ORDER R.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order passed by the III Addl. District Judge, Nainital, dismissing the appeal and upholding the order passed by the prescribed authority allowing the application of the landlord, respondent No. 3, for the release of the accommodation in proceedings under S. 21(1)(a) of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. Brief facts of the case are that Ram Lal, respondent No. 2, filed an application for the release of the disputed accommodation i.e. 1/9, Subzi Mandi, Rudrapur, district Nainital on the ground that the same is needed for enabling his unemployed son Man Mohan, who has completed technical training of Radio and Television Mechanic after completing his studies, for settling him in an independent business and that there was no other accommodation available with the landlord where his unemployed son Man Mohan could start his business and the landlord having a big family, was not able to meet the expenses of his family, and hence his need for settling his unemployed son in business was bona fide and genuine and greater hardship would be caused if the accommodation is released in his favour. 3. The application was contested by\the petitioner on the ground that the need of the landlord was not bona fide and genuine and that the landlord besides the disputed accommodation, has another accommodation D. 17, Hari Mandir Road, in the same town, in a portion of which one Harnamsingh was the tenant who had vacated the same and which is available to the landlord for settling his son in business and further that" the petitioner being a practising doctor would suffer greater hardship if he is evicted from the disputed accommodation. 4. The Prescribed Authority, on a consideration of the entire material on the record, came to the conclusion that the need of the landlord to settle his own unemployed son Man Mohan in business was genuine and pressing and he had in other accommodation available where Man Mohan could carry on his business and that the accommodation on Hari Mandir roadwasnot available or starting his business. It was also held that the accommodation on Hari Mandir road was jointly owned by several co-shareres and hence the same was also not available as an alternative accommodation to the landlord. It was also held that the accommodation on Hari Mandir road was jointly owned by several co-shareres and hence the same was also not available as an alternative accommodation to the landlord. The Prescribed Authority further held that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if the disputed accommodation is not released in his favour and on these findings allowed the application. 5. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner went up in appeal before the Addl District Judge, Nainital who affirmed the findings recorded : by the Prescribed Authority on the question of bona fide need and comparative hardship and dismissed the appeal Aggrieved, against the same, the petitioner filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11511 of 1983. The Court upheld the finding of the Addl. District Judge on the question of bona fide need and eld that under the circumstances, the inference drawn by the Courts below that the need of the landlord to settle Man Mohan in independent business j is bona fide seems to be perfectly correct and calls for an interference by this Court but held that the Addl. District Judge has not addressed himself to the aspect wheiher Harnam Singh had vacated the accommodation occupied by him as a tenant in house No. D-17. Hari Mandir Road and hence remanded the case to the Addl. District Judge to decide the question whether Haram Singh had vacated the said accommodation or not and whether the need of the landlord would be satisfied by that accommodation. It further directed that in view of the fact that it is asserted that the petitioner has shifted to his own residential accommodation at Indira Nagar colony, Adarsh Nagar, Rudrapur where he is residing and is also carrying on his practice as a Doctor, the Addl. District Judge should decide this aspect of the case also. 6. After remand, the Addl. District Judge, after taking into consideration the evidence led by the parties, held that the accommodation vacated by Harnam Singh in house No. D-17, Hari Mandir Road was a residential accommodation and was never used for business purposes and hence the said accommodation vacated by Harnamsingh could not be released for occupation for business purposes. 6. After remand, the Addl. District Judge, after taking into consideration the evidence led by the parties, held that the accommodation vacated by Harnam Singh in house No. D-17, Hari Mandir Road was a residential accommodation and was never used for business purposes and hence the said accommodation vacated by Harnamsingh could not be released for occupation for business purposes. It further held that the said accommodation vacated by Harnamsingh was jointly owned by the landlord along with his mother and his five brothers and hence also was not available to the landlord for his exclusive use and occupation On the question of petitioner shifting to Indira Nagar colony, Adarsh Nagar, Rudrapur in his own residence, it held that the petitioner has already shifted to his own accommodation where he was also carrying on his business as a medical practitioner and in the circumstances of the case, greater hardship would be caused if the accommodation is not released in favour of the landlord and on these findings dismissed the appeal, vide his order, dated 28-5-1988 which is challenged in the present writ petition. 