ORDER S.D. Aggarwal, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The petitioner, Swarnamala Jain is the landlady. The Cane Development Council is the tenant in the premises in dispute at the rate of Rs. 35/- per mensem. The property in dispute is situate in Bijnor. 3. The case of the petitioners was that she was a teacher at Shamli, District Muzaffarnagar and she retired in June 1981. She is a widow and issuless. After retirement, she shifted to Bijnor, where she is staying in a rented house at the rate of Rs. 10/- per mensem. She does not have any house for residence. Consequently, it was prayed that the portion of the house in dispute which belongs to her, be released in her favour as she requires the same for her personal need. 4. The application was contested by the Cane Development Council. 5. The Prescribed Authority by an order dated 30th Nov. 1984, dismissed the release application. 6. Against the order dated 30th Nov. 1984, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. The Appellate Authority found in favour of the petitioner that her need was bonafide and genuine. It was also found that greater hardship would be caused to her in case the release application is not allowed. The release application, however, was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on the ground that the same should have been moved also by Smt. Raj Kumar Jain, the landlady of the other portion of the property and, consequently, it was held that the application for release was not maintainable. The resultant effect was that though the Appellate Authority found that the need of the petitioner was bonafide and genuine, the release application was dismissed on the ground of being non-maintainable. This order was passed by it on 28th May, 1986. 7. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the present petition has been filed in this Court. 8. I have heard Shri Rishi Ram, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S.R. Singh, learned counsel for the Cane Development Council. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that in respect of the portion which was sought to be released the petitioner was the sole landlady. 8. I have heard Shri Rishi Ram, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S.R. Singh, learned counsel for the Cane Development Council. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that in respect of the portion which was sought to be released the petitioner was the sole landlady. The view taken by the Appellate Authority that the application was not maintainable, was a view manifestly erroneous. 10. It is not in dispute that initially the Cane Development Council had taken the entire house on rent at the rate of Rs. 40/- per mensem. After the house was taken on rent, a partition took place in the family. The portion in dispute came to the share of Swarnamala Jain while the other portion came to the share of Smt. Raj Kumar Jain. Since a decree for partition was passed, the tenancy was split up with effect from the year 1960. The petitioner was paid Rs. 28/- per mensem by the Cane Development Council in respect of her portion and Rs. 12/- per mensem was given as rent to Smt. Raj Kumar Jain of her portion. Once the tenancy was split up and two amounts of rent were given by the Cane Development Council to the two different landladies fresh contract of tenancy came into existence. One contract of tenancy was with Smt. Swarnamala Jain which was at the rate of Rs. 28/- per mensem and other tenancy was with Smt. Raj Kumar Jain at the rate of Rs. 12/- per mensem. In the circumstances, it is clear that so far as the portion in dispute is concerned, the only landlady was the petitioner Swarnamala Jain. Smt. Raj Kumar Jain had nothing to do with the portion in dispute. In the circumstances, the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority that two lessors came into existence in respect of the property in a dispute, is finding which is manifestly erroneous. There was only one lessor, namely, petitioner and one lessee, namely, the Cane Development Council in respect of the property in dispute. In view of this factual position the question of non-maintainability of the application does not arise. The application made by the petitioner Smt. Swarnamala Jain was clearly maintainable. The Appellate Authority has relied on the decision of this Court in Devi Charan v. III Addl. District Judge, Muzaffarnagar, 1980 All Rent Cas 381. 11. In view of this factual position the question of non-maintainability of the application does not arise. The application made by the petitioner Smt. Swarnamala Jain was clearly maintainable. The Appellate Authority has relied on the decision of this Court in Devi Charan v. III Addl. District Judge, Muzaffarnagar, 1980 All Rent Cas 381. 11. This case has been specifically overruled by a Full Bench Decision of this Court in Gopal Das v. Ist Addl, District Judge, Varanasi, 1987 All LJ 494. The Full Bench of this Court has categorically held that where there is a partition of a joint of family premises and the rented portion comes to the share of the co-owner he can maintain an application for release of the premises alone without impleading the other erstwhile co-sharer. In view of the above, the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent has made a submission that the present release application is not maintainable in view of Section 21 sub-section (8) of the Act. This question was not raised before the Prescribed Authority or before the Appellate Authority. It is dependent upon facts as the learned counsel for the petitioner has categorically urged that the premises in dispute is being used for the residence of the Secretary, who is paying the rent in respect of the property. Since the disputed question of fact arises in respect of this submission, it is not open to the respondent to raise this question at this stage. 13. In this result, the petition is allowed. The orders dated 30th Nov. 1984 and 28th May, 1986 are quashed. The release application filed by the petitioner is allowed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. The Prescribed Authority is directed to enforce the release order forthwith.