ORDER Dr. T. N. Singh, J.- l. This matter came before us a number of times and the fact which is also not disputed is that pursuant to an order passed on 3-11-1987 (Annexure P/1), the petitioner is continuing in detention under the provisions of the National Security Act, 1980 for short, the 'Act'. From time to time bearing was adjourned because State defaulted in producing the relevant records on dates fixed for that purpose. On the last date, we had to warn the State that adverse inference shall be drawn if the default continued, because of alleged non-consideration of petitioner's "representation" which has become the pivotal issue for decision in this case. 2. In the petition, challenging the detention order and continued detention pursuant to the order being confirmed, at para 3 itself, it was stated on oath on 25-1-1988 that the petitioner had submitted a "representation" [contemplated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution] of which a copy was furnished with the petition and marked as Annexure P/2. True, in the Return, at para 3, respondents have taken the plea that no representation was received till 23-11-1987 or even till 14-12-87. The fact which is also stated in the Return is that the petitioner was produced before the Advisory Board on 14-12-1987 and that he was heard without any representation. Because the fact of submission of representation was contested in the Return, petitioner's mother, who had sworn to the petition, filed subsequently another affidavit buttressing the position that she had submitted representation to the Jailor and that the Jailor assured her that he would do the needful as signature on the representation had to be obtained of the petitioner who was incarcerated in Jail. However, we are not basing our decision on that affidavit. 3. We have looked into the records of the advisory Board; where it is merely indicated that the detenu was heard. The record of the proceedings does not show that the Advisory Board made any query to the petitioner as to whether he had submitted any "representation" or would like to submit that before he was heard by the Board. This Court has taken the view in Dhunna (Misc. The record of the proceedings does not show that the Advisory Board made any query to the petitioner as to whether he had submitted any "representation" or would like to submit that before he was heard by the Board. This Court has taken the view in Dhunna (Misc. Petition No. 1108/87, decided on 7-5-1988), that right to make an affective representation contemplated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution is an important right which has been vocalised in the relevant statutory provisions as well namely, in Sections 10 and 11 of the Act. Indeed, it is clearly indicated in Section 10 that when the detenu is produced before the Board for being given a personal hearing. "representation", if any made by him, should also be placed before the Board at the same time. According to Section 11, the Board is authorised to call for further material or information as it may deem necessary from any person, in the course of the proceedings held for giving its 'opinion" contemplated under the Act and the Constitution. Indeed. it was also held in Dhunna (supra), relying on two decisions of Apex Court rendered in A.K. Roy AIR 1982 SC 710 and Abdul Zahbar AIR 1983 SC 505 that when the Board has to hear the detenu appearing before it and the Board does not have before it any "representation" submitted by him, it becomes the duty of the Board to question the detenu if he would require any assistance for submitting the "representation" contemplated under the Constitution. We are in complete agreement with that view which accords primacy to the independent status of the Advisory Board and expects that Board to discharge its Constitutional duty with special Care it deserves because it is required to consider the "representation" of the detenu before tendering its opinion in order to fulfil the Constitutional guarantee. The "opinion" of the Board contemplated under Article 22 (4) (a) is not meant to be reduced to empty formality when the Supreme Court in Rattan Singh AIR 1982 SC 1 speaks of the Constitutional guarantee as a "modicum of safeguard" to be zealously protected. 4. Shri Dudawat, appearing for the respondents has endeavoured seriously to persuade us to take a different view of law in this matter, but we do not see any reason why we should oblige him. 4. Shri Dudawat, appearing for the respondents has endeavoured seriously to persuade us to take a different view of law in this matter, but we do not see any reason why we should oblige him. A considered decision rendered by another co-ordinate Bench of this Court is binding on us till the decision is set aside or reviewed by Larger Bench. If we have to say anything more, suffice it to say that on of us (Dr. T. N. Singh, J.) was a party to that decision and importantly rather, facts of the instant case exemplify the soundness of the view taken therein inasmuch as had the Board inquired of the detenue in the instant case of submission of "representation" by him, the factual controversy relating thereto would not have survived today. The Constitution-makers in their vast wisdom and sound judgment, conceived of interposition of an independent body like the Advisory Board as the surest possible guarantee of the "modicum of safeguard" against infraction of personal liberty of citizens to ensure that the prized possession of the same by the citizens of the free country was duly protected with proper care and caution. 5. We have no doubt that Section 10 and 11 of the Act are to be read conjointly with Articles 22 (4) (a) and 22 (5) of the Constitution. Because Section 10 speaks of representation, "if any", to be before the Board, it follows as a Constitutional imperative that the Board is required to satisfy itself and not rely merely on Detaining Authority's information that no representation was submitted by the detenu. If any "information" can be called under section 11, we do not see why the detenu himself cannot be queried by the Board as to whether he had submitted any "representation" or he would like still to submit "representation" and needed assistance for doing so. We have no doubt that the words' if any" do not relieve the Board of its Constitutional' duty of satisfying itself of the existence or otherwise of the "representation" which, according to Section 10 itself was required to be heard in the course of the proceedings when the detenu was procuded before the Board. That duty it must discharge itself and that can be bast discharged by questioning the detenu himself. 6. That duty it must discharge itself and that can be bast discharged by questioning the detenu himself. 6. In the circumstances aforesaid, we have no doubt that even if it is assessed, as contended by the respondents, that the petitioner had not submitted any representation, it is still difficult to uphold the continued detention of the petitioner as constitutional because' his fundamental right under Article 22 (5) has been infringed for the reasne aforesaid. He did not have any opportunity to be heard by the Board with the "representation" as contemplated under Section 10 of the Act. Indeed, we have also found that the Board did not inquire from him to satisfy itself whether any representation by the detenue was made or whether the detenu still wanted to submit a representation so that the Board could discharge with due care and caution its constitutional duty manifested in Section 10 and 11 of the Act. 7. For all the foregoing reasons, we have no other option except to take the view that the continued detention of the petitioner under the Act is unconstitutional and void. Accordingly, we direct that he be set at liberty forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other Case.