JUDGMENT : A.P. Ravani, J. The petitioner was running fair price shop under licence issued by the Civil Supplies Authorities at village Amaratvel situated in taluka Savarkundla, district Bhavnagar. His shop was raided on January 28, 1988 and on February 6, 1988 by the Officer of Civil Supplies Department. On search carried out by the Inspector of Civil Supplies, several irregularities were found. It was found that false bills were issued in respect of kerosene, sugar, rice and wheat. On physical verification of the stock it was found that there was excess stock of kerosene to the extent of 55 litres, sugar was in excess to the extent of 14kg., rice was in excess to the extent of 25kg. and wheat was in excess of 63kg. than what was shown in the stock registers. The detaining authority, i.e. District Magistrate, Bhavnagar, on being satisfied that certain irregularities amounted to offence under the provisions of the Gujarat Essential Commodities (Licence Regulation & Declaration of Stock) Order, 1981 and under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, considered that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community, and hence passed an order of detention dated March 22, 1988 which is produced at annexure-A to the petition. The petitioner was actually detained on March 28, 1988. The petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the order of detention by filing this petition. 2. It was contended that as required under the provisions of Section 3(4) of the Prevention of Black marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 when any order is approved by the State Government under the provisions of Section 3 of the said Act, the State Government is required to make report of the fact within seven days to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the order. It is an admitted position that the detention order has been passed by the District Magistrate which is an authority mentioned in sub-section (2) of the Section 3 and therefore the order was required to be approved by the State Government within a period of 12 days as provided under sub-section (3) of Section 3. The order was passed by the District Magistrate on March 22, 1988 and the same has been approved within the prescribed time limit, i.e. March 30, 1988. The State Government forwarded its report to the Central Government together with necessary particulars vide its letter dated March 31, 1988 and the said report was received by the Central Government on April 8, 1988, that is not within seven days but after the stipulated period by seven days. In view of the aforesaid admitted factual position it is submitted that there is breach of the provisions of Section 3(4) of the Act, and once there is infraction of the procedural requirements the order of detention must fail. 3. Reliance is placed on the Division Bench judgment of this High Court in the case of Jivrajbhai Vrajlal Patel v. State of Gujarat and Others 1988(1) GLR 17 . Therein it is held that report should reach the Central Government within seven days. As against this the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that a different view is taken by a Divisional Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Ullas Sahu v. District Magistrate, Cuttack, 1988 Cri. L.J. 32. After careful consideration of the aforesaid two decisions and the scheme of the Act when we pointed out the learned counsel for the petitioner that prima facie we were inclined to differ with the interpretation given by Division Bench of this High Court in the aforesaid decision and were inclined to refer the matter to a larger Bench, he conceded that he does not press this point. In view of this concession made by the learned counsel for the petitioner we do not think it necessary to consider this point in further details. The contention that the provisions of Section 3(4) of the Act have not been complied with and that there is breach of same is not decided as the same is not passed. 4. In view of this concession made by the learned counsel for the petitioner we do not think it necessary to consider this point in further details. The contention that the provisions of Section 3(4) of the Act have not been complied with and that there is breach of same is not decided as the same is not passed. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the detenu made representation to the State Government on June 2, 1988 but the same has not been decided promptly. We have been shown the relevant file by the learned counsel for the respondent-State authorities. It transpires from the file that the representation was sent by the Jail authorities on June 3, 1988. The clerk concerned dealt with the same on June 4, 1988 and it was placed before the Under Secretary on June 5, 1988. The Under Secretary, after considering the same forwarded it to the Deputy Secretary on June 6, 1988 who after making necessary endorsement therein placed it before the Minister concerned on June 7, 1988. The Minister concerned has decided the same on June 7, 1988. In above view of the matter it is clear that there is no delay, much less unexplained and/or inordinate delay, whatsoever. Similarly the Central Government has decided the representation made to it within a period of four days. As regards that also it cannot be said that there is any delay whatsoever. Therefore, this point does not survive. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that some of the documents supplied to the detenu are not legible and therefore he has been deprived of his right to make representation against the order of detention as guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. We ourselves have gone through the documents. It is true that some of the copies of the bills are not as legible as one may like them to be, but at the same time it cannot be said that the bill which are the xerox copies of the carbon copies of bills (duplicate) cannot be in any way more legible than what has supplied to the detenu. With some difficulty the bills could be read. Therefore the contention raised on this count also cannot be accepted. 6. With some difficulty the bills could be read. Therefore the contention raised on this count also cannot be accepted. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was delay in passing the detention order inasmuch as the raid was conducted on January 20, 1988 and then on February 6, 1988 and yet the order of detention has been passed on March 22, 1988. In this contention reference may be made to a decision of Supreme Court in the case of Rajendrakumar Natvatlal Shah v. State of Gujarat and Others, AIR 1988 SC 1225. As laid down therein, even if there is un-explained delay in passing the order of detention, such delay cannot and would not vitiate the order of detention unless it is shown that the grounds on the basis of which order of detention is passed have become stale or illusory or ceased to have nexus with the order of detention. In the present case it is not even the contention that the grounds of detention have become stale or they are illusory or they have ceased to have nexus with the order of detention. This fact is also stated in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the detaining authority. Therefore this contention also fails. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the lesser drastic remedy of cancellation of licence has not been considered. The detaining authority has filed affidavit-in-reply and has clearly stated that this aspect was in his mind while passing the order. Once this is so stated in the affidavit-in-reply we do not think it necessary to probe further. We accept the affidavit-in-reply and hold that this aspect was very much present in the mind of the detaining authority. Moreover, even in the grounds of detention it is stated that the steps by way of ordinary criminal prosecution would not be sufficient and therefore it was necessary to pass the order of detention. This also indicates that the detaining authority has considered this aspect of taking alternative steps for preventing the detenu from indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of essential commodities. There is no substance in this argument either. 8. No other contention is raised. In above view of the matter the petition fails. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed.