JUDGMENT - P.S. SHAH, J.:---By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged his detention pursuant to an order dated January 8, 1988, passed by the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay; under section 3 of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on his being satisfied that it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community. 2. The order of detention is dated January 8, 1988, and was served on the detenu along with the grounds of detention the same day. The petitioner has challenged his detention on several grounds in the petition. One of the grounds on which the petitioner has challenged his detention is that the mention of the period of his detention in the order of detention dated January 8, 1988, vitiates the order of detention. Since in our view the impugned order of detention is liable to be quashed on this ground alone, it is necessary for us to consider the other grounds on which the petitioner has challenged his detention as illegal. The order of his detention passed by the Commissioner of Police on January 8, 1988, runs thus : Office of the Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay. ORDER: Dated : January 8, 1988. D.O. No. 1/C.B. (C), CID/1988 : Whereas the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, is satisfied in respect to the person known as Rajendra Manshukhlal Shah, resident of 2/113, Navyug Nagar, Opposite Bhatia Hospital, Forjet Street, Tardeo, Bombay 400 036, that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community, it is necessary to make the following orders : Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) read with clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (Act No. VII of 1980) the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, directs that the said Rajendra Mausukhlal Shah be detained under the said Act, for a period of six months from the date of detention. Sd/-V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay." 3. It is urged by Mr. Sd/-V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay." 3. It is urged by Mr. Sardar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, that having regard to the provisions of section 3 as also the Scheme of the Act, the mention of the period of six months as the period of detention in the impugned order of detention issued under section 3 of the Act is impermissible and this mention by itself vitiates the order. The Counsel submitted that the Detaining Authority is not entitled to fix the period of detention at the initial stage when the order under section 3(1) of the Act is passed by him. It was contended that the mention of the period of detention at the outset even before the detention is considered by the Advisory Board vitiates the order as it is likely to prejudice the case of the detenu before the Advisory Board. In order to appreciate this contention it would be proper at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act which are as under : "8(1) The Central Government or a State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government specifically empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government specifically empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained." (2) Any of the following officers, namely : (a) District Magistrates ; (b) Commissioner of Police, wherever they have been appointed, may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. (3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government. 10. Reference to Advisory Boards.---Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3, also the report by such officer under sub-section (3) of that section. 11. Procedure of Advisory Boards.---(1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials placed before it and, after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate Government or from any person called for the purpose through the appropriate Government or from the person concerned, and if, in any particular case, it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the appropriate Government within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. (2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned. 12. Action upon the report of the Advisory Board---(1) In any case whether the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. 12. Action upon the report of the Advisory Board---(1) In any case whether the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. (2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. 13. Maximum period of detention---The maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under section 12, shall be six months from the date of detention. 14(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified--- (a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State Government, by that State Government or by the Central Government; (b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the Central Government or by a State Government by the Central Government." 4. From these provisions it would appear that when the order is passed by the Officer viz. the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police he has to forthwith report the fact to the State Government and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days, after making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government. In other words, in the case of an order passed by the aforesaid officers, the life thereof can never be more than 12 days, unless the State Government sets its approval thereon within the said period. Then the Government is enjoined within a period of three weeks from the date of detention under the Act to place before the Advisory Board the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order. It is also incumbent on the Government to place before the Advisory Board the relevant papers including the order of detention within the period of three weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. It is also incumbent on the Government to place before the Advisory Board the relevant papers including the order of detention within the period of three weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. The Advisory Board is required to submit its report to the Government within seven weeks from the date of the detention of the person concerned and the report has to specify in a separate part thereof the opinion of the Advisory Board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned. On receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board, the Government has to take appropriate action. If the opinion rendered by the Advisory Board is that in its opinion there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person, the Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. Thus the earliest stage of fixing a period of detention would be after the receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board by the State Government and his power has to be exercised by the State Government and not by the officer who has passed the order. Whereas the wording of sub-section (1) of section 12 shows that there is discretion in the State Government to confirm or revoke the detention order of the person concerned where the Advisory Board has given its opinion that there is sufficient cause for the detention; there is no such discretion in the State Government where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned. The Government must in such a case revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. The provisions would also show that the maximum period for which a person can be detained in  pursuance of any order of detention which has been confirmed by the State Government is six months from the date of detention. Section 14 provides for exercise of powers of revocation by various authorities. It would be clear from the aforesaid Scheme as also the plain wording of section 3(1) that there is no power in the Detaining Authority either to fix or mention the period in the order of detention at the time of making of the order of detention under section 3(1). It would be clear from the aforesaid Scheme as also the plain wording of section 3(1) that there is no power in the Detaining Authority either to fix or mention the period in the order of detention at the time of making of the order of detention under section 3(1). The order is of temporary nature which is continued by virtue of the other provisions and the steps taken later under the provisions of the Act. If the State Government does not grant its approval to the order of the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, as the case may be, passed under section 3(1) within a period of 12 days from the date of the making of the order, the order automatically comes to an end. Section 3 (1) nowhere provides that the authority making the order of detention under section 3(1)(2) should mention the period of detention. If the law does not provide for such a direction, prima facie the exercise thereof is illegal and would vitiate the order of detention. There is substance in the contention of the learned Counsel that the mentioning of the period of the detention at the stage of passing of the order under section 3(1) is likely to prejudice the detenu's case before the Advisory Board or would have a tendency to prejudice a fair consideration of his case by the Advisory Board. 5. In support of his contention the learned Counsel relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court in (Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab)1, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 27 and (Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay)2, A.I.R. 1952, S.C. 181. In both these cases the orders of detention passed under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, were challenged as illegal. In Makhan's case he was detained under an order dated March 1, 1950, issued by the District Magistrate, Amritsar, under section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. This order was challenged by the petitioner, but while the petition was pending before the Supreme Court he was served on 6th August with another detention order dated 30th July, 1951, purporting to be made by the Governor of Punjab under sub-section (1) of sections 3 and 4 as amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951. In this order of detention it was inter alia directed that the petitioner be detained till March 31, 1952. In this order of detention it was inter alia directed that the petitioner be detained till March 31, 1952. Thus as in the present case, in Makhan's case also a period of detention was mentioned in the order of detention passed under section 3(1) read with section of the Preventive Detention Act. The supreme Court held that the fixing of the period of detention in the initial order itself i.e. at the stage of passing of the order under section 3(1) was contrary to the scheme of the Act and could not be supported. The Supreme Court further held that such a direction would tend to prejudice a fair consideration of the detenu's case when it is placed before the Advisory Board. It would be useful to recall the relevant observations of the Supreme Court in para 4 of the judgment which runs thus : "Whatever might be the position under the Act before its amendment in February 1951, it is clear that the Act as amended requires that every case of detention should be placed before an Advisory Board constituted under the Act (section 9) and provides that if the Board reports that there is sufficient cause for the detention 'the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit' (section 11). It is, therefore, plain that it is only after the Advisory Board, to which the case has been referred, reports that the detention is justified, the Government should determine what the period of detention should be and not before. The fixing of the period of detention in the initial order itself in the present case was therefore, contrary to the scheme of the Act and cannot be supported. The learned Advocate-General, however, urged that in view of the provision in section 11(2) that if the Advisory Board reports that there is no sufficient cause for the detention the person concerned would be released forthwith, the direction in the order dated 30-7-1951 that the petitioner should be detained till 31-3-1952 should be ignored as more surplusage. We cannot accept that view. It is obvious that such a direction would tend to prejudice a fair consideration of the petitioner's case when it is placed before the Advisory Board. We cannot accept that view. It is obvious that such a direction would tend to prejudice a fair consideration of the petitioner's case when it is placed before the Advisory Board. It cannot be too often emphasised that before a person is deprived of is personal liberty the procedure established by law must be strictly followed and must not be departed from to the disadvantage of the person effected." 