JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Articles 226/227 of the constitution of India for quashing the impugned orders passed by the Collector, panna dated 29-1-1986 in an election petition under Rule 43 of the M. P. Krishi Upaj mandi Niyam, 1974 (hereinafter referred as the Rules ). Accordingly, the election petition has been allowed and the notification by which the present petitioner Uttam singh was declared elected as member of ward No. 4 of Panna Mandi has been set aside and the petitioner in that case, i. e. respondent No. 3 Brijendra Singh, has been declared elected as member of the Panna Mandi from Ward No. 4. ( 2. ) IT is common ground that the market was established by the State government for regulating the purchase and sale of agricultural produce under section 4 of die M. P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1973 (hereinafter called the adhiniyam ). A market committee known as Panna Krishi Upaj Mandi was established under Section 7 of the said Adhiniyam. The market area was divided into several wards and election was held for the membership of the committee for each ward. The petitioner Uttam Singh as well as respondent No. 3 Brijendra Singh filed nomination forms for membership for Ward No. 4. The nomination papers were published and date of scrutiny was notified. The petitioner raised an objection that respondent No. 3 was disqualified to contest, as he was defaulter and owed a sum of Rs. 2000/- to Sewa sahakari Samiti Maryadit, Vaishobha for which a certificate was filed (Annexure-A ). The scrutiny officer rejected the objection and the respondent No. 3 Brijendra Singh was allowed to contest. The petitioner was elected as member of the said committee from Ward No. 4 whereas respondent No. 3 was defeated. The respondent No. 3 filed an election petition under Rule 43, alleging inter alia that the petitioner was convicted for an offence under Section 324, Indian Penal Code and consequently was not eligible to contest in view of Rule 7 (x) of the Rules. The Collector in his orders dated 29-1-1986 (Annexure-B) held that the offence committed involved moral turpitude and accordingly passed the impugned orders referred earlier. The Collector in his orders dated 29-1-1986 (Annexure-B) held that the offence committed involved moral turpitude and accordingly passed the impugned orders referred earlier. It was further held that the respondent (present petitioner) has not established clearly that the petitioner (respondent No. 3 in this petition) was wilful defaulter at the time of filing of the nomination papers and therefore, negatived that contention. ( 3. ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, his conviction under Section 324, Indian Penal code is not covered under Section 7 (x) of the Rules, as the said offence did not involve moral turpitude1 and therefore, the election petition against him was liable to be dismissed. Furthermore, respondent No: 3 was disqualified, being a defaulter, and therefore, he was incompetent to contest for the membership and had no locus standi to file the election petition and also could not have been declared elected on the election petition of the petitioner being held invalid. ( 4. ) THE respondent No. 3 filed his return stating that he was eligible to contest the election, as he was not a defaulter. That since he was a contesting candidate he had locus standi to challenge the election. The respondent No. 3 has filed a copy of the judgment dated 17-7-1982 in S. T No. 29/81 by S. J. , Panna (Annexure R-I) and also filed copies of the election petition and the written statement (respectively Annexures r-II and R-III ). ( 5. ) RECORD perused. The learned counsel for the petitioner Shri M. L. Jaiswal, shri M. A. Khan for respondent No. 3 and Shri O. P. Namdeo, Dy. Govt. Advocate for respondent No. 1 heard. The short question for consideration is : "whether conviction of the petitioner under Section 324, Indian Penal Code entails disqualification for election as member of market committee as it is an offence involving moral turpitude ? ( 6. ) THE provisions of Rule 7 (ix) and (xi) are as follows : "7. Disqualification for membership.-No person shall be eligible for being elected as a member of the market committee if -XXX xxxxx xxxxxx xxxx (ix) He has been convicted by a Court of Law of an offence involving moral turpitude; xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx (xi) he has been held responsible by the market committee for default in payment of dues to the market committee; xxxx XXXXXX XXXXX" ( 7. ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner Shri M. L. Jaiswal has assailed in particular para 8 of the impugned orders passed by the Collector wherein he was of the view that two conditions are to be fulfilled to find out whether the present case is one that involves moral turpitude (i) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of the society as a whole (ii) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and. whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society. The learned Collector was of the view that in the present case the society as a whole was affected by the nefarious activities of the respondent (present petitioner) and his accomplices. The whole village was ferrorised by these people. So it is conclusively proved that the offence for which the respondent (present petitioner) was convicted is clearly one that involves moral turpitude. According to Shri Jaiswal, the conviction under Section 324, Indian Penal code does not involve any element of moral turpitude. ( 8. ) THE learned counsel, Shri Jaiswal, maintained that after all the conviction of the petitioner under Section 324, Indian Penal Code is not a circumstance which would shake the moral conscience of the society as a whole or he could be said to be a depraved character. It was further submitted that he was not able to trace any direct decision of this Court on interpretation of the expression moral turpitude. However, we have examined certain decisions of other High Courts referred during arguments. All these decisions have generally held that the expression moral turpitude is not defined anywhere. In Baleshwar Singh vs. District Magistrate and Collector, AIR 1959 ail 71 (SB), it was observed, "that the expression moral turpitude means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It implies deprivity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. " This decision related to disqualification alleged to have been incurred by a panchayat member on account of two convictions, one under Section 107, Criminal procedure Code and the other under Section 182, Indian Penal Code. It implies deprivity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. " This decision related to disqualification alleged to have been incurred by a panchayat member on account of two convictions, one under Section 107, Criminal procedure Code and the other under Section 182, Indian Penal Code. The learned single Judge held, that no disqualification arises for conviction under Section 107, criminal Procedure Code. It was further observed, that the offence under Section 182, indian Penal Code can take two shapes, one falling under Clause (a) and other under clause (b) thereof. A case falling under clause (b), i. e. , where a false information is given with the intention that the public servant uses his power to the injury or annoyance of any person will doubtless involve moral turpitude. This was so held relying on a decision in Sitaram vs. District Magistrate, 1959all. LJ. 383. In Risal Singh vs. Chandgi Ram, AIR 1966 Pun. 393, the petitioner was convicted under Section 19 (f) of the Indian Arms Act for being in possession of an unlicensed revolver and the question was whether such conviction involved moral turpitude so as to disentitle him to be elected to or to remain a member of the Gram Panchayat. Their lordships referred to a decision from Allahabad High Court reported in Mangali vs. Chhakki Lal, AIR 1963 All. 527 , which would be referred hereafter. In this Punjab decision applying the tests referred in Allahabad case and "on the facts of the case" their Lordships held that the conviction of the petitioner did not imply such depravity and wickedness of character or disposition which would involve any moral turpitude. It was further observed that people keep fire-arms for their personal safety and sometime they resort to keeping arms without licence when they feel that their status in society is not such as would enable them to get a licence from the authorities. With great respect we would say that whether a particular conduct amounts to moral turpitude has to be examined in the context of circumstances prevailing at that time, may be in the present context of what is happening in Punjab, that view may call for reconsideration. In fact in Gurubachan Singhs case, AW? With great respect we would say that whether a particular conduct amounts to moral turpitude has to be examined in the context of circumstances prevailing at that time, may be in the present context of what is happening in Punjab, that view may call for reconsideration. In fact in Gurubachan Singhs case, AW? 1974 Pandh 24, Chandgirams case has been referred but not followed and conviction under Sections 324/326, Indian penal Code were held to be disqualification for holding the office of Sarpanch and test for determining moral turpitude have been explained. ( 9. ) IN Mangali vs. Chhakki Lal (supra) it was observed that:- "no absolute standard can be laid down for deciding whether a particular offence is to be considered one involving moral turpitude. The question will necessarily depend on the circumstances in which the offence is committed. It is not every punishable act that can be considered to be an offence involving moral turpitude. The tests which should ordinarily be applied and which should in most, cases be sufficient for judging whether a certain offence does or does not involve moral turpitude appear to be (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general, (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society. " At page 528 it was observed :- "ideas of morals often undergo changes in different periods of a countrys history. It is also true that different people of the world some times differ as to whether a particular act is moral or immoral. Whenever a question has to be considered as to whether a certain act is moral or immoral one has to consider as to how that act is viewed by the society or the community, as the case may be, and if the society or the community views such act as involving moral turpitude, then even though some particular individual may not consider it so will not make the act a moral, one, or a praiseworthy act. Therefore, whether an act involves moral turpitude or does not, has to be determined