Judgment :- 1. The main question which arises in this revision is this: Whether any question of law was involved in the decision of the trial court for clothing the appellate court with jurisdiction under S.96 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the Code') since the amount of the original suit does not exceed Rs. 3,009/-? Other questions raised need be considered only if the main question is answered in the affirmative. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by limitation But the District Court in appeal found that as the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit under S.14 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 ('Act' for short) the suit is not barred by limitation. The District court passed a decree against the defendant who has not come up in revision. 2. A short resume of the facts is this: Plaintiff conducted a chitty in which the defendant had jointed for two units. One of the units was prized by the defendant at a discount of Rs. 2,902/-. Plaintiff deposited the prized amount (Rs. 2.098/-) in a bank on failure of the defendant to furnish security for the due payment of future instalments. Plaintiff later appropriated the amounts covered by the future instalments from the amount so deposited in the bank. But as the said deposit was not sufficient to cover the entire future instalments, he filed Original suit No. 206/76 (that suit will be referred to as the earlier suit) for realisation of a sum of Rs. 2,044/-. Though the earlier suit was decreed by the trial court, it was dismissed by the District Court in appeal on the ground that the suit was instituted during a period of prohibition as per S.3 of the Kerala Debtors (Temporary Relief) Act, 1975 (Act 30 of 1975). After the expiry of the period of prohibition, the plaintiff filed the present suit for identical reliefs. The main contention advanced by the defendant, in the written statement, is that the present suit is barred by limitation. In the plaint it is alleged that in computing the period of limitation the period during which the earlier suit was pending has to be excluded under S.14(1) of the Act. The trial court dismissed the present suit as barred by limitation, holding that the earlier suit was prosecuted without diligence or good faith. In the plaint it is alleged that in computing the period of limitation the period during which the earlier suit was pending has to be excluded under S.14(1) of the Act. The trial court dismissed the present suit as barred by limitation, holding that the earlier suit was prosecuted without diligence or good faith. But the District Court in appeal found that the earlier suit was instituted and prosecuted by the plaintiff in good faith and also with due diligence and hence the period during which the earlier suit was pending roust be excluded in computing the period of limitation. 3. S.96 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus: "No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law. from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees". There is no dispute that the amount of the original suit does not exceed Rs. 3,000/-. Hence an appeal before the District Court could not have been maintained unless there was a question of law. Learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that the question of limitation itself is a question of law and hence the appellate court was justified in entertaining the appeal. But the other side argued that merely by raising a contention that the suit is barred by limitation, it cannot be said that a question of law is involved in the contention. 4. S.14 (1) of the Act permits exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation for any suit in certain cases. The sub-section says that "the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted is good faith in a court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it". Three important ingredients to attract the sub-section are: (a) prosecution of the earlier suit with due diligence; (b) prosecution of the earlier suit in good faith; (c) the court before which the earlier suit was prosecuted was unable to entertain it on account of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. Three important ingredients to attract the sub-section are: (a) prosecution of the earlier suit with due diligence; (b) prosecution of the earlier suit in good faith; (c) the court before which the earlier suit was prosecuted was unable to entertain it on account of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. Whether a plaintiff prosecuted the earlier suit with due diligence and in good faith depends upon findings of fact. Learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that when inference has to be drawn from facts, the question whether the inference so drawn would be sufficient to conclude that the earlier suit was prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith is a question of law and at any rate, it is a mixed question of fact and law. In the latter case if would amount to a question of law according to the counsel. The decision in J.T. Mookken v. Commissioner of Income tax (1977 KLT. 229) was cited to support the contention. The expression "question of law" in S.256 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was considered in the said decision. The court found it difficult to draw a line of distinction between questions of law and fact. Whether there was sufficient material before the Tribunal for coming to a particular conclusion, is really a dispute regarding facts and the learned judge held that only such questions as relate to one or the other of the following matters can be questions of law: (1) the construction of a statute or document of title; (2) the legal effect of the facts found where the point for determination is a mixed question of law and fact; and (c) a finding of fact un-supported by evidence or unreasonable and perverse in nature. Counsel also cited the decision of a learned single judge of this Court in Kochukunju Nair v. Velayudhan Nair (1980 KLT. 319) wherein it is held that the question of possession whether adverse or not is a question of law when the finding of adverse possession is to be based on legal conclusions from proved facts, although the finding regarding possession is based on evidence. The learned judge has said that "the inference from proved facts whether possession is adverse or not falls clearly and unhesitatingly within the region of question of law". 5. The learned judge has said that "the inference from proved facts whether possession is adverse or not falls clearly and unhesitatingly within the region of question of law". 5. In the classical decision on the distinction between questions of law and fact (Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. I. T. Commissioner (AIR. 1957 SC 49-Vol. 44) ) the Supreme Court has stated that where a finding is given on a question of fact based upon an inference from facts, it is not always a question of law; the proposition that an inference from facts is one of law will be correct in its application to mixed questions of law and fact but not to pure question of fact. Inferences from facts may themselves be inferences of fact and not of law and such inferences are not open to review by the court. Inference from facts would be a question of fact or of law according as the point for determination is one of pure fact or mixed question of law and fact. Venkatarama Ayyar. J. who delivered the judgment in the said case cited the following illustration to explain the position: "Let us suppose that in a suit on a promissory note the defence taken is one of denial of execution. The Court finds that the disputed signature is unlike the admitted signatures of the defendant. It also finds that the attesting witnesses who speak to execution were not, in fact, present at the time of the alleged execution. On a consideration of these facts, the Court comes to the conclusion that the promissory note is not genuine Here, there are certain facts which are ascertained, and on these facts, a certain conclusion is reached which is also one of fact Can it be contended that the finding that the promissory note is not genuine is one of law, as it is an inference from the primary facts? Clearly not The position cannot be explained better. The point raised in this revision can be analysed in the light of the guidelines so pithily explained by the Supreme Court in the said decision; As the areas have interconnections and even overlappings, the question is not easy for determination. 6. In the decisions in Shaikh Fazlul Jamil v. Shaikh Helaluddin (AIR. The point raised in this revision can be analysed in the light of the guidelines so pithily explained by the Supreme Court in the said decision; As the areas have interconnections and even overlappings, the question is not easy for determination. 6. In the decisions in Shaikh Fazlul Jamil v. Shaikh Helaluddin (AIR. 1927 Patna 256) and Maya Singh v. Udham Singh (AIR 1938 Lahore 704) it has been held that the question whether a party bad acted in good faith within the meaning of S.14 of the Act is a mixed question of law and fact. But a Division Bench of this Court has held in Govindan v. Chellamma (AIR 1959 Kerala 237) that the presence or absence of good faith and due diligence (in S.14 of the Act) is a question of fact. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Haji Mumtajuddin v. Debendra Nath (AIR 1959 Calcutta 78) also held that "whether the plaintiff is entitled to the deduction of period during which the suit remained pending in the trial court, depends on the question whether the suit was prosecuted in good faith which is a question of fact, and if the lower appellate court decided it in favour of the plaintiff after adverting to the evidence bearing on it, the question cannot be allowed to be raised in second appeal". No definite scale or Yardstick can be provided to make an easy distinction between questions of law and questions of fact incases falling under S.14(1) of the Act. Application of the sub-section may sometimes involve questions of law. But generally its application depends upon establishment of factual position alone. What is the inference to be drawn from a set of facts is very often a question of fact only though sometimes it may raise mixed questions of fact and law also. But it does not necessarily involve such mixed questions. A decision has to be taken in each such case whether it involves a question of law or not. Such a decision is sine qua non in cases Where S.96(4) of the Code comes into play. If there is no such express decision, there must be decision atleast by implication. 7. Unfortunately the District Court did not consider whether there is any question of law. Such a decision is sine qua non in cases Where S.96(4) of the Code comes into play. If there is no such express decision, there must be decision atleast by implication. 7. Unfortunately the District Court did not consider whether there is any question of law. In this case the court bad only considered whether there was evidence to show that the plaintiff prosecuted the earlier suit with diligence and in good faith. In that consideration what the court had to satisfy was whether the plaintiff bad reasons to believe that the defendant was assessed to income tax during three years preceding the commencement of the Act 30 of 1975. Those who were assessees under Indian Income Tax Act were excluded from the purview of the definition "debtor" in Act 30 of 1975. The materials produced by the plaintiff to establish his diligence and circumspection were weighed to come to factual conclusion which did not involve legal questions in any manner. So even if the District Court bad turned to consider whether any question of law was involved, the answer would have been in the negative. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, I bold that no question of law as such was involved in the appeal presented before the District Court against the decree of the trial court. If so, the appeal should not have been entertained by the District Court as not maintainable in law. 9. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent then contended that the maintainability of an appeal was not challenged by the defendant in the court below and even in revision petition the same was not taken up as a ground. The words used in S.96(4) of the Code is that "no appeal shall lie, except on a question of law". If an appeal is not otherwise maintainable in law, it would not become maintainable due to the silence on the part of the opposite party or on account of omission to raise objection in that regard. When the Code prohibits filing of appeal against a decree, except under certain conditions, it must be deemed that no appeal has been validly presented without fulfilment of the conditions. Hence there is no question of waiver or acquiescence. As the District Court has reversed the decree, in an appeal which is not maintainable in law, the learned District Judge has committed jurisdictional error. Hence there is no question of waiver or acquiescence. As the District Court has reversed the decree, in an appeal which is not maintainable in law, the learned District Judge has committed jurisdictional error. I therefore, allow this revision and set aside the judgment and decree under attack. No costs.