JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This petition is directed against the order dated 26.6.87 (Annexure5) whereby the petitioner has been placed under suspension. 2. The petitioner was appointed to the post of Hindi Translator in the office of the Senior Divisional Manager on 30.1.86, on 6 months probation. It appears that he was later confirmed on the post. On 26.6.87 the impugned order of suspension was passed by Senior Divisional Manager. Thereafter the same Senior Divisional Manager issued chargesheet dated 13.7.87 (Annexure6). The petitioner submitted his reply on 6.8.87. At this stage the Senior Divisional Manager realised that some of the allegations made in the chargesheet pertained to himself and, therefore, he should not hold the enquiry, He accordingly transmitted the papers to the Regional Manager, opposite party No. 2. The opposite party no. 2 thereafter issued a fresh chargesheet on 7.8,87 (Annexure8). In this charge it was specifically mentioned that the earlier chargesheet dated 13.7.87 was rescinded. 3. The petitioner has challenged the suspension order on the following grounds: (i) No preliminary inquiry was held before the order was issued; (ii) The charges are petty; (iii) Rules 20 and 23 of the General Assurance (Conduct. Discipline & Appeal) Rules, are arbitrary: (iv) When the first chargesheet was rescinded by the second the suspension order automatically lapsed; (v) that the suspension order could not be issued by the person who was himself complainant, and (vi) the second chargesheet was issued without with drawing the first chargesheet. 4. Our attention has not been invited to any law under which a preliminary enquiry is obligatory to be held before a domestic enquiry is commenced. In our opinion it depends upon the facts of each case. Considering the nature of the allegations made against the petitioner in the present case, we are of the opinion that no such enquiry was required. The first ground of challenge, therefore, fails. 5. A perusal of the chargesheet shows that the petitioner Defused to come to the office of the Senior Divisional Manager when, he was. called in his office. In charge no. 3 it is mentioned that he used derogatory language. In charge no. 5, it is stated that the petitioner used abusive and unparliamentary language. In our opinion when a subordinate official uses abusive and unparliamentary language against his Superior and refuses to obey his order, the misconduct cannot be said to be petty. called in his office. In charge no. 3 it is mentioned that he used derogatory language. In charge no. 5, it is stated that the petitioner used abusive and unparliamentary language. In our opinion when a subordinate official uses abusive and unparliamentary language against his Superior and refuses to obey his order, the misconduct cannot be said to be petty. In our opinion the suspension order can not, therefore, be challenged on the ground that it is based on petty charges. 6. The vires of the Rules was tried to be assailed on the ground that the Rules were not placed before the parliament. When the learned counsel was asked to point out the provision of law under which the Rules were required to be placed before the parliament he stated that it is contained in the Rules. He was not able to point out any such provision either in the Act or in the Rules. However we find that such a provision exists in section 39 (2) of the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, J972 (57 of 1972). Whether the Rules were placed before the Parliament or not was a question of fact and should have been raised through the writ petition itself. The writ petition does not contain any such allegation. It is only in the Rejoinder affidavit that an allegation has been made in paragraph 5 to this effect ...and it is further submitted that the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1975, have neither been approved by the Parliament nor been certified under the provisions of Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act and, as such, the said Rules have no force of law and are void abinitio...The averment falls such short of the argument advanced and of the requirements of Section 39 (2). There is no averment that the Rules were not laid before each house of Parliament which is the requirement of Section 39 (2). The averment is that they have not been approved. There is no requirement of approval by the Parliament. The obligation of the Rulemaking authority is to lay the Rules before each House of Parliament and thereafter it is open to the Parliament to modify or annul the Rules. If the Parliament does not modify or annul the Rules, they remain effective. 7. There is no requirement of approval by the Parliament. The obligation of the Rulemaking authority is to lay the Rules before each House of Parliament and thereafter it is open to the Parliament to modify or annul the Rules. If the Parliament does not modify or annul the Rules, they remain effective. 7. From the extracted portion of the Rejoinder affidavit it would be seen that another factual averment was freshly made therein which was not made in the writ petition and that is that the Rules were not certified under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. This again could not be done through Rejoinderaffidavit. However we need not pursue the matter further as this plea was not raised in oral arguments. 8. The learned counsel then invites our attention, to subrule (4) of Rule 20 and submits that this subrule makes provision for operating order of suspension retrospectively which is not permissible. SubRule (4) provides that where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon an employee under suspension, is setaside or declared or tendered void in consequence of or by a decision of court of law and the competent authority, on consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the employee shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the appropriate authority from the date of original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. This stage has not yet been reached in the present case and, therefore, it is not necessary for us to examine the vires of subRule (4) of Rule 20. 9. The vires of Rule 23 is also challenged on the ground that it mentions various penalties which may be imposed after enquiry but it provides no guideline as to when a particular penalty would be imposed. The penalties are divided into two headsMinor penalties and Major penalties. The minor penalties are Censure, with holding of one or more increments either permanently or for a specified period and recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation Subsidiary by negligence or breach of orders. The minor penalties are Censure, with holding of one or more increments either permanently or for a specified period and recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation Subsidiary by negligence or breach of orders. The major penalties are reduction to a lower service, or post or to a lower time scale, or to a lower stage in time scale, compulsory retirement, removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment and dismissal from service. Rule 23 does not prescribe the guidelines but on that account, in our opinion, the Rule cannot be held to be ultravires. 