JUDGMENT - H.D. PATEL, J.:---This revision is directed against the order dated 17-2-1988 passed by Shri K.J. Rohi, Assistant Sessions Judge, Nagpur (In-charge Judge of the Small Causes Court, Nagpur) on Exh. 1 in Small Cause Darkhast No. 103 of 1988, whereby the learned Judge directed the issue of warrant of possession. 2. The facts giving rise to this revision are rather unusual. The applicant is a tenant of house situated on Plot No. 3, Shirkey Layout, Chhaoni, Nagpur, since the month of April, 1985 on monthly rent of Rs. 1800/-. The non-applicant is the owner of the said premises and hence the landlord of the applicant. Since the applicant was not paying the rent regularly, the non-applicant applied for distress warrant before the Court of Small Causes, Nagpur, vide Application No. 14 of 1986 and the moveables belonging to the applicant came to be attached. At the relevant time the rent of Rs. 16,200/- was outstanding against him. Even thereafter the applicant failed to pay the rent and further outstanding arrears were to the tune of Rs. 9,000/-. Another application for distress warrant was also filed and that was registered as Application No. 85 of 1986. the goods belonging to the applicant were again attached. The goods so attached under the two warrants were to be sold on 27-10-1986 and 13-11-1986. it appears that the applicant with a view to save the goods from being sold gave an undertaking before the Court of Small Causes, Nagpur, whereby he agreed to pay the entire rent and also vacate the house by 31st March, 1987. Some amount was paid by the applicant in cash. 3. Since, however, the applicant did not abide by his undertaking a petition for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act was filed by the non-applicant. The said application was registered as Contempt Petition No. 13 of 1987. When the petition was listed for hearing, the applicant again gave an undertaking that he would pay the entire amount of rent on or before 29th April, 1987. Acting on this undertaking the contempt petition was disposed of by this Court. Once again the applicant committed the breach of the undertaking. The premises were also not vacated by the applicant. 4. Acting on this undertaking the contempt petition was disposed of by this Court. Once again the applicant committed the breach of the undertaking. The premises were also not vacated by the applicant. 4. The non-applicant, therefore, filed Contempt Petition No. 50 of 1987 which came to be decided by this Court on 16-12-1987 holding the applicant Ashok guilty of contempt of Court, the operative part of which reads as under : “38. As regards the action to be taken against the respondent for contempt of Court committed by him by breach of his undertaking in respect of non-payment of arrears of rent and vacation of the tenanted premises, it may be that there is no extenuating circumstances in his favour. He has strangeously justified his action and even as regards non-payment of rent his apology is not clean and unequivocal. Moreover, his conduct subsequent to 29-4-1987 would show that he wants to harass the petitioner by not clearing his arrears and not paying rent even thereafter regularly. Taking all these circumstances into consideration the ends of justice would be served if a fine of Rs. 2,000/- is imposed upon the respondent for committing contempt of Court in not complying with his undertakings about payment of arrears of rent and about vacation of the tenanted premises. The respondent is directed to pay the above fine of Rs. 2,000/- within one month from the date of this order, failing which he is directed to undergo a simple imprisonment for one week. 39. Besides the above punishment for committing contempt of Court the respondent is directed to comply with his undertaking relating to vacation of the suit premises by giving vacant possession to the petitioner of the said premises on or before 31-1-1988. The respondent is also directed as per his original undertaking dated 27-10-1986 to pay the rent upto the date of vacation of the tenanted premises, on or before 5-2-1988. If any of the above directions are breached the respondent is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one week on each amount. Both the sentences, however, shall run concurrently if the breach is committed of both these directions. If any of the above directions are breached the respondent is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one week on each amount. Both the sentences, however, shall run concurrently if the breach is committed of both these directions. Looking to the conduct of the respondent as is clear from the facts and circumstances narrated in this judgment, it is directed by modifying the order dated 15-4-1986 passed in the previous contempt case that as per the original undertaking the attached property shall continue to remain under attachment and in the custody of the petitioner till the above directions are complied with by the respondent . 40. The respondent is directed to pay costs of the instant contempt petition to the petitioner which are quantified at Rs. 1,000/- and which he should pay to the petitioner along with the rent payable on or before 5-2-1988. 41. Rule in this contempt petition is thus made absolute against the respondent in terms of paras 38, 39 and 40.” 5. The applicant feeling aggrieved by the order filed Contempt Appeal No. 1 of 1988 on 19-1-1988. The appeal was admitted on 29-1-1988. The appeal was admitted on 29-1-1988. Rule on stay was however issued and was made returnable on 1-2-1986. On that day the following order came to be passed. “ Stay in respect of sentence only. Appeal to be heard on 29-8-1988.” 6. The non-applicant filed an execution application in the Court of Small Causes, Nagpur, which was registered as Small Cause Darkhast No. 103 of 1988. By this application the non-applicant prayed for execution of the order passed by this Court in Contempt execution of the Petition No. 50 of 1987 by issue of warrant of possession of the suit premises. Simultaneously the non-applicant who applied for permission to break open the lock and also sought police help. The learned Judge of the Small Causes Court passed an order on 17-2-1988 directing issue of warrant of possession . Accordingly the warrant came to be executed on 18-2-1988 despite objection being raised by the mother of the applicant and the non-applicant was placed in possession of the premises. The order dated 17-2-1988 is now being impugned in this petition. 