6. In Dattatraya's case the order of detention made against the petitioner dated February 13, 1951, by the District Magistrate, Surat, under the Prevention of Detention Act, 1950, was challenged before the Supreme Court. One of the contentions urged before the Supreme Court was that it is imperative on the part of the appropriate Government when it confirms the order of detention under section 11(1) to specify the period during which the detention was to continue and omission to state the period vitiated the order. While dealing with this contention the Supreme Court referred to and relied on the decision in Makhan Singh's case. In separate judgment delivered by B.K. Mukherjee, J., in para 13 at page 186 it is observed : "It is to be noted that section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act under which the initial order of detention is made is worded differently in this respect and it merely empowers the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, to make order, under the circumstances specified in the section directing that a person be detained, and nothing is said about the period for which such detention should be directed. It is now settled by a pronouncement (vide 'Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab , Petition No. 308 of 1951 (S.C.) of this Court that not only it is not necessary for the Detaining Authority to mention the period of detention when passing the original order under section 3 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act, but that the order would be bad and illegal if any period is specified, as it might prejudice the case of the detenu when it goes up for consideration before the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board again has got to express its opinion only on the point as to whether there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned. The Advisory Board again has got to express its opinion only on the point as to whether there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned. It is neither called upon nor is it competent to say anything regarding the period for which such person should be detained. Once the Advisory Board expresses its view that there is sufficient cause for detention at the date when it makes, its report what action is to be taken subsequently is left entirely to the appropriate Government and it can under section 11(1) of the Act 'confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit'. In my opinion, the words 'for such period as it thinks fit, pre-suppose and imply that after receipt of the report of the Advisory Board the Detaining Authority has to make up its mind as to whether the original order of detention should be confirmed and if so, for what further period the detention is to continue. Obviously that is the proper stage for making an order of decision of this description as the investigation with regard to a particular detenu such as is contemplated by the Preventive Detention Act is then at an end and the appropriate Government is in full possession of all the materials regarding him. It could not have been in the contemplation of the Legislature that the matter should be left indefinite and undetermined even then. This, in my opinion, is the reason for the difference in the language of section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act as compared with that of section 3(1) of the Act. I do not think that once the appropriate Government in making the order under section 11(1) specifies the period during which the detention of the person concerned is to continue, it becomes 'functus officio' and is incapable of extending the detention for a further period at a subsequent time if it considers necessary. I do not think that once the appropriate Government in making the order under section 11(1) specifies the period during which the detention of the person concerned is to continue, it becomes 'functus officio' and is incapable of extending the detention for a further period at a subsequent time if it considers necessary. In my opinion, section 13 of the Act gives very wide powers to the Detaining Authority in this respect and it can revoke or modify any detention order at any time it chooses and the power of modification would certainly include a power of extension of the period of detention provided such power is exercised before the period originally fixed has expired and provided the extended period does not exceed the over all limit which is co-extensive with the life or duration of the Act itself." 7. Though it is clear from the above observations of the Supreme Court that the proper stage of fixing a period within the over all limit is the stage of confirmation of the order of detention, the observations in para 14 would indicate that non-specification of the further period in an order under section 11 of the Preventive Detention Act does not make the order of detention a nullity. In this connection the following observations of the Supreme Court in para 14 may be noted: " The question now is whether the omission to state the period of further detention while confirming the detention order under section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act makes the detention illegal ? The point is not free from doubt, but having regard to the fact that the new Preventive Detention Act is a temporary statue which was to be in force only upto the 1st of April, 1952 and has only been recently extended to a further period of six months and no detention under the Act can continue after the date of expiry of the Act. I am inclined to hold that non-specification of the further period in an order under section 11(1) of the Act does not make the order of detention a nullity. If no period is mentioned the order might be taken to imply that it would continue up to the date of the expiration of the Act itself when all detentions made under it would automatically come to an end. If no period is mentioned the order might be taken to imply that it would continue up to the date of the expiration of the Act itself when all detentions made under it would automatically come to an end. Of course, the appropriate Government is always at liberty to terminate the order of detention earlier, if it considers proper in exercise of its general powers under section 13 of the Act. I am not much impressed by the argument that the non-mentioning of the period in the order of confirmation is likely to cause serious prejudice to the interests of the detenu. It may be that if a period is mentioned, the attention of the Government is likely to be drawn to the case near about the time when the period is due to expire and the facts of the case may be reviewed by the appropriate authority at that time before it decides to extend the detention any further, but it seems to me to be clear from the provision of section 13 that the Act contemplates review of individual cases by the appropriate Government from time to time irrespective of any period being mentioned in the order of detention. It can legitimately be expected that the Detaining Authority would discharge the duties which are imposed upon it, but even if it does not, there is nothing in the law which prevents it from fixing the period of detention up to the date of expiry of the Act itself, which is by no means a long once, and in that case the Court would obviously be powerless to give any relief to the detenu". 8. Thus, in Dattatraya's case the Supreme Court affirmed the view taken in Makhan Singh's case that the very mention of the period of detention in the original order under section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act renders that order bad and illegal as the specifying such a period might prejudice the case of the detenu when it goes up for consideration before the Advisory Board. On the other hand, non-specification of the period after confirmation does not stand on the same footing in the sense that it does not vitiate the order because no prejudice is caused by reason of such non mention of the period in the order of confirmation. On the other hand, non-specification of the period after confirmation does not stand on the same footing in the sense that it does not vitiate the order because no prejudice is caused by reason of such non mention of the period in the order of confirmation. In Dattatraya's case which was decided by a Bench of five Judges, Mahajan, J., did not agree with the majority view that the non-mention of the period of detention at the time of confirmation of the order does not vitiate the order. However, in his dissenting judgment Mahajan, J., referred to the decision in Makhan Singh's case with approval (See para-26 at page 189) 9. There is no material difference in the scheme of the Preventive Detention and the Scheme of Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, with which we are concerned, in so far as the question that is being canvassed before us. The salient features of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, before the amendment are that the order of detention can be passed by the authority under section 3 (1) which does not provide for mentioning the period of detention at that stage. Sections 8 to 10 relate to the constitution of Advisory Boards, reference to Advisory Boards and the procedure of the Advisory Boards. The State Government is enjoined to make a reference to the Advisory Board within a period of thirty days from the date of detention and the Advisory Board has to submit the report within a period of 10 weeks from the date of the detention under the detention order. The provisions also shows that the report of the Advisory Board, must specify as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of a person concerned. Section 11 provided that if the Advisory Board reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned 'for such period as it thinks fit'. Section 12 provides for duration of the detention and section 13 provides for revocation of the detention order. This Act was first amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951 (Act No. IV of 1951) which came into force on 23rd February, 1951. Section 12 provides for duration of the detention and section 13 provides for revocation of the detention order. This Act was first amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951 (Act No. IV of 1951) which came into force on 23rd February, 1951. Section 9 of the Original Act regarding reference to Advisory Boards has been modified by section 9 of the Amending Act. Sections 11 and 12 of the original Act were substituted by section 11 and the new section 11 provides for action upon the report of the Advisory Board and it is provided therein that in any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned 'for such period as it thinks fit' and if the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. The Act was further amended by the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952 (Act No. LXI of 1952) which came into force on August 22, 1952. The original section 3(c) has been amended by inter-alia providing that no order of detention passed under section 3(1) after the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government. This provision inserved by the Second Amendment Act is pari-material with the provisions of section 3(3) of the Preventive of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. There are some amendment to sections 9 and 10 relating to the Advisory Board, but these amendments are not relevant for our purpose. There is, however, the insertion of section 11-A by section 10 of the Second Amendment Act which provides as under: "11-A. Maximum period of detention---(1) The maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under section 11 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. There is, however, the insertion of section 11-A by section 10 of the Second Amendment Act which provides as under: "11-A. Maximum period of detention---(1) The maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under section 11 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), every detention order which has been confirmed under section 11 before the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall, unless a shorter period is specified in the order, continue to remain in force until the 1st day of April, 1953, or until the expiration of twelve months from the date of detention, whichever period of detention expires later. (3) The provisions of sub-section (2) shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 3 of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952 (XXXIV of 1952) but nothing contained in this section shall effect the power of the appropriate Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time." 10. With these amendments it can be said that the Scheme of the Preventive Detention Act as amended is in pari-materia with the Scheme of the aforesaid Act of 1980. 11. It was urged by Mr. Gumaste, the learned Counsel, appearing for the respondents that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Makhan Singh and Dattatraya would not hold good in view of the insertion of section 11-A. According to him, the two Supreme Court decisions could have relevance only to the cases prior to the insertion of section 11-A. It was also submitted that by the addition of section 11-A by the Second Amendment, the difficulty created by the two Supreme Court judgments were virtually overcome by the legislature and, therefore, no assistance can be had from the two Supreme Court decisions for deciding the question agitated before us. In other words, it was submitted that having regard to the wording of section 11-A, it became necessary to mention the period of detention. In other words, it was submitted that having regard to the wording of section 11-A, it became necessary to mention the period of detention. We must hasten to add that Shri Gumaste's main contention before us is that what is to be considered is whether any prejudice is caused to the detenu by reason of mention of the period of detention and since no prejudice as such can be said to have caused, the insertion or otherwise of the period of detention in the initial order would not have the effect of vitiating the order of detention. It was further submitted that since in view of the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act which empowers the Detaining Authority to revoke or modify the order of detention, it enables the Detaining Authority to mention any period subject to the maximum prescribed in section 11-A and in view of the power of revocation it cannot be said that any prejudice is caused to the case of the detenu before the Advisory Board or otherwise. These arguments stand repelled by the decisions of the Supreme Court in (Venkateswaraloo v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Hyderabad)3, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 49. It is sufficient to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in para-8 of the report which runs thus : " It was suggested that on a grammatical construction of this section, the word 'order in sub-section (2) means the initial order of detention and cannot refer to the order of confirmation as no such order is contemplated by the Act. In our opinion, this contention is not sound. It was held by this Court in Makhan Singh Tarsikki v. State of Punjab, (1), Petition No. 908 of 1951 that the fixing of the period of detention in an initial order of detention is contrary to the scheme of the Act and cannot be supported as it tends to prejudice a fair consideration of the petitioner's case when it is placed before the Advisory Board. That decision was pronounced on 10-12-1951 and according to well-known canons of construction of statutes and principles of legislation it has to be presumed that when Parliament enacted section 11-A in Act 61 of 1952 it was aware of the decisions of this Court that no period could be specified in the initial order of detention. That decision was pronounced on 10-12-1951 and according to well-known canons of construction of statutes and principles of legislation it has to be presumed that when Parliament enacted section 11-A in Act 61 of 1952 it was aware of the decisions of this Court that no period could be specified in the initial order of detention. It follows that when Parliament in sub-section (2) provided that "every detention order which has been confirmed under section 11 before the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall unless a shorter period is specified in the order, continue to remain in force" till a certain date, it plainly intended by the words 'the order' to refer, not to the initial order of detention, for no period of detention could legally be specified in that order, but to the order of detention as eventually confirmed under section 11(1). We are not on any doubtable ground when we say that at that stage it is open to an appropriate Government to specify the period of detention in the case of every detenu. We are satisfied that when sub-section (2) refers to the specification of a period in the order, it intends to refer to the detention order as confirmed under section 11(1) and not the initial order of detention." 12. Our attention is also drawn by Mr. Sardar to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in (Kavita v. State of Maharashtra)4, A.I.R. 1981, S.C. 1641. In that case the detention was under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. It is sufficient to state that the scheme of the Prevention of Black Marketing Act is similar to the scheme of COFEPOSA as far as the controversy raised before us is concerned and it is not necessary to set out the relevant provisions of COFEPOSA. In para 4 of the judgment it has been observed that it is important to note that the period for which a person is to be detained under the COFEPOSA is not to be determined and specified at the time of making the original order of detention under section 3(1). It has to be determined and specified at the time of confirming the order of detention under section 8(f), after receiving the report of the Advisory Board. It has to be determined and specified at the time of confirming the order of detention under section 8(f), after receiving the report of the Advisory Board. The Supreme Court has also noted the scheme as regards the time schedule under the COFEPOSA in the following words : "First the Detaining Authority, who may be the Central Government, the State Government or an Officer of either Government specially empowered in that behalf, must be satisfied that it is necessary to detain a person with a view to preventing him from acting in a certain manner or doing certain things, and if so, satisfied, an order of detention may be made section 3(1) COFEPOSA. The order of detention has not to specify the proposed period of detention at that stage. Within five days of the detention, the detenu is required to be furnished with the grounds of detention so as to enable him to make a representation to the Detaining Authority (Article 22(5) of the Constitution and section 3(3) COFEPOSA). Thereafter, within three months from the date of detention the Advisory Board has to report on the sufficiency of cause for such detention. This is a constitutional mandate (Article 22 (4)) of the Constitution in order to enable the Advisory Board to discharge its constitutional obligation the Government is required to make a reference to the Advisory Board within five weeks from the date of detention (Section 8 (b) of COFEPOSA. The Advisory Board in its turn is charged with the task of submitting a report within eleven weeks from the date of detention, specifying its opinion as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned (section 8 (c), COFEPOSA). Quite obviously the period of eleven weeks from the date of detention prescribed for the submission of the report of the Advisory Board is to enable compliance with the Constitutional time-limit of three months. On receipt of the report the Government has to revoke the detention if the Board has reported that there is no sufficient cause for the detention or to confirm the order of detention and specify the period of detention if the Board has reported that there is sufficient cause for the detention (Section 8 (f) COFEPOSA). On receipt of the report the Government has to revoke the detention if the Board has reported that there is no sufficient cause for the detention or to confirm the order of detention and specify the period of detention if the Board has reported that there is sufficient cause for the detention (Section 8 (f) COFEPOSA). In the meanwhile at, any time, the Central Government in any case and the State Government if the order of detention was made by the State Government or by an Officer of the State Government, are entitled to revoke the order of detention. Thus there is no Constitutional or Statutory obligation on anyone, until after the report of the Advisory Board is received to decide finally or tentatively upon the period of detention. The initial compulsion on the Detaining Authority before making an order of detention is to arrive at the satisfaction that it is necessary to detain the person concerned with a view to preventing him from acting in a certain manner or with a view to preventing him from committing certain acts. The obligation to specify the period of detention is upon the appropriate Government and that has to be done at the final stage, after consideration of the report of the Advisory Board. There is no intermediate stage at which any tentative conclusion is to be arrived at by the Government regarding the period of detention, though, at any and ever stage the Government has the full liberty to revoke the order of detention. We are, therefore, of the view that the act of making a reference to the Advisory Board is a mechanical and ministerial act involving no exercise of discretion. Though of course the Government is at that stage, as at all other stages, at liberty to revoke the order of detention. The prescription of five weeks in section 8(b) of the COFEPOSA for the making of a reference to the Advisory Board is with a view to enable the fulfilment of the Constitutional requirement of Article 22(4) and not with a view to imposing an obligation upon the Government to consider the question of the length of detention and arrive at a tentative conclusion even at that stage." 13. Our attention is also invited to another decision of the Supreme Court in (Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration)5, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1143 which was a case of detention under the National Security Act. It is observed in para-11 of the judgment that--- "It is plain from a reading of section 3 of the act that there is an obvious fallacy underlying the submission that the Detaining Authority had the duty to specify the period of detention. It will be noticed that sub-section (1) of section 3 stops with the words make an order directing that such person be detained' and does not go further and prescribe that the Detaining Authority shall also specify the period of detention. Otherwise, there should have been the following words added at the end of this sub-section and shall specify the period of such detention." 14. What emerges from the above discussion is that the order of detention has not to specify the proposed period of detention at the initial stage viz. at the stage of passing the order under section 3. It is also affirmately laid down by the various decisions of the Supreme Court that not only that it is not necessary for the Detaining Authority to mention the period of detention when passing the original order, but that the order would be bad and illegal, if any period is specified, as it would have a tendency to prejudice the case of the detenu when it goes up for consideration before the Advisory Board. 15. Reliance was, however, placed by Mr. Gumaste on an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in (Commissioner of Police v. Gurbux Anandram Bhiryani)6, Criminal Appeal No. 493 of 1987, decided on December 15, 1987, which was a case of detention under the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act No. LV of 1981 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bootleggers Act'). A Division Bench of this Court quashed the detention on the ground that the fact that the detenu had been released on bail in the criminal prosecution had not been placed before the detaining Authority and not being aware of such a material fact appellant had come to the conclusion that it was necessary to place the detenu under detention under the Act. It appears from the judgment that though their Lordships were not in agreement with certain observations made by this Court, they, were found it difficult to interfere with the order quashing the detention. Their Lordships were also of the view that the order of view that the order of detention was also bad as it did not specify the period of detention at the initial stage of passing the order under section 3 of the Act. While dealing with the aspect the Court observed : "The order is bad on another ground, namely, the period of detention has not been indicated by the Detaining Authority. The Scheme of this Act differs from the provisions contained in similar Acts by not prescribing a period of detention but as section 3 of the Act indicates, there is an initial period of detention which can extend up to three months and that can be extended for periods of three months at a time. It was open to the Detaining Authority to detain the detenu even for a period of lesser duration than three months. That necessitated the period of detention to be specified and unless that was indicated in the order, the order would also be vitiated. In scores of decision this Court has been emphasising the necessity of strict compliance with the requirements of the Preventive Detention Law; yet authorities on whom the power is conferred have not been complying with the requirements and even if there be merit to support the order of detention, the procedural defects lead to quashing thereof as a result of which the purpose of the Act is frustrated and the suffering in the community does not abate." Section 3 of the Bootleggers Act provides as under : 3. (1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the order such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section : Provided that the period specified in the order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that if it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. (3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government." 