Raghuvir, C.J. — The Khadi & Village Industries Commission is incorporated under the Village Industries Commission Act, 1956 (Act 61 of 1956). The Director of the Commission at Dimapur and the Commission both are petitioners in this writ petition. The Commission is located in a private premises at Duncan Road of Dimapur town in Nagaland. The premises is owned by Bina Agarwalla. She let out the premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 1093/- on January 1, 1977. The demised premises consists of a room in the front where there is a showroom of the Commission, another room in the rear used as store room. On June 17, 1987 the tenant was informed the lease period expired therefore was asked to hand over vacant possession before December 31, 1987. The tenant was warned in a letter if over stayed the period prescribed in that case Rs. 4,000/-per month will have to be paid for use and occupation of the premises. The tenant requested extension of lease period for two years. The request was promptly refused on July 24, 1987. A lawyer's notice on February 17, 1988 was served on the tenant demanding vacant possession before February 20, 1988 in that Rs. 200.00 per day was claimed towards damages. Again on April 6, 1988 time was extended upto April 30, 1988 for vacating the premises if only payment of Rs. 4000.00 from January, 1988 is paid. Yet by another letter on May 2, 1988 the tenant was asked to hand over the possession by May 9, 1988. Vexed by the letters and threats the Commission approached the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, Nagaland for protection when the lessor threatened to demolish the premises. The Commission also approached the Superintendent of Police. Dimapur for help. The Police Station house officer at Dimapur helped the tenant from being thrown out. On June 1, 1988 the land lady with her spouse was at the threshold of the premises to dismantle the eastern wall. On June 2, 1988 the tenant was informed to vacate the premises within seven days. On June 10, 1988 otherwise the premises is to be demolished. The Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur at the instance of the lessor ordered the tenant to ensure removal of the goods of the tenant in seven day. On June 2, 1988 the tenant was informed to vacate the premises within seven days. On June 10, 1988 otherwise the premises is to be demolished. The Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur at the instance of the lessor ordered the tenant to ensure removal of the goods of the tenant in seven day. Exasperated by the threats the tenant approached this Court on June 9, 1988 under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner dated June 2, 1988. In the writ petition tenant avers to be in lawful occupation of the premises therefore cannot be unlawfully evicted. It is urged no tenant cannot dismantle a portion of the tenanted house. The order passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur is assailed as an order without authority, without jurisdiction, and illegal. Pending the writ petition the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur on June 17, 1988 heard the counsel for the lessor and tenant further ordered-"The portion of the wall which has been broken by Mrs. Agarwalla on 10. 6. 88 be closed up in order to make the premises secure from theft, burglary etc, pending the final disposal of the case. Repair of the broken wall is ordered as the wall was broken on 10. 6. 88 where as the same day an order was issued restraining Mrs. Bina Agarwalla to carry out any repairs etc, as per the direction of the High Court. Let notice issue to Mrs. Bina Agarwalla to repair the wall broken on 10. 6. 88 at her expense in order to keep the premises secure within a period of 7 (seven) days from the date of service of the order.” In opposition to the writ petition the lessor asserts the is the owner of the building and she leased out the premises for ten years on January 1, 1977. The period of lease expired. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement she gave notice of six months before the lease period expired. She is in need of the building for her personal use therefore gave notice on December 31, 1987 and the tenant did not vacate the premises. She referred to her letters which we are adverted earlier in opposition of the writ petition. In this case the State of Nagaland, Additional Deputy Commissi­oner is impleaded as a party respondent. She is in need of the building for her personal use therefore gave notice on December 31, 1987 and the tenant did not vacate the premises. She referred to her letters which we are adverted earlier in opposition of the writ petition. In this case the State of Nagaland, Additional Deputy Commissi­oner is impleaded as a party respondent. Ordinarily having regard to the facts of this case this Court would have asked the tenant to seek relief in the Civil Court or before any other competent authority. But in the State of Nagaland there is no legislation . affecting the landlords and tenants. The Transfer of Property Act 4 of 1882 is not applicable to the State of Nagaland. Besides the revenue authorities like the Additional Deputy Commissioner are invested the powers of Civil Justice of Civil Courts and the whole situation is not a happy one to see through the impediments. The tenant in this writ petition contends the Additional Deputy Commissioner has no power in law to interfere with the occupation of the premises as the tenant is in peaceful possession of the demised premises even after expiry of the lease period but it is urged the tenant has a right of holding over. The tenant is not a trespasser therefore the tenant seeks protection of the possession of the demised premises. It is urged on bahalf of the lessor the tenant in the face of the above facts is not entitled to any protection in law. What is the character of possession of a tenant after expiration of the lease period the Courts held possession of such a tenant is juridical possession. As to the meaning of that word, Black's Law Dictionary 1979 Edition (Fifth) shows “Juridical : relating to administration of justice, or office of a Judge ; Regular: done in conformity to the laws of the country and the practice which is there observed. In this case a controversy however is raised whether a tenant who occupies the demised premises after the lease period is over can be considered a tenant holding over and if he is not what is the status of such a tenant. There was at one point of time controversy in the Courts in India as to the status of such a tenant who remained in the premises after the lease period is over. There was at one point of time controversy in the Courts in India as to the status of such a tenant who remained in the premises after the lease period is over. Such a controversy is now set at rest by the decisions of the Courts. It is accepted a tenant who continues to occupy the premises even after the lease period is over in India is called a tenant by sufferance. This expression used or is fallowed in Courts where common law is followed. There is no uniformity it may be added in this regard even in the Common Wealth Countries. Without any further discussion we hold the Khadi and Village Industries Commission is the tenant after January,' 1988 is a tenant by sufferance on the demised premises. Whether a tenant by sufferance has no authority to remain in possession or he should be considered as a trespasser is another controversy on which there was an acute division of opinion of various High Courts. The controversy was accentuated by clause (q) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.-[109 (q). On the determination of the lease> the lessee is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property]. In that sub-clause a duty is cast on the tenant to deliver possession after the expiration of lease period or when the tenancy is terminated. In the context of that duty of such a tenant at one time the Courts considered a tenant who fails in that duty has no right to remain in possession therefore he should be treated as a trespasser. It was also held in some cases the Courts cannot recognise possession of such a tenant in law and cannot protect the possession but that view is no more holds the field. See for example in AIR 1954 Bombay 358 (K. K. Verma vs. Union of India) the words in the Government Premises (Eviction) Act (27 of 1950) in section 3(1) (b) were considered. The words in that section "any person is in unauthorised occupation of the de­mised premises" was explained with reference to tenancy by sufferance. The Bombay High Court held-"our law makes a clear and sharp distinction between a trespasser and an erstwhile tenant and the possession of a tenant by sufferance was a judicial possession and is protected by law''. The tenant by sufferance thus was not held a trespasser. The Bombay High Court held-"our law makes a clear and sharp distinction between a trespasser and an erstwhile tenant and the possession of a tenant by sufferance was a judicial possession and is protected by law''. The tenant by sufferance thus was not held a trespasser. But see the Supreme Court considered a case of Cinema Talkies under Regulation 30 of the Madras Cinemas Regulation Act 1955, after expiration of lease period, whether possession of the tenant was lawful. A Single Judge of the Madras High Court held; the tenancy without the consent of the landlord, was not lawful. The Division Bench of that Court, on appeal, reversed that view. On further appeal the Supreme Court held possession of such a tenant in AIR 1974 SC 104 (M. C. Chockalingam & ors. vs. V. Manicka -vasagam and ors.) as not lawful. The expressions lawful, unlawful, authorised, unauthorised, legal, illegal, it appears are of different nuances and content we may not here open that controversy in this case. Therefore it is not possible to hold what is legal, is not illegal, and when it is said unauthorised has to be distinguished from not authorised. But it is accepted, on all hands, possession of a tenant by sufferance is a juridical possession or judicial possession and a tenant by sufferance is entitled to protection by Courts in India. Relevant to this subjects very often provision of section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is referred [S. 6-suit by person dispossessed of immovable property-(l) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by Suit, recover posses­sion thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. (2) No suit under this section shall be brought-(l) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession ; or (b) against ' the Government. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed. (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed. (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. ] See what the Allahabad High Court has said in an old case Wali Ahmed Khan and others vs. Ajudhia Kanu ILR 13 All 537 that in our jurisprudence and philosophy Courts "drive the person who wanted to eject a person into the proper court and to prevent them from going with a highhand and eject such person". The Privy Council improved the idea and jurisprudence in 1924 P. C. 144 (Midnapur Zamindar Co. Ltd. ts. Kumar Naresh Narayan Raj & ors) and held-That in our jurisprudence, persons are not permitted to take forcible possession. They must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court." Thus trespasser also cannot be evicted by force. The law in its zeal to protect orderly procedure even a trespasser dispossessed, has a right to restitution of possession under Specific Relief Act without reference to title. If such a person files a suit within six months or beyond six months he has a right to claim possession. So this question also at one point of time there was difference of opinion in various High Courts. The controversy in now set at rest by the decision in AIR 1968 SC 1165 (Nair Service Society Ltd. vs. K. C. Alexander & ors). We may part with the subject here as it is not relevant to the controversy in the instant writ petition. The legal philosophy in our jurisprudence is as adumbrated in Allahabad High Court and elaborated in Privy Council in Midnapur Zamindary case received a further impetus in AIR 1931 PC 248 :1931 AC 662 Eshugbayi Eleko vs. Government of Nigeria. This is another case we find in India a rewarding experience to read again and again as it ripens with years. It is always exhilarating experience no matter how many times one reads the case. The facts show the Ruling Chief Docemo of Lagos in 1861 by Treaty ceded to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, the territory of Lagos. Docemo died in 1920. The war of succession ensued, Eshugbay, alias Eleko was recognised in 1920 the Chief. It is always exhilarating experience no matter how many times one reads the case. The facts show the Ruling Chief Docemo of Lagos in 1861 by Treaty ceded to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, the territory of Lagos. Docemo died in 1920. The war of succession ensued, Eshugbay, alias Eleko was recognised in 1920 the Chief. The claims of his rival, Dyekan were rejected. On August 6, 1925, the Governor of Lagos ordered Eleko to leave the provinces of Abeokuta Ijebu and Ondo, and on non-compliance Dyekan was deported to Dyo Province. One of the questions raised in the Courts of Nigeria was whether the Chieftency was a title of dignity or an office or both. The entire controversy no doubt betrayed a colonial flavour. But in that case what-was said by Lord Atkin is found to be the foundation stone of jurisprudence. He said-"In accordance with British jurisprudence no member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except on the condition that he car support the legality of his action before a Court of justice. And it is the tradition of British justice that judges should not shrink from deciding such issues in the face of the executive...". This became entrenched in our Constitution. In AIR 1961 SC 1570 Bishna Das vs. State of Punjab- ''.- the action of the Government in taking the law into their hands and the dispossessing the parties by the display of force, exhibits a callous disregard of the normal requirements of the rule of law apart from what might legitimately and reasonably be expected from a Government functioning in a society governed by a Constitution which guarantees to its citizens against arbitrary invasion by the executive of peaceful possess­ion of property. The case AIR 1954 SC 415 (Wazir Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh) high lighted are view point from the executive power the executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of a citizen unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their ects. In AIR 1967 SC 1170 (State of Madhya Pra­desh vs. Thakur Bharat Singh) Eleko case in specific terms was referred and Article 13 of the Constitution was emphasized the Judge cannot interfere without having resort in a statutory provision as under Article 13 of the Constitution. In AIR 1967 SC 1170 (State of Madhya Pra­desh vs. Thakur Bharat Singh) Eleko case in specific terms was referred and Article 13 of the Constitution was emphasized the Judge cannot interfere without having resort in a statutory provision as under Article 13 of the Constitution. In AIR 1968 SC 620 ( Lallu Yeshwant Singh vs. Rao Jagdish Singh ) the ratio in Midnapur Zamindary case principle was reiterated. In India persons are net permitted to take forcible possession, they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. These reverberations of the two facets one in Eleko's case and Midnapur Zamirdary case are the bedrocks of our jurisprudence. In States and territories where the statute of Transfer of Pro­perty Act is not applicable natural justice, equity and good conscience are applied and the spirit of the Statue is transported but that method need not be resorted to after the Constitution. Today it is our legal philosophy and our jurisprudence which stands in­corporated as common law in our Constitution under Art. 372 of the Constitution. We have sufficiently extrapoliated the subject from the point of our legal culture and philosophy in jurisprudence. The tenant in this case is in possession of what was demised to them under a lease. The Commission therefore cannot be evicted unless lessor obtains decree for eviction by the Civil Court. This is what is set out in Specific Relief Act, 437 of 1963. No specific provision of law is brought to our notice to enable the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur to pass the impugned orders. Therefore the orders passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner and impugned in this case are hereby quashed. The parties can seek relief in Civil Court for settlement of their dispute. The writ petition is allowed as indicated above. No costs.