JUDGMENT K. Sreedharan, J. 1. Petitioner was an employee under the first respondent. He claims to have left the employment on 19-9-1981, after putting in 13 years of service. By Ext. P1 application dated 29th May, 1982 the petitioner claimed gratuity for the services rendered by him to the first respondent. The said application was admittedly filed beyond the period prescribed by the Payment of Gratuity Rules, 1973. The petitioner did not file any application to condone the delay along with Ext. P1. On 1st August, 1984, he put in Ext. P3(a) application supported by Ext. P3 affidavit praying for condoning the delay occasioned in filing Ext. P1. The first respondent, by Ext. P2 objection dated 20-10-1982 raised a contention that the petitioner is not entitled to any gratuity because he had voluntarily abandoned his service from August, 1981, for joining Government Service. 2. The 2nd respondent, by Ext. P4 order directed the first respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 1,229,60/- towards the gratuity due to the petitioner. On appeal by the first respondent, the appellate authority, the 3rd respondent reversed the same by Ext. P5 order. Hence this Original Petition. 3. The petitioner would contend that he resigned from the service of the first respondent on 19-9-1981 and so he is entitled to gratuity since he had put in 13 years of service. In Ext. P2 the first respondent had taken a contention that the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned his service in August, 1981, and entered Government service without even informing the matter to the employer. It is admitted by the petitioner that he has not got a copy of the resignation letter. He had not called upon by the first respondent to produce the resignation letter alleged to have been sent by him. When the first respondent had specifically averred in the counter that the petitioner took up employment in Government Service in August, 1981, the petitioner at least ought to have given the date of his joining the Government Service. As per S.4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, an employee who abandoned the post is not entitled to any gratuity. The employee claiming gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act should establish that his case falls in one of the categories enumerated in clause (1) of S.4. Only on such proof he can maintain a petition under the Act. As per S.4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, an employee who abandoned the post is not entitled to any gratuity. The employee claiming gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act should establish that his case falls in one of the categories enumerated in clause (1) of S.4. Only on such proof he can maintain a petition under the Act. In the instant case, as there is no evidence regarding the resignation, the appellate authority had come to the conclusion that there was no termination of the service on any of the grounds mentioned in S.4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act. I do not find any ground to interfere with the said finding. 4. Even on the petitioner's own showing he left the service on 19-9-1981. Ext. P1 application was filed on 20-5-1982. Before approaching the 2nd respondent the petitioner ought to have claimed gratuity from his employer. R.7 of the Kerala Payment of Gratuity Rules, 1973, enjoins an employee to file an application before the employer in Form 'I' within thirty days of the termination of the employment. Though the petitioner stated in Exts. P1 and P3 that such an application was filed, there is no evidence to substantiate this contention. In this Original petition the petitioner has not stated that such an application was filed before the employer. As per R.10 of the Rules the employee should file an application in Form 'N' to the controlling authority for issuing direction under S.7(4) of the Act to the employer to pay the gratuity. That rule further provides that the said application should be filed within 90 days of the occurrence of the cause for the application. It means that the application in Form 'N' should be filed within 90 days of termination of employment. Proviso to Clause (1) of R.10 states: "Provided that controlling authority may accept any application under this sub-rule; on sufficient cause being shown by the applicant, after the expiry of the specified period." The specified period mentioned therein is the period of 90 days from the date of termination of the employment. An application filed after the expiry of that period can be accepted by the controlling authority only if the applicant shows sufficient cause for the delay. In other words the establishment of sufficient cause for the delay is a condition precedent for accepting the application by the controlling authority. An application filed after the expiry of that period can be accepted by the controlling authority only if the applicant shows sufficient cause for the delay. In other words the establishment of sufficient cause for the delay is a condition precedent for accepting the application by the controlling authority. Only on such establishment of the condition precedent can the controlling authority accept the application. The result is that the application filed beyond the period of 90 days fixed in clause (1) of R.10 can be considered to be a valid application only after the controlling authority was satisfied of the cause for the delay. According to me, the application filed after the expiry of 90 days can be treated as a valid application only after the delay is condoned. 5. In the instant case Ext. P1 was filed on 20-5-1982. The petitioner admits that the said application was one filed out of time. Ext. P3(a) application for condoning the delay was filed only on Ist August, 1984. That is more than two years and two months after the main application, Ext. P1, which itself was filed out of time. Ext. P3(a) petition was supported by Ext. P3 affidavit. Nothing was stated in that affidavit for condoning the delay of more than 2.5 years in filing Ext. P3(a). The averments in the affidavit shows that the petitioner was trying to explain the delay of four months occasioned in filing Ext. P1 Actually he ought to have explained the delay of 2.5 years and not four months, Therefore, I hold that the petitioner did not show any cause, much less sufficient cause, for the delay in filing the application. 6. The 2nd respondent proceeded on the basis that the application for condonation of delay, Ext. P3, will relate back to the date of Ext. P1. I find it difficult to accept this position. Ext. P1 can be considered as a valid application only with effect from the date on which Ext. P3 was allowed. In the instant case the petitioner has not given any valid explanation for the delay of two and a half years. His attempt was to explain the delay of nearly four months in not filing Ext. P1 within 90 days of the alleged resignation, as prescribed by the Rules. P3 was allowed. In the instant case the petitioner has not given any valid explanation for the delay of two and a half years. His attempt was to explain the delay of nearly four months in not filing Ext. P1 within 90 days of the alleged resignation, as prescribed by the Rules. In this view the 2nd respondent was clearly in error in thinking that the delay was only of four months. This mistake has now been rectified by the 3rd respondent. The approach made by the 3rd respondent was perfectly legal and I find no ground to interfere with the same either. In view of what has been stated above, I find no merit in this Original petition. It is accordingly dismissed.