JUDGMENT A.N. Dikshita, J. - The defendants-applicants have filed this revision against the judgment and decree dated 12-12-1984 passed by Sri Dinesh Chandra, III Addl. District Judge, Allahabad in J.S.C. Suit No. 41 of 1981 decreeing the plaintiffs-opposite parties' suit for ejectment from premises no. 19 Sardar Patel Marg formerly known as 19 Elbert Road, Allahabad (corresponding to its present number) and for recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits besides the costs of the suit. 2. Facts encompassing the controversy and giving rise to this revision are that the opposite-party nos. 1 to 18 had filed a suit in the court of Judge Small Causes claiming a decree for ejectment of defendant-applicants nos. 1 to 14 from House no. 19 Sardar Patel Marg, formerly known as 19 Elbert Road, Allahabad (with its present corresponding number) and for putting the plaintiffs opposite parties into actual vacant possession of the house besides a decree for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 700/- per day and the costs of the suit. This suit was filed contending that the house was let out after the death of Dr. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to defendant no. I for accommodating the office of the Railway Service Commission on a rent of Rs. 1562-50 per month, tenancy whereof commences on the first day of each Gregorian Calendar month and ending on the last day of the same month. The premises which was jointly owned by Sri P.N. Sapru, Sri A.N. Sapru and Sri T.N. Sapru as coparceners had died and their interests had been inherited by the heirs who are the plaintiff opposite-parties. Certain compulsions with the growth of the family permitted such heirs for the petition of the house in order to avoid any future controversy amongst the heirs (plaintiffs-opp. parties) and who consequent to such partition may reconstruct the building in such a manner so as to meet the requirements of each heir (Plaintiffs-opp. parties). With this necessity having arisen the plaintiffs-opp. parties requested defendants-applicants nos. 1 to 4 to vacate the premises. However, such a request was spurned by the defendants-applicants nos. 1 to 4. The plaintiffs-opp. parties consequently sent a registered notice dated 20.10.1982 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy. parties). With this necessity having arisen the plaintiffs-opp. parties requested defendants-applicants nos. 1 to 4 to vacate the premises. However, such a request was spurned by the defendants-applicants nos. 1 to 4. The plaintiffs-opp. parties consequently sent a registered notice dated 20.10.1982 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy. This notice was served upon the defendants i.e., Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Railways on 2.11.1980, General Manager, Northern Railway, Allahabad on 3.11.1980 and Divisional Railway Manager, Northern Railway, Allahabad on 3.11.1980. The defendants-applicants were thus served with such notices. By this notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the plaintiffs-opp. parties called upon the defendants-applicants to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the property and also stipulating that on the expiry of 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice. the tenancy shall stand terminated. It was also provided in this notice that on the failure of the defendants-applicants to comply with the requirement of the notice a suit for eviction, arrears of rent and damages would be filed and the defendants-opp. parties after the termination of the tenancy would be liable to pay mesne profits at. the rate of Rs. 700/- per day. The defendant-applicants nos. I to 4 acknowledged receipt of the notice and intimated by letter dated 30.3.1981 that the matter was receiving active consideration of the authorities. However, when the requirements as contained in the notice were not complied with the plaintiffs-opp. parties compellingly sent another notice dated 3.3.1981 under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was served on the Union of India defendant-applicant no. 1 on 5.3.1981. Despite this notice the defendant-applicants did not vacate the premises nor paid the amount of arrears of rent as well as the mesne profits which was claimed. It was clearly mentioned in the plaint that the building is let out to the Union of India and would be deemed to be a public building within the meaning of Section 3 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act (Act XIII of 1972) and, therefore the provisions of the said Act do not apply to the building. 3. On such allegations in the plaint, the suit for the reliefs mentioned above was tiled on 13.10.1981 and was registered as Original Suit no. 3. On such allegations in the plaint, the suit for the reliefs mentioned above was tiled on 13.10.1981 and was registered as Original Suit no. 41 of 1981, Judge Small Cause Court suit in which the following were arrayed as defendants : 1. Union of India, through Secretary Ministry of Railways, Government of India Rail Bhawan New Delhi. 2. The General Manager, Northern Railway Baroda House, New Delhi. 3. Divisional Manager, Northern Railway, Allahabad. 4. The Railway Service Commission through its Chairman, Allahabad. The defendants contested the suit. Allegations in the plaint were denied. However, while replying to the contents of para 2 of the plaint it was admitted that the premises no. 19 Sardar Patel Marg is in the tenancy of the defendants wherein the office of the Railway Service Commission is accommodated presently on a rent of Rs. 1562.50. For a better appreciation allegations of para 2 of the plaint as well as the contents of para 2 of the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants are reproduced : "2. That the house was let out after the death of Sri Tej Bahadur Sapru to defendant no. 1 for accommodating office of the Railway Service Commission on a rent of Rs. 1552.50 P. per month the tenancy of which starts on every 1st of each English Calendar month and ended on the last day thereof". Para 2 of the written statement : "2. That the contents in para 2 of the plaint it is only admitted that the premises no. 19. Sardar Patel Marg is under the tenancy of the defendant where in the office of the Railway Service Commission is accommodated and at present the rate of rent is Rs. 1562.50 per month wherein Rs. 200/- per month is being deducted towards maintenance charges". 4. Besides denying the plaint allegations it was also alleged that :- (i) The suit is not maintainable as all the landlords have not signed on the plaint which has rendered the plaint defective. (ii) The suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as all the land- lords have not been impleaded. (iii) No valid and legal notices have been served and on this ground alone the suit is liable to be dismissed. That the accommodation in question is not needed by the plaintiff. (ii) The suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as all the land- lords have not been impleaded. (iii) No valid and legal notices have been served and on this ground alone the suit is liable to be dismissed. That the accommodation in question is not needed by the plaintiff. (iv) There was a clear understanding between the parties that till rent is being paid plaintiffs will not ask for vacation of the building in question. ,, (v) The premises is on the land of State and as the lease of the plaintiff had already expired the plaintiffs have no right to continue the suit and the defendants have moved the petition for grant of lease in their favour which is under consideration. (vi) The building is not a public building within the meaning of Section 3 sub-clause (a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. (vii) The plaintiff is not entitled to damages at the rate of Rs. 700/- per day. (viii) The rent amount has already been deposited in advance in court. (ix) The suit is bad on account of the principles of acquiescence, estoppel and waiver. (x) The Railway Service Commission and its members and the Chairman are being accommodated where huge quantity of files and papers are stocked in the building in question and on account of the paucity of accommodation, it is not possible for the defendants to vacate and shift the office somewhere else, and (xi) Lastly the suit be dismissed with costs and special costs. 5. During the pendency of the suit an application for amendment of the written statement was filed on behalf of the Union of India defendant-applicant no. 1 claiming the following paragraphs to be incorporated in the written- statement. Such paras which were sought to be incorporated in the written statement are reproduced herein below : "32. That the premises no. 19 Sardar Patel Marg, Allahabad is not a public premises and is within the purview of the U.P. Act-XIII of 1972. 33. That since the sole basis of the suit is that the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 is not applicable to the present suit but this is not legal position. So the suit has already become infructuous. 34. That the plaintiffs nos. 6 to 19 and plaintiff Sri Jeetendra Narain Sapru s/o late Sri P.N. Sapru, Smt. Madhuri Haksar w/o Sh. So the suit has already become infructuous. 34. That the plaintiffs nos. 6 to 19 and plaintiff Sri Jeetendra Narain Sapru s/o late Sri P.N. Sapru, Smt. Madhuri Haksar w/o Sh. A.N. Sapru, Sri Jagdish Narain Sapru, Smt. Sanjay Sapru and Mrs. Anjali Hasan, Sh. Kailash Narain Sapru, Sri Ajay Narain Sapru and Sri Shanta Shivpuri and or have not authorised his-her attorney Sh. B.N. Sapru, or the lawyer to sign and verify the pleadings and as such the suit has not been properly verified and presented by the competent persons. 35. That the power of attorney is not in respect to the premises in question. 36. That the addresses as given are also incorrect. 37. That the defendants are not defaulters. 38. That the suit is undervalued and the court fee paid is in- sufficient". After inviting necessary objections and after hearing the parties this application for amendment was allowed by learned III Addl. District Judge, Allahabad on 3-12-1983 and the proposed amendments were allowed to be incorporated in the written statement. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed. 1. Whether premises in question is a public building and is not governed by U.P. Act no. XIII of 1972 ? 2. Whether notice under section 106 T.P. Act is valid ? 3. Whether notice under Section 80 C.P.C. is valid ? 4. Whether suit. is not maintainable as alleged in para 20 of written statement ? 5. Whether suit is not maintainable for want of joining of all land- lord ? 6. Whether there was any understanding between the parties as alleged in para 23 of the written statement ? 7. Whether suit is not maintainable as pleaded in para 25 of the written statement ? 8. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages ( Rs. 700/- per day, if not, what is correct amount of damages ? 9. Whether suit is barred by principles of estoppel and acquiescence ? 10. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ? 11. Whether the suit has become infructuous as alleged in para 33 of the W.S. ? 12. Whether suit is not maintainable as alleged in para 34 of the W.S. ? 7. 9. Whether suit is barred by principles of estoppel and acquiescence ? 10. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ? 11. Whether the suit has become infructuous as alleged in para 33 of the W.S. ? 12. Whether suit is not maintainable as alleged in para 34 of the W.S. ? 7. After necessary evidence was adduced by the parties the suit was decreed with costs for the ejectment of the defendants from the premises in suit and for recovery of mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1562.50 per month from the date of the suit till the date of possession on payment of necessary court fee in the execution vide judgment and order dated 12.12.1984 passed by Sri Dinesh Chandra, III Addl. District Judge, Allahabad. 8. Aggrieved the defendants-applicants have filed the instant revision on 7.2.85 praying that the revision be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the court below decreeing the plaintiffs-opposite parties' suit for ejectment and recovery of rent and mesne profits and the suit of the plaintiffs-opposite parties be dismissed with costs throughout. 