Judgment S.B.Sanyal, J. 1. This Civil Revision application has been filed against an order dated 17-1-1987 passed by Munsif, Jamshedpur, under Sec.15 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). 2. Facts:Plaintiff-landlord-opposite party, instituted a suit in February, 1978 bearing Title Suit No. 58 of 1978 praying for the following reliefs : That the plaintiffs therefore pray that a decree may kindly be passed against the defendant. (a) For his eviction from the suit premises described in Schedule A below with a direction to him to Vacate the same within a time to be fixed by the court failing which the plaintiff will be at liberty to get him evicted therefrom through the processes of Court, (b) For payment of a sum of Rs. 2,570.00 as arrear of house rent for the suit premises as described in Schedule B below. (c) For the cost of the suit together with interest till realisation. (d) For any other reliefs to which the plaintiffs may be found entitled in law or equity. (This has been set out in paragraph No. 2 of the Civil Revision Petition). 3 In Schedule B as referred to in the relief, the arrears of house rent was claimed from 1-11-1976 to 31-1-1978, fifteen months, at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month and other charge from July, 1976 to January, 1978 comprising a sum of Rs. 1,445/-, total Rs. 2,570/-. 4. The tenant contested the suit for eviction. On 5-9-1985 an application under Sec.15 of the Act was made praying for deposit of arrears of rent since 1-11-1976 as also current rent as when falling due. The court below acceded to the prayer of the land-lord opposite party by directing payment of arrears of rent since 1-11-1976 at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month to be deposited within fifteen days of the making of the order as also directed deposit of current rent by the fifteenth of the next following month. On failure whereof the defence was directed to be struck out. 5. Mr. Sarkar appearing on behalf of the petitioners, relying on a decision of this Court in the case of Dwarika Prasad Kapri V/s. Smt. Chandra Mania Devi 1987 P.L.J.R. 864 contended that the direction made in the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction and is contrary to the decision of the Court. 5. Mr. Sarkar appearing on behalf of the petitioners, relying on a decision of this Court in the case of Dwarika Prasad Kapri V/s. Smt. Chandra Mania Devi 1987 P.L.J.R. 864 contended that the direction made in the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction and is contrary to the decision of the Court. According to the learned Counsel, the court below could have only directed the rent which fell due within three years of the date of filing of the petition under Section 15 of the Act i.e., 5-9-1985 and the rent subsequently falling due. In short, the Court could have directed the tenant to deposit by way of arrears rent from September, 1982 to 5-9-1985 and the current rents falling due thereafter. On being pointedly asked whether the arrears of house rent already claimed in the suit constituting a sum of Rs. 2,590.00 is also barred, learned Counsel has submitted that since the rent claimed in the suit was within three years from the date of institution of the suit it is not barred by law of limitation but H could only be decreed in the suit. The same cannot be realised through the mechanism of Sec.15 of the Act, which provide for penal consequences. 6. Mr. Roy appearing on behalf of the land-lord opposite party on the other hand, submitted that Dwarika Prasad Kapris case (supra) has no application to the instant case since the petitioners have not only claimed the arrear of rent within three years of the institution of the suit, as would be evident from the relief already quoted above, as also any other relief to which the defendants may be found entitled to in law or equity impliedly meaning the rent accruing during the pendency of the suit month by month. 7. Having considered the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the case of Dwarika Prasad Kapri (supra) is clearly distinguishable and was rendered under altogether different circumstances. In the said case there was no claim for arrears of rent. It was a suit for eviction of tenant simplicitor. The legal position which obtained in this case was not in controversy but that I say so was conceded, as would be evicted from paragraph-4 of the judgment of the said case. In the said case there was no claim for arrears of rent. It was a suit for eviction of tenant simplicitor. The legal position which obtained in this case was not in controversy but that I say so was conceded, as would be evicted from paragraph-4 of the judgment of the said case. It is a well established principle of law, once a suit is instituted claiming appropriate relief in the suit, the running of limitation for the said relief remains suspended during the pendency of suit. In the instant case, arrears of rent have been claimed, which is within time, there is also an implied prayer claiming consequential relief to which the land-lord is entitled to in law and equity which, in my opinion, amounts to pendente lite rent, in such a situation, running of limitation under Sec.15 of the Act will remain suspended. Therefore, the realisation, either of arrears prior to the institution of the suit or arrears prior to the filing of an application under Sec.15 of the Act are lawfully realisable rent through the process of the said section. The ratio of Dwarika