JUDGMENT : 1. K. C. Agarwal J.-Out of the seven writ petitions, four were filed by the persons whose land have been declared as surplus by the District Judge, Agra by the judgment dated 18-11-1980. The areas declared as surplus are : Writ Nos. Surplus area 1. 5476 of 1981 : 2343.3067 sq. meters 2.302 of 81 : 103.3394 sq. meters 3. 5499 of 81 : 1730.6019 sq. meters 4. 5503 of 81 : 2140.0434 sq meters The remaining three writ petitions have been filed by the State of U. P. 2. By the aforesaid judgment, the District Judge partly set aside the judgments of the Competent Authority, as a result whereof area declared in each one of these writ petitions by the Competent Authority was reduced. Draft statements prepared by the Competent Authority, under Section 6 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). An objection was filed by the petitioner Kailash Chand in writ petition no. 5476 of 1981 under Section 6 (1) of the Act stating that he was not possessed of any vacant land in excess of the ceiling area. The Competent Authority dismissed the objection by its order dated 12th September, 1978 holding that the petitioner held surplus vacant land, and, accordingly, directed final statement to be prepared under Section 9 of the said Act. The petitioner filed an appeal under Section 33 of the Act. The appeal was allowed partly by the District Judge. He gave the petitioner benefit of 800.875 sq. meters. Accordingly, the area of land declared as surplus was reduced. By the judgment of the District Judge reducing the area, State of U. P. felt aggrieved and has thus filed the following writ petitions : 1. Writ No. 4031 of 1981, 2. Writ No. 4032 of 1981 and 3. Writ No. 4033 of 1981. 3. On behalf of the State, learned counsel urged that the District Judge committed an error in excluding the land underneath the boundary wall altogether and in not taking the same into account while calculating the extent of the vacant land. 4. In State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson, 1983 AWC 798 the controversy as to what was to be excluded or what was to be taken into account to calculate the vacant land was considered. 4. In State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson, 1983 AWC 798 the controversy as to what was to be excluded or what was to be taken into account to calculate the vacant land was considered. The Supreme Court held : "Section 4 (9) contemplates that if a person holds vacant land as also other portion of land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit, the extent of land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto shall be taken into account in calculating the extent of the vacant land." Consequently, the District Judge was wrong in leaving the area underneath the boundary wall for all purposes. The area had to be considered for the purpose mentioned in State U. P. v. L. J. Johnson (supra;. The principles laid down in Johnson's case was that the total area of the land of a land-holder had to be first determined and if the total area, built or unbuilt, fell below the ceiling limit prescribed for a particular category of town, there would be no question of any excess land, but if there is excess land beyond the ceiling limit, the same would have to be taken over by the Government. The method of calculation of the ceiling limit has been given by the Supreme Court in this decision. 5. Consequently, the learned District Judge was wrong in directing that the site of the boundary wall would not be treated as vacant land. 6. Another question that was argued by the learned State counsel was whether the chabutra could be considered as a building and, as such, the learned District Judge committed an error in creating the chabutra as the separate building and in leaving out the area underneath the same as well as giving 500 sq. meters around it on that basis. The word 'building' has not been defined in the Act. Section 2 (e) of the Act defines 'dwelling unit'. The definition given is as under : "(e) "dwelling unit", in relation to a building or a portion of a building, means a unit of accommodation, in such building or portion used solely for the purpose of residence." The learned District Judge held: "Therefore, 2409.00 sq. meters plus 500 sq. Section 2 (e) of the Act defines 'dwelling unit'. The definition given is as under : "(e) "dwelling unit", in relation to a building or a portion of a building, means a unit of accommodation, in such building or portion used solely for the purpose of residence." The learned District Judge held: "Therefore, 2409.00 sq. meters plus 500 sq. meters as appurtenant thereto has to be allowed." For the view taken above, the District Judge relied on a decision of the State of U. P. v. Smt. Ram Shri, 1975 AWC 632 . In that case, this court interpreted Section 9 of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and keeping the context and object of that Act into account held that a chabutra could be considered as a building for Section 9 of the said Act. The Object of the present Act, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhimsinghji v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 234 , is to provide for the imposition of ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomeration for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of a building on such land and matters connected therewith. This Act had been passed to subserve the common good in furtherance of the Directive Principle of the State policy under Section 39 (b) (c). If every chabutra is excluded as a separate building and not only the land