Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order of removal dated the 3rd October, 1978, passed by the Divisional Manager as contained in annexure-1 to the writ application as also the order dated the 23rd July, 1979, passed by the Zonal Manager upon an appeal preferred by the petitioner against the aforementioned order dated the 3rd October, 1978, whereby and whereunder the same was rejected and as contained in Annexure-9 to the writ application. 2. In view of the points involved in this case, it is not necessary to state the facts in details. Suffice it to say that at the relevant time the petitioner had been working in the Muzaffarpur Branch of the Life Insurance Corporation of india as an Assistant. The petitioner was charge-sheeted for temporary embezzle ment in respect of some amounts while he was working as a Receiving Cashier. The said charge-sheet is contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application. 3. On receipt of the chargesheet, the petitioner admitted his guilt and submitted that the amounts in question could not be deposited because of his lack of knowledge in this regard and for other reasons mentioned in his show cause. Thereafter, the petitioner was issued with a second show cause notice. On receipt of the aforementioned second show cause notice, the petitioner filed another show cause which is contained in Annexure-7 to the writ application 4. However, the petitioner addressed a letter dated the 2nd March, 1978, to the Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Muzaffarpur, in the following terms : - "further to my reply dated 8-2-1977 to the referred charge-sheet, I beg to state that I admit the charge and plead mercy. I am ready to pay the 15th items money as mentioned in the charge-sheet. " 5. From a perusal of the enquiry report submitted in this case and as is contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application, it appears that the petitioner admitted that he had deposited 14 items of the amount said to have been tem-porily embizzed by him. I am ready to pay the 15th items money as mentioned in the charge-sheet. " 5. From a perusal of the enquiry report submitted in this case and as is contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application, it appears that the petitioner admitted that he had deposited 14 items of the amount said to have been tem-porily embizzed by him. The relevant portion of the said inquiry report reads as follows : - "whereas Shri Ram Chandra Prasad in this letter dated 8-2-1978 admit ted that out of the fifteen items of collections mentioned in the charge-sheet he had subsequently deposited on different dates fourteen amounts and the remaining one amount would be deposited by him on being advised to do so, although in the said letter dated 8-2-1978 he stated that the un-accounted moneys were with him because he was not aware of the rules and that such thing happened due to his lack of adequate knowledge about the procedure of handling cash which plea, is not acceptable at all. And whereas Shri Ram Chandra Prasad has thereafter given a further lettar dated 2-3-1978 in which he has admitted the charges as men tioned in the charge-sheet dated 23-12-1977 and has prayed for mercy, the charges framed are proved beyond any doubt by self admission. Having regard to gravity of the charges which have been admitted by shri Ram Chandra Prasad, I have decided to issue show cause notice to him proposing the penalties of (i) recovery of Rs.721.20 collected by him under Policy No.29504418 on 12-2-1977 as per posting in policy Ledger and Premium Invoice of Branch Office together with overdue interest on the said amount to be calculated upto the date of actual recovery of the entire amount and (ii) dismissal from service of the LIC in terms of Regulation 39 (I) (c) and 39 (I) (g) of the (Staff) Regulations, 1960 respectively, which notice I hereby issue calling upon Shri Ram Chandra Prasad to show cause by a written statement to reach the undersigned within 15 days from date as to why the penalties, as proposed above, should not be imposed upon him. " 6. " 6. Thereafter, the impugned order as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application was issued whereby and whereunder the petitioner, inter alia, was removed from services and he was further awarded a penalty of recovery of a sum of Rs.721.20 collected by him. The aforementioned penalties were awarded against the petitioner in terms of Regulations 39 (I) (c) and 39 (I) (f) of the Staff regulations, 1960. 7. The petitioner being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, filed a mercy petition which was treated as an appeal and the same was also rejected by an order dated the 23rd July, 1979, as contained in Annexure-9 to the writ application. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in support of the writ application has raised the following contentions :- (a) The petitioner having been appointed by the Zonalg Manager, it is evident from the offer of appointment dated the 6th December, 1958, and as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application, he could not have awarded a punishment in terms of Regulations 39 (1) (c) and 39 (1) (f) by an authority lower than that of the appointing authority. (b) Before the impugned order as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application was passed no departmental enquiry was held. (c) The order passed by the disciplinary authority as contained in annexure-1 to the writ application as also the order passed by the appellate authority as contained in Annexure-9 to the writ application are not speaking orders inasmuch as no reason has been assigned in support of the said orders by the aforementioned authorities. (d) The amount of gratuity forfeitted has no nexus with the loss which might have occurred to the Corporation and, as such, the same is illegal. 9. Re : Question No. (a ).-It appears from Annexure-2 to the writ appli cation that the offer of appointment was issued under the" signature of the Zonal manager. The petitioner, therefore, contends that the Zonal Manager and the zonal Manager alone was the appointing authority and in terms of regulation 39 of the said Regulations as existed then the petitioner could not have been removed by any person lower than that of the sajd authority, namely, the Zonal Manager. The petitioner, therefore, contends that the Zonal Manager and the zonal Manager alone was the appointing authority and in terms of regulation 39 of the said Regulations as existed then the petitioner could not have been removed by any person lower than that of the sajd authority, namely, the Zonal Manager. The Central Government, in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the Act) with the previous approval of the Central government made a regulation known as Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1956 (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the 1956 Regulations ). In terms of the said Regulations, the Zonal Manager was the appointing authority of the petitioner. 10. However, later on, the Life Insurance Corporation of India made an other regulation in the year 1960 known as the Life Insurance Corporation of india (Start) Regulations, 1960 (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the 1960 Regulations ). There is no doubt that in terms of the aforementioned 1960 Regulations, so far as the power of removal of an employee from services is concerned, as is contained in Regulation 39 (1) (f) thereto, the same was vested in the Zonal manager in terms of the schedule appended thereto. 11. However, in the year 1971, an amendment was made in the said 1960 Regulations as a result whereof the crucial words appearing in sub-regula tion (2) of regulation 39 was omitted. Sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 39 now reads as follows : " (2) No order imposing on an employee any of the penalties specified in Clauses (b) to (g) of sub-regulation (1) supra, shall be passed by the disciplinary authority specified in Schedule I without the charge or charges being communicated to him in writing and without his having been given a reasonable opportunity |of defending himself against such charge or charges and of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. " 12. There has been a further amendment in the Schedule appended to the said regulation as a result whereof the power of disciplinary authority in respsct of all the Grade III employees was vested in the Divisional Manager. " 12. There has been a further amendment in the Schedule appended to the said regulation as a result whereof the power of disciplinary authority in respsct of all the Grade III employees was vested in the Divisional Manager. It is, therefore, clear that by reason of the aforementioned amendment, the disciplinary authority in relation to the petitioner even for the purpose of awarding upon him a punishment of removal from service became the Divisional Manager. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the petitioner was appointed in the year 1958 and the offer of appointment having been issued under the signature of the Zonal Manager ; the Zonal Manager alone was his appointing authority. The learned counsel has further submitted that in terms of Regulation 2, the said regulations would have no application in the case where a provision contrary to it is contained in the terms of contract, agreement or letter of appointment. According to him, the letter of appointment was issued under the signature of the Zonal Manager. In such a situation, the amendments made in the 1960 Regulations in 1971 has absolutely no effect inasmuch as his letter of appointment remained unaltered and thereby the Zonal Manager con tinued to be his appointing authority. 13. Before going into the merits of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, some admitted facts may be noted. The petitioner, by reason of the aforementioned offer of appointment as contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application, was appointed in the post of Record Clerk. The petitioner, there after, was asked as to whether he would out for the post of Development Officer or not. The petitioner opted therefore but, as he could not do the minimum business of eight lacs in a year, he was reverted to the post of Assistant. This order was passed by the Divisional Manager. The petitioner, therefore, evidently accepted and acknowledged the Divisional Manager to be his appointing authority and disciplinary authority. Further, the very fact that the petitioners appeal was considered by the Zonal Manager clearly goes to show that he acted in terms of the Regulations as amended in the year 1971, particularly in view of the fact that no challenge to that effect has been made before me. Evidently the Zonal manager could not be both appointing authority as well as appellate authority. 14. Evidently the Zonal manager could not be both appointing authority as well as appellate authority. 14. There is no doubt that, although the petitioner was appointed by the zonal Manager but it is relevant to note that the petitioner at the relevant time was holding the post of Assistant and not the post of Record Clerk. As men tioned hereinbefore, the petitioner was reverted to the post of Assistant from the post of Development Officer by an order passed by the Divisional Manager. There cannot, therefore be any doubt that the petitioner accepted the Divisional manager as his appointing authority. The Life Insurance Corporation (staff)Regulations, 1960 has the force of law as that has been framed in terms of the provisions contained in Sec.49 (2) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. As mentioned hereinbefore, the said regulation has been issued after obtaining previous approval from the Central Government. The petitioner as an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India was thus governed by the regulations as framed and or amended from time to time. 15. In view of the fact, that in the year 1971, the makers of the regulations intended to bring about a change in the position of the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority, necessary amendment as mentioned hereinbefore was made in regulation 39 as also the schedule appended thereto. In view of the fact that the petitioners conditions of service were governed by the aforemen tioned Staff Regulations, the same could have been altered even unilaterally by his employer by making necessary amendment in the service regulation itself. In my opinion, no exception can be taken to the same. 16. So far as the contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that the regulalion could not have been given retros pective effect, in my opinion, it has qo substance, As mentioned hereinbefore. the petitioner has not only accepted by his conduct the Divisional Manager to be his appointing and the disciplinary authority but also in fact, the departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner after coming into force of the aforementioned amendment in the year 1971. the petitioner has not only accepted by his conduct the Divisional Manager to be his appointing and the disciplinary authority but also in fact, the departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner after coming into force of the aforementioned amendment in the year 1971. So far as the contention raise on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that the amended regulation will have no application in the case of the petitioner, in view of regulation 2 of the aforemen tioned regulation is concerned, it is necessary to note the said regulation for appreciation the said submissions which made as follows :- "they shall apply to every whole-time (salaried) employee of the Corpo ration (in India) unless otherwise provided by the terms of any contract, agreement or letter of appointment. " 17. From a perusal of the offer of appointment as contained in Annexure 2 to the writ application, it does not appear that the application of the aforemen tioned regulations has been excluded in the case of the petitioner. On the other hand, the said offer of appointment mentions about the application of the regula tion in relation to the petitioner In this view of the matter, the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in my opinion, has no force. 18. Re : Question No. (b ).-True it is that no departmental enquiry as such was conducted as against the petitioner but it is the admitted fact that the petitioner was chargesheeted in terms of Annexure-4 to the writ application and the petitioner also filed his show cause in terms of regulation 39. 18. Re : Question No. (b ).-True it is that no departmental enquiry as such was conducted as against the petitioner but it is the admitted fact that the petitioner was chargesheeted in terms of Annexure-4 to the writ application and the petitioner also filed his show cause in terms of regulation 39. Regulation 39 reads as follows : - " (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of other regulations, any one or more of the following penalties for good and sufficient reasons, and as hereinafter provided, be imposed by the disciplinary authority specified in Schedule I on an employee who commits a breach of regulations of the Corporation, or who displays negligence, ineffi ciency or indolence or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interest of the Corporation, or conflicting with the instructions or who cammits a breach of discipline, or is guilty of any other act prejudicial to good conduct :- (a) Censure ; (b) withholding of one or more increments either permanently or for a specified period ; (c) recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by negligence or breach of orders; (d) reduction to a lower service, or post, or to a lower time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale ; (e) compulsory retirement; (f) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment ; (g) dismissal. (2) No order imposing on an employee any of the penalties specified in clauses (b) to (g) of sub-regulation (1) supra, shall be passed by the disciplinary authority specified in Schedule I without the charge or charges being communicated to him in writing and without his having been given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such charge or charges and of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. (3) The disciplinary authority empowered to impose any of the penalties, (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g) may itself enquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or if it considers it necessary so to do, appoint a board of enquiry or an enquiry officer for the purpose. (3) The disciplinary authority empowered to impose any of the penalties, (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g) may itself enquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or if it considers it necessary so to do, appoint a board of enquiry or an enquiry officer for the purpose. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-regulations (1) and (2)above- (i) Where a penalty is imposed on an employee on the grounds of con duct which had led to a conviction on a criminal charge ; or (ii) where the authority concerned is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in this regulation ; or (iii) where an employee has abandoned his post, the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit. " 19 From a perusal of the aforementioned regulation, it is evident that the disciplinary authority specified in Schedule I to the said regulation may impose penalties specified in various sub clauses of sub-regulation (2) of the said Regu lation, provided the charge or charges are communicated to the delinquent employee in writing and a reasonable opportunity of defendin g himself against the such charge or charges and of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him is given. Admittedly, the petitioner was served with charges and he had been given an opportunity to file a representation and to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. However, as mentioned hereinbefore, no departmental proceeding was initiated. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that in absence of any departmental proceeding initiated against him, the petitioner can not be said to have been given any reasonable opportunity of defending himself against the charge or charges framed against him. 20. However, from the facts as mentioned hereinbefore, it is evident that the petitioner admitted the charges. He, however, tried to make out a circumst ance on the ground of his inadequate knowledge of procedure or on the ground of serious illness of his mother, wife and children for not depositing the collected amount immediately. As mentioned hereinbefore, these admissions were taken note of by the Enquiring Officer as also by the disciplinary authority. 21. He, however, tried to make out a circumst ance on the ground of his inadequate knowledge of procedure or on the ground of serious illness of his mother, wife and children for not depositing the collected amount immediately. As mentioned hereinbefore, these admissions were taken note of by the Enquiring Officer as also by the disciplinary authority. 21. Learned counsel in this connection has referred to the case of Jagdish prasad Saxena V/s. State of Madhya Bharat, (1961 SC 1070) and submitted that, if the statement made by the delinquent officer before the Enquiring Officer does. not constitute a clear admission, the same cannot be taken into consideration against him. However, in this gase, so far as the admissions made by the petition are concerned, they were absolutely clear and unambiguous as the petitioner did accept that he deposited the amount at a much later date than he was required to do. This admission on the part of the petitioner was, therefore, absolutely unambiguous. Further, in his letter dated the 2nd March, 1978, as quoted hereinbefpre, he agreed to deposit the 15th item as mentioned in the charge-sheet also. It may be mentioned here that in the first show cause filed on behalf of the petitioner he admitted that he deposited the 14 items of the amount at a later date and, in fact, the same has also been mentioned in the charge-sheet as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application. In such a situation, in my opinion, it was not necessary for the respondent Corporation to initiate a depart mental proceeding as against him. 22. So far as the extenuating circumstances are concerned, the authorities could in fact did take them into consideration while passing the orders as con tained in Annexures-1 and 9 to the writ application. Even the petitioner was given an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him and he filed the show cause as contained in Annexure-7 to the writ application. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, there has been a sub stantial compliance with the doctrine of audi alteram pattern. Even the petitioner was given an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him and he filed the show cause as contained in Annexure-7 to the writ application. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, there has been a sub stantial compliance with the doctrine of audi alteram pattern. In K. L. Tripathi V/s. State Bank of India ( AIR 1984 SC 273 ) it has been observed as follows: - "the party who does not want to controvert the veracity of the evidence from or testimony gathered behind his back cannot expect to succeed in any subsequent demand that there was no opportunity of cross-examination specially when it was not asked for and there was no dispute about the veracity of the statements. Where there is no dispute as to the facts, or the weight to be attached on disputed facts but only an explanation of the acts, absence of opportunity to cross-examination does not create any prejudice in such cases. " The aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court has recently been quoted with approval and followed by two Division Benches of this Court in the cases of Girija Nandan Singh V/s. State of Bihar and others (1987 PUR 95) and m/s Instrumentation Ltd. V/s. Presiding Officer Labour Court and another (1988 pljr 145 ). 23. In view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of this court as well as the Supreme Court, in my opinion, it was not necessary for the corporation to initiate a regular departmental, proceeding as against the petitioner. 24. Re : Question No. (c ).-The learned counsel has drawn my attention to the impugned appellate order dated the 23rd July, 1979, as contained in annexure-9 to the writ application. The learned counsel, in this connection, has drawn my attention to Regulation 47 of the aforementioned Regulations for the purpose of showing that the appellate authority, while considering the appeal was obliged to consider the following facts :- (a) Whether the procedures in the regulation were complete and, if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in failure of justice (b) Whether the findings are justified? (c) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate? 25. (c) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate? 25. The learned counsel on the basis of the regulation, therefore, sub mitted that the appellate authority was bound to apply its mind with reference to the factors enumerated in sub-regulation (2) of regulation 46 which apparently has not been done by the Zonal Manager as is evident from Annexure-9 to the writ application. 26. In my opinion, the submission of the learned counsel is misplaced. It is true that in a normal case the appellate authority is bound to pass a speak ing order so as to show that he had applied his mind to the factors enumerated in Clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sub-regulation 2 of Regulation 46, but, as mentioned hereinbefore, such is not the case here. The disciplinary authority having awarded the punishment as against the petitioner without holding any depart mental enquiry which has been found not necessary on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the question of the appellate authoritys assigning any reason in relation to the Clauses (a) and (b) of Regulation 46 (2) did not and could not arise. So far as the consideration of the factor as mentioned in clause (c) thereto is concerned, the appellate authority manifestly has done so as he has not found any justification to interfere with the order spassed by the dis ciplinary authority in this regard. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, there has been no violation of Regulation 46 aforementioned. 27. Re: Questionr No. (d ).-The respondents in their counter affidavit have categorically stated-that the amount of gratuity shall be kept confined to the extent of the financial loss suffered by the Corporation in terms of Regulation 77 (2) of the 1960 "regulations. As mentioned hereinbefore, the petitioner in his letter dated the 2nd March, 1978, agreed to deposit the 15th item of money as mentioned in the chargesheet. There is no dispute that the petitioner had already deposited other 14 items of amount as mentioned in the charge-sheet. In this view of the matter, it would be open to the petitioner to point out before the Divisional Manager of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Muzaffarpur to show as to whether the petitioner had actually deposited the amount of rs.721.20 or not. In this view of the matter, it would be open to the petitioner to point out before the Divisional Manager of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Muzaffarpur to show as to whether the petitioner had actually deposited the amount of rs.721.20 or not. If that amount has been deposited, there is no doubt that the said fact would be taken into consideration by the Divisional Manager of the life Insurance Corporation of India and consequently no amount whatsoever would be deducted from the gratuity payable to the petitioner. It is also pertinent to note here that the respondents have accepted that the petitioner has refunded all the amount taken as advance loan from the Life Insurance Corpora tion of India and, as such, he would be entitled to his dues towards the provident fund, gratuity and other benefits to which he may be found entitled to. 28. In the result, subject to observations and directions mentioned herein before, this application is dismissed. But, in the circumstances of this case, there shall- be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.