JUDGMENT 1. 1. This is a frivolous and vexatious writ petition filed by a public undertaking, Rajasthan State Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., Jaipur. The petitioner is a public undertaking and functions in the name and style of Rajasthan State Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., Jaipur. The present litigation is for enforecement of Payment of Wages Act. The Payment of Wages Authority is seized of the matter and the case is still pending. The Corporation's case is that neither the Payment of Wages Authority nor the Inspector who filed the case, is competent. 2. We find that under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, an appeal lies to the District Court. Section 17 reads as under: "17. Appeal - (1) An appeal against an order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under Sub-section (2) of Section 15, or against a direction made under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) of that section may be prepared, within thirty days of the date on which the order or direction was made, in a Presidency town before the Court of Small Causes and else where before the District Court. (a) by any employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under Section 3, if the total sum directed to be paid by way of wages and compensation exceeds three hundred rupees, or such direction has the effect of imposing on the employer or other person a financial liability exceeding one thousand rupees or (b) by an employed person on any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authority in writing to act on his behalf or any Inspector under this Act, or any other person permitted by the authority to make an application under sub-section (2) of Section 15 if the total amount of wages claimed to have been withheld from the employed person exceeds twenty rupees or from the unpaid group to which the employed person belongs or belonged exceeds fifty rupees or (c) by any person directed to pay a penalty under sub-section (4) of section 15." 3. At the beginning of his submissions, we have pointed to Mr. Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner that it does not behove to a public sector undertaking to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution of India for withholding the consideration of the claim of payment of wages. At the beginning of his submissions, we have pointed to Mr. Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner that it does not behove to a public sector undertaking to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution of India for withholding the consideration of the claim of payment of wages. It was pointed out by the Court that the Preamble of the Constitution emphasises for social justice and the entire scheme of the Constitution exhibits the anciety on the part of the constitutional Pandits who made the Constitution, to ensure to the poor, down-trodden, workmen, peasant, handicapped and the disabled, weaker sections of the society and those who have been suppressed, oppressed and depressed for centuries and are consequently deprived now, at least, to get justice, which should be social, economic and political that it is our pious and sacred object, rather first and foremost to etadicate their miseries. It is high time that at least public sector undertakings or the State should fight the challenge the vary right of demand of payment of wages or minium wages or enforcement of labour laws or factory laws. or those laws which have been enacted to ameliorate the economic and social condition of the poor, down-trodden and weaker sections of the society, which certain include workmen and labourers. 4. We are shocked to find that the Rajasthan State Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., Jaipur has challenged the authority of the Payment of Wages of Authority and being not satisfied with the challenge before that authority and, further when having lost to have patience to await the out come of the litigation, where they can certainly file an appeal, if they chose to do, they have filed this writ petition. In our opinion. unless there is very serious constitutional controversy or matter of public importance are involved, an employer should not be allow to rush to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution without first taking recourse to the remedy of appeal provided under the said Act. 5. With great reluctance, we permitted Mr. Paris Kuhad to argue the case and inquired as to what is the central point on which he would like to lay emphasis. Mr. Paras Kubad pointed out that the Payment of Wages Authority had no jurisdiction, because Dy. Commissioner along cast be made Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and Payment of Wages Authority. The Dy. Commissioner was demoted and Asstt. Paris Kuhad to argue the case and inquired as to what is the central point on which he would like to lay emphasis. Mr. Paras Kubad pointed out that the Payment of Wages Authority had no jurisdiction, because Dy. Commissioner along cast be made Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and Payment of Wages Authority. The Dy. Commissioner was demoted and Asstt. Commissioner and thereafter the Government by an administrative order, permitted him to work as Deputy Commissioner, which could not have been done. 6. The second limb of the submission of Mr. Paras Kuhad was that a labour Inspector cannot file a case for payment of wages. It is only the Factory Inspector or a workman or somebody on their behalf who can preferred a case about payment of wages. 