R. J. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal has been directed against the judgment and order dated 29-3-1979 rendered in Special Civil Application No. 174 of 1978 Appellant herein is the original petitioner. ( 2 ) A few facts require to be noticed at the outset. In the afore- said petition the reliefs claimed inter alia were as under:"17 That Your Lordships will be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other writ order or direction of setting aside the judgment and order dated 21/01/1978 (Exh. E) passed by the Tribunal constituted under the Gujarat Secondary Education Act 1972 below Exh. 10 in Application No. 208 of 1977 and Appeal No. 6 of 1977; (aa) That Your Lordships will be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other writ order or direction setting aside the judgment and order dated 2/05/1978 passed by the Tribunal constituted under the Gujarat Secondary Education Act 1972 in Application No. 208 of 1977 and Appeal No. 6 of 1977" ( 3 ) THE aforesaid petition was filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The same came to be rejected on 29-3-1979. ( 4 ) A preliminary objection has been taken regarding the main- tainability of the present appeal. ( 5 ) ARTICLE 226 (1) of the Constitution as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment Act 1976 and after its amendment by the 42nd Amendment Act provided as follows: ____________________________________________________________________________before AMENDMENT AFTER AMENDMENT ____________________________________________________________________________226 Notwithstanding anything in Art 226. Power of High Courts to issue 32 every High Court shall have power certain writs: (1) Notwithstanding throughout the territories in relation to anything contained in Art. 32 but which it exercises jurisdiction to is subject to the provisions of Art. 131a to any person or authority including in and Art. 226a every High Court shall appropriate cases any Government have power throughout the territories within those territories directions in relation to which it exercises jurisdic- orders or writs including writs in the tion; to issue any person or authority nature of habeas corpus and certio- including in appropriate cases any rari or any of them for the enforce- Government within those territories ment of any rights conferred by Part directions orders or writs including III and for any other purpose. writs in the nature of habeas corpus mandamus prohibition qua warranto and certiorari or any of them. (a) for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Part III; or (b) for the redress of any injury of a substantial nature by reason of the contravention of any other provision of this Constitution or any provision of any enactment or Ordinance or of any order rule regulation bye-law or other instrument made thereunder; or (c) for the redress of any injury by reason of any illegality in any pro- ceedings by or before any authority under any provision referred to in sub-clause the where such illegality has resulted in substantial failure of justice. ____________________________________________________________________________ It is not necessary to reproduce the other unamended provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution. By the aforesaid 42nd Amendment Act the words and for any other purpose were deleted or dropped from the amended Article. In effect therefore the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 after the 42nd Amendment Act could be exercised only as under: (a) for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Part III; or (b) for the redress of any injury of a substantial nature by reason of the contravention of any other provision of this Constitution or any provision of any enactment or Ordinance or any Order Rule Regulation Bye-law or other instrument made thereunder or (c) for the redress of any injury by reason of any illegality in any proceedings by or before any authority under any provision referred to in sub-clause the where such illegality has resulted in substantial failure of justice; ( 6 ) THE aforesaid 42nd Amendment Act also amended Art. 227 of the Constitution as under: BEFORE AMENDMENT AFTER AMENDMENT 227 Every High Court shall have 227. Power of Superintendence over Superintendence over all Courts and All Courts by the High Court Tribunals throughout the territories (1) Every High Court shall have in relation to which it exercises Superintendence over all Courts jurisdiction. Subject to its appellate jurisdiction. it is not necessary to reproduce for the purpose of the judgment- the other unamended provisions of Art. 227 of the Constitution. Subject to its appellate jurisdiction. it is not necessary to reproduce for the purpose of the judgment- the other unamended provisions of Art. 227 of the Constitution. ( 7 ) THUS by virtue of the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 the Jurisdiction order Art. 227 of the Constitution is confined only to powers of superintendence over all Courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction. It can thus be seen that both Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution underwent changes by virtue of the 42nd Amendment Act 1976 ( 8 ) AT this stage it is pertinent to note that 42nd Amendment Act was brought into force on 1-2-1977 and remained in force upto 19 when the 44th Amendment Act restored the position. ( 9 ) THE contention therefore was that no appeal was maintainable against the decision in question dated 29-3-1979 in view of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and in view of the aforesaid constitutional position. ( 10 ) AN analysis of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent clearly brings out that no appeal lies against any one of the following categories of judgments: (1) judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the High Court; (2) order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction; and (3) a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of the power of superinten- dence under the provisions of Sec. 107 of the Government of India Act (1915) or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction". Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for an appeal against the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court unless it falls into one or the other of the aforesaid three categories. ( 11 ) IN the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Anand AIR 1963 SC 946 it has been observed in connection with the power conferred under Art. 226 of the Constitution as under:"it is therefore clear from the nature of the power conferred under Art 226 of the Constitution and the decisions on the subject that the High Court in exercise of its power under Art. 226 of the Constitution exercises original jurisdiction. though the said jurisdiction on shall not be confused with the ordinary Civil jurisdiction of the High Court. This jurisdiction. though the said jurisdiction on shall not be confused with the ordinary Civil jurisdiction of the High Court. This jurisdiction. though original in character as contrasted with its appellate and revisional jurisdiction is exercisable throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and may for conve- nience be described as extra-ordinary original jurisdiction. If that be so. it cannot be contended that a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is a continuation of the proceedings under the Act". It is to be noticed that this was a decision which was rendered by the Supreme Court prior to the 42nd Amendment Act and at a time when the Art. 226 contained the words and for any other purpose which words have been deleted by the aforesaid 42nd Amendment Act. It also requires to be noticed that not only Art. 226 underwent a change as stated hereinabove but Art. 227 also underwent a change by virtue of the 42nd Amendment Act as noticed above. ( 12 ) IN Shanker v. Krishna AIR 1970 SC 1 which was also a decision rendered prior to the 42nd Amendment Act the Supreme Court has observed as under:"now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of recti- fying the error of the Court below. Section life of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being. exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense". ( 13 ) A Full Bench of this Court in Patel Kashiram Lavjibhai v. Narortamdas Bechardas and Ors. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense". ( 13 ) A Full Bench of this Court in Patel Kashiram Lavjibhai v. Narortamdas Bechardas and Ors. [1978] 19 GLR 1047 after considering several decisions of the Supreme Court has drawn the following conclusions in Paragraph 14 of the report (at page 1055 of GLR): (1) The revisional jurisdiction which the High Court exercises is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which it possesses over all Courts subordinate to it; (2) The power of superintendence under Art. 227 of the Constitution prior to its amendment by 4nd Amendment Act of 1576 was a power of judicial superin- tendence akin to the power of revision being exercised under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But after the 42nd Amendment Act the power under Art. 227 of the Constitution can only be exercised in respect of orders or decisions of subordinate Courts; (3) An order made by a single Judge of the High Court in exercise of the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution is neither in exercise of its appe- late jurisdiction nor in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It is in exercise of its extra-ordinary original jurisdiction"; ( 14 ) AFTER considering Art. 226 of the Constitution as it stood prior to the amendment and after its amendment by the 42nd Amendment Act the Full Bench inter alia has also observed as under (at page 1056 of GLR):"all that the High Court does in exercise of the jurisdiction under Art. 226is to see to it as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Election Commissioner v. Venkata Rao AIR 1953 SC 210 (Supra) that any proceedings commenced against the citizens of the country are conformable to the law if a writ of certiorari is to be issued and if a writ of prohibitions is to be issued it is issued to the inferior Tribunals in the States to function within the limits of their respective jurisdictions. It must be pointed out that the power is a power of judicial review in the context in which it has to see to it that the proceedings pending before the Tribunal as well as before any authority constituted under law are in conformity with law and the proceedings are carried out in accordance with law. The power of super- intendence is quite distinct from this power under Art 226 of the Constitution. It is true as