ORDER Dr. T. N. Singh, J.- 1. Petitioners are threesome, all lifers, against whom conviction under Section 302/149/396, IPC, was entered on 2-1-1979. While serving their sentences in Central Jail, Gwalior, they applied to the Jail authorities for taking steps for their "premature release" under Rules 358/359 of M. P. Jail Manual, Vol. I. They have come to this Court on being told that they did not have the requisite entitlement under the law which position is further clarified in the Return filed. Reliance is placed in the Return on Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also on the Constitution Bench decision in Maru Ram's case, AIR 1980 SC 2147 to rebutt the petitioners' complaint. 2. Section 433-A, Cr. P. C. came on the Statute Book on 18-12-1978, and is as follows: "433A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases -Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment". (Emphasis added). While it cannot be disputed that in Maru Ram (supra), the prohibition contemplated under aforequoted Section 433-A was held ineffective against those of U. P Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938, it cannot also be denied at the same time that scope of Section 433-A was examined extensively. The model controversy in that case was resolved, holding that section 433-A did not in any manner interdict "intermissions of freedom" and, therefore, "parole or other relief within 14 years' span" Was not only permissible, but rather desirable. 3. The model controversy in that case was resolved, holding that section 433-A did not in any manner interdict "intermissions of freedom" and, therefore, "parole or other relief within 14 years' span" Was not only permissible, but rather desirable. 3. However, the position in so far as it concerned convictions entered prior to 18-12-1978 was also considered in the other context and put beyond doubt by their Lordships, holding categorically that section 433-A would not operate in those cases and the convicts undergoing the sentence would be "entitled to consideration by Government for release on the strength of earned remissions although a release can take place only if Government makes an order to that effect" Because Statutes enacted in several States contemplating "parole or release within 14 years' span" were not evidently offensive to the prohibition contemplated under Section 433-A under which an embargo was put on a lifer being set at liberty and restored his full freedom before completion of 14 years' confinement, cases of "remission" prohibited by section 433• A which had their roots in sections 432 and 433 were considered separately. 4. At para 72 of the Report, the twin dicta relevant to the instant case appears and the same is extracted in extenso: "(2) We affirm the current supremacy of Section 433-A over the Remission Rules and short-sentencing statutes made by the various States. (3) We uphold all remissions and short sentencing passed under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution but release will follow, in life sentence cases, only on Government making an order en masse or individually, in that behalf." It was further observed that Sections 432 and 433 were not a manifestation of the Constitutional power vested in the President/Governor under Articles 72/161 of the Constitution, but a separate and independent power under Section 433-A did not touch the Constitutional power of commutation and remission of sentence, etc. 5. However, this Court had an occasion to examine the scope and genesis of Rules 358 and 359 in Nainaram, 1987 MPLJ 685 wherein a Division Bench of this Court took the view that those Rules, to be found in M. P. Jail Manual, Vol. I, were enacted by the State Government under Section 59 of the Prisoners Act, 1894. 5. However, this Court had an occasion to examine the scope and genesis of Rules 358 and 359 in Nainaram, 1987 MPLJ 685 wherein a Division Bench of this Court took the view that those Rules, to be found in M. P. Jail Manual, Vol. I, were enacted by the State Government under Section 59 of the Prisoners Act, 1894. There is no doubt that the "premature release" contemplated in Rules 358/359 come within the mischief of the class of "short sentencing statutes" contemplated under the aforesaid judicial dicta of Maru Ram (supra). Indeed, Rule 358 (1) contemplates that a lifer "shall be considered for relelise as soon as the term actually undergone (together with any remission earned under the Rules) and such other special remissions, if any, as have been granted by the Government in a celebration of any public event amounts to fourteen years", while under Rule 359, the eligibility condition contemplated is that the prisoner has to complete half of his total sentence in case of lifer. 6. We have no doubt that Section 433-A will operate and affect the currency of Rules 358/359 in appropriate cases, namely, in cases in which conviction of the prisoner was entered subsequent to 13-12-1978. It is only when the President/Governor exercises his Constitutional power and remits the sentence of any prisoner directing him to be set at Liberty that there would be no scope for Section 433-A to operate. In other cases when any "remission" is granted by the State Government, whether under Section 432, Cr. P. C. or under extant "Prison Rules", of the like of Rules 358/359 aforesaid, the prisoner convicted after 18-12-1978 will have to face the interdiction contemplated under Section 433-A. He would not be entitled to claim release from confinement without actually undergoing the life sentence for a period of 14 years and the 'remission' earned by him under the Prison Rules would not help him. 7. Some support for the view we have taken can be read in the decision of their Lordships in Sadhu Singh, AIR 1984 SC 739 wherein the distinction between the case of two classes of lifers, those convicted prior and subsequent to 18-12-1978, in the context of 433-A and similar provision of Punjab Jail Manual was pointed out. 7. Some support for the view we have taken can be read in the decision of their Lordships in Sadhu Singh, AIR 1984 SC 739 wherein the distinction between the case of two classes of lifers, those convicted prior and subsequent to 18-12-1978, in the context of 433-A and similar provision of Punjab Jail Manual was pointed out. However, the further question that came to be considered in that case was that provisions of Punjab Jail Manual were not statutory and. therefore, formal order of commutation under Section 55 IPC and Section 433 (b), Cr. P. C. would be necessary even when a road to premature release is not blocked by Section 433-A. Cr. P. C. In the case of G N Morey, AIR 1982 SC 1163 the same distinction between two cases of cases of lifers convicted before and after 18-12-1978 was brought out. 8. It is not disputed that none of the petitioners has yet actually served 14 years of sentence. Hence, for all the foregoing reasons, we have no hasitation to hold that relying merely on the provisions of Rules 358/359 of M. P. Jail Manual, Vol. I. petitioners cannot seek mandamus from us to the Jail authorities to forward their applications for consideration of their' premature release" under these Rules. 9. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed.