The State of Bihar through the Divisional Forest Officer, East Hazaribagh v. Basudeo Singh
1988-04-03
B.P.SINGH, N.P.SINGH
body1988
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT N.P. Singh, J. This appeal has been filed on behalf of the State of Bihar for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh, in exercise of the powers under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 87 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. It appears that the suit in question had been filed by the plaintiffs-respondents before the Revenue-Officer, Hazaribagh, under sub-section (1) of section 87 of the Act for declaration that old Survey Plot No. 2465/4049 under old Khata No. 103/319 of Village Murmo, District Hazaribagh, were their raiyati lands and the entry in the revisional survey of rights in favour of the Forest Department, Hazaribagh was incorrect and illegal. A prayer was also made to correct the aforesaid entry. That suit was transferred by the Revenue-Officer to the Civil Court in accordance with the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 87 of the Act which was heard and decreed, as already stated above. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree aforesaid, the present appeal was filed on behalf of the State of Bihar, because the valuation determined of the subject-matter of the suit was more than Rs. 20,000/-. 3. When the appeal was taken up for hearing before a learned Judge of this Court, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents regarding the maintainability of this appeal on the ground that no appeal lies to the Courts against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge; the appellant should have filed the appeal before the Judicial Commissioner/District Judge concerned in accordance with sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act. That question was referred to a Division Bench for consideration. 4 Section 87 of the Act is as follows :- "87.
That question was referred to a Division Bench for consideration. 4 Section 87 of the Act is as follows :- "87. Institution of suit before Revenue Officer.-(1) In proceedings under this Chapter a suit may be instituted before a Revenue officer at any time within three months from the date of the certificate for the final publication of the record-of rights under sub-section (2) of Section 83, of the decision of any dispute regarding any entry which a Revenue-officer has made in, or any omission which he has made from, the record, [expect an entry of a fair rent settled under the provisions of section 85 before the final publication of the record of rights] whether such dispute be- (a) between landlord and tenant, or (b) between landlords of the same or of neighbouring estate. OF (c) between tenant and tenant, or (d) as to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists. OF (e) as to whether land held rent-free is property so held, or (ee) as to any question relating to the title in land or to any interest in land between the parties to the suit; or (f) as to any other matter; and the Revenue-officer shall hear and decide the dispute; Provided that the Revenue-officer may subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf under Section 264, transfer any particular case or class of cases to a competent Civil Court for trial; Provided also that in any suit under this section the Revenue-officer shall not try any issue which has been, or is already, directly and substantially in issue between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, in proceedings for the settlement of rent under this Chapter, where such issue has been tried and decided, or is already being tried, by a Revenue-officer under Section 86 in proceedings instituted after the final publication of the record of rights.
(2) An appeal shall lie, in the prescribed manner and to the prescribed officer from decisions passed under sub-section(1) and a second appeal to the High Court shall lie from any decision on appeal of such officer as if such decision were an appellate-decree passed by the Judicial Commissioner under Chapter XVI." In view of aforesaid section, a suit may be instituted before a Revenue-officer whenever there is any dispute regarding any entry in the record of rights and such Revenue-officer has to hear and decide that dispute. Under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 87 of the Act, the Revenue-officer may subject to such rules as may be framed under section 264, transfer any particular case to a competent Civil Court for trial. 5. In the present case, the Revenue-officer in exercise of the power under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 87 transferred the suit to the Civil Court for decision. Now the question which has to be answered is as to whether after the decision given by the Subordinate Judge the appellant could have pursued his remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure by filing an appeal in accordance with the provisions of the said Code. There is dispute that if the judgment of the Subordinate Judge is held to be judgment of Civil Court which could have been challenged in accordance with the provisions of the Code then it has to be held that this appeal is maintainable. But the difficulty is in view of sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act which says in dear and unmistakable words that an appeal against a decision passed under sub-section (1) of section 87 of the Act shall lie to the prescribed officer. 6. The learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellant submitted that once the suit was transferred for decision to the Civil Court it was to be heard and decided in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which will also include the provisions for filing appeal against such decision. It was also pointed out that, in section 87 or in any other section, the application of the Code of Civil Procedure has not been barred and as valuation of the appeal was more than Rs. 20,000/- at the relevant time it could have been filed before this Court as a regular first appeal. 7.
It was also pointed out that, in section 87 or in any other section, the application of the Code of Civil Procedure has not been barred and as valuation of the appeal was more than Rs. 20,000/- at the relevant time it could have been filed before this Court as a regular first appeal. 7. When sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act says that an appeal against a decision passed under sub-section (1) shall lie to the prescribed officer, does it not include even the order passed by Civil Court in the cases which have been referred to it under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 87 of the Act? In my view, the answer is in affirmative. The power has been vested in the Civil Court to try such cases by the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 87 of the Act; as such when an order is passed finally deciding the dispute in question, it shall amount to an order under subsection (1) of section 87 of the Act. The result whereof shall be that an appeal shall lie in view of sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act to the prescribed officer. 8. Rule 75 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) is as follows :- “Appeals under Section 87(1)-(1) Appeals from decision of Revenue-officer under Section 87(1) shall lie to the Judicial Commissioner. (2) Every such appeal must be presented within 30 days from the date on which the decision appealed against was signed and delivered." It is true that Rule 75(1) of the Rules says that the appeals from the decision of Revenue officer under section 87(1) shall lie to the Judicial Commissioner and it does not speak specifically about the appeals against the decisions of Civil Courts. But when section 87 of Act specifically says that an appeal shall lie to the prescribed officer "from decision passed under sub-section (1) “then is shall also cover the decision given by the Civil Court Under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 87 of the Act. In this connection it may be pointed out that forum of the appeal bas been created by sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act. Rule 75 of the Rules merely prescribes the officer to whom the appeal has to be presented.
In this connection it may be pointed out that forum of the appeal bas been created by sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act. Rule 75 of the Rules merely prescribes the officer to whom the appeal has to be presented. If sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act prescribes the same officer before whom appeals against decision of the Revenue officer as well as of the Civil Court have to be preferred, then if Rule 75 of the Rules has to be consistent with sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act, then it has to be read to mean that appeals against the decision of the Revenue-officer as well as Civil Courts have to be preferred before the Judicial Commissioner. 9. It is well-known that forum of appeal is a creature of statute and has to be prescribed either under Code of Civil Procedure or under different enactments. The matter would have been different if there was no specific provision under the Act prescribing the forum of the appeal. But when a special appellate forum has been prescribed under the provisions of the Act itself it shall be deemed that the framers of the Act excluded any other forum of appeal by necessary implication. Apart from that, there is a clear indication in sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act itself that only a second appeal can be filed before the High Court. Sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act was amended by the Bihar and Orissa Act V of 1920, saying that a second appeal to the High Court shall lie from any decision on appeal of such officer as if such decision were an appellate decree passed by the Judicial Commissioner under Chapter XVI." By the aforesaid amendment, a fiction was introduced because of which a decision given on appeal by the prescribed officer i.e. the Judicial Commissioner, is to be treated as an appellate decree. In my view, there is no scope for holding that a first appeal can be preferred to the High Court against the decision of the Civil Court it may be mentioned that in sub-section (2) of section 87 the appellate authority has been described as a prescribed officer, which also excludes the High Court. 10.
In my view, there is no scope for holding that a first appeal can be preferred to the High Court against the decision of the Civil Court it may be mentioned that in sub-section (2) of section 87 the appellate authority has been described as a prescribed officer, which also excludes the High Court. 10. During the hearing on the question of maintainability of this appeal, it was urged by the Government Pleader that sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act as well as Rule 75 of the Rules speak about Judicial Commissioner but except at Ranchi there is no other Judicial Commissioner in the districts to which the provisions of the Act are applicable. It was rightly pointed out by Mr. N.K. Prasad, who appeared for the plaintiffs-respondents. that sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act was amended in the year 1920 when there was only one Chota Nagpur Division which was headed by a Judicial Commissioner; later after creation of several districts in the said Chota Nagpur Division, except at Ranchi in other districts where the provisions of the Act are applicable they are known as District Judges. In my view the expression "Judicial Commissioner" used in sub-section (2) of section 87 of the Act as well as Rule 75 of the Rules, has to be read to mean Judicial Commissioner and District Judges of the districts to which the provisions of the Act are applicable. In the instant case, the dispute arose within an area which is now under the judgeship of Hazaribagh. The District Judge, Hazaribagh shall be deemed to be the prescribed authority to hear the appeal against the decision of the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh. 11. Unfortunately, this appeal has remained pending before this Court since 1970 and after lapse of 16 years it is being held that this appeal is not maintainable before this Court. But there being no precedent on this point and even the suit having been registered by the Subordinate Judge as a regular title suit, who later even passed a decree, I am of the view that a bona fide mistake has been committed by the appellant in preferring this appeal before this Court.
But there being no precedent on this point and even the suit having been registered by the Subordinate Judge as a regular title suit, who later even passed a decree, I am of the view that a bona fide mistake has been committed by the appellant in preferring this appeal before this Court. Accordingly, I direct the memorandum of appeal which is find before this Court along with the certified copies of the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge be returned to the Government Pleader No. 1 for proper presentation before the District Judge, Hazaribagh, in accordance with law. It will be open to the appellant to file an application under section 5 read with section 14 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in filing this appeal. The District Judge shall consider the question of condonation of delay in the light of section 5 and section 14 of the Limitation Act because the appellant has been pursuing the remedy in a wrong court under a bonafide mistake. B.P. Singh, J. - I agree.