7. We are of the opinion that after the decision in the case of (1) M.C. Mehta v. Union of India ( 1987 1 SCC 395 ) , wherein a constitutional bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expended the horizon and dimension of judicial activism and observed that even for compensation the petitioner need not to go to any person; he can file a petition. In an are of public interest litigation extending with every new innovation by the Supreme Court, it is most shocking that a technical argument is made and that too by a public undertaking that Labour Inspector who is primarily and mainly concerned with labour cannot file a claim for payment of wages. In M.C. Mehta's case (Supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the earlier case of (2) Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India ( 1984 3 SCC 161 ) and expanded the horizon further by removing incessant cruelties which were earlier imposed and served as under:- "We are also of the view that this Court under Article 32 (1) is free to devise any procedure appropriate for the particular purpose of the proceeding, namely enforcement of a fundamental right and under Article 32 (2) of the court has the implicit power to issue whatever direction, order or writ is necessary in a given case, including all incidental, or ancillary power necessary to secure enforcement of fundamental right. The power of the court is not only injunctive in ambit, that is preventing the infringement of a fundamental right. The power of the court is not only injunctive in ambit, that is preventing the infringement of a fundamental right. but it is also remedial in scope and provides relief against a breach of the fundamental right already committed vide Bandhua Mukti Morcha case." it was further observed as under : "Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. As new situations arise the law has to be evolved in order to meet the challenge of such new situations, Law cannot afford to remain static. We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialised economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build our own jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an argument that merely because the law in England does not recognise the rule of strict and absolute liability in cases of hazardous or inherently dangerous activities or the rule laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher as developed in England recognises certain limitations and exceptions, we in India must hold back our hands and not venture to evolve a new principle of liability since English courts have not done so. We have to develop our own law and if we find that it is necessary to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concommitant to an industrial economy, there is no reason why we should hesitate to evolve such principle of liability merely because it has not been so done in England. We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results in and any one on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results in account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part." 8. It may be observed that M.C. Mehta-s case (Supra) was in relation to the incident of gas leakage in the city of Delhi and one of the questions raised was whether such a petition can be maintained as a public interest litigation and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in terms observed that now we have accepted and recognised the right of any person to file a claim for compensation, even though be may not be a party, It is not permissible to raise an objection regarding locus standi. The doctrine of lacus standi was even earlier expanded in (3) S.P. Gupta V. Union of India (AIR 1981 Suppl SC 87) by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which is popularly known as 'Judges case'. 9. We, therefore, refuse to go into intricate pleas and technicalities reminding us way back to Merchant of Venis by Shakesphere and the arguments of Portia and Antonio. Legal and technical contention was for equality and justice and for saving her form the clutches of Syloke who wanted to take advantage of the poverty of Antonio. Fortunately, we are now leading to 21st Century, but the workmen are not even allowed to be heard and argument is made that we must stop them from even making the grievance of non-payment or less payment. Fortunately, we are now leading to 21st Century, but the workmen are not even allowed to be heard and argument is made that we must stop them from even making the grievance of non-payment or less payment. It is adding insult to injury when even the State functionary i. e. the Labour Inspector is forced to face litigation which is being multiplied by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. We are of opinion that the basic bedrock of social justice is independent of laws so far as this country is concerned. Further we cannot be unmindful of the fact that Fluxurious litigation in the shape of approach to this Court in extra-ordinary jurisdiction, where an appeal lies and all points can be canvassed and that too by a public undertaking or State should be depricated as reprehensible 11. We had occasion to point out in the case of (4) ' Miss Bharti Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan (Civil Writ Petition No 770 of 1918, decided on January 2, 1979) and again in the case of Balwant Singh (Citation missing) that 'hen the dockets of the High Court are over-burdened with lacs of cases and sere are lacs of people who are waiting for their turn to get their cases decided 'ho are languishing in jail. There are so many farmers who have put their labour and sown the crops and are being harvested and their rights are invaded, cannot afford to wait in getting justice then we cannot have the luxury of legal gynmasium. An academic juristic debate which may be very useful for Universities, public, societies or seminars. We have pointed Court in those judgments the situation in which our courts are functioning and pointed out at the same time that luxurious litigation should be avoided. In Bharti Chaturvedi's case (Supra), we have observed as under : "The Parliament in its wisdom put these two riders, which of course are alternative to circumscribe and put fetters on the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. This plenary power of the Legislature cannot be challenged. In Bharti Chaturvedi's case (Supra), we have observed as under : "The Parliament in its wisdom put these two riders, which of course are alternative to circumscribe and put fetters on the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. This plenary power of the Legislature cannot be challenged. It is also a matter of common knowledge that even earlier to it the High Courts used to insist