ORDER Amarendra Nath Varma, J. - Meerut Thok Kendriya Upbhokta Sahkari Bhandar Limited, Meerut, the petitioner No. 1, is a consumers Co- operative Society. Sri G.D. Agarwal, the petitioner No. 2 is its secretary. The petitioners are assailing the validity of the order dated 19-4-1983 passed by the Additional District Magistrate (C S)/Delegated authority Meerut in the purported exercise of powers under S. 8 of the U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947 (the Act for short) derequisitioning building No. 659, Begum Bridge, Meerut. 2. A brief history of the case will be necessary. The building in dispute was requisitioned under the aforesaid Act by the District Magistrate, Meerut, by his order dated 12-9-1966 in the exercise of his power under S. 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, the purpose disclosed being to provide for an accommodation for running a Departmental store. It is not disputed that the property belonged to A.D. Mukerji, the respondent No. 2 herein. 3. It appears that in course of time, portions of the building in question came to be occupied by various shopkeepers and Banks including the State Bank of India, the District Co-operative Bank, and the land Management Bank. The allegation is that the petitioners had contrary to the purpose for which the building was requisitioned sublet portions thereof to various shopkeepers and Bank etc., This led to filing of an application dated 10-12-1981 by Sri Mukerji addressed to the ADM(CS), complaining that though the building was requisitioned for the purpose of running a Government Departmental store, the petitioners have illegally sublet portions thereof to others who are using the same for altogether different purposes, like Banks, Restaurant, Betel shop, Jewellers, Dry Cleaners, shoe stores, Gandhi Ashram, Tailors, etc. On these allegations Sri Mukerji requested that the building be derequisitioned and the petitioners be asked to pay a sum of Rs. 15000/- per month with effect from 1-11- 82 till delivery of possession. The Additional District Magistrate (CS)/Delegated Authority considered the entire material on the record and has recorded a very categorical finding that the accommodation had been permitted to be used by the petitioners for purposes which are entirely different from that for which it was requisitioned. 15000/- per month with effect from 1-11- 82 till delivery of possession. The Additional District Magistrate (CS)/Delegated Authority considered the entire material on the record and has recorded a very categorical finding that the accommodation had been permitted to be used by the petitioners for purposes which are entirely different from that for which it was requisitioned. As many as twelve different portions of the building have been sublet to various shopkeepers for running multifarious businesses mentioned above, whereas the building was requisitioned only for running a Government Department store for selling consumer goods and articles on a co-operative basis. The Addl. District Magistrate has further found that the sub-tenants of the petitioners have made the building a source of profiteering. On these findings, the Addl. District Magistrate has directed that the building be released from requisition with immediate effect. 4. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing that order. 5. Sri A. K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the validity of the impugned order principally on the ground that the Addl. District Magistrate has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under sub-section (v) of S. 8 of the Act legally and properly inasmuch as he has not addressed himself to the question whether in view of the fact that the petitioners were still in occupation of a part of the building and carrying on the business for which the property was requisitioned the order of derequisition ought not to have been maintained at least in regard to that part of the accommodation even if the Addl. District Magistrate was of the opinion that the remaining part was being used for some other purpose or purposes. 6. Having given the submission a careful consideration and having perused the affidavits exchanged between the parties, I find no merit in this contention. Sub-section (v) of S. 8 merely vests a discretion or power in the District Magistrate to derequisition a part only of the requisitioned accommodation in appropriate cases. But it does not oblige him to do so even in a case where, as here, he comes to the conclusion that the order of requisition is being abused or misused. Sub-section (v) of S. 8 merely vests a discretion or power in the District Magistrate to derequisition a part only of the requisitioned accommodation in appropriate cases. But it does not oblige him to do so even in a case where, as here, he comes to the conclusion that the order of requisition is being abused or misused. In cases where the competent authority finds that the occupiers for whose use the accommodation has been requisitioned are abusing the order, there would be, in my opinion, no scope for applying clause (v) of S. 8. In the instant case the finding of the Add1 District Magistrate is that the petitioners have misused their privilege by subletting as many as twelve portions of the building to various persons who were using the same for purposes other than that for which the accommodation was requisitioned by the District Magistrate. The Additional District Magistrate has further pointed out in the impugned order that the subtenants have been using the accommodation for making profits which is wholly inconsistent with the object for which the building was requisitioned. On these findings the Addl. District Magistrate cannot have lawfully left any part of the accommodation with the petitioners in the exercise of his powers under S. 8(v). In this connection it may be mentioned that the petitioners had not even raised this point before the Addl. District Magistrate. that is, asked him to leave the remaining port ion with them. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners relying on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1980 All Ren Cas 311 however submitted that even if the petitioners did not specifically raises the plea based on sub- section (v) of S. 8 before the Addl. District Magistrate the latter should have gone into this question on his own and examined the possibility of leaving the portion of the building which is in occupation with them untouched, 8. This decision, to my mind, has no application to the facts of the present case and to the scheme of the enactment under examination. That was a case which was concerned with the scope of rule 16(1)(d) of the Rules framed under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. This decision, to my mind, has no application to the facts of the present case and to the scheme of the enactment under examination. That was a case which was concerned with the scope of rule 16(1)(d) of the Rules framed under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. One of the requirements of that statute is that before directing the release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord the Prescribed Authority should consider whether keeping in view the comparative hardship likely to be caused to the tenant and the landlord from the order proposed to be passed the need of the landlord would not be served by leaving some portion' with the tenant and releasing the remaining portion with the landlord It was in the context of this statutory mandate that the Supreme Court held that before directing release of the accommodation the Prescribed Authority should in each case consider whether the release of a part o f the accommodation would not satisfy the need of the landlord irrespective of whether the tenant raised this plea or not. 9. In the present case, however, as has been held by a Bench of this court in the case of Nirbhay Narain Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1986) 2 All Ren Cas 176. The occupant of a requisitioned accommodation does not have any enforceable right in respect thereof. They have only a privilege to remain in occupation so long as the order of requisition lasts. That privilege can be withdrawn by exercise of power of derequisition incorporated under S. 8 of the Statute. It will, therefore, be seen that there is no parity between the present case and a case governed by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The considerations are entirely different. The statutory scheme and its purpose are different. Under that enactment there is a competition between the rights of private individuals, whereas the present enactment deals with a matter which is part of public law. The privilege or the right of occupation derived by occupants under the order of requisition do not confer on the occupants any independent right so as to insist that the order of requisition must be continued indefinitely. The privilege or the right of occupation derived by occupants under the order of requisition do not confer on the occupants any independent right so as to insist that the order of requisition must be continued indefinitely. As mentioned clause (v) of S. 8 merely vests a discretion in the District Magistrate and not a right in the occupier whose position is that of a licencee. 10. The last submission of the learned counsel was that in 1969 Sri A. D. Mukerji had sent a notice to the petitioners stating' that the disputed property had been sold by him to his wife and his minor son and that from the date of that notice rent should be paid directly to his wife and son. This notice had been filed by the petitioners before the Addl. District Magistrate before the decision of case. That being so, it was urged, Sri A.D. Mukerji must be deemed to have ceased to be the owner of the property. He had, therefore, no locus standi to ask the Additional District Magistrate to derequisition the property. 11. lam unable to agree. The exercise of power by the District Magistrate under S. 8 is not dependent on the filing of any application by the owner or one who claims to be the owner of the property. There can be variety or circumstances in which this power can be exercised. The power can, for example be invoked even upon an information received or facts gathered in any other manner. As mentioned above, the exercise of power is not dependent on any application by the owner. On the facts found by the Additional District Magistrate, therefore, the impugned order cannot be faulted merely on the ground that Sri A.D. Mukerji had ceased to be the owner of the property. It may, however, be mentioned at this point that in paragraph 1 of the application filed by Sri Mukerji he asserted that he was the owner of the property in dispute and his averment had been admitted by the petitioners in their reply as well as affidavit. The notice given in 1988 relied on by the petitioner was hence not relevant or decisive of the controversy. The relevant point of time was the date on which the application was filed. 12. The notice given in 1988 relied on by the petitioner was hence not relevant or decisive of the controversy. The relevant point of time was the date on which the application was filed. 12. Finally a feeble attempt was made to argue that no public purpose would be served by derequisitioning the property which will have the effect of possession of the building being handed over to somebody who is not the owner of the property. This argument is again founded on the same premise, viz., that Sri A.D. Mukerji was not the owner of the property on the relevant date and is, therefore, rejected for the reasons already given. In any case, the release of accommodation has, been ordered on the ground that it is no longer needed for the public purpose for which it was initially requisitioned. The existence of public purpose is relevant only for derequisitioning the property, not for derequisitioning it. 13. In the premise, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The interim orders are discharged. 14. Sri A.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, prayed that the enforcement of the order challenged in the writ petition may be suspended for a period of three months to unable him either to vacate the premises or to take other appropriate legal proceedings. In the entire facts and circumstances, a month's time is allowed to the petitioners to vacate the premises.