7. Two contentions were raised on behalf of the applicant- tenant. Accordingly the warrant came to be executed on 18-2-1988 despite objection being raised by the mother of the applicant and the non-applicant was placed in possession of the premises. The order dated 17-2-1988 is now being impugned in this petition. 7. Two contentions were raised on behalf of the applicant- tenant. The main contention was that the impugned order is wholly illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction inasmuch as the Judge of the Small Causes Court could not have issued a warrant of possession in the absence of any order or decree being passed by the Civil Court. The other contention was that since the consequences of not following the directions were stayed, it was not obligatory on the applicant to follow either of the directions given by the Court in para 39 of the judgement in Contempt Petition No. 50 of 1988. In substance there was also a stay of possession. 8. What falls for consideration is whether the order passed by this Court in contempt proceedings under relevant provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act can be deemed to be an “order” falling under section 36 or a “decree” falling under section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The term "decree" is defined under sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to mean a formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in a suit and may be either preliminary or final. To constitute a decree or of the conditions therefore is that the decision must be arrived in a suit. Though proceedings in the Contempt of Courts Act may be a civil proceeding, yet it cannot be regarded as a suit. A suit is a process of recovering or enforcing a substantive right or claim by the procedure laid down in the Code. Therefore, the decision in contempt proceedings cannot be termed as a decree within the meaning of the word “decree” as defined in the Code. 9. Relying on the decision in (Kilachand Devchand Co. v. Ajodhyaprasad Sukhanand, and others)1, A.I.R. 1934 Bom. Therefore, the decision in contempt proceedings cannot be termed as a decree within the meaning of the word “decree” as defined in the Code. 9. Relying on the decision in (Kilachand Devchand Co. v. Ajodhyaprasad Sukhanand, and others)1, A.I.R. 1934 Bom. 452 it was contended on behalf of the non-applicant that the order made on a notice of motion is an order within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Civil Procedure Code and could, therefore, be executed under section 36. It is further held that section 36 is not limited to orders only under the Code, but is applicable to all orders which could be included in the definition of the term “order”. With reference to the facts in that case it was held that the order passed upon notice of motion did fall under the definition of the term "order". It is to be seen whether the decision in contempt proceedings can be termed as an order. It has been defined in section 2(14) of the Code as under : “In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context; “order” means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree”. (Emphasis supplied). The aforesaid definition cannot be so extended as to include even the final orders passed on the contempt proceedings. 10. It is now well settled that the execution is enforcement by the process of Court of its own decree or order. Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the decree may be executed either by the Court which passed the decree or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure enacts that the provision of the Code relating to execution of decrees shall, so far as they are applicable, be deemed to apply to the execution of orders. A decision in contempt proceedings cannot be regarded as a 'decree' or 'order' executable in the manner adopted by the Judge of Small Causes Court. With these findings the entire execution proceedings are misconceived and the issuance of warrant by the order dated 17-2-1988 was wholly illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. The order impugned deserves to be quashed. 11. A decision in contempt proceedings cannot be regarded as a 'decree' or 'order' executable in the manner adopted by the Judge of Small Causes Court. With these findings the entire execution proceedings are misconceived and the issuance of warrant by the order dated 17-2-1988 was wholly illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. The order impugned deserves to be quashed. 11. Because of the aforesaid finding, it is not necessary for this Court to consider the other contention that because the sentence was stayed it was not obligatory to deliver vacant possession. Only because the arguments were advanced at length, it would be appropriate to decide this point as well. 12. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the order passed in the contempt petition was a composite order inasmuch as this Court directed the applicant to comply with his undertaking by giving vacant possession on or before 31-1-1988 and also ordered that in case the direction is breached, the applicant was to suffer simple imprisonment for one week. Since the sentence was stayed, it was contended that the direction was also stayed. In substance there was stay of possession as well. The contention is both fallacious and wrong. 13. This Court in para 39 very categorically ordered the applicant to comply with the direction of vacating the premises on or before 31-1-1988. Admittedly this direction has been breached since the premises were not vacated by the date given. The only course left was that the consequences should follow, but before the punishment could be imposed the sentence alone is stayed by an order passed on 1-2-1988. The direction to vacate the premises was already breached on 31-1-1988 before the consequences of its breach was stayed on 1-2-1988. Even otherwise merely because the sentence was stayed, no advantage could flow there from to the applicant. He cannot claim that possession was stayed more so when the date for vacating the premises had also expired. The breach of the direction is complete and in terms of the judgement in Contempt Petition No. 50 of 1987 the consequence must follow. 14. In the result, the revision application is allowed and the order impugned is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs. Application allowed. -----