Judgment :- 1. Second defendant is the appellant. Respondents 1 to 7 (plaintiffs) filed the suit for partition claiming 7/8 shares. First defendant is the mother of the plaintiffs and second defendant their maternal uncle. Property belongs to the tavazhi of the plaintiffs and their mother the first defendant. Second defendant was impleaded in the suit as he obtained assignment (Ext. B-1) of a portion of the plaint schedule properly from the 1st defendant on her own and acting as guardian of the plaintiffs. Contention of the plaintiffs is that the first plain lift was a major at the time of Ext. B-1 assignment and so it has no validity in view of S.33 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act. 2. It is common case that the first defendant for herself and acting as guardian of plaintiffs 1 to 6 assigned a portion of the plaint schedule property to the second defendant as per Ext. B-1 dated 3-10-1973 for a consideration of Rs. 1,500/-. Contention of the plaintiffs is that at the time of Ext. B-1 assignment deed the first plaintiff was a major as she was born on 29-11-1953 and so the first defendant was net competent to execute the document. If the first plaintiff was a minor at the time of Ext. B-1 assignment the irrefutable position is that there cannot be any valid challenge against it. The trial Court held that as there is no evidence that the 1st plaintiff had attained majority on the date of Ext. B-1 it cannot be invalidated. The learned District Judge relied on the evidence of PW.1 (father of the plaintiffs and husband of the first defendant) and Ext. A-2 (true extract of S S.L.C. book) and held that the first plaintiff was born on 29-11-1953 and that she was a major at the time of Ext. B-1. 3. Counsel for the second defendant contended that Ext. A-2 is only a true copy of the S.S.L C. book and as it has not been properly proved no reliance can be placed on it. Counsel submitted that when primary evidence can be easily produced and it is not produced, the secondary evidence is not admissible. It is argued that no reliance can be placed on Ext. A-2, as the primary evidence viz. the original S.S.L.C. book or birth register of the first plaintiff was not produced before the Court. Counsel submitted that when primary evidence can be easily produced and it is not produced, the secondary evidence is not admissible. It is argued that no reliance can be placed on Ext. A-2, as the primary evidence viz. the original S.S.L.C. book or birth register of the first plaintiff was not produced before the Court. Counsel for the plaintiffs contended that when Ext. A-2 was marked no objection was raised and therefore the belated objection is untenable in the appellate Court. Marking of Ext. A-2 was not objected to by the counsel in the trial Court. Where the copies of documents were admitted in the Court without objection its admissibility cannot be challenged in the appellate Court. The proceedings paper in the case would show that Exts. A-1, A-2 and B-1 to B-5 were marked on 24-11-1978. It is apparent that these documents were marked by the Court without any objection. The party opposing admission of the document should have objected to the marking of the document then and there. There cannot be any doubt that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in circumstances envisaged under S.65 of the Evidence Act. S.64 of the Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence is not generally admissible. Exceptions to the above rule are specified in S.65 of the Act. Contention of the second defendant is that the original S.S.L.C. book is with the first plaintiff and there was no difficulty at all for her to produce it before the Court and as no justifiable circumstances exist for adducing secondary evidence the Court has no option but to discard Ext. A-2. When a party produces in evidence a certified copy without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, objection must be taken at the time of admission and such objection cannot be allowed at a later stage. If a timely objection was taken it would have alerted the opposite party and he could salvage the position by adducing the primary evidence. If an objection was raised, the first plaintiff could have easily produced the S.S.L.C. book or her birth register. It is elementary rule that objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and not later. Proper time to object to the admissibility of evidence is when the evidence is tendered. If an objection was raised, the first plaintiff could have easily produced the S.S.L.C. book or her birth register. It is elementary rule that objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and not later. Proper time to object to the admissibility of evidence is when the evidence is tendered. If the method of proving a particular document was not opposed at the threshold objection to it cannot be allowed to be raised in the appellate Court as it would virtually result in complete negation of justice as by then it would not be possible to the party concerned to rectify the lacuna by adducing the necessary primary evidence. 4. In AIR 1931 Lahore 722 and in AIR 1925 Rangoon 113 it has been held that no objection should be allowed to be taken in the appellate Court as to the admissibility of the copy of a document which was admitted in evidence in the Court below without any objection. In Jiwan Mal v. Jiwan (AIR 1925 Lahore 347) three documents were endorsed by the trial Court as having been admitted in evidence. There was nothing on record to show that any objection to their being admitted was raised by or on behalf of the defendant. The Court held: "The rule is firmly established that no objection should be allowed to be taken in an appellate Court as to the admissibility of a copy of document, which was admitted in evidence in the court below without any objection." Subbarao v. Venkata Rama Rao (AIR 1964 Andhra Pradesh 53) is another apposite decision. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held thus: "The rule in S.65 of the Evidence Act excluding secondary evidence is not so rigid as to be enforced even If do objection has been taken at the trial by the party against whom the secondary evidence has been offered. When a party has waived proof of circumstance! justifying the giving of secondary evidence, and the secondary evidence is allowed be cannot raise the objection to its admissibility in appeal." The question of proof of a document is a question of procedure and definitely it can be waived. Whether a document is relevant or not could be raised in the appellate stage. justifying the giving of secondary evidence, and the secondary evidence is allowed be cannot raise the objection to its admissibility in appeal." The question of proof of a document is a question of procedure and definitely it can be waived. Whether a document is relevant or not could be raised in the appellate stage. Where the abjection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible, but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular or insufficient, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial stage before it is marked as an exhibit and admitted. A party cannot lie by until the case comes in appeal. 5. In Annapurna v. Narendra (AIR 1967 Orissa 129) it has been held that objection to the admissibility of certified copies of documents must be taken at the earliest point of time when the documents are tendered in evidence in the trial Court and objections are not permissible to be raised at a subsequent stage. In cases not coming under S.65 reception of secondary evidence can be objected and the court will rapt allow it to be admitted. The settled legal position is that if the objection is confined only to the mode of proof it must be taken at the earliest paint of time when the documents are tendered in evidence and the objection is not allowed to be raited at a subsequent stage or in appeal. In Ramachandra v. Ranganayaki (AIR 41 Madras 612) it was held: "Once secondary evidence of a will is found to have been admitted by the trial Court without any objection the contention in appeal as to its inadmissibility must be overruled." In the above case a copy of the registered will was produced during the trial and when secondary evidence was produced no objection was raised by the defendant and it was permitted to be received. The Madras High Court held that once it is found to have been admitted by the trial Court without any objection the contention in appeal as to its inadmissibility has to be overruled. 6. The Madras High Court held that once it is found to have been admitted by the trial Court without any objection the contention in appeal as to its inadmissibility has to be overruled. 6. Counsel for the appellant relying as Gopalakrishnaji v. Mohamed Haji Latif (AIR 1968 S.C.1413) argued that if a party in possession withholds the best evidence which would throw light on the issue in controversy the court ought to draw adverse inference against him irrespective of the onus of proof and that a party cannot rely on the abstract doctrine of onus of proof or take the stance that he was not called upon to produce it. It is contended that even if it is assumed that the burden of proof is not on the plaintiffs they could have easily produced the original S.S.L.C. book of the first plaintiff which would have set at rest the controversy as to whether the first plaintiff was a major or minor at the time of Est. B-I and as that has not been done adverse inference has to be drawn. This contention though attractive at the first blush is not tenable in view of Ext. A-2 which has been admitted in evidence. 7. In Bindeshwari Singh v. Ramraj Singh (AIR 1939 Allahabad 61) it is held as follows: "The proper time to object to the admissibility of evidence is at the trial when the evidence is tendered and it is then that the court should rule as to the admissibility or inadmissibility of the evidence. Hence where a document is once admitted in evidence without any objection by a party in the first court the party is precluded from objecting to the admissibility of the document in appeal," Still another authority for the above position is Abdul Smad v. Gunendra Krishna (AIR 25 Calcutta 452) where it is held: "Any objection as to the method of proving a particular document must be taken when it is tendered for admission." The above proposition rests upon the well known principle with regard to the rule of evidence. The principle is that objection to the admissibility of a document mult be taken at the time when it is tendered for admission so that it would enable the opposite party to adduce better evidence if he so chooses. The principle is that objection to the admissibility of a document mult be taken at the time when it is tendered for admission so that it would enable the opposite party to adduce better evidence if he so chooses. In Uppara Hanumantha v. Peddapalle Smacharlu (XXXIII Indian Cases 188) the Madras High Court held as follows: "When a party produces in evidence a certified copy without proving the circumstances entitling him to give secondary evidence, objection to it must be taken by the other parly at the time of admission and such objection will not be allowed at a later stage." The above decision is an authority for the position that even in a case where secondary evidence is allowed to be admitted without protest by the opposite side the latter cannot later contend for the position that the evidence is inadmissible as the primary evidence has not been produced. In Arjuna v. Dayanidhi (AIR 1927 Madras 60) the Court held: "When the trial Court with the consent of the parties admits document in evidence without formal proof, it is not open to the appellate Court to reject the document from consideration as not having been properly proved, but it can refute to consider a document on the ground that it is not a relevant document." As the documents on both sides were marked on the same day and as there is no evidence of any protest being made regarding the marking of Ext. A-2 