not necessarily on abstract notions of the rights and wrongs involved or the harm or the good coming out of the act but how that act is looked upon in the society where the act has been committed. " In the matter of p an Advocate, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1313 , a case which related to professional misconduct of an Advocate on Record, their Lordships of Supreme court have observed :- "in dealing with this aspect of the matter, however, it is of utmost importance to remember that the expression moral turpitude or delinquency is not to receive a narrow construction. Wherever conduct proved against an advocate is contrary to honesty, or opposed to good morals, or is unethical, it may be safely held that it involves moral turpitude. . . . . the expression moral turpitude or delinquency is not to be construed in an unduly narrow and restricted sense. " Similarly, in Biswabahan vs. Gopen Chandra, AIR 1967 SC 895 , one Hazarika had paid compensation of Rs. 50/- in respect of forest offence under Section 62 (l) (a ). Their Lordships referring to the distinction of consequences under Section 545, criminal Procedure Code vis-a-vis Section 62 of the Assam Forest Regulations were of the view that it was a case of moral turpitude and therefore, the High Court was not right in quashing the order of the Board of Revenue, which was not wrong in law in taking into Hazarikas conduct in rendering compensation for a forest offence. ( 10. ) ON a consideration of the principles and precedents we are of the view that the expression moral turpitude is nowhere defined; such definition if attempted could be only illustrative and not wholly descriptive or exhaustive; there can be no doubt that certain offences involve moral turpitude, for example, offences punishable under the Gambling Act, or sexual offences punishable under Section 354 or 366,376, Indian penal Code or under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which involve stigma. There can be a large number of cases such as driving a vehicle without licence or failure to renew licence under the Motor Vehicles Act which do not involve any moral turpitude. The question whether a conviction involves moral turpitude would ultimately turn on the peculiar circumstances of a particular case. There can be a large number of cases such as driving a vehicle without licence or failure to renew licence under the Motor Vehicles Act which do not involve any moral turpitude. The question whether a conviction involves moral turpitude would ultimately turn on the peculiar circumstances of a particular case. In Durga Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 Punj. 97, a member of the police force was found drunk at a public place. It was held that such conviction would involve moral turpitude. The depravity or wickedness or character of disposition of a person has to be of a particular conduct "which may generally mean to be a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, good morals and contrary to What a man owes to a fellowmen or society in general. Moral turpitude is art act of baseness, vileneas or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. ( 11. ) APPLYING the above criteria to facts of this case, we find from the copy of judgment (Annexure R-I) in S. T. No. 29\81 decided on 17-7-1982 that the petitioner along with 19 others was prosecuted on charges under Sections 147,148, 323,302 and 149, Indian Penal Code Paras 112, 117, 122, 126, 127, 130, 135 and 136 relate to the petitioner. All other accused persons have been acquitted but the petitioner Uttam singh arid two more accused have been found guilty under Section 324, Indian Penal code. The petitioner was acquitted of the charge under Section 25 of the Arms Act. Since the petitioner was in custody from 6-3-1980 to 164-1981 he was let off with a fine of Rs. 150/ -. Significantly enough para 3 of the judgment shows that the incident occurred because of enmity which arose because of a previous Gram Panchayat election wherein the brother of the accused Kailash was a candidate and the deceased was a rival candidate. The deceased withdraw his name on condition that he would be made the Up Sarpanch. That shows the background or the motive for the incident. The deceased withdraw his name on condition that he would be made the Up Sarpanch. That shows the background or the motive for the incident. In this context therefore, the Collector was jusfitied in observing that in this case the society as a whole was affected by the activities of the respondent and in the circumstances of this case the conviction involved moral turpitude leading to disqualification under Rule 7 (ix) of the Rules. To conclude, conviction under Section 324, Indian Penal Code may not involve moral turpitude in every case but, in the circumstances of this case, the conviction of the petitioner under Section 324, Indian penal Code involves moral turpitude which occasioned disqualification for the election. The impugned orders, therefore, do not call for any interference. Incidentally, it was argued and also shown on the basis of Annexure-C dated 25-2-1987 that meanwhile respondent No. 3 has resigned from Ward No. 4 (Annexure-D ). That is a different matter and the vacancy may be filled in as per the Adhiniyam and Niyam. ( 12. ) IN the result, this petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit be refunded to die petitioner. Petition dismissed.