9. During pendency of this revision the defendants-opposite parties filed an application on 26.2.88 for permission to amend the written statement so as to incorporate the following additional pleas besides permission to file the copy of memorandum of the terms and conditions on which the premises known as 19 Elbert Road, Allahabad had been let out to the Railway Service Commission as an additional evidence. (i) That the notice of ejectment was invalid in view of the fact that the tenancy was for a year and it could not be determined during the currency of any particular year. (ii) That there was in law no lease inasmuch as no document of lease was executed by the landlord or tenant. (iii) That the transaction of the letting out of premises would not amount to lease as it contravenes Article 299 of the Constitution. The Central Government was no party to the letting out of the premises. (iv) That a notice of ejectment cannot be given by an advocate as such. The person giving a notice of ejectment even though he be advocate must be specifically authorised on that behalf by all the landlords. Again on 13-5-88 the defendant-applicants filed another application for permission to produce the documents in evidence and to take such documents in evidence. 10. The person giving a notice of ejectment even though he be advocate must be specifically authorised on that behalf by all the landlords. Again on 13-5-88 the defendant-applicants filed another application for permission to produce the documents in evidence and to take such documents in evidence. 10. When the instant revision came up for hearing learned counsel for the defendants-applicants Sri Jagdish Swaroop assisted by Sri Vinod Swaroop and learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicants Sri S.S. Bhatnagar assisted by Sri A.K. Sharma submitted that both these applications dated 26-2-88 and 13-5-88 be disposed of alongwith the final hearing of the revision. This prayer was allowed and the parties were permitted to make their submissions on merit. 11. Heard counsel for the parties. 12. Before appreciating the rival contention of the parties on merits it is considered expedient to dispose of the above two applications dated 26.2.88 and 13.5.88. 13. Learned counsel for the defendants-applicants has strenuously submitted that the applications date 26.2.88 and 13.5.88 which have been filed on behalf of the defendants-applicants deserve to be allowed as pleadings can be amended at any stage of the proceedings and the court should be liberal in allowing the amendment of the pleadings. It has also been submitted that additional evidence (documents) also require to be admitted. 14. Learned counsel for the defendants-applicants Sri Jagdish Swaroop to buttress his above submission as regards the application for amendment has placed reliance on catena of decision. 15. In the case of Haridas Aildas Thadani and others v. Godrej Rustom Kermani, 1984 (1) SCC 668 their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the Court should he extremely liberal in granting prayer for the amendment unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. It was further observed that the test for allowing the amendment is to find whether the proposed amendment works any serious injury to the other side. 16. In the case of Maitreyee Banerjee v. Prabir Kumar Mukherjee, AIR 1982 Supreme Court 17 a similar view was taken that unless the amendment works serious injustice to the other side it should be allowed and more so when the amendment sought was not clearly barred by limitation or may cause an irreparable injury to the other side. 17. 16. In the case of Maitreyee Banerjee v. Prabir Kumar Mukherjee, AIR 1982 Supreme Court 17 a similar view was taken that unless the amendment works serious injustice to the other side it should be allowed and more so when the amendment sought was not clearly barred by limitation or may cause an irreparable injury to the other side. 17. In the case of Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhara, AIR 1985 Supreme Court 817 it was held that normally amendment is not allowed if it changes the cause of action or raises a new case but amounts not more than adding to the facts already on record. 18. In the case of Kamal Regmi and others v. Nepal Bank Ltd. and others, 1987 ALJ 349 a similar view was taken. 19. To repel the above contentions urged on behalf of the defendant- applicants learned counsel for the plaintiffs-opposite parties Shri S.S. Bhatnagar has vehemently submitted that the amendment sought to be incorporated in the written statement at this stage will take away the valuable right that has accrued in favour of the plaintiff-applicants. It has been urged on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite parties that the defendants-applicants though admitting the tenancy have raised a plea that it was not the valid one as no lease was executed between the parties. This plea was never raised before the trial court. In support of his submission learned counsel for the plaintiffs-opposite parties has relied upon the various decisions. 20. In the case of Jagan Nath (deceased) through L.Rs. v. Chander Bhan and others, 1989 (3) SCC 57 the Supreme.Court held as under : "During the pendency of the appeal the tenant preferred an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking permission to amend his written statement. The appellant contended that the landlord filed eviction petition in respect of the said premises against the appellant and his two sons which was assigned to Sri A.P. Chaudhary, Additional Rent Controller. Another objection raised was that the property was taken on rent by M/s. Bindra Tent House and, therefore, the petition for eviction was not maintainable. The application had been contested in which it had been admitted that the earlier petition for eviction was filed but according to the respondent it was not properly instituted and the same was withdrawn. It was denied that the application was not maintainable. The application had been contested in which it had been admitted that the earlier petition for eviction was filed but according to the respondent it was not properly instituted and the same was withdrawn. It was denied that the application was not maintainable. The Tribunal on an analysis of the matter came to the conclusion that belated amendment could not be permitted. It was emphasised that the tenant had admitted in the written statement that he was a tenant in the property in question. He could not subsequently be allowed to wriggle out of this situation and withdraw the admission. If the amendment was allowed, they would take valuable right of the other side and altogether a new plea would be taken, it was held. This cannot be permitted. In this connection, the Rent Tribunal relied upon the observations of the Assam High Court in Subashini Majumdar v. Krishna Prasad Mahatoo (supra). The same view was reiterated by this Court in Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram and Co., (supra). Where the proposed amendment introduced an entirely new case seeking to displace the other side completely from the admission made then. It was held that such an amendment could not be allowed. We are of the opinion that the Rent Tribunal was therefore, right in refusing the amendment on the basis of the aforesaid principle. The Tribunal on an analysis of evidence and facts came to the conclusion that there was no merit in the appeal and dismissed the appeal and affirmed the eviction order". 