JUDGMENT Sathiadev, J. Plaintiffs in O.S. No. 513 of 1971 on the file of II Additional, Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli are the appellants. The two defendants are respondents herein. Plaintiffs filed the above suit in forma pauperis for declaration and for possession with mesne profits. 1. In the plaint, they claimed that one Perumal had two sons, Parimanam Pillai and Ondachia Pillai. Ondachia Pillai had a son Maria Pillai, to whom Thiruvengadam was born, and for the purpose of this appeal, he is called as Thiruvengadam-I. He had two sons and they are the two plaintiffs, Parimanam Pillai had a son known as Thiruvengadam Pillai, called as Thiruvengadam-II, who died in 1923 leaving behind his wife Sivabaghyam, who died on 24.1.1967, leaving behind her daughter Ranganayaki, the second defendant, and her husband Arunachalam, the first defendant. The suit property is old Door No. 8 and new Door No. 21 in Varaganeri, Tiruchirapalli, which was purchased by Ondachia Pillai on 6.5.1885. There being no divisions between the brothers, on the death of Thiruvengadam-II in 1923 leaving behind his wife Sivabaghyam and his daughter Ranganayaki, and there being no male heir, plaintiffs claimed that the properties in which Parimanam hada share went to the surviving coparceners, and therefore, they fell to the share of plaintiffs. Sivabaghyam had only a right of residence in the house. On 23.3.1938, she executed Exhibit A-4, a release deed in favour of Thiruvengadam I, the plaintiffs' father, on consideration of the latter agreeing to discharge the debts to the extent of Rs. 300/- contracted by her. This was attested by the first defendant who also identified her before the Sub-Registrar. On the same day, a settlement deed was executed in her favour by plaintiffs' father, conferring on her a life estate in the suit house for the purpose of her residence without any power of alienation. She died on 24.1.1967. During her life time, contrary to the terms of the settlement deed, Exhibit A-5, she had executed a sale deed in respect of the house in favour of her son-in-law, the first defendant on 27.11.1941 under Exhibit B-1. As she had no legal right to alienate the property, and since defendants refused to surrender possession, they had no legal right whatsoever, and hence, the plaintiffs had to file the suit for declaration and for recovery of possession with mesne profits. 2. As she had no legal right to alienate the property, and since defendants refused to surrender possession, they had no legal right whatsoever, and hence, the plaintiffs had to file the suit for declaration and for recovery of possession with mesne profits. 2. First defendant disputed the relationship of pax parties and claimed that Sivbhagyam's limited right became absolute on the passing of Hindu Succession Act, and therefore, Exhibit B-1 is valid. The release deed (Exhibit A-4) was brought about by undue influence and misrepresentation. Exhibit A-5 settlement deed was never acted upon. 3. Trial Court held that the release deed (Exhibit A-4) and the settlement deed (Exhibit A-5) are true and valid documents, and they had been acted upon, and hence decreed the suit. Defendants preferred A.S. No. 754 of 1974 to this Court. The learned Judge held that this is a case to which Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act applies, and as Sivabagyam, held the property as full owner on her death, second defendant being the statutory heir, was therefore entitled to the property, irrespective of any alienation by her in favour of first defendant under Exhibit B-1. Hence, it was held that plaintiffs had no right to the property, and therefore, dismissed the suit. As against the said decision, this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by plaintiffs. 4. Mr. Saravabhauman, learned Counsel for the appellants-plaintiffs, would first submit that Sivabaghyam, a limited owner having executed Exhibit A-4 release deed, she had given up her right to maintenance, and therefore, this is not a case in which she could claim any right under Act 30 of 1956 (hereinafter called as the Act) when it came into force on 17.6.1956. She died on 24.1.1967. Her possession on 17.6.1956 was not in recognition of any pre-existing right in her favour, and therefore, none of the decisions relied upon by the learned Judge could apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. Unless on that day, she had a legal right to be in possession, and such possession was either actual or constructive, any other kind of possessory right she had acquired under Exhibit A-5 would not lead to invoking the provisions of the Act. 5. Unless on that day, she had a legal right to be in possession, and such possession was either actual or constructive, any other kind of possessory right she had acquired under Exhibit A-5 would not lead to invoking the provisions of the Act. 5. To strengthen this contention, he would first refer to Hussain Uduman v. Venkatachala Mudaliar, 1974-2 MLJ 275=87 LW 583 DB, in which while dealing with the scope of Section 14, it was held that if the female member held a restricted estate even prior to the date of the instrument or decree, and all that the instrument or the decree does is merely to recognise her pre-existing restricted estate, then Section 14(1) would certainly operate and expand her rights into absolute one. 6. He would then rely on Meenakshisundaram v. Srinivasaga Reddiar, 1971-1 MLJ 44=83 LW 626 DB, which took the view that unless the woman had any vestige of right, after parting with possession of the properties prior to the coming into force of the Act, she cannot claim to have become the absolute owner of the property under the Act. 7. In Dinadayal v. Rajaram, it was held that a trespasser of a property could never claim any rights under the Act. 8. In Gopal Singh v. Dile Ram, while dealing with a gift made by a woman with life interest before 17.6.1956, it was pointed out that if she had validly gifted away her properties when she was a limited owner, then she would not have become absolute owner after coming into operation of the 1956 Act and would not have been competent to bequeathe the properties by will, again on 9.3.1959. It was a case in which by a compromise decree it was declared that the gift made prior to 1956 was ineffective, and hence it was held that she continued to be the limited owner of the properties until 1956, and therefore she became absolute owner which she could transfer by 1959. Such a situation does not exist in the instant case. 9. Therefore, by relying on these decisions, he submits that, under Exhibit A-4, Sivabaghyam having lost the right to be in possession of property, and having relinquished her right of maintenance which alone she was entitled to, any possession of the property held by her on 17.6.1956, had not led to herself acquiring absolute ownership. 10. 9. Therefore, by relying on these decisions, he submits that, under Exhibit A-4, Sivabaghyam having lost the right to be in possession of property, and having relinquished her right of maintenance which alone she was entitled to, any possession of the property held by her on 17.6.1956, had not led to herself acquiring absolute ownership. 10. Exhibits A-4 and A-5, the release deed and settlement deed had come into existence on the same day, viz., 23.3.1938. At that time she had a daughter, who is none other than the second defendant. In Exhibit A-4 what she had conveyed is stated as follows. X X X X X 11. She released her right to be in possession of property for a consideration of Rs. 300/- which was intended to be utilised for discharging certain debts incurred by her. It is the contention of Mr. Sarvabhauman, learned Counsel for plaintiffs, that she had alienated her maintenance rights. Mr. Ramu, learned Counsel for defendants would state that maintenance right claimed is the bundle of rights, and out of which, she had only given up her right to be in possession of the property, and not that she had given up her maintenance right as a whole. This interpretation is acceptable. When she had parted with the possession of property, it has to be seen whether on 17.6.1956, Sivagami had the right to be in possession, either actual or constructive. This right to be in possession undoubtedly she acquired, under Exhibit A-5, which came into existence as the next document registered on the same date, on which a release deed was executed by her. 12. This according to Mr. Sarvabhauman was not in recognition of her pre-existing right, but a benevolence given to her out of love and affection which the reversioner had condescended to give her. The fact that on 17.6.1956 she was in physical possession of property, was admitted. It was pursuant to Exhibit A-5, she regained possession of property, on the same day when she released it. There is no evidence that she was physically dispossessed and was again put in possession of the property on that day. She continued to be in possession, when the two documents were brought into existence Even though consideration under Exhibit A-5 is claimed to be out of love and affection, it was only a device adopted by the reversioner, for certain ulterior purposes. She continued to be in possession, when the two documents were brought into existence Even though consideration under Exhibit A-5 is claimed to be out of love and affection, it was only a device adopted by the reversioner, for certain ulterior purposes. It has been held in Jagamathan v. Kunjithapadam , that if a limited owner regains possession, she acquired absolute interest, and what is essential to find out is, whether she bad any lawful right to possession of property. What was conferred under Exhibit A-5 was a continuation of her right to be in possession which she had preceding its execution. Rather, she continued to have the same right to be in possession, during her life time. It is this right to be in possession, which became absolute under the Act, and therefore, the learned Judge was in order in holding that this is a case to which Section 14(1) would apply. 13. Yet another contention put forth by Mr. Sarvabhauman, learned Counsel for appellants is that, when defendants have relied on Exhibit B-1 claiming rights there under, they were obliged to establish its validity and in its absence, they cannot acquire any right to the suit property It is curious to note that plaintiffs who have themselves assailed Exhibit B-1 in para 8 of the plaint that is was a nullity in law, cannot be heard to plead differently In spite of it, Mr. Sarvabhauman would submit that, irrespective of an erroneous stand taken by a litigant about the legality or otherwise of a document it has to be understood and applied on principles of law. If a litigant under misconception thinks that a particular document is invalid or illegal it would not become so in the eye of law. It is not his understanding which could prevail. Conversely, if he understands an invalid document as a valid document and claims right thereon, it cannot be granted. Therefore, he pleads that the appellants are not approbating and reprobating, but looking to the Court for a decision, as to whether Exhibit B-1 is a valid document or not. 14. In 1941, Sivabaghyam had a limited estate which she could convey under Exhibit B-1. She had no right to convey absolute rights in it, and therefore the vendee cannot in turn claim absolute rights. 14. In 1941, Sivabaghyam had a limited estate which she could convey under Exhibit B-1. She had no right to convey absolute rights in it, and therefore the vendee cannot in turn claim absolute rights. She having lost possession of the properties as made out in Exhibits B-3 to B-28, on 17 6 1956 she was neither in actual nor in constructive possession of properties and therefore, Section 14(1) cannot be applied. In support of this plea that an erroneous view of legal right would not prevent such a person claiming rights which are available in law, he refers to Sankaran Nambi v. Nangeeli Amma, AIR 1935 Madras 1062-42 LW 725. It was held therein that the doctrine of estoppel would apply in a case where both parties take an erroneous view of legal rights pertaining to the construction of the will, and that in respect of it, the true interpretation of the will has to be applied by the Court and the party, who has held the erroneous view of law would not be deprived from ascertaining his rights thereunder. A wrong belief on point of law cannot act as estoppel, was the view taken in Jagat Narain v. Salik Ram, AIR 1938 Oudh 110. In Society Belee De Banque v. Girdhari Lal, AIR 1940 PC 90, it was held that an erroneous admission on a point of law would not invite the application of the doctrine of estoppel, and that the Court is not precluded from deciding the rights of parties on a true view of the law. 15. Nachiappa v. Muthukaruppan, AIR 1946 Madras 398=59 LW 227, takes the view that admission under wrong impression of law does not bind the party, and that on a proper interpretation of the document, relief could be granted. Kalidas v. State of Bombay, holds that, when facts are fully set out and admitted, a party's opinion about the legal effect of those facts is of no consequence, and no estoppel could arise under such circumstances. Banarasi Das v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1963 SC 1156, holds that an admission in so far as facts are concerned would bind the maker of the admissions, but not in so far as it relates to a question of law. 16. Relying on these decisions. Mr. Banarasi Das v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1963 SC 1156, holds that an admission in so far as facts are concerned would bind the maker of the admissions, but not in so far as it relates to a question of law. 16. Relying on these decisions. Mr. Sarvabhauman, learned Counsel for the appellants, refers to the claim made in para 13 of the written statement to the effect that after the sale of the property to first defendant, on 27.11.1941, from that date onwards defendants are the owners of the suit property, and that mutation of registry had been carried out in favour of the first defendant and municipal tax had also been paid by him from that date. Hence, he submits that, when Sivabaghyam had lost possession in 1941 under Exhibit B-1 irrespective of the plea of nullity, when a valid sale had taken place thereunder, and she having been out of possession on 17.6.1956, the benefits of claiming absolute right to the property under Section 14(1) is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. 17. In the light of the decisions above referred to the plea of nullity found in the plaint cannot stand in the way of finding out whether valid sale had taken place resulting in Sivabaghyam being deprived of physical or constructive possession of the property. Since Mr. Sarvabhauman had claimed that irrespective of the plea taken or the existence or any document, the reality and the truthfulness of the matter alone would have to prevail, and the legal rights of the parties will have to be worked out irrespective of the stand that may be taken by the concerned parties, equally, the same logic would apply as far as Exhibit B-1 is concerned, and whatever presently the defendants may state in the written statement, the Court will have to find out whether Sivabaghyam was in lawful possession of the property on the crucial date or not. 18. On this point taken before the learned Judge it was held as follows : "So ran his argument. 18. On this point taken before the learned Judge it was held as follows : "So ran his argument. The short answer to this submission is that, the case appears to have proceeded throughout on the basis that she continued to reside in the property till her death on 24th January, 1967 and that after her death, the defendants as allienees had taken possession of the property." In this context when the evidence of first plaintiff as P.W. 1 is looked at, he had spoken thus : "...1941... ... ... X X X X" In cross-examination, he would again reiterate : "...1942... ... ... X X X X" Therefore, having come forward with such a firm stand that Sivabaghyam had continued to reside in the property in spite of the sale, and the claim put forth by defendants that they have enjoyed the properties having been denied and opposed, it is not open to them to claim that she had not been in lawful physical possession of property on 17.6.1956. That right to be in physical possession of property, was based on Exhibit A-5. Her attempted sale under. Exhibit B-1 had not resulted in herself being dispossessed. On 27.11.1941, she could only convey her limited right of enjoyment of property. In spite of Ex. B-1 she had continued to be in possession of it. Treating it as a transfer of absolute right thereunder, first defendant had brought about mutation of names in the registry and paid taxes. But these acts have not prevented her from enjoying the rights under Exhibit A-5. An anamolous situation brought about by her by executing Exhibit B-1, has not any manner destroyed or affected the right of possession which she got under Exhibit A-5, and which she continued to have. It was not an impossibility, because, whatever she had attempted to do under Exhibit B-1, was in favour of her son-in-law. This close relationship had enabled her to continue to be in physical possession of property, based on Exhibit A-5. It was not an impossibility, because, whatever she had attempted to do under Exhibit B-1, was in favour of her son-in-law. This close relationship had enabled her to continue to be in physical possession of property, based on Exhibit A-5. Therefore, in spite of a negative stand taken by plaintiffs, by construing what had followed on the execution of Exhibit B-1, it has to be held that in spite of it, Sivabaghyam had continued to be in physical possession of the suit property in exercise of her rights under Exhibit A-5, which she had not in any manner parted with till she died, subsequent to the passing of the Act. Hence, Section 14(1) applies to the facts and circumstances of this case. 19. Further the learned Judge in the concluding portion of the judgment, bad pointed out that on her death on 24.1.1967 the alienation could be questioned only by the heirs of Thiruvengadam II and not by the plaintiffs. On that date, second defendant being the heir, plaintiffs had no right over the property, and therefore, they could not have filed the suit. This reasoning also disentitles the plaintiffs/appellants herein from securing any relief in the suit, and therefore, this appeal is dismissed with costs.