Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. In this writ application, the petitioner prays for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus upon the respondents commanding upon them to reinstate the petitioner forthwith and to give effect to Annexure-14 to the writ petition whereby the member, Board of hevenue, gave certain directions to his subordinate officers in favour of the petitioner. 2. The facts of this case lie in a very narrow compose. The petitioner who was appointed as a Kanungo was employed at the relevant time under the State of Bihar and joined his post on 26/1/1984. A criminal case was instituted as against the petitioner and the petitioner was put under suspension with effect from 16/6/1962 as would appear from Annexure-5 to the writ application. The petitioner, however, ultimately by order dated 18/2/1971 passed by the special Subordinate Judge, Ranchi in Special Case No.1/68 was discharged in terms of the provisions of Sec.251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 18 8. The said order is contained in Annexure-7 to the writ application. The petitioner received subsistence allowance from June, 1962 to February, 1963 and again received such allowances from 19/12/1977. The petitioners further case is that he made various representations and went up to the Member Board of revenue who is the highest administrative officer so far as the Revenue Department of the State is concerned. By various orders and, in particular, by order dated 20/4/1981 (Annexure-14), the Member Board of Revenue asked the commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh to reinstate the petitioner and pay all his back wages. 3. Mr. B. Y. Kishore learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that this is a case in which the apathetic attitude on the part of the state of Bihar is writ large on the face of the records. He submits that since 1966, the petitioner had been under suspension, but, for a brief period he was not paid any subsistence allowance. He further submitted that although the learned court of the Special Subordinate Judge in the aforementionec. He submits that since 1966, the petitioner had been under suspension, but, for a brief period he was not paid any subsistence allowance. He further submitted that although the learned court of the Special Subordinate Judge in the aforementionec. criminal case did not find any ground even to frame charges as against the petitioner, and, discharged him by an order dated 18/2/1971, but, he was neither reinstated nor paid his subsistence allowance As a matter ot fact, as has been seen hereinbefore, only subsistence allowance was paid to the petitioner again from 19-12-1977 although no fresh order of suspaa sion was passed nor any departmental enquiry was initiated. 4. Mr. N. Roy, learned Government Pleader No. II appearing for the state contended with ref erence to statements made in the counter-affidavit to the effect that the petitioner did not report for duty at Ranchi where his headquarters was fixed during the period of his suspension but he had merely been looking after his criminal case. Mr. N. Roy further drew my attention to the statements made in paragraph 14 of the counter-affidavit as also Annexure-A thereto for the purpose of showing that, in fact, a departmental proceeding was initiated as against the petitioner 18/8/1981, whereas the present writ application was filed sometime in September, 1981. Mr. Roy further contends that from a perusal of the reply to the said counter-affidavit, it would appear that the petitioner has since reached the age of superannuation and as such the question as to what amount of subsistence allowance and/or salary would be payable to him will have to be considered in terms of the provisions of the Bihar Service Code, particularly, rules 99 and 100. 5. Mr. B. Y. Kishore, learned counsel for the petitioner, did not dispute the proposition of law that the matter with regards to the suspension as also payment of subsistence allowance will be governed by Bihar Service Code. He, as a matter of fact based his submission on Rule 97 thereof. Mr. Kishore also drew my attention to a Single Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1969 Cal 461 and submitted that the order of discharge being an order of acquittal he would be deemed to be reinstated in service with effect from the date on which Annexure-7 was passed by the Special Subordinate Judge, Rancbi. Mr. Kishore also drew my attention to a Single Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1969 Cal 461 and submitted that the order of discharge being an order of acquittal he would be deemed to be reinstated in service with effect from the date on which Annexure-7 was passed by the Special Subordinate Judge, Rancbi. He further draws my attention to the statements made in paragraph 24 of the petitioners reply to the counter-affidavit wherein the petitioner stated that in fact, no departmental proceeding had been initiated as against him nor any charge-sheet was served. The petitioner further contended therein that, as a matter of fact, false statements have been made in the counter-affidavit only because the petitioner had to tell point blank about the way in which he was being dealt with on the face of respondent No.4, Sri A. Singh, the then Commissioner, Chota nagpur North Division. 