16. Apart from contending that the detention in Bhiryani's case was under a different Act, it was urged by Mr. Sardar that the view taken in Bhiryani's case is probably on account of the proviso to sub-section (2) being interpreted as a proviso to sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Bootleggers Act. In this connection he submitted that the period prescribed in the proviso has relevance for the periods during which the power can be exercised by the officers mentioned in sub-section (2) and has nothing to do with the fixation of period of detention under section 3(1). In this connection he submitted that the period prescribed in the proviso has relevance for the periods during which the power can be exercised by the officers mentioned in sub-section (2) and has nothing to do with the fixation of period of detention under section 3(1). He submitted that the scheme of Bootleggers Act is not different from the scheme of other Acts because this Act also provides for reference to Advisory Board for its opinion and that section 3 of the Bootleggers Act is in pari materia with section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980, which came up for consideration in Ashok Kumar's case. We are afraid that it is not possible for us to accept the view expressed by the learned Counsel, since, we are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court and the efficacy and the binding nature of the decision is not affected even if it is demonstrated that the construction of the section by the Supreme Court id not correct. Just as we are bound by the decision in Bhiryani's case we are equally bound by the various decision of the Supreme Court referred to above. The question that would arise is that in view of the conflict of the views which of the decisions should be followed and applied by us. We have given our anxious consideration to this aspect, since we find that there is an apparent conflict of the view taken by the Supreme Court in Bhiryani's case on the one hands and the other decisions cited above on the other. What course in such conflict of views is to be adopted is pointed out by the Supreme Court in (Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian)7, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2433. In para 12 of the judgment of the Supreme Court laid down that the proper course for a High Court in such a case is to try to find out and follow the opinions expressed by larger benches of the Supreme Court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches. The decision in Subramanian's case has been also quoted with approval in a later decision of the Supreme Court in (State of U.P. v. Ramchandra Trivedi)8, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2547 and the principle has been reiterated. 17. In our opinion, there is a clear conflict between the view taken in Bhiryani's case and the earlier decisions cited above. The decision in Subramanian's case has been also quoted with approval in a later decision of the Supreme Court in (State of U.P. v. Ramchandra Trivedi)8, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2547 and the principle has been reiterated. 17. In our opinion, there is a clear conflict between the view taken in Bhiryani's case and the earlier decisions cited above. The view taken in Bhiryani is that non-mention of the period of detention at the initial stage would vitiate the order; whereas in the three earlier decisions Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab, Dattatraya v. State of Bombay and Venkateswara v. Superintendent, Central Jail, it has been held that the mentioning of the period of detention at the initial stage under section 3(1) vitiates the order because such a direction would tend to prejudice a fair consideration of the detenu's case when it is placed before the Advisory Board and further that before a person is deprived of his personal liberty the procedure established by the law must be strictly followed and must not be departed to the disadvantage of the person affected. Both the decisions in Makhan Singh's case and Dattatraya's case are by a bench of five Judge of the Supreme Court. In Venkateswara's Mahajan, J., speaking for the bench confirmed the view taken in the earlier two decisions by a bench of five Judges to which also he was a party by holding that the fixing of the period of detention at the initial stage of the order of detention is contrary to the scheme of the Act and cannot be supported as it tends to prejudice a fair consideration of the detenu's case by the Advisory Board. Kavita's case was decided by a bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court wherein on a consideration of the scheme of the COFEPOSA it has been held that the order of detention under section 3(1) has not to specify the period of detention at the stage of passing of the order under section 3(1). In Ashok Kumar's case the argument that the detaining authority had the duty to specify the order of detention under section 3(1) was repelled by a bench of three Judges. Ashok Kumar's case was under the National Security Act. In Ashok Kumar's case the argument that the detaining authority had the duty to specify the order of detention under section 3(1) was repelled by a bench of three Judges. Ashok Kumar's case was under the National Security Act. The scheme of section 3 as noted in the various sub-sections both under the National Security Act, 1988, and the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act, 1981 is the same. In particular sub-section (3) of section 3 of the National Security Act corresponds to sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act. In view of the precedents laid down by the larger benches of the Supreme Court as stated above we have no other option but to follow those precedents in preference to the judgment of the two Judges in Criminal Appeal No. 493 of 1987. In our view, therefore, the impugned order of detention of the petitioner is bad and illegal on the ground that it specifies the period of detention at the initial stage viz. at the time of the passing of the order under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act. 18. In the view that we have taken, it is not necessary for us to deal with the other contentions urged by the petitioner in support of his case that the order is vitiated on these counts. In the result, the petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute and it is directed that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in some other case. Petition allowed. -----