The defendant in Title Suit No. 51 of 1977 in the Court of Sadar Munsiff, Tezpur is the revision petitioner. The facts leading to this petition are simple. But the legal points raised in the petition on the facts require consideration by this Court. The substantial question involved in this revision petition is as to illegal assumption of the jurisdiction by the Court below in passing a decree for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement of the landlord. Can it be examined by this Court by exercising its revisional jurisdiction. The settled Jaw is that if it relates to the question of jurisdiction of the Court below to pass a decree for eviction of the tenant in view of the provision of sec. 5(1) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, for brevity 'the Act, the question may be examined by this Court to ascertain as to whether the decree passed by the Court was within the jurisdiction to pass such a decree on condition that the provisions of sec. 5 (1) of the aforesaid Act was fulfilled. Hare is the case where such a question has been posed before me challenging the legality and propriety of the judgment of the first appellate Court to assume jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction of a tenant from the suit premises on the ground of bonafide requirement as enumerated in clause (c) of sec. 5(1) of the Act It is settled that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to case or illegal assumption of the jurisdiction by the subordinate Courts. If a subordinate Court is found to possess the jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be said to exercise it illegally or with material irregularity even if it decides the matter wrongly. In other words, it is not open to the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code to correct errors of fact howsoever gross or even errors of law unless the errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself (see AIR 1978 SC 1341 , Shersingh vs. Joint Director of Consolidation). In the present case the only challenge that has been raise before me by Mr. In the present case the only challenge that has been raise before me by Mr. D. N. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the petitioner is as regards the jurisdiction of appellate Court below to pass a decree for eviction of the revision petitioner from the suit premises under clause (c) of section 5 (1) of the Act on the ground that the plaintiff-landlord was entitled to a decree on the ground of bonafide requirement of the premises in question. The admitted position is that the petitioner is a tenant of the opposite party landlord in respect of a shop house and a verandah in Dhekiajuli town at a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-payabie according to English calender month. There is no dispute that the opposite party-plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises. The opposite party as plaintiff brought the suit to evict the defendant-petitioner from the said shop house and verandah in the Court of Sadar Munsiff, Tezpur (being T. S. No. 51/77) on the ground that the plaintiff required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. It may be mentioned that prior to the filing of the suit notices were issued upon the defendant-petitioner by the landlord to evict him from the premises. The notices which were made exhibits in course of trial would be relevant for the purpose of appreciating the argument of Mr.Choudhury on the point of bonafide requirement which would be taken up later on. In response to the notice of the suit the defendant-petitioner appeared and contested the suit, by filing written statement. The plea taken by the defendant, apart from other point, is the denial of the plea of bonafide requirement of the premises in question by the plaintiff The defendant further denied that the plaintiff requires the house for his own use after its reconstruction. It appears from the respective pleadings of the parties that the only ground seeking for eviction of the defendant is the "bonafide requirement" of the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises for his own use and occupation of the same after re-construction of the suit premises. Though as many as 7 issues were formulated by the learned trial Court. Issue No.5 was the relevant issue for its consideration other issues being formal in nature. Though as many as 7 issues were formulated by the learned trial Court. Issue No.5 was the relevant issue for its consideration other issues being formal in nature. Issue No. 5 runs as follows : "Whether the plaintiff is in bonafide need of the room in question either for reconstruction or for his own occupation ?" Both the parties led their evidence in the trial Court, oral as well as documentary. The learned trial Court considered the evidence of the parties and upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence came to the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to prove any bonafide requirement in respect of the suit premises and as such, shall not be entitled to a decree. In other words, the trial Court retained no juris­diction to pass a decree for eviction against the defendant in absence of the satisfactory evidence to show that the plaintiff's case comes within the purview of section 5 (1) (c) of the Act. Consequently, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. The plaintiff being aggrieved, preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Assistant District Judge, Sonitpur at Tezpur to test the legality and propriety of the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. The appellate Court upon hearing the parties through their counsel, however, did not accept the findings of the learned trial Court on Issue No. 5 and reversed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. This is how the revision petition is filed in this Court. As has been said earlier that the only question raised in this revision petition by Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner is as to the findings of the learned appellate Court on Issue No. 5. I have perused the impugned judgment of the learned appellate Court below. It appears that though the learned appellate Court laboured much in referring very many decisions of different Courts including of this Court and the Supreme Court yet it appears that the facts of the present case in respect of which a consideration had been called for was not considered at all. The grievance of the petitioner is that the vital issue has not been decided on the basis of evidence on record. It is submitted by Mr. Choudhury that the absence of bonafide require­ment is revealed from the conduct of the plaintiff himself. The grievance of the petitioner is that the vital issue has not been decided on the basis of evidence on record. It is submitted by Mr. Choudhury that the absence of bonafide require­ment is revealed from the conduct of the plaintiff himself. If admitted documents which were exhibited in course of trial are considered it would be apparently clear that the plaintiff had no bonafide requirement either prior to the institution of the suit or even subsequent to the filing of the suit. It is candidly admitted that the subsequent event in respect of bonafide requirement may also be considered by the Court. But in the instant case there is no such material at least to show that even subsequent to the institution of the suit the plaintiff has bonafide requirement of the suit premises. The instances as submitted by Mr. Choudhury were very much on record. My attention was drawn to Ext. 