ORDER R.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against an order passed by the V Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar, dated 24-10- 88, dismissing the revision and upholding the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, dated 18-7-88, rejecting the application of the petitioner for the release of the accommodation in proceedings under S. 16(1)(b) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is the landlady of the house in dispute 59/41 Birhand Road, Kanpur of which one Smt. Kaushilya Devi was the tenant on the third floor. Smt. Kaushilya Devi, however, constructed her own house in Govind Nagar, Kanpur and hence removed her effects and shifted to newly acquired accommodation in Govind Nagar upon' which vacancy was declared by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, respondent No. 2 on 1-3-88. The respondent No. 3 J. P. Upadhya applied for allotment of the disputed accommodation vacated by Smt. Kaushilya Devi while the petitioner who is the landlady and owner of the disputed house, filed an application for the release of the same under S. 16(1)(b) of the Act. The case of the petitioner is that there are 18 members in her family and she is living in her house at 58/58 Neelwali Gali, Kanpur which has only four rooms while there are 18 members in the family and-hence there is no sufficient accommodation for her children and grand-children and hence her need for the disputed accommodation is bona fide and genuine which may be released in her favour. 3. J.P. Upadhya respondent No. 3, who is, however, a prospective allottee for the disputed accommodation, contested the application of the petitioner for the release of the disputed accommodation on the ground that the petitioner has sufficient accommodation in her house and she has other accommodation also available to her and hence her need for the disputed accommodation is not bona fide and genuine and hence the petitioner's application for the release of the disputed accommodation is liable to be rejected. 4. 4. The prescribed Authority allowed Sri J. P. Upadhya the prospective allottee to participate in the proceedings for consideration of the petitioner's release application and after taking into consideration the affidavit filed by J.P. Upadhya respondent No. 3 as well as other evidence produced by him and after hearing both the parties, came to the conclusion that the petitioner's need for the additional accommodation was not bona fide and genuine and dismissed the release application. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner went up in revision before the V Addl. Distt. Judge, Kanpur Nagar, who also dismissed the revision upholding the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, rejecting the petitioner's application for the release of the- disputed accommodation. It is these orders which are in challenge in the present writ petition. 5. Heard Sri Ram Vilash Gupta for the petitioner and Ram Prasad Singh, Chief Standing Counsel for the respondents. 6. The short point for consideration in the present case is whether the prospective allottee has a right to file objection against the release application of the landlord filed under S. 16(1)(b) of the Act and contest the release application. This question came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Talib Husain v. 1st Addl. District Judge Nainital, AIR 1986 All 196 : 1986 All LJ 845 where it was held that the scheme of the U.P. Act X III of 1972 and the Rules framed thereunder clearly point to the conclusion that a prospective allottee has no right to file objection against the release application of the landlord filed under S. 16(1)(b) of the Act and the right of the prospective allottee to have his application for allottment considered accrues only after the rejection of the release application. It was held that neither the Act nor the Rules framed thereunder postulate any right in a prospective allottee to file objection against release application. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the Full Bench case of Talib Husain (supra) contended that in the present case J.P. Upadhya respondent No. 3 who is a prospective allottee has been .allowed to contest the application for the release filed by the petitioner. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the Full Bench case of Talib Husain (supra) contended that in the present case J.P. Upadhya respondent No. 3 who is a prospective allottee has been .allowed to contest the application for the release filed by the petitioner. The prospective allottee J.P. Upadhya has filed his own affidavit apart from the other evidence filed by him in support of his case that the need of the petitioner for the disputed accommodation is not bona fide and genuine and further that he needs the disputed accommodation which may be allotted to him. On a perusal of the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and also a perusal of the order passed in revision by the V Additional Distt. Judge, respondent No. 1 clearly shows that the prospective allottee has been allowed to contest the application of the petitioner for the release of the disputed accommodation and has filed his evidence in support of his case that the need of the petitioner for the disputed accommodation is not bona 'fide and genuine. The impugned order further shows that both the parties have been heard: and the evidence led