Judgment :- 1. Syamala, the wife of the appellant, died on 6-10-1984. The autopsy on the dead body conducted by the Doctor revealed that her heart was ruptured and she died as a result of the multiple injuries on the chest and abdomen. The trial of the appellant on the charge of murder for having caused the death of his wife by beating, hitting, stamping etc. ended in his conviction under S.302 I.P.C. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life. 2. The conviction was entered mainly on the evidence of the two eye witnesses, Pw. 2 Thulasi alias Kannan, a neighbour and Pw.3 Anish, the minor son of the deceased. 3. The appellant and his wife lived together along with their six year old son Anish in the village near a thodu. There used to be frequent quarrels between the couple. When Pw.5, a neighbour once made enquiries the appellant resented and pw. 5 was thereafter indifferent. On the night of 5-10-1984 Syamala slept in the lean to after she was beaten by the appellant. The next morning at about 8.15 a.m. the appellant saw her in the tea shop nearby. The appellant asked her with whom she slept last night. Syamala picking up her children ran towards the bouse. The appellant followed, caught hold of her by the tuft when she reached the court yard, beat her, hit and fisted her. She fell on the court yard. The appellant dragged her to the varandha of his house, attacked her with the kitchen knife and throwing away the knife slapped on her cheek. She fell on her back near the door. He then climbed on her body, hit on the chest, stamped on the hip, chest and abdomen. He cut her hair. Anish was on the verandha witnessing the attack. pw. 2, Kannan alias Thulasi, an employee in the tea shop had followed the couple and he stood near the well to see what was happening. When pw. 2 asked the appellant not to beat Syamala the appellant turned towards him leaving Syamala. Kannan took to his heels. The appellant abandoned his chase and slipped away. 4. Pwl, the younger brother of the deceased and pw. 4 her mother on receiving the message reached the scene. The boy- narrated the incident. pw. When pw. 2 asked the appellant not to beat Syamala the appellant turned towards him leaving Syamala. Kannan took to his heels. The appellant abandoned his chase and slipped away. 4. Pwl, the younger brother of the deceased and pw. 4 her mother on receiving the message reached the scene. The boy- narrated the incident. pw. I lodged the first information at the police station at 11-30 a. m. The crime registered against the appellant on recording Ext. P1 statement was investigated by the Circle Inspector, Pw. 12. He drew up Ext P2 inquest report, questioned the material witnesses and arrested the appellant. Ext. PA certificate was issued by Pw. 11, the Assistant Professor of Forensic Medicine on conducting the autopsy. While the appellant denied his complicity, suggested in the course of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses as also in bis statement under S.313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that there had been illicit intimacy between the deceased and Kannan that on being provoked he beat his wife in the night and left the house the next morning to attend the marriage of his nephew and came to know about her death in the evening. 5. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the prosecution evidence in arriving at the conclusion that the deceased received the injuries at the hands of the appellant and that she died as a result of those injuries. 6. There is ample evidence to prove that Syamala died as a result of the injuries sustained. Pw. 11, the Assistant Professor of Forensic Medicine had certified that there bad been 21 antemortem injuries. Injuries 16 and 17 are contusions with corresponding internal injuries to the heart, liver and intestine. In the opinion of Pw. 11 these injuries are individually sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The evidence of the two eye witnesses established that the injuries bad been inflicted by the appellant and none else. Pw. 2 was employed in the tea shop and be lived in the neighbourhood. He bad narrated the whole incident without any discrepancy or inconsistency whatsoever. Even though wild suggestions bad been made attributing motive for the witness to support the prosecution, there is no material in evidence to show that on the date of the occurrence or the previous night Pw. He bad narrated the whole incident without any discrepancy or inconsistency whatsoever. Even though wild suggestions bad been made attributing motive for the witness to support the prosecution, there is no material in evidence to show that on the date of the occurrence or the previous night Pw. 2 was in the company of the deceased in the house to cause any provocation to the appellant. His presence at the scene is quite probable. There is nothing strange in the conduct of a young person in moving towards the house of the deceased when be saw Syamala suddenly going to the house as soon as her husband emerged at the tea shop, out of curiosity or sympathy. He could clearly see what was happening in the court yard and the verandha by standing near the well. Even though it is a quarrel between the husband and wife the impression which the witness gathered from the deceased about the conduct of the appellant the previous day as spoken to by him might have persuaded pw. 2 to adopt that course and to go near the house of the appellant. We do not consider that the evidence is artificial or untrue. pw. 3, the child witness, corroborates Pw. 2 on all material particulars He affirms that the appellant assaulted bis mother. The learned judge bad been impressed with the narration given by Pw. 3. He had not been faltering or hesitant and did not leave the impression that be was tutored. The testimony of the child witness could, therefore, be accepted and acted upon. If a boy of tender age happens to see before his eyes bis mother being tortured by his own father and the mother, before long breathing her last, the incident would leave an indelible impression in the mind of the child. When he is to recount what he had seen it is not likely that the witness would go wrong. The learned judge has rightly accepted the testimony of Pw. 3. There is, therefore, no room for doubt that the appellant is the perpetrator of the crime and that he fatally injured his wife and caused her death. 7. When he is to recount what he had seen it is not likely that the witness would go wrong. The learned judge has rightly accepted the testimony of Pw. 3. There is, therefore, no room for doubt that the appellant is the perpetrator of the crime and that he fatally injured his wife and caused her death. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant contended before us that even if the prosecution case is accepted as true, the appellant cannot be found guilty of murder and the causing of the death in the circumstances proved would constitute only an offence punishable under S.304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, 8. The argument advanced is that the intention to kill or to cause such an injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death cannot be gathered from the nature of the act committed. It is pointed out that the appellant had not used any lethal weapon or particularly chosen any vulnerable part of the body and could not have intended to cause any internal injuries when he beat or kicked and none of the clauses under S.300 IPC. would, therefore, be attracted. 9. The case of grave and sudden provocation suggested by the defence has no basis on the materials on record. The presence of the deceased in the tea shop where Pw. 2 was working, after she had avoided the appellant the previous night could have enraged the appellant. It could not give any provocation to deprive him of his power of self-control. He did not suddenly attack this woman. He only followed her until she reached the court yard and there he began to assault her. There is, therefore, no scope for claiming the benefit of the Exception to S.300 IPC. 10. Whoever causes death by intentionally inflicting injuries and such injuries are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death would be guilty of murder as Clause Thirdly of S.300 IPC., will be attracted in such a case. The Supreme Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC. 465 laving down the guiding principles for the application of Clause Thirdly of S.300 IPC. stated that it must be first established that an injury is caused, next it must be established objectively what the nature of that injury in the ordinary course of nature is. The Supreme Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC. 465 laving down the guiding principles for the application of Clause Thirdly of S.300 IPC. stated that it must be first established that an injury is caused, next it must be established objectively what the nature of that injury in the ordinary course of nature is. If the injury is found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death one test is satisfied. Then it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that very injury and not some other injury. If this is also held against the offender the offence of murder is established. The relevant paragraphs in the report may be extracted here: "(8) It was argued with much circum-locution that the facts set out above do not disclose an offence of murder because the prosecution has not proved that there was an intention to inflict a bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. S.300 'thirdly' was quoted: "If it is done with the intention of causing hodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death", It was said that the intention that the section requires must be related, not only to the bodily injury inflicted, but also to the clause, "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death". (9) This is a favourite argument in this kind of case but is fallacious. If there is an intention to inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then the intention is to kill and in that event, the "thirdly" would be unnecessary because the act would fall under the first part of the section, namely "If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death". In our opinion, the two clauses are disjunctive and separate. The first is subjective to the offender: "If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person". In our opinion, the two clauses are disjunctive and separate. The first is subjective to the offender: "If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person". It must of course.first be found that bodily injury was caused and the nature of the injury must be established, that is to say whether the injury is on the leg or the arm or the stomach, how deep it penetrated, whether any vital organs were cut and so forth. These are purely objective facts and leave no room for inference or deduction: to that extent the enquiry is objective; but when it comes to the question of intention, that is subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had an intention to cause the bodily injury that is found to be present. (10) Once that is found, the enquiry shifts to the next clause: "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." The first part of this is descriptive of the earlier part of the section, namely, the infliction of bodily injury with the intention to inflict it that is to say if the circumstances justify an inference that a man's intention was only to inflict a blow on the lower part of the leg, or some lessor blow, and it can be shown that the blow landed in the region of the heart by accident, then, though an injury to the heart is shown to be present, the intention to inflict an injury in that region, or of that nature, is not proved. In that case, the first part of the clause does not come into play. Bat once it is proved that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found to be present, the earlier part of the clause we are now examining - "and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted" is merely descriptive. All it means is that it is not enough to prove that the injury found to be present is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature; it must in addition be shown that the injury is of the kind that falls within the earlier clause, namely, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. Whether it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is a matter of inference or deduction from the proved facts about the nature of the injury and has nothing to do with the question of intention," Having stated thus the Court summarised the law in paragraphs, 12 and 13: "(12) To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under S.300 'thirdly'; First, it must establish, quite objectively that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and; Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. (13) Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under S.300 "'thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accident at or otherwise unintentional." 11. The Supreme Court, on a review of the later decisions and the observations in Virsa Singh's case, reiterated in Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1981 SC 1552; "Under Clause Thirdly of S.300 of the Code, culpable homicide is murder if both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz. that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted," 12. The law is thus settled that to bring a case under Clause Thirdly of S.300 IPC. it is not enough to prove that the injury found to be present is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It must in addition be shown that the injury found to he present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. It the totality of the circumstances justifies an inference that the accused did not intend to inflict the injury that is proved to be present, the intent the section requires is not proved and the case is taken out of the clause. 13. The question so far as intention is concerned is not whether the accused intended to kill or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question. As stated in Virsa Singh's case, in considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury found to have been inflicted the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for example, whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous spot, and Whether with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been inflicted. 14. 14. It is not necessary to enquire into every last detail as, for instance, whether the accused intended to nave the bowels fall out, or whether be intended to penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the heart. When a person resorts to indiscriminate beating and attacks the victim incessantly until the latter collapses and the death has resulted from the injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is readily deducible and the case is then brought under Clause Thirdly. 15. The appellant herein infuriated by the conduct of the deceased the previous day assaulted her. He did not retreat after giving the blows. He continued to strike her violently. Even if no weapon had been used successfully, be hit her on vulnerable parts of the body, kicked her and stamped on the chest and abdomen and continued to do so until she collapsed. The ferocity with which the act was done by the appellant is a clear indication that be intended to cause the injuries which, according to the medical evidence, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The act cannot, therefore, be taken out of S.300 IPC. The conviction and sentence under S.302 IPC. in the circumstances is warranted. We find no merit in the appeal. The Criminal Appeal is accordingly dismissed. Dismissed.