Hansaria J. — A point of some importance requires our determination in this appeal. The question is whether provisions of Order 9 Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code, are applicable to a proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act, for short 'the Act'. The question has arisen on these facts. The respondent-husband filed a petition before the learned District Judge, Jorhat, praying for a decree of divorce against his wife. This case came to be decreed ex-parte on 27.11.84. A petition under Order 9 Rule 13 was filed on 31.5.85 which was dismissed on 30.4.85 on the ground that it does not lie. In assailing the maintainability of this petition the counsel for the respondent relied on decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Anjan Kumar vs Minakshi, AIR 1985 Gau 44 in which it has been held that against an ex parte decree in a proceeding under the Act only appeal lies to this Court and not an application under Order 9 Rule 13. The appellant has challenged the view taken in the aforesaid decision by this Court. 2. The aforesaid view was however taken by referring, to section 28 (1) of the Act, which is in the following language : "28 (1). All decrees made by the Court in any proceeding under this Act shall subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be appe alable as decrees of the court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, and every such appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the court given in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction." While taking the aforesaid view, the learned Judge took note of section 21 of the Act also, which reads as below- "21. Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf, all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V 1908)”. This section having stated that the proceedings shall be regulated as far as may be by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 "subject to the other provisions contained in this Act", it was felt that provisions of section 28(1) shall override the command of section 21. This section having stated that the proceedings shall be regulated as far as may be by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 "subject to the other provisions contained in this Act", it was felt that provisions of section 28(1) shall override the command of section 21. Sri Barua on the other hand has contend that the scope of sections 21 and 28 and the field of their operation are different inasmuch as section 28 deals with appeal, the forum of the appeal and the period of limitation whereas section 21 speaks of applicabi­lity of the Code, as far as may be. This position is fairly admitted by Sri Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent. 3. It is then contended by Sri Barua that there is nothing in section 28 to run counter to what has been stated in section 21. It has been further urged by the learned counsel referring to by G. Vijayalakshmi vs. G. Ramachandra Sekhar Sastry, AIR 1981 SC. 1143 , in which scope of section 21 of the Act-was dealt with, that the section having stated that all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no distinction was sought to be made between procedural and substantive provisions of the Code. It was further pointed out in this decision that the phrase "as far as may be" means and intends to exclude only those provisions of the Code as are or may be inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. Filing of a petition under Order 9 Rule 13 cannot be said to be inconsistent with the provisions contained in section 28, which deals with appeals. These two are independent remedies and it is for the suitor or for the parties concerned to decide which remedy he would like to avail. Our attention has also been drawn by Sri Baruah to Grindlays Bank vs. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1981 SC 606 , wherein though it was stated that the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribu­nal shall be vested, in view of what has been stated in section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with the named powers exercised by Civil Court, even so it was held that Order 9 Rule 13 would toe applicable in a proceeding before the named adjudicatory authority. We are then referred by the learned counsel to Indira Kashyap vs. K. N. Kashyap, (1984) 3 SCC 107 , wherein a petition under Order 9 Rule 13 was decided on merits without any party having raised any objection regarding the maintainability of the same even though the case was under the Act. From this decision it cannot however be held that the Apex Court has held that the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 would apply in a procee­ding under the Act. 4. Our attention his however been invited by Shri Barua to four decisions of the different High Courts of the country which would indicate that the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 shall apply to a proceeding under the Act as well. First of these decisions is Sunanda vs Gundopant, AIR 1961 Bom 225 where it was held that even if no rules had been framed by the High Court as required by section 21 of the Act, provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 would apply. 5. The second decision to be referred is Tirukappa vs. Karaalamma, AIR 1966 Mysore 1 where a peittion under the Act was dismissed due to the default of the plaintiff and a prayer was made to revive the petition. It was held that provisions of Order 9 Rule 9, CPC. would apply and restoration could be ordered. In taking this view it was observed by the Division Bench that there was nothing repugnant in any provision of the Act to exclude the applicability of provisions contained in Rule 9 of Order 9. It is contended by Sri Barua, and rightly, that if provisions finding place in Order 9 Rule 9 would apply to a proceeding under the Act, provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 would also apply. 6. In Manjit Kaur vs. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1978 P & H 150, it was stated that the expression "as far as may be" in section 21 of the Act excludes the applicability of only those provisions of the Code which cannot in the nature of things apply to proceeding under the Act. 6. In Manjit Kaur vs. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1978 P & H 150, it was stated that the expression "as far as may be" in section 21 of the Act excludes the applicability of only those provisions of the Code which cannot in the nature of things apply to proceeding under the Act. It was further observed that the aforesaid expression had reference to different provisions of the Code and merely means that all those provisi­ons of the Code shall apply to the proceedings under the Act which are neither inconsistent with any provisions,.of the Act, nor contrary to its scheme or purpose Being of this view it was held that there was no escape from applying the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 to the procee­dings under the Act by operation of section 21. In taking this view the decision rendered by the Mysore High Court in Tirukappa (Supra) was relied on. 7. The last decision to be brought to our notice by Sri Barua is Laxmibai vs. Keshrimal, AIR 1986 MP 138 where ft was pointed out that the scope of appeal provided by section 28 of the Act is different from that of a petition under Order 9 Rule 13. It was, held in this decision that in an appeal under section 28 of the appellant cannot be allowed to show that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing at the hearing. For that purpose he must have recourse t0 the special procedure under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code for setting aside the ex parte decree. 8. Sri Choudhury has brought to our notice the comment made in Mayne's, Hindu Law and Usage at page 307 of 12th Edition wherein, while dealing with the decision of this Court in Anjan Kumar (Supra), it has been observed that the latter part of the observation "may not be sound". 9. We are in respectful agreement with what has been stated in the aforesaid decisions and are therefore satisfied that the provisions contai­ned in Order 9 Rule 13 do have application to proceeding under the Act also, and as such the petition of the wife under Order 9 Rule 13 did not merit dismissal on the ground that it did not lie. 10. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the case is remanded to the learned District Judge for decision on the merits of the case.