7. Heard Sri Ravi Kiran Jain for the petitioner and Sri L.N. Pandey for the respondents. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued firstly that the Addl. District Judge has wrongly held that the accommodation vacated by Harnamsingh at D-17,. Hari Mandir Road, is a residential accommodation and hence not available for occupation for business purposes and secondly urged that the Addl. District Judge has also erred in holding that the landlord would be put to greater hardship if the accommodation is not released in his favour. 9. As regards the question of availability of an alternative accommodation at D-17, Hari Mandir road vacated by Harnamsing, the Addi. District Judge has held that no evidence could be adduced by the petitioner to show that the said accommodation was used by Harnamsingh for business purposes. A letter, dated 12-4-1981 written by Kartar Singh, father of Harnam Singh, was produced by the petitioner in support of his case. A bare perusal of the same shows that Harnam Singh was using the said accommodation for his residence. The user of the said accommodation has been described as "Rihayasi Kamron Me Rahta Hai" which clearly indicates the nature of the user of the said accommodation. The Addl. A bare perusal of the same shows that Harnam Singh was using the said accommodation for his residence. The user of the said accommodation has been described as "Rihayasi Kamron Me Rahta Hai" which clearly indicates the nature of the user of the said accommodation. The Addl. District Judge has held that nothing could be shown from the record that the said accommodation vacated by Harnam Singh was ever used for business purposes. On the contrary after perusal of the evidence on record, the Addl. District Judge held that the said accommodation vacated by Harnam Singh was used for residential purposes and not for business purposes. The said finding having been arrived at after applying his mind to the evidence on record, cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction by this court and it is not open to this court to re-appraise the evidence on this question of fact and come to a conclusion different from that arrived at by the Addl. District Judge. In view of the third proviso to S. 21 of the Act, which provides that no application for the release of the accommodation shall be entertained in case of any residential building, for occupation of business purposes, it is clear that the accommodation, vacated by Harnam Singh could not be available to the landlord for enabling his son Man Mohan for carrying on the business of T. V. and Radio repair. 10. The Addl. District Judge, respondent No. 1, has further held that the said accommodation D-17, Hari Mandir road was jointly owned by the landlord's mother along with his five brothers. It is admitted that the building was initially owned by the father of the landlord, respondent No. 3 in the case, and was inherited by the mother of respondent No. 3 along with respondent No. 3 and his five brothers. In that view of the matter, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the said accommodation was not available for exclusive use and occupation of the landlord, respondent No. 3, and hence could not be taken into consideration while considering the release application filed by the landlord. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 in support of his contention placed reliance on the case of Satendra Kumar Kohli v. IV Addl. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 in support of his contention placed reliance on the case of Satendra Kumar Kohli v. IV Addl. District Judge, 1982 1 All Rent Cas 506 where it was held that there is nothing in S. 21 or in R. 16 to indicate that the property owned by the wife of the landlord should also be taken into account while considering the availability of the accommodation with the landlord. In that view of the matter also the Addl. District Judge has rightly held that the said accommodation vacated by Harnam Singh could not be taken into consideration while considering the application of the landlord for the release of the disputed accommodation. 11. Now coming to the next limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the', petitioner that the Addl. District Judge has erred in giving a finding on the question of comparative hardship in favour of the landlord, I think it appropriate that this point may be considered along with the question ' whether the petitioner has shifted to his own genuine requirement to possess the house, house at Indira Nagar Colony, Adarsh Nagar, but it is necessary for them to do so in order Rudrapur where he is residing and also doing to augment their income and maintain his practice as a doctor. The case of the j'. themselves properly. Being owners of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that house, they cannot be compelled to live below though the petitioner has shifted to his own residential building situated in Indira Nagar Colony is comfortably settled there and is carrying on his practice as a doctor while on the other hand the son of the landlord Man Mohan is unemployed and in spite of his having received training in the business of radio and T.V. is not able to start his business to settle himself in life, the son of the landlord will be put to a greater hardship if he is not able to start his business and earn his own living. 12. The Addi District Judge, respondent No. 1, on a consideration of the evidence on record, held that the petitioner is residing and also doing his practice as a doctor from his own building situate in Indira Nagar Colony, Adarsh Nagar, Rudrapur. 