by both the parties have been taken into consideration while passing the impugned orders. In opinion, the point is concluded by the Full Bench case of Talib Husain (supra) and the prospective allottee has no right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to be entitled to any hearing in the disposal of the release application even on the general principles of doctrine of audi alteram partem which pre-supposes existence of some right or interest in the subject matter or the lis. Even Rule 13(4) of the Rules framed in the Act clearly provides that no allotment order in respect of a building covered by the application under . S. 16(1)(b) of the Act shall be made unless the release application is rejected. The right of the prospective allottee to have his applications for allotment considered, hence arises only after the rejection of the landlord's application under S. 16(1)(b) of the Act for the release of the accommodation. The prospective allottee comes into picture only after the disposal of the landlord's application for the release and only if the same is rejected. The right of the prospective allottee to have his applications for allotment considered, hence arises only after the rejection of the landlord's application under S. 16(1)(b) of the Act for the release of the accommodation. The prospective allottee comes into picture only after the disposal of the landlord's application for the release and only if the same is rejected. Thus the prospective allottee comes into picture only after the disposal of the landlord's application for the release and only if the same is rejected. Thus the prospective allottee has no right to be heard in opposition to an application for the release filed by the landlord and hence on the principles laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Talib Husain, 1986 All U 845. (supra), the impugned orders passed by the respondents 1 and 2 are clearly vitiated in law. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent strenuously contended that the revisional Court has taken into consideration other evidence also apart from the evidence led by the prospective allottee J.P. Upadhya in arriving at a conclusion that the need of the petitioner for the disputed accommodation is not bona fide and hence no illegality has been committed by the respondents 1 and 2 in rejecting the release application of the petitioner. I find no merits in this submission. It 'is clear that in the present case the prospective allottee has been allowed to participate in the proceedings and contest the release application filed by the petitioner who is the landlady of the disputed accommodation. The prospective allottee has also filed his affidavit and evidence and the respondents 1 and 2 have decided the case after giving full hearing to the prospective allottee also. Hence it is clear that the prospective allottee has been allowed to contest the release application filed by the petitioner and participate in the proceedings and hence on the law laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Talib Husain (supra) the orders passed by respondents 1 and 2 are vitiated in law and liable to be set aside. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that after the decision of the revision by the V. Addl. Distt. Judge the petitioner moved an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer nomiating one Sriram Sharma to whom the disputed accommodation may be allotted. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that after the decision of the revision by the V. Addl. Distt. Judge the petitioner moved an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer nomiating one Sriram Sharma to whom the disputed accommodation may be allotted. A photostat copy of this application dated 30-10-88/1-11-88 has been filed. In the Rejoinder Affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner, this application has been denied and it has been stated that no such application was ever moved by the petitioner. Hence this becomes a controverted fact and this Court can proceed only on admitted facts or facts which are proved. This subsequent fact of moving an application after the decision of the revision itself, becomes of doubtful veracity when the same is denied by the petitioner. However, since the impugned orders have been challenged on the ground that the prospective allottee has been allowed to participate in the proceedings and contest the release application filed by the petitioner under S. 16(1)(b) of the Act and the point is concluded by the Full Bench decision of Talib Husain, 1986 All LJ 845. (supra), where it was held that the prospective allottee has no right to have his application for allotment considered or to participate in the proceedings and contest the application for the release of the accommodation filed by the landlord, and further that the prospective allottee has no right to be heard in opposition to an application for release filed by the landlord, the impugned orders passed by respondents 1 and 2 are liable to be quashed. 10. In t he result the writ petition is allowed with costs. The impugned orders passed by respondents 1 and 2 dated 24-10-88 and 18-7-88 respectively, are quashed and the case is sent back to the Rent Control and Eviction. Officer, respondent No. 2 to decide the release application filed by the petitioner afresh with law, keeping,-M view the observations made above.