10. The ultimate punishment to be awarded depends upon a variety of circumstances and it is not conveniently possible to codify all the circumstances and tie down the hands of the disciplinary authority in the matter of punishment to be imposed. In a given case even after the guilt has been established the disciplinary authority may take a compassionate view and impose a lenient punishment. Such may be the case where but for the guilt established the employee has all along been faithful and efficient or misconduct or guilt occurred inadvertantly or innocently. Similarly, although the misconduct proved is severe but the employee is on the verge of retirement, the employer may take a lenient view and allow him to retire peacefully. Invariably the punishment will be commensurate with the misconduct established against the employee. For all these reasons we are of the opinion that Rule 23 cannot be said to be arbitrary and invalid. We may mention that the stage for this challenge has also not been reached because the domestic enquiry is still pending and no punishment has yet been imposed. We may also state that the learned counsel for the petitioner has not invited oar attention to any authority on the strength of which the Rule may be held to be invalid or ultravires. 11. Suspension order and the first chargesheet were issued on different dates. One is not dependent on the other. Therefore the suspension order cannot lapse on the cancellation of the first charge sheet, especially when the cancellation is not made with a view to drop the enquiry. 11. Suspension order and the first chargesheet were issued on different dates. One is not dependent on the other. Therefore the suspension order cannot lapse on the cancellation of the first charge sheet, especially when the cancellation is not made with a view to drop the enquiry. It is apparent from the second charge sheet that there was no intention on the part of the opposite party to drop the enquiry against the petitioner. In support of the argument that the suspension order automatically lapses on the issue of second chargesheet no authority has been cited by the learned counsel. 12. The 5th ground of challenge is also without substance. Principles of natural justice do require that a complainant cannot be a judge in his own cause and in view of this principle the complainant cannot ordinarily be the enquiry officer also. Even this rule has exceptions which is not necessary to be dealt with here. However, we are not aware of any authority where this principle may have been applied to the case of suspension from service pending disciplinary proceedings. An enquiry into the conduct of an employee is quasijudicial while suspension pending enquiry is administrative. Principles of natural justice have indeed in recent time been extended to certain administrative actions also but not to all such actions. Ordinarily they apply to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings. Our attention has not been invited by the learned counsel for the petitioner to any authority where the principle canvassed by him may have been applied to a case of suspension pending enquiry. 13. The last ground of challenge is based on incorrect statement of fact in the writ petition and the rejoinder affidavit. In paragraph 19 of the writ petition it has been stated It is further submitted that the earlier chargesheet has not been withdrawn...... In reply to their assertion it was stated in paragraph 18 of the counteraffidavit In fact, a bare perusal of Annextire8 to the writ petition would indicate, that the deponent has cancelled and rescinded the chargesheet issued by Sri I.R. Lamba dated 13.7.1987......... This averment has been made in paragraph 9 of the counteraffidavit also, Replying to paragraph 9 of the counteraffidavit, the petitioner states in paragraph 9 of the rejoinderaffidavit... It is further submitted that the deponent w s never informed that the chargesheet issued to him by Sri Lamba was cancelled. This averment has been made in paragraph 9 of the counteraffidavit also, Replying to paragraph 9 of the counteraffidavit, the petitioner states in paragraph 9 of the rejoinderaffidavit... It is further submitted that the deponent w s never informed that the chargesheet issued to him by Sri Lamba was cancelled. In paragraph 18 of the counter affidavit it has been correctly stated that a bare perusal of Annexure8 of the writ petition, which is a copy of the second chargesheet, would show that the first chargesheet issued by Sri Lamba had been rescinded. Third paragraph of Annexure8 reads as follows: In view of the above, the chargesheet No. Personali/IRI/87 dated 13.7.1987 issued by Sri I.R. Lamba, Sri Divisional Manage , Lucknow DO II is hereby rescinded. It is not understood how in the face of this clear statement in Annexure8 the petitioner could, not only make a false statement in the writ petition, but repeat it in the rejoinder affidavit. It appears that either the petitioner has no regard for truth or has no compunction in making reckless allegations. However, the falsity of the argument is apparent from a bare perusal of Annexure8 of which attention of the petitioner was specifically invited by the opposite parties through their counter affidavit. 14. It is not only the above allegation that has been falsely or recklessly made, the entire writ petition and the rejoinder affidavit have been similarly recklessly sworn. Rule 1 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of Court, 195 requires a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to be accompanied by an affidavit verifying the facts stated therein. It is also stated that such affidavit (or affidavits) shall be restricted to facts which are within the deponent's own knowledge. Chapter IV of the same Rules deals with affidavits. Rule 12 of the Chapter states that except on interlocutory applications an application shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove. A writ petition is not an interlocutory application and therefore, the affidavit should have been confined to those facts only which the petitioner was able of his own knowledge to prove. In several paragraphs of the writ petition and rejoinder affidavit statements of fact and law have been combined together and all such paragraphs have been sworn from personal or own knowledge of the deponent. In several paragraphs of the writ petition and rejoinder affidavit statements of fact and law have been combined together and all such paragraphs have been sworn from personal or own knowledge of the deponent. This is against the Rules of the Court. However, since the writ petition is being dismissed on other grounds nothing more is required to be done in respect of the defective affidavit filed by the petitioner. 15. In view of the above the petition lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with costs to the opposite parties.