underneath it excluded, but 500 sq. meters is also given, the whole object of the Act would be defeated and that does not appear to be correct. The expression 'building', as stated earlier, has not been defined, but if whole of the Act is taken into consideration, an irresistible conclusion would be that the Parliament did not intend to treat a chabutra of a building as separate from the building itself and to confer upon the chabutra the benefit of 500 sq meters of land separately A chabutra can be treated as a building only when it is a part of the same. But, treating it to be so, the two have to go together. Consequently, the District Judge erred in finding it to be a separate building and allowing 500 sq. meters of land to it on that ground. But, treating it to be so, the two have to go together. Consequently, the District Judge erred in finding it to be a separate building and allowing 500 sq. meters of land to it on that ground. It is no doubt true that the imperfection of human language renders it not only difficult, but absolutely impossible to define the word 'building' with any approach to accuracy. For an attempt to be made in that regard, Object and Reasons should be taken into account. In Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1987 SC 1454 , it is said : "A Statute is being understood if one knows the reason for it. The Reasons for a Statute is the safest guide to its interpretation. The words of a statute take their colour from the reasons for it. These are the external and internal aids to discover the reason for a Statute." 7. It is not clear from the District Judge's judgment as to whether the chabutra for which the benefit was given by excluding 2409 sq. meters was a separate construction or was a part of the building. The law in this regard has been laid down by the Supreme Court in- State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson (supra). The area which is liable to be treated as to be within ceiling area has been laid down therein. But in so doing, the chabutra could not be considered as separate building for the purpose of being so treated for the Act. 8. Contesting party urged that as in M/s Agra Concrete Pipe Co. v. Competent Authority, 1987 AWC 643 a Full Bench of this Court held that a pond was a building, the decision of that Full Bench is binding on this Court and, therefore, it must hold the chabutra to be a building. The Supreme Court distinguished that case by saying that the decision given with regard to a pond could not provide basis for holding that a chabutra is also a building. A chabutra, counsel urged, is an open piece of land and could not, therefore, be considered as a building for the purpose of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The Supreme Court distinguished that case by saying that the decision given with regard to a pond could not provide basis for holding that a chabutra is also a building. A chabutra, counsel urged, is an open piece of land and could not, therefore, be considered as a building for the purpose of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. It submitted that in the Full Bench case, as it did not have any occasion to consider whether the chabutra be considered as a separate building, that decision, therefore, is not applicable. The contention raised on behalf of the counsel appearing for Kailash Chand etc. was that the artificial definition of the expression 'family' given in Section 2 (f) in relation to prescription of ceiling area under Section 4 (1) was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and, as such, was ultra vires the Constitution. This controversy has been decided by the Supreme Court in Bhimsingh Ji v. Union of India, AIR 19el SC 234. It was held : " 'Family' as defined in Section 2(f) accords with the current life-style in urban conditions and is neither artificial nor arbitrary nor violative of Article 14." 9. Counsel for the petitioner urged that exemption had been applied for under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, long time back, but the State Government has ' not passed any order and, as such, he is entitled to a direction being issued to the State Government for exempting the area regarding which applications have been filed. No satisfactory explanation has been given in the counter affidavit indicating the reasons on account of which the applications made by the respondents could not be decided. Guide-lines with regard to exemption have been issued by the Ministry of Urban and Development Government of India, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi. On the basis of these guide-lines and other materials, the State Government should have considered the application made under section 20 and decide the same. Delay on the part of the State to decide such applications shakes confidence in its working. One has to run from pillar to post. 10. For what I have said above, I allow the writ petitions nos. 4031, 4032 and 4033 of 1981 to the extent indicated above. Writ petitions 5476, 5302, 5499 and 5503 of 1981 are dismissed. Delay on the part of the State to decide such applications shakes confidence in its working. One has to run from pillar to post. 10. For what I have said above, I allow the writ petitions nos. 4031, 4032 and 4033 of 1981 to the extent indicated above. Writ petitions 5476, 5302, 5499 and 5503 of 1981 are dismissed. The Competent Authority is directed to decide the extent of the surplus area in possession of the respondents on the relevant date by keeping the observations made in this judgment into account. No costs.