JUDGMENT : A.N.Varma, J. 1. This second appeal raises an interesting question as to the interpretation of the term 'heir' occurring in clause (1) of Section 3 (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (the 'Act' for short, hereafter). Both the courts below having decreed the plaintiff- respondent's suit for possession against the appellant, the latter has filed this second appeal. 2. The facts found by the courts below and which are not in dispute, lie within a narrow compass. One Smt. Kashi Devi was admittedly residing in the accommodation in dispute as its tenant. The plaintiff-respondents were the landlords of the same. At the time of her death in the year 1973, the appellant who is the son of the brother of Smt. Kashi Devi's husband, was residing with Smt. Kashi Devi. The appellant's father Gopal Singh, though alive at that time, was, however, not residing with Smt. Kashi Devi. Gopal Singh also died in 1975. On the death of Smt. Kashi Devi the present suit was brought by the plaintiff-respondents against the appellant on the ground that the appellant was residing with Smt. Kashi Devi only as the latter's licensee and inasmuch as he was not an heir of Kashi Devi he did not inherit her tenancy rights. With the result that after her death the appellant had ceased to have any legal claim to remain in possession over the disputed accommodation. The defence of the appellant, on the other hand, was that, firstly, he had legally inherited the tenancy rights of Kashi Devi as one residing with her normally and also being an heir and consequently till his tenancy was determined the plaintiff could not seek a decree for dispossession ; and, secondly, he having been adopted by Nanhe Singh and his wife Smt. Kashi Devi, he became a tenant of the disputed accommodation after the death of Smt. Kashi Devi, Nanhe Singh the original tenant having predeceased Kashi Devi. 3. Both the courts below have found that the appellant is not the adopted son of Nanhe Singh and Kashi Devi. 3. Both the courts below have found that the appellant is not the adopted son of Nanhe Singh and Kashi Devi. They have also rejected the claim of the appellant that he had succeeded to the tenancy rights of Kashi Devi on the ground that he was not the latter's heir even though he might have been normally residing with her, in view of the fact that her father Gopal Singh was alive at the time of her death. 4. For the appellant, Sri S. M. Dayal submits that the question whether a person is an heir within the meaning of Section 3 (a) (1) of the aforesaid Act should be determined not only with respect to the personal law applicable to the deceased tenant but also the relevant provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The issue, it is contended, cannot be decided totally divorced from the purpose and object of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Sri S. N. Agarwal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents, on the other hand, submitted that whether a person is an heir within the meaning of Section 3 (a) (1) has to be determined entirely on the basis of the personal law of succession governing the deceased tenant. In support, he has cited several decisions which have been commented upon hereafter. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length and giving the matter an anxious consideration I am of the view that the view taken by the courts below is correct. In order to resolve the controversy, it will be convenient to have a look at the relevant provisions. Section 3 (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 reads as follows : "3. Definitions-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- (a) 'tenant' in relation to a building, means a person by whom its rent is payable, and on the tenant's death- (b) in the case of a residential building, such only of his heirs as normally resided with him in the building at the time of his death ; (2) in the case of a non-residential building, his heirs" 6. The next relevant provision would be Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which lays down the general rule of succession in the case of female Hindus. The next relevant provision would be Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which lays down the general rule of succession in the case of female Hindus. It provides that the property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rule set out in Section 16. It is not disputed that Smt. Kashi Devi died issueless. Clause (a) of Section 15 (1), therefore, stands excluded. That brings in clause (b) of Section 15 (1) which provides that in the absence of the heirs mentioned in clause (a) of Section 15 (1) the heirs of the husband would succeed. For determining the heirs of the husband, therefore, we will have to turn to Sections 8 and 9 of the Hindu Succession Act which lay down the rules of succession in the case of males. Section 8 provides that the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of that Chapter, i.e. firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule. Secondly, if there is no heir of Class I then upon the heirs of the relatives in Class II and so forth. Section 9 lays down the order of succession among the heirs of the Schedule. Inter alia, it provides that those in the first entry in Class II shall be preferred in those in the second entry ; and thus the second entry shall be preferred to those in the third entry : and so on. We then turn to the heirs mentioned under Class II in view of the admitted fact that the husband of Smt. Kashi Devi did not leave any heirs in Class I mentioned in this Schedule. In Class II of the Schedule a brother is one of the heirs falling in the second entry, whereas brother's son falls under the fourth entry. If, therefore, we go strictly by the Hindu Succession Act, it is apparent that in the lifetime of Gopal Singh, his son, the appellant in this appeal, could not inherit the tenancy rights of Smt. Kashi Devi. 7. If, therefore, we go strictly by the Hindu Succession Act, it is apparent that in the lifetime of Gopal Singh, his son, the appellant in this appeal, could not inherit the tenancy rights of Smt. Kashi Devi. 7. The question that, however, falls for determination is whether we should import the considerations of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, as suggested by Sri S. M. Dayal, in determining the question as to who was the heir of Smt. Kashi Devi entitled to claim the tenancy rights after the death of Kashi Devi. Sri Dayal submitted that as Gopal Singh was not residing with Smt. Kashi Devi, he did not inherit her tenancy rights. Consequently this court should hold that there was no heir available among those mentioned in the second entry of Class II. That being so, the heirs mentioned in the fourth entry of Class II should be deemed to have inherited the tenancy rights of Smt. Kashi Devi. 8. I find it difficult to accept the contention. The submission can be accepted only by stretching the language of the statute, viz. Section 3 (a) (1) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 beyond permissible limits. In fact, what the learned counsel wants this Court to hold is that in construing the term 'heirs' in clause (1) we should read further that if a preferential heir was not residing with the deceased tenant then the heir next in order of preference as prescribed under the Hindu Succession Act who was residing with the tenant, should be deemed to be the heir of the tenant within the meaning of that clause. Such a construction is not warranted either by the language or the scheme or purpose of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. On a plain and simple construction of Section 3 (a) (1) of this Act, only that heir would be entitled to inherit the tenancy rights in respect of residential accommodation who was actually residing with the tenant and the heir would be one who is entitled under the personal law to inherit the rights of the deceased. A precisely similar argument as urged by the learned counsel for the appellant was advanced before a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Om Prakash v. The Prescribed Authority, 1984 (2) ARC 634. A precisely similar argument as urged by the learned counsel for the appellant was advanced before a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Om Prakash v. The Prescribed Authority, 1984 (2) ARC 634. In this case the position was that at the time of the death of the last tenant both the son and grandson of the tenant were residing with him. The grandson claimed that he had inherited the tenancy rights of the tenant as he was also one of the heirs entitled to succeed under the Hindu Succession Act coupled in view of the fact that he was also residing with the tenant. This Court repelled the contention and observed as follows : "A perusal of the definition of 'tenant' in Section 3 (a) of the Act would indicate that a tenant is a person by whom the rent is payable and on his death, his heir becomes a tenant. The Act contemplates distinction between the residential and non-residential accommodation. In the case of a residential accommodation such of the heirs as have been living with the tenant would alone become tenant. The definition does not connote that every member of the tenant's family, though he was not residing with him and though he was not his heir, would become the tenant. What is necessary is that the person should be an heir of the deceased tenant and in the case of residential accommodation, should have been residing with him. It is obvious that if such a person was not an heir of the deceased tenant, he would not become the tenant although he might be a member of his family. It is also obvious that even if he was an heir of the deceased tenant but was not living with him, he would not become a tenant of the residential accommodation. The word 'heir' as commonly understood, means a person who normally inherits the estate of the deceased. It is also obvious that even if he was an heir of the deceased tenant but was not living with him, he would not become a tenant of the residential accommodation. The word 'heir' as commonly understood, means a person who normally inherits the estate of the deceased. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary the word 'heir' has been defined as under :- " Heir-One-who inherits or is entitled to succeed to the possession of the property after the death of its owner as (1) Heir at Law (2) Meres (3) one who in modern civil codes based upon the Civil Law (as in Europe) succeeds to the entire estate of a person by operation of law or by treatment and has a right of renunciation and use a right of entry with the benefit of inventory (4) Scot's Law ; one taking heritable property by distinction ; one who succeeds only to movable estate (5) one who receives some of the property of a deceased person by operation of law, by virtue of a will, or in any of various other ways 1 : one who receives or is entitled to receive property during the life time of a former owner made his find of the form after deciding to live elsewhere 2 : one who inherits or is entitled to succeed to a hereditary rank, title, or office upon the death or removal from office by other cause (at abdication) of the holder to the principality of Monaco succession to the throne by the King's following his abdication, 3 : one to whom something other than property as a position of leadership, participation in a tradition or culture, a natural talent a quality of character is transmitted or seems to be transmitted in accordance with or apart from wish of a predecessor and with or without necessity of direct succession " With respect I entirely agree with the dictum and the line of reasoning adopted for holding that in the lifetime of his father, the son, even though residing with the deceased tenant, could not claim to be an heir. I also agree with the learned Judge that the term ' heir ' means a person who normally inherits the estate of the deceased. I also agree with the learned Judge that the term ' heir ' means a person who normally inherits the estate of the deceased. The same view was taken in another decision of this Court in the case of Om Prakash Sharma v. IXth Additional District Judge, Lucknow, 1986 AWC 245= 1986 (1) ARC 402 in para. 5 of which it was emphasized that the issue whether a person inherits the tenancy rights has to be decided with reference to the provisions of the personal law which was in that case the Hindu Succession Act. 9. I entirely agree with the approach of the learned Judges deciding the above cases. In my opinion, the issue whether a person is an heir entitled to claim the benefit of inheritance u/, Sec. 3 (a) of the aforesaid Act has to be decided entirely with reference to the personal law applicable to the tenant. I am further of the opinion that if we import the provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in deciding even this limited question, namely, whether the claimant is an heir of the tenant, it might lead to anomalous results which can be easily demonstrated. Suppose the tenant Smt. Kashi Devi left both residential and non-residential accommodation, then if the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant were accepted, it would mean that in case of the non-residential accommodation Gopal Singh would be deemed to have inherited the tenancy rights of Smt. Kashi Devi, while in the case of residential accommodation, the appellant would. That obviously could not have been the intention of the legislature. The heir of a deceased tenant would be one and the same whatever may be the nature of the property left behind by the last owner. That is how the statute was interpreted by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Sharma v. II Addl. District Judge, Etawah, 1981 ARC 33 (Short Note No. 55). The learned Single Judge held the word ' heir ' used in sub-clauses (1) and (2) has to be given the same meaning. I entirely agree. 10. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. But I make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.