Prasad Kapris case (supra) is not contrary to the view taken by me in this case. 8. Under the scheme of the Act if a tenant wants to contest a suit for his eviction he is required to clear himself of his lawful financial obligations arising out of his relationship as landlord and tenant. This is based on equitable principle. In Kapris case it was held if a landlord is not entitled to realise the rent on the date he filed an application under Sec.15 of the Act by instituting a regular Money Suit, the said landlord should not be permitted to do so through the mechanism of Sec.15 of the Act. This question, as indicated earlier, does not arise in this case. A passing reference however, can be made to the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in the case of Ram Nandan Sharma V/s. Moost. Maya Devi -- which decision was largely responsible for the amendment brought about in Sec.15 of the Act. 9. In my opinion, therefore, the impugned direction is not barred by limitation. The order passed by the learned Munsif is not tainted by any vice and is fully within his jurisdiction and in consonance with the provisions of Sec.15 of the Act. 9. In my opinion, therefore, the impugned direction is not barred by limitation. The order passed by the learned Munsif is not tainted by any vice and is fully within his jurisdiction and in consonance with the provisions of Sec.15 of the Act. The Civil Revision is, accordingly, dismissed. But, there shall be no order as to costs. 10. I, however, add that since this petition directed only against the first part of the order dated 17-1-1987, Court is expressing no opinion with respect to the latter part of the order of the same date. B.P.Singh, J. 11 I entirely agree with the order just pronounced by my learned brother. It was contended before us that the impugned order, in the instant civil revision application, is inconsistent with the principles laid down by this court in Dwarika Prasad Kapris case (supra). I was a member of the Bench which decided Dwarika Prasad Kapris case and hence I considered it proper to add a few words of my own. 12. In Dwarika Prasad Kapris case two questions were canvassed before us. The first question was whether an order under Sec.15 of the Act can be made in respect of arrears of rent due prior to the date of filing of the suit. In view of the clear provisions of Sec.15 of the Act, the court had no difficulty in answering that question in the affirmative. The other question raised before us was regarding the starting point of limitation under Sec.15 of the Act, since Sec.15 of the Act provides that an order could be made subject to the law of limitation. The observations in that judgment, particularly those contained in paragraph No. 7 have to be understood in their proper perspective and the factual background of that case. In that case it was not even disputed before the court that an application under Sec.15 of the Act would lie even with respect to the arrears of rent due prior the date of the filing of the suit, if a claim for arrears of rent was made in the suit itself within the period of limitation prescribed by law. In that case the court was dealing with a suit in which apart from claim for eviction, no relief for payment of arrears of rent, or for payment of current rent during pendency of the suit, was made. In that case the court was dealing with a suit in which apart from claim for eviction, no relief for payment of arrears of rent, or for payment of current rent during pendency of the suit, was made. In that connection, repelling the argument that the starting point for the period of limitation should be the date of filing of the suit, certain observations were made in paragraph No. 7 of that judgment. It was held that if a claim for money in the nature of arrears of rent is barred by the law of limitation, the same cannot be revived by filing an application under Sec.15 of the Act. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the arrears sought to be realised by an application under Sec.15 of the Act is barred under the law of limitation or not, if it is barred, an application under Sec.15 will not be maintainable in respect of the time barred amount. The consideration will be different, as pointed out by my learned brother, where in the suit itself the amount has been claimed so as to save it from the operation of the law of limitation. If such an amount is directed to be paid under Sec.15 of the Act it cannot be said that the direction is in respect of any amount barred by limitation, since the same is saved by filing of the suit. The observations, therefore, in paragraph No. 7 of the judgment in Kapris case must be understood in the factual background of a case where the arrears of rent claimed under Sec.15 of the Act have already become barred by limitation because the same had neither been claimed in the suit for eviction, nor had they been saved by making a claim in any other suit for money. Such a claim, if otherwise barred by limitation, cannot be revived by an application under Sec.15 of the Act. The aforesaid observations were made while considering the question as to what would be the relevant point for considering the question of limitation under Section 15 of the Act. So far as the facts of Kapris case go, the entire amount claimed in the application under Sec.15 of the Act, whether before or after the filing of the suit, was within the period of limitation from the date of filing of the application under Sec.15 of the Act.