12. The Addi District Judge, respondent No. 1, on a consideration of the evidence on record, held that the petitioner is residing and also doing his practice as a doctor from his own building situate in Indira Nagar Colony, Adarsh Nagar, Rudrapur. He also held that even though number of shops were allotted by the Municipal Board, Rudrapur but the petitioner did not make any attempt or filed any application for the allotment, of a shop during the pendency of the proceedings. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 contended that the son of the landlord is unemployed and he has a legitimate right to settle himself in business and to earn his own living and cannot be deprived of his legitimate right merely because the tenant would be put to some inconvenience in carrying on his practice as a doctor from his residence in Indira Nagar Colony and in support of his contention, he relied on the case of Mst. Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272 . where the Supreme Court observed thus : "In view of our findings it has been established that the landlords have not only a respondent No. 3 contended that the landlords have not only a genuine requirement to possess the house, but it is necessary for them to do so in order to augment their income and maintain themselves properly. Being owners of the house, they cannot be compelled to live below the poverty line merely to enable the respondents to carry on their flourishing hotel business at the cost of the appellants. This shows great prejudice that will be caused to the plaintiffs if the suit is dismissed. The Supreme Court further observed that- "It was then submitted by Mr. Andlay, the counsel for the respondents, that if the respondents are ejected they will be thrown out on the road; that hotel is only source of their sustenance and they are not likely to get any alternative accommodation on being evicted. If the defendants had proved that they will not be able to get any accommodation anywhere in the city where they could set up a hotel. This might have been a weighty consideration, but the evidence of all the witnesses examined by the defendants only shows that the defendants may not get alternative accommodation in that very locality where the house in dispute is situated. This might have been a weighty consideration, but the evidence of all the witnesses examined by the defendants only shows that the defendants may not get alternative accommodation in that very locality where the house in dispute is situated. There is no satisfactory evidence to prove that even in other business localities, there is no possibility of the defendants getting a house. To insist on getting an alternative accommodation of a similar nature in the same locality will be asking for the impossible." 13. The learned counsel for the I respondent further relied on Rajeshwari Prasad v. Fateh Bahadur Chaturvedi, 1984 1 All Rent Cas 347 : 1984 All U 541 where it was held that S. 21 is for the benefit of the landlord and if non-availability of alternative accommodation to the tenant is sufficient to establish his hardship, then probably the proviso would defeat the entire objective of S. 21. 14. ' In the case of Suraj Prasad Sharma v. II Addl. District Judge, Mirzapur, (1983) 1 All Rent Cas 427 : 1983 All U 769, it was observed thus "It is a commonplace fact that invariably when an application under S. 21 of the Act is allowed, the tenant has to quit and this involves discomfort but if this alone were sufficient to non-suit the landlord, no application for release could ever be allowed. Judging comparative hardships is a matter of deeper import and it would be a lopsided order which dismisses a landlord's application for release merely with the plaintiffs platitudinous observation that the tenant would be "thrown on the street." The physical dispossession of the tenant is the necessary concomitant of every release application of the landlord which is allowed. However, well founded the application may be an element of inconvenience or discomfort is inherent in the very process of vacating an accommodation. A release application cannot be thrown out merely with the bald observation that the tenant would suffer greater hardship." 15. In view of the observations made above, it is clear that the landlord would be put to greater hardship if his unemployed son is not able to start his business in the disputed accommodation and hence the Addl. District Judge has rightly held that the landlord would be put to greater hardship in case accommodation is not released in his favour to enable his unemployed son to start his business. 16. District Judge has rightly held that the landlord would be put to greater hardship in case accommodation is not released in his favour to enable his unemployed son to start his business. 16. No other point has been pressed on behalf of the petitioner. 17. In the result, there are no merits in this writ petition which is dismissed with costs. 18. At the time of delivery of judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that some time may be allowed to him to vacate the disputed accommodation and 'handover peaceful possession of the same to respondent No. 3. In case the petitioner files an undertaking before the prescribed Authority respondent No. 2 that he shall vacate the disputed shop and handover peaceful possession of the same to respondent No. 3 till 28th February 1989, he shall not be evicted from the disputed accommodation till 28th February 1989. In case the' undertaking, as stated above, is not filed by the petitioner within a period of one month from today the respondents may evict the petitioner forthwith in accordance with law.