21. In the case of M/s. Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Lid. and another v. M/s. Ladha Ram and Co., AIR 1977 Supreme Court 680 it was held that by means of amendment the defendant wanted to introduce an entirely different case and if such amendments were permitted, it would prejudice the other side. The defendants applicants cannot be allowed to change completely the case and in any case the defendants-applicants wants to resile from admissions made in the written statement. It was found by the Supreme Court that the trial court which held that the repudiation of the clear admission is motivated to deprive the plaintiff of the valuable right accruing to him and it is against law. 22. It was found by the Supreme Court that the trial court which held that the repudiation of the clear admission is motivated to deprive the plaintiff of the valuable right accruing to him and it is against law. 22. In the case of Smt. Satya Sharma v. S.K. Sen and others, 1988 ARC 451 it was held that a tenant seeking certain amendments relating to denial of landlord's title were not bona fide and the amendment was not liable to be allowed. 23. In the case of Co. Zamir Ahmad (Retd.) v. Smt. Shah Jahan Begum, 1988 ARC 507 it was held by this Court that a new plea cannot be permitted to be raised in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act and more so when such plea needs investigation. 24. In the case of Jamuna Ahir (deceased by Lr's) and others v. Ram Bali Singh, 1986 ALJ 179 it was held that any amendment taking a contradictory plea by withdrawing the admissions made would not be permissible in law. 25. In the case of Baluna Commercial College v. IV Additional District Judge, Lucknow and others, 1986 ALJ 618, it was held as under : "That the amendment sought was not only highly belated but clearly mala fide is apparent from the fact that the proceedings had commenced in 1970 and only five years later this plea was sought to be taken and that too during the pendency of an appeal. That the amendment was not moved bona fide is also clear from the fact that clear averments have been made in the written statement to the effect that it was P. N. Bhargava alone who was concerned with Baluna Commercial College and that his other two brothers had nothing to do with it nor he had anything to do with other two typing schools being run by his brothers. The purpose of the tenancy cannot be dissociated and it is obvious that the premises in dispute were taken for running a typing school in the name of Baluna Commercial College. The purpose of the tenancy cannot be dissociated and it is obvious that the premises in dispute were taken for running a typing school in the name of Baluna Commercial College. To take the plea of non-joinder at such a late stage and that too in the face of the clear averments made in the written state meat denying concern of others with these premises or the tenancy was clearly motivated by a desire to prolong the proceedings on these technical grounds which even on merits had no substance. The learned Addl. District Judge was, therefore, justified in rejecting the application for amendment. Learned Counsel for the opposite- party no. 2 (landlord) has relied upon Ishar v. Sudesh Kumar, AIR 1973 Punjab & Haryana 392. In support of the contention that an amendment of this nature if allowed would convert the defence into a totally different and inconsistent type of plea. Although the facts in that case were different but in principle it cannot be denied that permitting the proposed amendment would wipe out the effect of admissions made by the tenant in the written statement, and would unnecessarily bring on record persons, who according to the own showing of the tenant are persons having no concern with the tenancy or the premises in question. In this view of the matter the amendment was rightly rejected and the petition is without merit". 26. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties in the light of the various decisions relied upon it has to be extracted from the facts and of the case as to whether this application at this stage deserves consideration. 27. At the cost of brevity and precision facts of the case were mentioned above as such narration was imperative to consider respective contention of the parties. 28. The plaintiffs-opposite-parties had filed the suit as early as 1981. In para 2 of the plaint it was clearly spelt out that the defendants-applicants were let out the building in question. While replying to this paragraph the defendants-applicants also admitted that the premises No. 19 Sardar Patel Marg is under the tenancy of the defendants wherein the office of the Railway Service Commission is accommodated at the present rate of Rs. 1562.50. It is thus clear that the defendants-applicants had admitted the factum of tenancy of the premises and that the building was let out to them. 1562.50. It is thus clear that the defendants-applicants had admitted the factum of tenancy of the premises and that the building was let out to them. Such an admission made as early as 1982 is now sought to be wriggled out on the plea of invalidity of tenancy, snacks of malafides. Such an intra sigence on the part of the mighty defendants-applicants has to be decried. The intention is apparent to prolong the proceedings and deny the plaintiffs opposite-parties the fruits of the decree. The defendants applicants thus cannot be permitted to wriggle out of the admissions made alleging that the tenancy was invalid or that the lease was not executed according to law. 29. Another aspect of this controversy also requires consideration that the application for amendment has been moved at the behest of the defendants- applicants after more than six and a half years. Such a belated effort to introduce a new case and to wriggle out of the admission is again worthy of rejection. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-opposite parties on various decisions cited above deserve merit and support the view that the amendment application at this late and belated stage is liable to be rejected. 30. This application for seeking amendments in the written-statement has been filed at the stage of revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. To permit the defendants applicants to introduce a new case and to wriggle out of the admissions and considering the belated delay in filing the application it would only tantamount to frustrate the plaintiffs-opposite parties the fruits of the decree. Such an attempt would only be termed to be malafide and in any case it is not a bona fide one. 31. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-opposite parties have also submitted that the application deserves to be rejected as it has not been properly verified. There is merit in this submission as the pleadings which are sought to be incorporated by means of the amendment have not been verified as enjoined under Order 6 Rule 15 C.P.C. The application, in view of the above, is thus liable to he rejected and is accordingly rejected. 32. Now the application filed by the defendants-applicants for permission to produce documents and to take them in evidence requires disposal. 32. Now the application filed by the defendants-applicants for permission to produce documents and to take them in evidence requires disposal. These documents are being sought to be produced and taken into evidence to supplement the pleadings which are sought to be incorporated by the amendment application. As the application for amendment of the written statement seeking incorporation of few pleadings has already been rejected (above) it would be a futile exercise to consider the application. However, the documents which are annexed to the affidavit for being produced and taken into evidence are as follows : 1. Copy of the minutes of the meeting held on August 6, 1954 incorporating terms and conditions agreed upon between the parties. 2. Photostat copy of the letter purported to have been written by Sri AN. Sapru to Sri Raghukul Tilak, Chairman, Railway Service Commission for signing the terms and conditions agreed upon for letting out the premises. 3. Copy of the letter dated 16.3.88 showing that no lease agreement was executed on behalf of the President of India with Sapru owners of the building in question. 4. Photostat copy of the letter dated October 13, 1972 sent by B.N. Sapru, Advocate to the Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway, Allahabad for enhancement of rent by 25 w.e.f. 15.7.72 in view of the provisions of Section 5 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act 1972. 5. Photostat copy of the letter written by Sri B.N. Sapru, Advocate regarding rental charges and water taxes. 33. At the outset it may be mentioned that these documents are not the original or certified copies and if the defendants-applicants wanted to rely on these documents, all these documents which were in original were and are in the custody of the defendants-applicants but they have been withheld. Their or correctness is highly suspicious and no reason has been forth- coming as to why the original documents have not been produced. These documents as such cannot be permitted to be produced and be taken in evidence. 34. Another significant aspect is that Order 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure excludes provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. confers a right on a Court of appeal to admit an additional evidence. But Order 4 Rule 27 has been expressly excluded from application of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 34. Another significant aspect is that Order 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure excludes provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. confers a right on a Court of appeal to admit an additional evidence. But Order 4 Rule 27 has been expressly excluded from application of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It is thus clear that neither the Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. in terms nor in principle can be applied for taking additional evidence. The first appellate Court has larger powers but in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act the court has a much narrower power. An interference is permissible under Section 25 only when the decree or order made in any case decided by a court of small causes is not according to law. Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. thus cannot be pressed into service for admitting additional evidence in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 35. Learned counsel for the defendants-applicants has placed reliance on the cases of Bihari Lal v. II Addl. District Judge, Mathura and others, 1983 (2) ARC 146 and Satya Narain Saxena and others v. IV Addl. District Judge, Aligarh, 1983 (2) ARC 343. The above are two judgments of a single Judge of this Court. In the case of Babu Ram v. Additional District Judge, Dehradun, 1983 (2) ARC 15 a Division Bench of this Court has clearly held that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. are not applicable in a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. I respectfully agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court. 36. Learned counsel for the defendant-applicants then submitted that this court has wide powers and by invoking its inherent powers the Courts should permit production of documents and taking them into evidence. I find no merit in this submission for the reasons that all these documents were in the custody of the defendants and in any case they are only to buttress the pleadings of the defendants-applicants and when such pleadings which have been sought to be incorporated by seeking amendment has been rejected, the question of admission of the documents and taking them into evidence does not arise. This application too is wholly ill-merited and deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected. 37. This application too is wholly ill-merited and deserves to be rejected and is hereby rejected. 