JUDGMENT : K.C.Agrawal, J. 1. These two revisions have been preferred against the judgment of the Judge Small Causes dated 22nd May, 1985. Revision No. 419 of 1985 is by the plaintiff whereas Revision No. 473 of 1985 is by the defendant. 2. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was the tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/- but as she had fallen in arrears of rent since October 1982 and had failed to pay despite service of notice of demand and termination of tenancy, hence the suit for ejectment, recovery of arrears of rent from October 1982 to June 1983 and for damages. The suit was contested by the defendant contending that she was not in arrears of rent from October 1982. She pleaded that the rent for the period upto April 1983 had been paid to the plaintiff for which she had not been issued any receipt. The rent for the month of May 1983 and onwards had been deposited in the court of Munsif under section 30 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. The court below framed four issues. Out of them issues 3 and 4 were as under : 3. To what amount of arrears of rent etc. is the plaintiff entitled ? 3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 4. Its finding was that the defendant was in arrears of rent since October 1982 as claimed by the plaintiff and since the same had not been paid, the defendant was liable to eviction on that ground. However, on the second question relating to the validity of the contract, the court below held that as there had been no allotment order of the disputed accommodation in favour of the defendant, consequently, the contract was void and the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree for ejectment. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the court below, the present revision No. 419 of 1985 had been filed by the plaintiff whereas revision No. 473 of 1985 was filed by the defendant. The defendant has challenged the finding that she was a defaulter whereas the plaintiff claimed that the defendant having entered into a contract of tenancy was not entitled to claim that the same was invalid. 5. The argument of the defendant that she was not a defaulter is not correct. The defendant has challenged the finding that she was a defaulter whereas the plaintiff claimed that the defendant having entered into a contract of tenancy was not entitled to claim that the same was invalid. 5. The argument of the defendant that she was not a defaulter is not correct. The court below after consideration of the evidence held that the defendant had not paid the rent since October 1982 and since she was in arrears of rent for more than four months, she was liable to eviction under section 20 of the Act. 6. Section 11 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 imposes a prohibition of letting without allotment order which is quoted below : "Save as hereinafter provided, no person shall let any building except in pursuance of an allotment order issued under section 16." Section 13 places restrictions on occupation of building without allotment order. It reads : "Where a landlord or tenant ceases to occupy a building or part thereof, no person shall occupy it in any capacity on his behalf or otherwise than under an order of allotment or release under section 16, and if a person so purports to occupy it, he shall, without prejudice to the provisions of section 31, be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant of such building or part." 7. The argument was that as there was an absolute prohibition of letting a premises and taking it on rent without the order of allotment, the contract arrived at between the plaintiff and the defendant was void ab-initio and as such, no right could flow from the same. Reliance had been placed on a decision of this court, 'Navin Chandra Sharma v. VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut, 1983 (1) ARC 50. It was held in this case : " Therefore, in the instant case, the contract of tenancy relied on by the petitioner was forbidden by law by virtue of the express prohibition contained under sections 11 and 13, and, is by its very nature such that if permitted it would defeat the provisions of the Act. The contract is plainly opposed to public policy being repugnant to public interest." 8. For the view taken in the aforesaid decision, the learned Judge relied on a Division Bench of this court in Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1982 AWC 461 . The contract is plainly opposed to public policy being repugnant to public interest." 8. For the view taken in the aforesaid decision, the learned Judge relied on a Division Bench of this court in Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1982 AWC 461 . In that case, the controversy was different than the one which arises for decision in this case. The question is whether a contract of tenancy arrived at against the prohibition contained in sections 11 and 13 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 by the parties was binding on them or not. This would raise the controversy whether the parties be permitted to relies when the same had been entered into with eyes open. In a Full Bench case arising under U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (? U. P. Act 3 of 1947), in Udhao Das v. Prem Prakash, 1963 AWR 125, the view was that : "Though the U. P. Act (3 of 1947) contains provisions punishing a person for letting out without permission or letting out in contravention of an order of allotment or refusing to let out inspite of an order of allotment and punishing abetment of the above acts and rendering a person liable to be convicted if he has occupied an accommodation in contravention of an allotment order...............there is no provision whatsoever rendering a contract of tenancy entered into by a landlord and another person void or even illegal." A similar controversy arose before the Supreme Court in Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of U. P., AIR 1974 SC 1924 . The Supreme Court held : "A lease made in violation of the provisions of section 7 (2) would be valid between the parties and would create the relationship of landlord and tenant between them although it might not bind the authorities concerned. Therefore, the lessee who had been paying the rent to the -lessor was a tenant and permission under section 3 to file a suit for eviction was necessary. Therefore, the lessee who had been paying the rent to the -lessor was a tenant and permission under section 3 to file a suit for eviction was necessary. Therefore, an agreement in the lease deed, providing that the parties will never claim the benefit of the Act and that the provisions of the Act will not be applicable to the lease deed, is illegal in view of section 23 of the Contract Act and it will not preclude tenant from contending that the suit for eviction filed without the permission of the District Magistrate was not maintainable......... The object of section 3 is to give protection to a tenant from eviction from an accommodation. Section 3 is based on public policy.... The language of the section is prohibitive in character. It precludes a court from entertaining the suit." 9. The Supreme Court was of the view that the tenant is precluded from contending that the suit for ejectment without permission under section 3 was not maintainable. The reason being that he himself was a party to the contract. From these decisions, the view appears to be that the contract is binding on the parties. 10. In Nanak Ram v. Kundal Raj, AIR 1986 SC 1194 , the question was again considered by the Supreme Court whether the possession of the party in contravention of Clause 22 of the Rent Control Order of that State, which imposed a prohibition on entering into a contract of tenancy, was invalid and not binding even on parties, the Supreme Court relied on the cases of Murlidhar Agarwal (Supra) and Udhao Das (Supra) and held : "It is not open to a landlord in a proceeding for permission to terminate the tenancy and for possession of the premises, to urge that the lease between the parties is void inasmuch as it was entered in contravention of Clause 22 of the Rent Control Order. The Supreme Court furthter held : "Nowhere does the Rent Control Order mandate that the Deputy Commissioner must eject a person who has entered into possession of a house in violation of Clause 22- If upon a view of the circumstances prevailing then, the Deputy Commissioner takes no action in the matter, there is no reason why the lease between the landlord and the tenant, although inconsistent with Clause 22 should not be binding as between the parties thereto. It is not a void transaction. There is nothing in the Rent Control Order declaring it to be so. If the lease is not void it is not open to either party to avoid the lease on the ground that it is inconsistent with Clause 22. The parties would be bound, as between them to observe the conditions of the lease and it cannot be assailed by either party in a proceeding between them." From the decisions of the Supreme Court it would be found that the contract of tenancy arrived at in contravention of the prohibition is binding on the parties although the same is not binding on the authorities. The result is that if the possession of the tenant is in breach of an allotment order, it will be entitled to take action against the person in possession or any one who is found to be guilty of breach of law. In fact, in Geep Industrial Syndicate v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1982 AWC 461 , the controversy was not in between the landlord and the tenant, but in between the authorities appointed under the Act and the third person. In that connection, this court had observed in paragraph 13 of the judgment that : "...It would appear that in case of an illegal letting or sub-letting, the view taken was that the contract may be binding on the parties to it, but not on the authorities, which would mean that the possession of a person who has been illegally let in would be unauthorised." 11. In a Full Bench decision in Shanker Lal Gupta v. V. Jagdishwar Rao, AIR 1980 AP 181 (FB), the Andhra Pradesh High Court came to the same conclusion that the tenancy created even in contravention of the Act is not illegal and void interse between the parties though it is void as against a controller. If a contract is illegal and if the parties are in pari delicto neither can establish a cause of action against the other without disclosing his own wrong doing. 12. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an illegal act. If a contract is illegal and if the parties are in pari delicto neither can establish a cause of action against the other without disclosing his own wrong doing. 12. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an illegal act. If from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appear to arise ex turpi cause, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, then the court says that he has no right to be assisted. Just as a court does not lend its aid to such a plaintiff, the defendant would also be not heard complaining that the transaction is illegal. For what is have said above, I hold that the parties were bound by the contract of tenancy and none of them could be permitted to resile from the same. The irresistible conclusion of that finding would be that the suit of the plaintiff for eviction against the defendant would be entitled to succeed. 13. In the result, civil revision no. 419 of 1985 succeeds and is allowed and revision no. 473 of 1985 fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. Stay order is vacated.