the only inference possible is that it was admitted on consent. If that be so, belated protest is unwarranted. In Kodarnath v. G.R. Pradhan (AIR 1937 Nagpur 13) it is held as follows: "When a document is tendered in evidence and no objection whatsoever is taken to it either as to its being secondary evidence or as to its being tendered In circumstances that would justify its being received as secondary evidence, ft is too late In appeal to take the point that it should not have been received." When Ext. A-2 was tendered in evidence it was perfectly open to the second defendant to challenge its admissibility as secondary evidence. He could also have pointed out the absence of any circumstance under S.65 of the Evidence Act justifying the reception of the secondary evidence. As he did not do so it is too late for him to raise such an objection in this Court. He could also have pointed out the absence of any circumstance under S.65 of the Evidence Act justifying the reception of the secondary evidence. As he did not do so it is too late for him to raise such an objection in this Court. Behari Lal v. Amin Chand (AIR 1924 Allahabad 918) is another authority far the position that where a document is admitted in evidence without objection in the trial Court, it cannot be objected to afterwards. In Fauja Singh v. Allah Ditto (AIR 1931 Lahore 722) the Court held thus: "When a fact has been erroneously allowed to be proved in a manner different from that which the law requires and no objection is taken in the Court of first instance, such objection cannot be taken later in appeal. This view is based on the principle that if objection is taken at the proper time to the reception of certain evidence (not inadmissible in itself) owing to such evidence not being produced in the form prescribed by law, an opportunity can be afforded to the party producing such evidence to remedy the defect and satisfy the requirements of the law." Useful reference can be made to Prasanna Deb Haikat v. Mohananda das (40 Indian Cases 553) where the Calcutta High Court held: "Documentary evidence which is not altogether Irrelevant and which has been admitted without objection, cannot be objected to in appeal on the ground that It is not admissible for the purposes for winch it has been used." If no objection was taken to the mode of proof of a relevant fact at the time evidence in proof of it was given, the patty neglecting to object or abstaining from objecting to it will not, on principles akin to these of estoppel, be permitted to object to it at a later stage. Thus where secondary evidence has been adduced and received in the Court without objection and without a foundation for its reception having been laid, or where secondary evidence of a wrong kind has been given and received without objection, the party omitting to object at the time the evidence is given will not be permitted to question it subsequently. In Gopal Das v. Sri. In Gopal Das v. Sri. Thakurji (AIR 1943 P.C. 83) the Privy Council observed: "Where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular or Insufficient, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. A party cannot lie by until the case comes before a Court of appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof." The desirability of objecting the admissibility of a document at the trial stage is emphasised in Jahangir v. Sheoraj Singh (30 Indian Cases 505). The Court held at page 506: "Objection to the admissibility of evidence taken at a late stage in litigation is not to be encouraged. The proper time to object to the admissibility of evidence is at the trial when the evidence is tendered and it is then that the Court should rule as to the admissibility or inadmissibility of the evidence. When the objection Is taken at the proper time, the party wishing to produce the evidence may be able to take steps to make the evidence admissible. If the objection is not taken until a late stage In the litigation, it may mean that an Appellate Court is obliged to decide against the party on a technical ground or the time of the Court is taken up in re-trying matters which ought to have been disposed of at the original bearing, the result being loss of public time and additional and unnecessary expense to the litigants." In view of the settled legal position as held by the long line of decisions it is a sheer exercise in futility on the part of the 2nd defendant to contend that Ext. A-2 has to be eschewed from evidence. P.W.1 has been cross examined with respect to Ext. A-2. In cross examination P.W.1 stated that the certificate was obtained by the 1st plaintiff herself from the School. In view of the evidence of P.W.1 and Ext. A-2 the learned District Judge held that first plaintiff was born on 29-11-1953 and that she had attained majority at the time of Ext. B-1 assignment. Even though the learned District Judge agreed with the finding of the trial Court that Ext. In view of the evidence of P.W.1 and Ext. A-2 the learned District Judge held that first plaintiff was born on 29-11-1953 and that she had attained majority at the time of Ext. B-1 assignment. Even though the learned District Judge agreed with the finding of the trial Court that Ext. B-1 is supported by Tavazhi necessity it was held by him that despite that finding Ext. B-1 cannot be upheld as regards the shares of the plaintiffs as the first defendant was not competent to assign their shares. As the first plaintiff was a major at the time of the execution of Ext. B-1 the position is that there were two major members of the tavazhi at the time of Ext. B-1 assignment. As there is no evidence of the first plaintiff consenting either orally or in writing for the assignment evidenced by Ext. B-1 the District judge was justified in holding that it is invalid so far as the shares of the plaintiffs are concerned. The findings of the learned District Judge do not call for interference. The Second Appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their respective costs in the Second Appeal.