petitioner was elected as President in any election held, rather much emphasis was laid just on Annexure-3 to the petition, which was a letter by the petitioner indicating that following office bearers including the petitioner as President were elected on November 24 and 25, 1984 at Kusmih Kalan, Ghazipur. The date at the top was given as 7 January 1988. That appears to be date of letter addressed to the Registrar of Trade Unions, Delhi Administration, 15, Rajpur Road, Delhi-7. But that cannot certainly be treated to be the date of election. The date at the top was given as 7 January 1988. That appears to be date of letter addressed to the Registrar of Trade Unions, Delhi Administration, 15, Rajpur Road, Delhi-7. But that cannot certainly be treated to be the date of election. A bare perusal of Annexure-3 to the petition indicates that in the body of the letter meeting of the general body was indicated to have been held on 24 and 25 November, 1984 and certain office bearers of the Organization were elected including the petitioner as President. In case the meeting of the general body was held on 7-1-88 in that event, the same could have been stated. A number of documents have been filed along with the counter affidavit indicating that respondent nos. 2 and 3 were elected as Secretary and President and they have made a number of correspondence with the relevant authorities about their election and the same was approved also and they were working as such. Consequently, the District Judge was justified in upholding the election of respondent nos. 2 and 3 and in refusing temporary injunction in favour of the petitioner. Reverting to the last question as to whether the word 'society' used in proviso (d) added by the U. P. amendment to Rule 2 of Order 39, would refer to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or would also refer to a society registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act. There is no dispute that the Labour Organization of Rural Poor was a society registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act, and not under the Societies Registration Act. But the expression used under proviso (d) of the U. P. amendment was only the word 'society' and not 'society registered under the Societies Registration Act'. The Courts interpret a particular provision consistent with the expression employed by the legislature to express its intention. It is not for the courts to add or substract from the words of a particular provision. In case the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, that would amount as if the proviso (d) was to the effect 'society registered under the Societies Registration Act'. But that was not the provision. It is not for the courts to add or substract from the words of a particular provision. In case the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, that would amount as if the proviso (d) was to the effect 'society registered under the Societies Registration Act'. But that was not the provision. Very wisely the legislature has used the word 'society' only and not the 'society registered under the Societies Registration Act.' The intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the words used as held in Land Revenue Commissioners v. Hinchy, (1960) AC 748 at page 767 ; and in Land Revenue Commissioners v. Ayrshire Mutual Insurance Co. Ltd., (1946) 1 All ER 637 at page 641 as follows : "What we must look for", Lord Reid once said, "is the intention of Parliament, and I also find it difficult to believe that Parliament ever really intended the consequences which flow from the appellants contention. But we can only take the intention of Parliament, from the words which they have used in the Act." 9. I am of the view that the word 'society' is very comprehensive. It includes society registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act as well and not only the society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Consequently, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted that the word 'society' used in proviso (d) was referring to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act only. 10. In the premises aforesaid, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed. The interim stay dated 13-7-1988 is hereby vacated. Petition dismissed.