pointed out by the Privy Council in Rules of Gasahandbo v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi AIR 1943 PC 164 that a writ of certiorari is an original writ which may issue out of a superior Court requiring that the record of the procee- dings in same cause or matter pending before an inferior Court should be transmitted into the superior Court to be there deals with. The writ is so named because in its original Latin form it required that the King should be certified of the proceedings to be investigated and the object is to secure by the exercise of the authority of a superior Court that the jurisdiction of the inferior Tribunal should be properly exercised. This writ does not issue to correct purely executive acts but on the other hand its application is not narrowly limited to inferior Courts in the strictest sense. Broadly speaking it may be said that if the act done by the inferior body is a judicial act as distinguished from being a ministerial act certiorari will lie. The remedy in point of principle is derived from the superintending authority which the sovereigns superior Courts and in particularly the Court of Kings Bench possess and exercise over inferrior jurisdictions. As pointed out by Subha Rao J. (as he then was) in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Anand (supra) when the farmers of the Constitution enacted Art. 226 of the Constitution what they did was to mould the remedies which the High Court could give under Art. 226 on the pattern of the writ issued by the Kings Bench Division. But the words of Art. 226 make it clear that over and above those ancient writs the High Court can issue directions or orders in the nature of writs to meet with the exigencies of a particular situation; and the High Courts are not confined to mere technicalities of the ancient writs". But the words of Art. 226 make it clear that over and above those ancient writs the High Court can issue directions or orders in the nature of writs to meet with the exigencies of a particular situation; and the High Courts are not confined to mere technicalities of the ancient writs". ( 15 ) IT has to be recalled at this stage that as per the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay Anand (supra) it is clear that from the nature of the power conferred under Art. 226 of the Constitution and the decisions on the subject that the High Court in exercise of its power under Art. 226 of the Constitution exercises original jurisdiction and that such jurisdiction though original in character as contrasted with its appellate and revisional jurisdiction is exercisable throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. In other words if a case fell under the appellate and revisional jurisdiction of the High Court it would not also fall within the aforesaid original jurisdiction exercisable under Art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 16 ) WE have noted the changes brought about by the 42nd Amendment Act both in Arts. 226 and 227. Considering the legislative intent and the dropping of the words and for any other purpose in Art. 226 of the Constitution and also noting the omission of the words and Tribunals in Art. 227 of the Constitution after the 42nd Amend- ment Act it would seem that the Legislature has taken away the power over Tribunals which could have been exercised before the 42nd Amendment Act under Art. 227 of the Constitution. This is more so when we also consider the aforesaid dropping of the words and for any other purpose in Art. 226 (1) of the Constitution where also the aforesaid legislative intent is clear. If both the amendments are consi- dered at the same time then the conclusion is inescapable that on the one hand the power vis-a-vis Tribunals which had hitherto vested under Art. 227 has been clearly taken away; and on the other such power cannot be exercised under amended Art. 226 for the reason that it would not be in exercise of its extra-ordinary original jurisdiction as per the ratio in Vijay Anands case (supra ). It is also pertinent to note that the Courts are expected to look at the substance and not the form and mere labelling of a matter as failing under Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot change the nature of the matter if it otherwise fell under Art. 227 of the Constitution as it stood prior to the 42nd Amendment Act. ( 17 ) WHEN we look at the judgment dated 29-3-1979 passed in Spl. Civil Application No 174 of 1978 out of which the present Letters Patent Appeal has arisen we find that the Managing Trustee and the Principal of a Secondary School had invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India in order to challenge a decision rendered by the Tribunal constituted under the Gujarat Secondary Education Act 1972 It is therefore obvious that the matter did not fall within the purview of the extra-ordinary original jurisdic- tion as per the ratio in Vijay Anands case (supra) so that the power could be exercised under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India The facts of the case clearly show that the matter fell within the purview of Art. 227 of the Constitution as it stood prior to the 42nd Amend- ment Act. In that view of the matter the Letters Patent Appeal is clearly incompetent and not maintainable. The same is therefore dismissed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .