LAXMESHWAR, J. ( 1 ) THE above Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30-1-1979 in R. A. No. 62/77 passed by the Civil Judge, Bellary, setting aside the judgment and decree dated 16-6-1977 in O. S. No. 429/73 by the Principal munsiff, Bellary. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief are that the plaintiff has filed this suit against the defendants for declaration of her title to the suit lands, situated in the village of Bellary bearing S. Nos. 283-F and 299 C and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men and persons claiming under them from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit lands. ( 3 ) IT is the case of the plaintiff that she is the lawful owner of the lands mentioned in the plaint schedule and they were purchased by late Kuppagal Erayya , the husband of the plaintiff under a registered sale deed dated 17th May 1938, executed by late Talari Erayya, father of the defendants and they were minors when the sale deed was executed in favour of kuppagal Erayya. He sold the property to Kuppagal Erayya for Rs. 400/- subsequently the husband of the Plaintiff died in 1952. During his life time he was said to be in possession and cultivated the lands. The plaintiff is the sole heir of her husband and entitled to the property as her son Kuppagal Nagappa who was given in adoption to another family, the natural son, though was given in adoption, he was managing the affairs and also the properties of the plaintiff. He prepared the land for sowing in May 1973. in 1973, defendants sent a telegram through their advocate making false allegations and that they were in possession. However the plaintiff stated that infact they were not in possession of lands. In support of her contention she has stated that she had raised loan in the land Mortgage Bank, Bellary, on the strength of the sale deed said to have been executed in her husband's name and prayed for as stated above. ( 4 ) DEFENDANT No. 2 filed written statement denying all the allegations made by the Plaintiff and others filed a memo adopting the same. ( 4 ) DEFENDANT No. 2 filed written statement denying all the allegations made by the Plaintiff and others filed a memo adopting the same. They had stated that the plaintiff was never in the possession of the suit lands at any time within 12 years and they have perfected their title by adverse possession and suit is barred by limitation, as it has lapsed 12 years. They have also stated that the suit is bad for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties. They asserted that Kuppagal erayya was never in possession and enjoyment of the said lands in his own right till his demise in 1952 and the plaintiff as his sole heir who came in possession of lands. Thus, the defendants prayed that they are in possession and enjoyment of suit lands in their own rights for a period of 12 years prior to the date of the presentation of the suit. The alleged bank loan transaction is void and prayed that suit may be dismissed. ( 5 ) ON the pleadings of the parties, the munsiff framed the following issues : 1. Whether the plaintiffs proves the sale deed dated 17-5-1938 by the father of the defendants in favour of the husband of the plaintiff ? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves her possession on the date of the suit ? 3. Whether the suit is barred by lime ? 4. Do the defendants prove that they have perfected their title by adverse possession ? 5. To what relief parties are entitled ? however the learned Munsiff after appreciating the evidence, examining the documents and hearing the parties, answered issue No. 1 and 2 in passitive and issue Nos. 3 and 4 in the negative. Ultimately the learned Munsiff decreed the suit. ( 6 ) BEING aggrieved the defendants filed an appeal in R. A. No 62/77 in the court of the Civil Judge, Bellary who after hearing both the parties, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court. Being aggrieved by the said order the plaintiff filed the above second appeal. At the time of admission this Court raised the following substantial questions of law : i) in view of the document Ex. Being aggrieved by the said order the plaintiff filed the above second appeal. At the time of admission this Court raised the following substantial questions of law : i) in view of the document Ex. P-1 supporting the title of the plaintiff whether the finding recorded by the lower appellate court, that the plaintiff has failed to prove the title is in accordance with law ? ii) Whether the finding of the lower appellate Court is justified in view of the non-consideration of the material admissions found in the evidence of d. W. 5 and also in view of the nonconsideration of the entries in the record of rights produced in the suit ? the learned Counsel Mr. M. R. Achar appearing for the appellant vehemently submitted that the learned Civil Judge did not appreciate the material placed on record. Particularly he pointed out that in view of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, what is required to prove is that the documents is of 30 years old. If it is proved of 30 years old, the other presumptions provided are to be raised. The learned Counsel, submitted that nothing has been placed by the other side to rebut the presumption that is arising in law. Secondly he has very seriously attacked the findings of the learned first Appellate Judge, that nonexamination of plaintiff, the lady is fatal to the case and also another finding given by the first appellate judge, that non production of power of attorney has been most seriously affected the case of the plaintiff. His stress to draw adverse inference against the plaintiff is not only perverse but also capricious, the learned counsel submitted that even for a while if it is presumed that non examination of the plaintiff may make some dent on the on the evidence of plaintiff but in this particular case non examination does not affect the case at all it is not the case of the other side that the lady was present when the documents were executed or she had participated in the transaction directly or indirectly. Nothing can be made out from the evidence and the pleadings. Therefore non examination of the plaintiff is immaterial in this case. Even if she was examined nothing more could have been placed before the court than the presumption available in Section 90. Nothing can be made out from the evidence and the pleadings. Therefore non examination of the plaintiff is immaterial in this case. Even if she was examined nothing more could have been placed before the court than the presumption available in Section 90. For the sake of convenience, I would like to re produced the Section itself. Section 90 of the Evidence Act reads as under: where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it has duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Therefore when the documents is purported to be of thirty years old the other presumptions follow. in the instant case the document is said to have been executed in the year 1938, and the suit is filed in the year 1973. Therefore undoubtedly the age of the document is more than 30 years. Therefore we have no other alternative than to raise presumption as provided under Section 90. Besides, as regards scribe the son of scribe is examined who in unequivocal terms recognised the writing of his father as he is conversant with his writing he knows the writing of his father who is dead. Being a son of a scribe he must have had an occasion to see the writing of his father. Therefore his evidence cannot be doubted at all. Besides in view of presumption the proof is also not required but however there is a proof which supports the presumption. Wherefore I am inclined to hold that the first Appellate Judge is wrong in holding to the contrary. Similarly the learned counsel Mr. Achar contended that though son of the Plaintiff who is a natural son but had gone in adoption to another family and it has also come in evidence that he managed the affairs of the natural mother. He had given evidence saying that he is a power of attorney holder. But non-production of the power of attorney does not warrant adverse interence. He had given evidence saying that he is a power of attorney holder. But non-production of the power of attorney does not warrant adverse interence. ( 7 ) IT is an admitted fact and a proved fact and no body has denied that he is not the natural son of the mother that is, plaintiff and also that he is managing the affairs and the property of his natural parents. Under these special circumstances, it does not warrant that an adverse inference can be drawn for not producing the power of attorney. Therefore, the learned Appellant Judge has also committed an error here. The substantial questions raised by this Court are to be answered in affirmative in view of the arguments advanced by Mr. Achar and also in view of the above observations. The Judgement and Decree passed by the Appellate judge are therefore, not sustainable in law. ( 8 ) IN the result, the Regular Second appeal is allowed. The Judgment and decree passed by the Civil judge, Bellary, in R. A. No. 62 of 1977 on 30-1-79 are set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Prl. Munsiff, Bellary, in O. S No. 429 of 1973 on 16-6-1977 are restored. Appeal is allowed. --- *** --- .