'Ka' which was a notice dated 6.6.77. The said notice was issued by the Advocate of the plaintiff asking the defendant-petitioner to purchase the suit premises as the plaintiff-landlord was in urgent need to dispose of the said property for starting a new business of his own. It was further disclosed in the said notice that this was issued with a view to give him first option to purchase the suit property by paying the agreed price within 15 days of the notice failing which a legal notice terminating the tenancy would be served on him. It is clear from the notice (Ext. Ka) that if the defendant fails to purchase the suit property within 1 5 days, a legal notice would be issued on him terminating his tenancy and shall take an action for his eviction in the court of law. If it is taken to be an offer it appears that the plaintiff desired to dispose of the suit property to start a new business of his own out of the sale proceeds of the same. Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiff had no bonafide requirement of the suit premises for his own occupation and in consequence of such purchase of the suit premises by the tenant, the property would be lost to him. The next notice was served on 4th July, 1977 which was exhibited as Exhibit-1 in the trial Court. Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiff had no bonafide requirement of the suit premises for his own occupation and in consequence of such purchase of the suit premises by the tenant, the property would be lost to him. The next notice was served on 4th July, 1977 which was exhibited as Exhibit-1 in the trial Court. This notice was issued terminating the tenancy of the defendant petitioner from the suit premises. Though it has reference of the earlier notice dated 6.6.77 by this notice the earlier notice was treated to be withdrawn because of the failure to suit premises. In view of the earlier terms of the notice dated 6.6.77 it appears that there is no bonafide requirement of the plaintiff to occupy the suit premises or for its reconstruction. In course of sub­mission Mr. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn my attention to an application dated 26.5.77 (Ext. 6) made by the plaintiff-landlord to the Chairman, Dhekiajuli Town Committee request­ing him to accord necessary permission to enable the plaintiff to start construction of house as per plan attached to the said application. Curiously enough, nothing has been mentioned in the application that the house was old and in dilapidated and it requires reconstruction. That' apart, the sale deeds, Exts. 'Cha' and 'Ja' are clear evidence to show that the plaintiff-landlord had sold his land to different persons. This piece of evidence also considered by the learned trial Court to ascertain as to whether the plaintiff had any bonafide requirement for the suit premises. It is admitted fact that three rooms of the said premises under occupation of different tenants were sold to those tenants by the plaintiff-landlord. All these circumstances clearly show that the plaintiff could not prove any bonafide requirement either prior to the institution of the suit or at subsequent stage that in fact he had genuine need for the suit premises. The proof of bonafide reqirement as enumerated under Sec. 5 of the Act is a condition precedent to pass a decree for ejectment. On fulfilment of any of the conditions as enumera­ted in sec. 5 of the Act the Court would be empowered to pass a decree for eviction of the tenant. It is now well settled as to the true meaning of the bonafide requirement. On fulfilment of any of the conditions as enumera­ted in sec. 5 of the Act the Court would be empowered to pass a decree for eviction of the tenant. It is now well settled as to the true meaning of the bonafide requirement. The word "required" signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need on the landlord must show, the burden being upon him, that he genuinely requires the suit premises in question for the purpose of starting his business or for his occupation. The decision on Issue No. 5 would certainly touch the jurisdiction of the Court as to whether the Court is empowered to pass a decree for eviction of a tenant by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 5(1) (c) of the Act. Such jurisdiction to pass a decree is restricted if the plaintiff fails to prove the bonafide requirement in respect of the suit premises on which a decree is sought for the eviction of the tenant. If the provisions of section 5 (1) (c) relating to the bonafide requirement of the landlord is not satisfactorily proved and if the Court is not satisfied, it cannot have any jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises. If that be the position, the superior Court while exercising jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure can certainly interfere with the finding of the learned Court below which passes the decree. The impugned judgment of the first appellate Court below regarding the bonafide requirement is not based on appreciation of evidence on record. The learned appellate Court below also filled to consider the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case to acquire its jurisdiction to pass such a decree in terms of the provisions of sec. 5 (1) of the Act. The plaintiff having failed to prove bonafide requirement in respect of the suit premises, the judgment and decree of the learned appellate Court in setting aside the decree passed by the learned Court below calls for an interference by this Court. The last submission of Mr. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the petitioner needs no consideration in view of the decision on Issue No. 5 It may be mentioned that in course of submission Mr. The last submission of Mr. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the petitioner needs no consideration in view of the decision on Issue No. 5 It may be mentioned that in course of submission Mr. Choudhury has urged that the defendant has no other accommodation in the town to carry on with his business and that aspect of the matter ought to have been also considered by the appellate Court in the light of the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court. It is further submitted that it would cause great hardship to the defendant if he is evicted form the suit premises. However, this aspect of the matter is not necessary to be considered and/or to be decided for the obvious reason that the decision on Issue No. 5 stands against the plaintiff-opposite party. In the result the petition is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned appellate Court are set aside and those passed by learned Munsiff are restored. I, however, make no order as to costs.