L. RATH, J, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by a convict from jail is directed against his conviction under section 302, I. P. C. and sentence to under go imprisonment for life for having caused the death of his father Danei Gochhayat (hereinafter referred to as the deceasedt) on 17-5-1982. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the prosecution case is that the appellant had been away at Assam since about ten years and had returned to the village four months prior to the occurrence and was putting up with his father, but after some time some, misunderstanding having started, he had started separate mess. He had given a goat to his father for tending which had given birth to two kids. On the occurrence day while the appellant was taking the goat and the two kids to his father-in-laws house, he was prevented by the deceased taking away one kid laying a claim over it. The appellant came back to the house with the goat and the other kid stating that he would either take all of them or would not take none at all and so saying left the cattle in the house and went away. At about 6. 00 p. m. when the deceased was coming on the village road, the appellant, who had concealed himself in the back side of the cabin of one Suria in the village, came running and pierced a spear (Barchha) in the chest of the deceased causing his death instantaneously. The occurrence was witnessed by the widow of the deceased (P. W. 4) and another co-villager (P. W. 3 ). F. I. R. was lodged on the next day at about 1. 00 a. m. by P. W. 2 -another co-villager and investigation was taken up by P. W. 11, the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station. Post-mortem examination was conducted on the same day at 5. 00 p. m. by P W 1, Medical Officer at Angul hospital and after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted leading to the trial of the appellant. ( 3 ) IT appears from the evidence of P. W. 1, the doctor conducting autopsy that there was a single penetrating wound 1/2 length x 1/2breadth x 3 depth over cardia area of left side of chest 2 below and 1/2 medial to the left nipple. ( 3 ) IT appears from the evidence of P. W. 1, the doctor conducting autopsy that there was a single penetrating wound 1/2 length x 1/2breadth x 3 depth over cardia area of left side of chest 2 below and 1/2 medial to the left nipple. On dissection of the dead body, the thoracic wall as well as pericardium was found pierced and the pericardium was full of blood and the right ventricle was also pierced at the site of the injury. All the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and were possible to have been caused by a weapon like an arrow. The death was due to the shock and haemorrhage due to the injury of the heart. It was the doctors opinion that death must have occurred within five minutes. In view of such evidence, it is unquestionable that the death was homicidal in nature. ( 4 ) TO bring home the charge against the appellant, the learned Sessions Judge has relied upon the two eye-witnesses (P. Ws. 3 and 4) and on the extra-judicial confession made before P. W. 5. ( 5 ) SO far as the extra-judicial confession is concerned, Mr. A. Routray, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has rightly challenged the same that though such confession is supposed to have been made on the very evening of the occurrence day, yet it was not disclosed to the police till as late as 8. 11. 1982 and that the fact of such confession had also not been told to anybody else earlier. Such fact appears from the evidence of P. W. 11 the Investigating Officer as also from the evidence of P. W. 5 herself. No plausible reason has also been assigned for the delay in the disclosure. It is true that P. W. 5 offered an explanation for the delay in shape of a threat from the appellant to cut her into pieces if she discloses about the confession, but since admittedly investigation had been taken up by the police soon after the occurrence, it does not stand to reason that any such alleged threat by the appellant could have continued effect so as to prevent the witness belonging to another village from disclosing the fact to others, particularly when her evidence is that the confession was made not only to her but also before her husband as also one Panjia. I would as such discard the evidence relating to the extra-judicial confession. ( 6 ) ON the two eye-witnesses, P. W. 3 stated that on the day of occurrence at about sun set time when he was going towards river side he saw from a distance of 30 cubits the appellant piercing his father with the spear as a result of which he fell down. Then Bengra (P. W. 4) came to the snot. He raised alarm of the appellant having killed his father. The appellant ran away and P. W. 4 himself gave water to the deceased who could not drink and the water came out and he died at the snot. In the cross-examination he stated to have witnessed the occurrence after one hour the sun began setting from a distance of 70 to 80 cubits as assessed by the learned Sessions Judge, and that by that time a little darkness had set in. He saw P. W. 4 from the same place where he saw the incident of murder and saw her sitting embracing the dead body of her husband lying on the ground and weeping. It was further stated by him that when he first saw the appellant, he was running away and that he saw him from his back. From such evidence it appears that the witness could not have been one to see the appellant piercing the deceased with the spear since by the time he saw, the deceased had, already fallen to the ground and hence this part of his evidence must be rejected. But rejection of such evidence does not mean that the evidence of the witness is to be thrown out in toto. On an analysis of the evidence and making concession for the usual tendency of embellishment by witnesses, it can be reasonably said that P. W. 3. was an immediate post-occurrence witness to have seen the appellant from his back running away after the assault. Admittedly P. W. 3 is not only a co-villager but also knew the appellant intimately and hence it would not be difficult for him to have identified the appellant from a distance of 70 to 80 cubits since then total darkness had not set in. ( 7 ) THE only other witness is P. W. 4 who remains the sole witness to the actual occurrence. ( 7 ) THE only other witness is P. W. 4 who remains the sole witness to the actual occurrence. Reading her evidence, it appears that she has given a graphic description of the incident. She had married the deceased when the appellant was only three years old. It is her statement that as she had come out of the house to see why her husband had been late coming home she saw from a distance of 7 to 8 cubits the appellant piercing the spear in the chest of her husband as a result of which he fell down and died instantaneously. The appellant had concealed himself in the backside of the cabin and came running and dealt the blow and also fled away running. Though she has been cross-examined at length, yet her version has been in no way shaken and the only ground on which her statement is attacked is her enmity with the appellant she being his step-mother and that admittedly the witness and the wife of the appellant were quarrelling at times for which the appellant was having a separate mess, had also gone away to his father-in-Laws place at village Gotamare 15 to 20 days prior to the occurrence and had returned to the village only a day before the occurrence. Besides there was a quarrel between the appellant, P. W. 3 and some others on one side and P. W. 4 on the other on account of which P. W. 4 stated that she herself and the deceased had made station diary entry in the police station and on the next day morning, i. e. in the morning of the day of occurrence a Constable had come to the village and that P. W. 3 and some others had effected a compromise with P. W. 4 by falling at her feet. Her evidence discloses that the quarrel on the previous day was due to the fact of the appellant and his family having been supplied water by P. W. 3 to which P. W. 4 had objected. ( 8 ) IT is true that the evidence discloses some amount of bias in P. W. 4 2gainst the appellant on account of strained relationship between P. W. 4 and the wife of the appellant. ( 8 ) IT is true that the evidence discloses some amount of bias in P. W. 4 2gainst the appellant on account of strained relationship between P. W. 4 and the wife of the appellant. It is however not the law that the evidence of a competent witness is liable for rejection merely because of a relationship with the deceased. On the contrary, without anything else, the evidence of such witness is mere a guarantee for truth since witnesses who are relations of the deceased would be rather more interested to see the person actually responsible for causing the death brought to book so that the death of the deceased is properly avenged. Even P. W. 3 who seems to have extended help to the appellant has deposed against him and corroborated her statement. Reading the evidence of P. W. 4, the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the appellant do not dislodge the effect of her ocular statement relating to cause of the death and I am persuaded to place reliance on such evidence to conclude the appellant as the author of the assault on the deceased. ( 9 ) MR. Routray next urged for modification of the sentence from conviction under section 302, I. P. C. to that of section 304 Part II, I. P. C. on the basis that there was only a single blow which had accidentally caused the death of the deceased. I do not find any force in the contention. There is no invariable rule that wherever death is caused as a result of a single blow, the resultant conviction must be one under section 304 Part II, I. P. C. There are absolutely no mitigating circumstances so far as the appellant is concerned. His action reveals rather a premeditated plan to commit the crime. He had concealed himself behind a cabin with a fatal weapon and had pierced the same at the chest, which is a most vital part of the body. There was no sudden quarrel to provide excuse of a sudden impulse on the spur of the moment to goad the appellant to act in the manner he acted. In such circumstances, I would hold that the appellant has been properly convicted under section 302, I. P. C. and that the sentence does not call for any modification. In the result, the appeal has no merit and is dismissed. In such circumstances, I would hold that the appellant has been properly convicted under section 302, I. P. C. and that the sentence does not call for any modification. In the result, the appeal has no merit and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. .