6. There cannot be any doubt that in this case the law s bark would be found to be worse than its bite. The petitioner who might have been involved in some criminal case was entitled in law to be treated equally with other employees similarly situated and was also entitled to get all benefits provided in the Bihar service Code. There cannot be any doubt that although a delinquent officer during the pendency of his criminal case may be put under suspension, but, taking into consideration the provision of Rule 100, the said suspension must be only for the period during which the criminal case remains pending. It goes without saying that even in relation to a matter relating to self-same charge involved in the criminal case, the same itself may be the subject-matter of a departmental proceeding, but for that either the departmental proceeding must be pending during the pendency of the criminal case or must be initiated thereafter. It is really surprising that inspite of the order passed by the Member Board of revenue dated 20th April, 1981, the then Commissioner, Chotanagpur North division instead of complying with the direction of his higher authorities chose to initiate a purported departmental proceeding in August, 1981. It is really surprising that inspite of the order passed by the Member Board of revenue dated 20th April, 1981, the then Commissioner, Chotanagpur North division instead of complying with the direction of his higher authorities chose to initiate a purported departmental proceeding in August, 1981. Although it has been contended by the petitioner that no such departmental proceeding was ever initiated, but, be that as it may, there cannot be any doubt that initiation of such a departmental proceeding after a delay of 15 years, particularly, in view of the order of the Member Board of Revenue in April, 1981, smacks of motive. It is well settled that when a departmental proceeding is initiated after a long delay, the same itself becomes violative of the principles of natural justice In the instant case, there cannot be any reason whatsoever as to why the authorities concerned were sleeping for 15 years and chose to initiate a departmental proceeding after such a long period, particularly in view of the fact that the petitioner stood discharged in the criminal case as far back as in the year 1971 itself. As such, the action on the part of authority cannot be said to be either reasonable or fair. The said action can, to say the least, be termed to be wholly arbitrary and capricious and wholly unreasonable. 7. It is no doubt true that the question as to the rate of the subsistence allowance etc. is to be calculated in terms of the provisions of Rule 99, as rightly contended by Mr. N. Roy learned counsel for the State, but, on the ott er hand, there is no reason whatsoever as to why the same could not be so calculated since 1966, particularly, in view of the fact that the petitioner was paid the subsistence allowance only during a brief period, that is, from June, 1962 to February, 1963. It also appears to be wholly beyond anybodys comprehension as to how and under what circumstance the petitioner was being paid the subsistence allowance again with effect from December, 1977, more so, in view of the fact that no fresh order of suspension was passed on or about that date. 8. It has not been contended by Mr. N. Roy that any fresh order of suspension was passed in the year 1977 and the petitioner was communicated to the aforementioned extent. 8. It has not been contended by Mr. N. Roy that any fresh order of suspension was passed in the year 1977 and the petitioner was communicated to the aforementioned extent. It also does not appear that the order directing initiation of a departmental proceeding is in respect of any matter not covered by the criminal case as against the petitioner. It also does not appear from annexure-A that the departmental proceeding was initiated or any charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner with regards to his non-reporting to duty at ranchi. From Annexure-A it appears that merely an order was passed for initiation of a departmental proceeding, but, the State has not come forward with a plea that, in fact, any charge-sheet has been served or any regular departmental proceeding as such was initiated against the petitioners. It is well known that merely passing an order on file to the effect that the departmental proceeding may be initiated as against the petitioner cannot be said to be initiation of the said proceeding in the eye of law. Such departmental proceeding is initiated only when a proper charge-sheet is issued against the delinquent employee. The said order which might have remained only in the file and might not have been communicated to the petitioner cannot itself be a ground for my coming to the conclusion that, in fact, such a departmental proceeding was initiated. 9. In this case, in view of various decisions of the Supreme Court which have been noticed in the aforementioned judgment of the Calcutta High court reported in AIR 1969 Calcutta 461, it is obvious that the petitioner would be entitled to his salary from the date when he was discharged by a criminal court in terms of Annexure-7 to the writ application. The authorities are also bound to pay the subsistence allowance to the petitioner during the period he was under suspension after calculating the same in terms of the provision of Rule 99 of the Bihar Service Code. 10. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and respondeat No.4 is hereby directed to pay to the petitioner all arrears of salary as also subsistence allowance which may be found admissible to him in accordance with law. 10. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and respondeat No.4 is hereby directed to pay to the petitioner all arrears of salary as also subsistence allowance which may be found admissible to him in accordance with law. In view of the fact that the petitioner has suffered a lot and for a long time, it is further directed that respondent No.4 would finalise the payment to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner, however, if he is so advised, may get a copy of this order served through special messenger at his cost. Mr. Narayan Roy also very fairly stated that he would himself communicate this order to respondent No.4 if a copy of this order be made available to him as early as possible. The office is hereby directed to hand-over a copy of this order to Mr. N. Roy, learned Government pleader No. II. In view of the fact that the petitioner has already reached the age of superannuation, the question of passing any order for his reinstatement does not arise and as such the petitioner would be entitled to the arrears of salary in terms of the observation made hereinbefore. The petitioner shall also be entitled to costs from the respondent which is quantified at Rs.1,000 (one thousand ).