37. Learned counsel for the defendant-applicant has submitted that the lease was not evidenced in writing as is required under Art. 299 of the Constitution of India. To this effect, in the application for seeking permission to amend the written statement, the following were sought to be incorporated : (i) That there was in law no lease inasmuch as no document of lease was executed by the landlord or tenant. (ii) That the transaction of the letting out of premises would not amount to lease as it contravenes to Article 299 of the Constitution. The Central Government was not party to the letting out of the premises". 38. The application for seeking permission to incorporate the above two paragraphs in the written-statement has already been rejected. However, it may be significantly mentioned that the defendants-applicants have clearly admitted in para 2 of the written statement that premises no. 19, Sardar Patel Marg, Allahabad (with its present corresponding number) wherein the office of the Railway Service Commission is accommodated and the present rate of rent is Rs. 1562.50 while Rs. 200/- per month is being deducted towards the maintenance charges. Such a circumvention at this stage is wholly impermissible. Moreover this plea was never raised by the defendants-applicants during the trial of the suit and to permit the defendants to raise this plea after a lapse of more than 6 years can not be permitted. However futile the exercise may be, it has to be mentioned that the tenancy between the defendants-applicants and the landlord opposite parties was created some time in the year 1951. Whether any allotment order at that stage was obtained by the defendants-applicants from the District Magistrate within the postulates of Section 7 (2) of Act III of 1947 is not borne out from the record. Even assuming that the allotment order was not obtained even then the contract of tenancy as admitted by the defendants-applicants, is neither void nor illegal. In the case of Udhav Das v. Prem Prakash, AIR 1964 Allahabad 1, it was held that there was no provision whatsoever rendering a contract of tenancy entered into by a landlord and another person void or illegal. In the case of Udhav Das v. Prem Prakash, AIR 1964 Allahabad 1, it was held that there was no provision whatsoever rendering a contract of tenancy entered into by a landlord and another person void or illegal. It was held that it was an act forbidden by the District Magistrate and not by law within the meaning of Section 23 of the Contract Act. The tenancy has not come into force after the enforcement of Act XIII of 1972 but was already existing at the time when Act No. XIII of 1972 came into force. Section 14 of Act No. XIII of 1972 provides for the regularisation or occupation of the existing tenants. It reads as under : 14. Regularisation or occupation of existing tenants.-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, any licensee (within the meaning of Section 2-A) or a tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976, not being a person against whom any suit, or proceeding for eviction is pending before any court or authority on the date of such commencement shall be deemed to be an authorised licensee or tenant of such building". 39. The above provision apparently was incorporated to save those tenants in whose favour no allotment order was passed. It is thus clear that the defendants-applicants' tenancy had been regularised and they will be deemed to be authorised tenant of the building in question. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-applicants that there was no valid lease granted by the plaintiff-opposite parties in favour of the defendants-applicants is wholly ill-merited and deserves to be rejected. Act XIII of 1972 provides absolute control of letting by the authorities with further power to evict the unauthorised person who has been inducted into the accommodation contrary to the provisions of the Act with further penal consequences. It cannot be disputed that if the parties enter into a contract which may obstruct the public policy in its implementation, or has the effect of nullifying such policy then it may be void. But, howsoever illegal it may be if it does not offend the public policy. Such a contract could always be implemented inter se between the parties. 40. But, howsoever illegal it may be if it does not offend the public policy. Such a contract could always be implemented inter se between the parties. 40. In the case of Ram Sakhi v. Rama Kant, 1988 ALJ 989, it was held that any contract sort of obstruction of public policy could not be said to be such as to be void inter se between the parties to the contract. It was further held that such contract of tenancy does not hit any public policy as laid down in any provision of Act XIII of 1972. 41. In the case of Murlidhar Agrawal v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1924 a similar view was taken. "A lease made in violation of the provisions of Section 7(2) would be valid between the parties and would create the relationship of landlord and tenant between them although it might not bind the authorities concerned. Therefore, the, lessee who had been paying the rent to the lessor was a tenant and permission under Section 3 to file a suit for eviction was necessary. In this case another question was raised that the agreement in lease deed mentioned that parties will never claim benefit of the Act and that the provisions of the Act will be inapplicable to lease deed then where (therefore ?) the tenant is precluded from contending that the suit for eviction without permission under Section 3 is not maintainable. To this, their Lordships held to the following effect : "Therefore, an agreement in the lease deed, providing that the parties will never claim the benefit of the Act and that the provisions of the Act will not be applicable to the lease deed, is illegal in view of Section 23 of the Contract Act and it will not preclude the tenant from contending that the suit for eviction filed without the permission of the District Magistrate was not maintainable.........The object of Section 3 is to give protection to a tenant from eviction from an accommodation. Section 3 is based on public policy.........The language of the section is prohibitive in character. It precludes a court from entertaining the suit". 42. Section 3 is based on public policy.........The language of the section is prohibitive in character. It precludes a court from entertaining the suit". 42. In the case of Bhagelu Ram Tiwari v. Judge Small Cause Court, 1977 ARC 75 relying on the decision in the case of Murlidhar Agrawal (supra) it was held that the lease made even in violation of section 7 (2) of the Act III of 1947 is valid between the parties and creates relationship of landlord and tenant. It was further held that when the party has entered into the lease, the tenant is estopped from denying that he is not a tenant of the premises as per the statute. 43. In the case of Ram Sakhi v. Ram Kant (supra) which has completely resolved the controversy as regards the status of a person who is in accommodation without any allotment order and it has been held that such person is a tenant and a suit for eviction would be maintainable as per the provisions of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 44. Learned counsel for the defendants-applicants has urged that as the lease is not in accordance with Article 299 of the Constitution of India. This plea also deserves to be rejected. 45. As shown above the tenancy is statutory, The doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government as against a private individual even though there has been no contract according to Article 299 (1). 46. In the instant case the building was let out to defendants-applicants so as to provide an accommodation where the office of Railway Service Commission may be accommodated. The defendants.applicants were discharging their duties and obligations as a tenant and paying rent in consideration of the occupation of the building. At this stage the defendants-applicants cannot be allowed to fall back and assert that the lease is not according to law. The defendants.applicants were discharging their duties and obligations as a tenant and paying rent in consideration of the occupation of the building. At this stage the defendants-applicants cannot be allowed to fall back and assert that the lease is not according to law. In the case of Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 718 it has been held as under : "This case, is in our judgment, a clear authority that even though the case does not fall within the terms of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, it is still open to a party who has acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by the Constitution". 47. Relying on the above decision the Supreme Court in the case of Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and another v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1021 has held as under : "Public bodies are as such bound as private individuals to carry out representations of facts and promises made by them, relying on which other persons have altered their position to their prejudice. The obligation arising against an individual out of his representation amounting to a promise may be enforced ex contracted by a person who acts upon the promises when the law requires that a contract enforceable at law against a public body shall be in certain form or be executed in the manner prescribed by statute, the obligation if the contract be not in that form may be enforced against it in appropriate cases in equity. If our nascent democracy is to thrive different standards of conduct for the people and the public bodies cannot ordinarily be permitted. A public body is in our judgment, not exempt from liability to carry out its obligation arising out of representations made by it relying upon which a citizen has altered his position to his prejudice". 48. If our nascent democracy is to thrive different standards of conduct for the people and the public bodies cannot ordinarily be permitted. A public body is in our judgment, not exempt from liability to carry out its obligation arising out of representations made by it relying upon which a citizen has altered his position to his prejudice". 48. In the case of M/s. Moti Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1979 Supreme Court 621 in its celebrated judgment the Supreme Court while interpreting the doctrine of promissory estoppel and the application of Article 299 of the Constitution of India has held as under : "Doctrine of promissory estoppel has been variously called, promissory estoppel", requisite estoppel, 'quasi estoppel' and new estoppel'. It is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel', it is neither in the realm of contract, nor in the realm of estoppel. The true principle of promissory seems to be that where one party has by his words, or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhabited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defence. There is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity. It is not necessary in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promise, acting in reliance on the promise, should suffer any detriment. There is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity. It is not necessary in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promise, acting in reliance on the promise, should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the promisee should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. But if by detriment we mean injustice to the promisee which would result if the promisor were to recede from his promise, then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee, if the promisor were allowed to go back on the promise. If this is the kind of detriment contemplated, it would necessarily be present in every case of promissory estoppel because it is on account of such detriment which the promisee would suffer if the promisor were to act differently from his promise, that the court would consider it inequitable to allow the promisor to go back upon his promise. In India not only has the doctrine of promissory- estoppel been adopted in its fullness but it has been recognised as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatives. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee acting in reliance on it, alters his position the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever high, or law, is above the law. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever high, or law, is above the law. Even one is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception It is indeed this pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual sofar as the obligation of the law is concerned ; the former is equally bound as the latter. The Government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it. x x x x x x x x x x But if the Government makes such a promise and the promisee acts in reliance upon it and alters his position, there is no reason why the Government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual. x x x x x x x x x x The Government can not claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expedency, nor can the Government claim to be the sole Judge of its liability and repudiate it on an ex-parte appraisement of the circumstances. x x x x x x x x x x The court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the government, for it is the court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. This is the absence of the rule of law." 49. The question of the invalidity of the contract on the ground of non- compliance with Article 299 cannot be allowed to be raised at this late juncture. It has to be pleaded in the written statement, in view of Order 6 Rule 8 C.P.C. and Order 8, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No doubt as has been held in the case of Moti Lal v. State of U.P., (supra) the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine and would be subject to limitation to which all equitable rights and obligations are subject. No such limitation has been shown and as such it has to be held that the plea raised at this late hour has to be rejected. No such limitation has been shown and as such it has to be held that the plea raised at this late hour has to be rejected. The defendant applicants in any case are estopped from raising such a plea. 50. Learned counsel for the defendants applicants has then submitted that the notice sent by the plaintiff-respondent is invalid. Nothing has been shown as to how the notice has been rendered invalid except that the names of the plaintiffs-respondents were not mentioned. Learned counsel for the defendants applicants has filed the paper book on 3.5.88. Serial Nos. 8-A and 9 at pages 45, 46 to 48 clearly show that the notice has been sent on behalf of the plaintiffs-opposite parties. Moreover after serving the notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act another notice under Section 80 C.P.C. was served on the defendants-applicants. It is at serial no. 10 of the paper- book pages 49 to 54. In this notice also names of all the plaintiff-opposite parties have been shown. It is settled law that a composite notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act and Section 80 C.P.C. can be given. In her statement before the trial court Smt. Shobna Sapru (P.W. 1) has stated that the notice had been given to the defendants through Sri S.S. Bhatnagar. The signatures of Sri Bhatnagar have been proved. Such a notice was sent on the instructions of the plaintiff-opposite parties. No other plea regarding the invalidity of the notice has been shown. Service of the notice under Section 106 Transfer of Property Act as well as Section 80 C.P.C., has not been denied. P.W. 1 Smt. Shobna Sapru was not subjected to any cross-examination on this point. I have myself perused the two notices and I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that both the notices are valid and legal one. 51. Learned counsel for the defendants-applicants has been submitted that the building is a public building within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act and in view of the Ordinance the suit could not have been decreed on the date. Admittedly, the suit was filed on 15.10.1981. It is this date which is material. On this date the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 were not applicable. Admittedly, the suit was filed on 15.10.1981. It is this date which is material. On this date the provisions of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 were not applicable. In the case of State of U.P. v. Malik Zarid Khalid, ARC 1988 (1) 31 it has been held that the amendments have been made effective only with effect from 18.5.83. Neither the ordinance nor the Amendment Act purported to be declaratory, or perspective. In any case 1985 Amendment Act has been made retrospective from 18.5.83. In the case of Dr. Smt. Sushila Devi State of U.P. and another, 1984 (2) ARC 654. It has been held that the provisions of the Amendment Act are not applicable to the proceedings initiated earlier. Such a view was also taken in the case of Rang Nath v. State of U.P. and others, 1984 (1) ARC 642. It has been held that normally the rights of the parties are to be determined on the basis of law applicable on the date of institution of the suit. It is settled law that any amendment of an Act until and unless it intends or does affect the pending matters the ordinary procedure would apply. On the date of the filing of the suit, there was no prohibition for filing the suit. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and another v. Abdul Khalid (supra) the submission has no force. The suit was maintainable on the date when it was filed and was correctly disposed of by the trial court. 52. The findings of fact recorded by the learned trial court is supported by the oral and documentary evidence and circumstances on record. It is not assailable in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The judgment and order passed by the trial court decreeing the plaintiff opposite parties suit for the ejectment of the defendants-applicants is according to law and does not require any interference. 53. No other submission has been made. 54. The revision having no force deserves to be rejected. The judgment and order is wholly according to law. 55. In the result the revision fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. The judgment and order of the III Addl. District Judge, Allahabad dated 12-12-1984 decreeing the plaintiffs-opposite parties suit for ejectment of defendant applicants from premises no. 54. The revision having no force deserves to be rejected. The judgment and order is wholly according to law. 55. In the result the revision fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. The judgment and order of the III Addl. District Judge, Allahabad dated 12-12-1984 decreeing the plaintiffs-opposite parties suit for ejectment of defendant applicants from premises no. 19 Sardar Patel Marg formerly known as 19 Elbert Road, Allahabad (corresponding to its present number) besides recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits and the costs of the suit are affirmed. 56. Pursuant to the above discussions, the applicants dated 26-2-1988 and 13-5-1988 also fail and are hereby rejected.