upon the proof of substantial injury or injury to the petitioner in most of the writ applications Unless the facts showing "substantial injury (or substantial failure of justice) are specifically pleased, a writ petition cannot be entertained under Act. 226 (1) (b) and (c) of the Constitution, and deserves to be dismissed in limine." "It appears to me that the express addition of the above two phrases in Cls. (b) and (c) in Article 226 was not without significance. The Parliament must have intended to oust and exclude the cases of 'academic interest' only so that the precious time of the court of 'academic interest only so that the precious time of the court is saved for being utilised for deciding those matters which affect and involve the rights of citizens. The Parliament as conscious of the fact this country cannot afford to waste the court's time for deciding academic or Luxurious litigation. The High Court should not be required to enter into controversies of academic interest although they may certainly be very useful and of great interest to the professors and students of law in Universities. They would be injurious and detrimental to other litigants who are waiting to queue for a decade and are impatient to get justice from High Court. The High Court should not be required to enter into controversies of academic interest although they may certainly be very useful and of great interest to the professors and students of law in Universities. They would be injurious and detrimental to other litigants who are waiting to queue for a decade and are impatient to get justice from High Court. "Are we to convert the sacred and pious temple of justice into 'legal gymastic clubs' 'legal debating societies', or even 'luxurious research centres of law?" Are we to wait and watch helplessly the gimmics of talented logic and brilliant feats of oratory' of those fortunate few, who can afford to have luxury of academic litigants who are their waiting in jail cells for last 4 or 6 years to get their guilt or innocence decided or those thousands of civil servants or industrial workmen, petty shopkeepers or farmers whose fundamental rights have been invaded by unscrupulous employer or State functioneries and who want to have 'justice' according to law at least if not real justice or social justice, but who are not getting their turn of hearing due to heavy cause-list and arrears of cases." A lakh of such disappointed, helpless, impatient, gloomy, sad faces of litigants involved in about 10,000 pending cases are staring before me and remind me of the great importance of giving effect to the 'riders' of 'substantial injury' 'substantial failure of justice' to make upon for deciding their awaiting fates and to liberate them from 'coma' caused due to suspense of pending cases for more than a decade." 12. In our opinion, the submissions of Shri Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner, regarding the jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Authority and the Labour Inspector filing the complaint have got no relevancy, substance and to achieve the goal of social justice, though, they have got some importance in technical legal debates. In our opinion, it is in understandable for us how state public undertakings who are mainly launched by the State investment corporation for development of industries and development of industries means on the bedrock of the labour as basis, seat and the pains which the labour and workman takes by and large, ignoring all hazards, fighting against most rough weather and difficult situations, without which no industry can prosper. 13. 13. It was in these circumstances that we repeatedly pointed out to Shri Paras Kuhad that whatever may be the case about the merits because they are yet to be decided. We would not like to enter into minor controversies, at this stage, but would hear only central main points. Having heard them, when we found them against the spirit of constitution and labour laws, we with the objet of curtailing the litigation commenced the dictation of the judgment We notice that this was not apprehended by the learned counsel, may be on account of the best professional ethics, a point on which we would not like to express an opinion. But, we do feel that at least senior advocates, at some stage of the maturity should try to understand the mind of the Court and appreciate which way the wind is blowing and stop there. We would therefore not like express any further opinion on the merits of the case because it is still at ti stage of pendency before the Payment of Wages Authority. 14. We reject the writ petition and hope that in future at least public undertaking would evolve a code of conduct in the matter of litigation where far as the litigation concerning the labour laws, the laws in relation to the enforcement of payment of wages, minimum wages and other such matters are concerned. The management has not shown magnanimity not to have a pitched battle at every front and at every stage. It should not be forgotten that the labour and management are not equal so far as the resources are concerned and, it is only the rule of law and majesty of justice which make them equal. The fact that the workmen and the management are not equal, the workmen being incapable in resources, both financially or otherwise should not be exploited by the management, rather we look forward for a day when the management should provide legal assistance to them to put up their cases as enshrined under Article 39-A of the Constitution of India so that disabled become disabled and encouraged and incapacity is removed. These observations are not new as time and again the Apex Court of this country has emphasised on this aspect of the matter in several cases. 15. These observations are not new as time and again the Apex Court of this country has emphasised on this aspect of the matter in several cases. 15. Consequently, we dismiss the writ petition and leave the petitioner to agitate upon the points which are permissible in law and facts and which are necessary in an appeal which may be filed against the judgment. 16. The writ petition is dismissed in limine. *******