JUDGMENT - RATNAPRAKHI M.S., J.:—The order passed by the District Judge, Buldhana in Civil Appeal No. 256/80 on 20-10-1984 directing the plaint in Civil Suit No. 449/78 to be returned for presentation to the proper Court, has been challenged in this revision. By amendment application filed on 15-3-1988, the petitioner also sought an amendment to the prayer clause allowing him to challenge the order passed by the said Court on 3rd October, 1984 allowing the amendment to the plaint. The revision memo is accordingly allowed to be amended. 2. The respondents happen to be the legal representatives of one Bhairubakas. This Bhairubakas filed Regular Civil Suit No. 449/78 for possession of a field and for mandatory injunction directing the removal of the structure on the suit land and for prohibitory injunction prohibiting the defendants from raising any fresh construction thereon. As far as possession of the field is concerned, it was valued at 20 times the land revenue. As the actual valuation was less than Rs. 5/-, minimum Court fee of Rs. 5/- was paid. The reliefs of mandatory and prohibitory injunctions were separately valued. We are not much concerned at this stage with the merits involved in that controversy. The claim of the plaintiff Bhairubakas was opposed by the defendants. One of the contentions relevant for the purpose of this revision application was that the suit was not properly valued and the market value of the suit would be at least to the tune of Rs. 36,000/- which ultimately would affect the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. 3. The parties went to trial on the issues framed by the Court. On merits the learned Judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish his title to the property. On the issue of valuation and competence of the Court, the learned Judge held that as there was absolutely no evidence to show that the claim was undervalued, the valuation was proper and was accepted. On these findings, he dismissed the suit. The decree of dismissal came to be passed some time in 1980. Bhairubakas preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court on 5-12-1980 and this appeal was registered as Regular Civil Appeal No. 256/80. Bhairubakas did not challenge the valuation in the plaint. He prosecuted this appeal till 9-1-1984 when he died. The decree of dismissal came to be passed some time in 1980. Bhairubakas preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court on 5-12-1980 and this appeal was registered as Regular Civil Appeal No. 256/80. Bhairubakas did not challenge the valuation in the plaint. He prosecuted this appeal till 9-1-1984 when he died. After his death, the present respondents applied on 6-8-1984 for substitution in place of the deceased as his legal representatives. This application was allowed by the trial Court on 15-9-1984. On the very day, these legal representatives filed an application for amendment of the plaint. The amendment application was very exhaustive. A map came to be filed depicting the different portions of the suit property, which included the agricultural land, and other portions of that land allowed to be converted for non-agricultural purpose. Measurements of different parts were given. Demarcation was made. The main part of the amendment was that the land which was converted for non-agricultural purpose was worth at least Rs. 36,000/-. The legal representatives wanted the valuation to be made accordingly and they showed their willingness to pay the Court fees on that. The learned District Judge, by his order dated 3-10-1984 allowed this application which virtually increased the valuation to Rs. 40,000/-. On amendment of the plaint, the learned Judge proceeded with the appeal on 20-10-1984 and he passed the order directing the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. Virtually what has been held by the District Judge was that because of the valuation of the claim at Rs. 40,000/-, the Court which tried the matter and passed the decree was not competent as far as the pecuniary jurisdiction was concerned. 4. It is these two orders passed on 3-10-1984 and 20-10-1984 which have been challenged before this Court in this revision. Mr. Kalele, the learned Advocates for the petitioners made his position very clear. According to him, though he raised a specific point about the valuation in his written statement, he is abandoning that point. According to him, he had also abandoned that point before the District Court, inasmuch as he did not raise any cross- objections to the finding of valuation and jurisdiction. 5. Mr. Kalele, strenuously urged before me that the deceased Bhairubakas went before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, submitted to its jurisdiction and claimed a relief from that Court. According to him, he had also abandoned that point before the District Court, inasmuch as he did not raise any cross- objections to the finding of valuation and jurisdiction. 5. Mr. Kalele, strenuously urged before me that the deceased Bhairubakas went before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, submitted to its jurisdiction and claimed a relief from that Court. Now he cannot be permitted to resile that position and cannot be permitted to say that the Court had no jurisdiction. In fact, the very nature of the amendment conveys that the motive behind it was to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court which not only tried the matter, but passed a decree. By raising the valuation at the stage of appeal, the motive was only to take the case out of the clutches of the Court which tried it and in fact they virtually succeeded in achieving that object, inasmuch as the District Court did pass an order directing the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. Mr. Kalele urged before me that it was not permissible for the learned District Judge to allow the amendment application and then virtually return the plaint for presentation to the proper Court when a decree was already passed by the Court to which the plaintiff himself submitted and claimed the relief. 6. There is much substance in what Mr. Kalele states. Admittedly, the plaintiff sought his own forum by valuing his claim at a particular level. Inspite of the objections raised by the defendants, he led the necessary evidence before the Court and called for the findings of the Court. When the findings went against him, he preferred appeal before the District Judge which was the ordinary Court of appeal as far as the orders and decrees passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, are concerned. He pursued with the appeal on merits before the District Judge. There is nothing to show that he had ever any mind to agitate before the District Judge as far as the point for valuation is concerned. He died on 9-1-1984 and it is his legal representatives-the present respondents who applied for amendment of the plaint suggesting that the value of the subject matter was more than Rs. 30,000/- and as such the Court which tried that matter had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the same. 7. Mr. He died on 9-1-1984 and it is his legal representatives-the present respondents who applied for amendment of the plaint suggesting that the value of the subject matter was more than Rs. 30,000/- and as such the Court which tried that matter had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the same. 7. Mr. Kalele, strenuously urged before me that in normal course the legal representatives would not be entitled to take any point or raise any defence inconsistent with the character and status of the deceased. As legal representatives, they are only to prosecute the remedy where the deceased left it. They are only to continue the lis commenced by the deceased. They have to go on with the lis as commenced by the deceased and they have no right to change the nature of the lis. As is evident in the case, Bhairubakas did go before the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division with an allegation that the property which was claimed was far below Rs. 30,000/- and as such he submitted to the jurisdiction of Civil Judge, Junior Division. He claimed the relief from the Civil Judge, Junior Division. When the relief was denied to him, he agitated against that decision before the District Court. But there also he did not say that the valuation made by him was in any way wrong. Having called for the decision of a Court before whom Bhairubakas submitted, it was not open for him to take a stand that the suit was not valued properly and the trial Court had no jurisdiction. When Bhairubakas could not take this stand, it is difficult to appreciate at this stage how his legal representatives could take this stand. Mr. Kalele invited my attention to (Dareppa Alagouda v. Mallappa Shivalingappa)1, A.I.R. 1947 Bombay 307 where this Court observed in para 3: "All that the legal representative can, therefore, do is to take up the suit at the stage at which it was left when the original party died and to continue it. It is not open to them to assert their own individual or hostile title to the suit. It is not open to them to assert their own individual or hostile title to the suit. It follows, therefore, that if any defence to the suit was not open to the deceased defendant, his legal representative would not be at liberty to plead that defence." It was further observed relying on (Thavazhi Karnavan v. Sankunni)2, A.I.R. 1935 Madras 52 : "If a legal representative wants to raise any new point which the deceased party could not have raised, he must get himself impleaded in his personal capacity, or he must challenge the decree in a separate suit." 8. The case cited above was about the legal representatives of the defendant. The case reported in (Radhakrishna Padhi v. Bhajakrishna Panda)3, A.I.R. 1981 Ori. 63 was about the legal representatives of the plaintiff, where it was observed: "We have already indicated above that in the facts of a case like the present one, the substituted legal representatives are entitled to continue the suit on the basis of the claim laid by the original plaintiff. They are not entitled to plead to the contrary and obtain reliefs which the plaintiff herself was not entitled to i.e. the substituted legal representatives are not entitled to claim independent title of theirs contrary to what has been claimed in the suit." It is thus evident that the legal representatives could not take a stand which even the deceased could not have legitimately taken before the Appellate Court. 9. The question which arises at this stage is, whether the learned District Judge could have justifiably allowed the amendment application. The object of the amendment was crystal clear. The legal representatives of the plaintiff wanted to plead that the property, which was claimed in the litigation, was worth more than Rs. 30,000/- according to the market value. By necessary implication they wanted to say that the valuation of the property being more than Rs. 30,000/- the Civil Judge, Junior Division had no pecuniary jurisdiction. Thus, though apparently the amendment was innocuous, its effect in law was to nullify the decree that has been passed by the trial Court. Whether such amendment could be legitimately allowed by the Appellate Court? 30,000/- the Civil Judge, Junior Division had no pecuniary jurisdiction. Thus, though apparently the amendment was innocuous, its effect in law was to nullify the decree that has been passed by the trial Court. Whether such amendment could be legitimately allowed by the Appellate Court? This has to be viewed on the background that an issue was specifically raised by the trial Court and the trial Court on merits have held that there was absolutely no evidence to show that the claim was undervalued by the plaintiff. Inspite of this finding, and without agitating this finding in the memo of appeal, a simple application for amendment of the plaint came to be made. To repeat it once again, the amendment though appearing innocuous at the initial stage, had the effect of nullifying the decree passed by the trial Court. When such amendment comes before the Appellate Court for the first time a principle underlying section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure could obviously be the guideline. Clause 2 of section 21 reads as follows: "No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." 10. Ingredients of this sub-clause are obvious. It creates a bar against raising an objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. The bar is removed only on fulfilling of two conditions, (i) That the objection is taken by a party at the earliest possible stage, and (ii) because of the non-consideration of this objection, a consequent failure of justice has followed. We have now to consider the present case on the background of the legislative mandate. It is the legal representatives of the plaintiff who are taking objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court before which the original plaintiff voluntarily submitted. The plaintiff did not raise the objection regarding pecuniary jurisdiction before the trial Court at any stage. It is for the first time that before the Appellate Court, they are alleging that the suit has not been properly valued before the trial Court. The plaintiff did not raise the objection regarding pecuniary jurisdiction before the trial Court at any stage. It is for the first time that before the Appellate Court, they are alleging that the suit has not been properly valued before the trial Court. In fact, they cannot be allowed to raise this objection before the Appellate Court in view of the bar created by sub-clause (2), because they have not taken these objections before the trial Court. The defendant had taken these objections and he could have legitimately continued that objection before the trial Court. But he does not want to agitate that point. In no case can the legal representatives of the plaintiff be allowed to agitate this point before the Appellate Court. 11. There is no question of prejudice being caused, because the plaintiff did not agitate about valuation before the trial Court. It cannot lie in the mouth of legal representatives that because now they are challenging the valuation at the Appellate stage, prejudice has been caused to them by previous trial. The term "prejudice" which finds place in sub-clause (2) relates to the action of others and not to the action of the party itself. If the act of the defendant prejudices the rights of the plaintiff, the plaintiff can legitimately come before the Court. But if the plaintiff suffers because of his own act, it cannot legitimately lie in his mouth to agitate that his own act has resulted in prejudice to him. 12. Thus, as far as the present case is concerned, the present legal representatives who have been substituted for the plaintiff have no legal right to raise the points regarding jurisdiction which the deceased himself could not legitimately raise. Secondly section 21(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure debars the Appellate and Revisional Court to entertain this objection regarding jurisdiction if no such objection is taken in the trial Court. 13. To repeat it once again, the amendment though innocuous at the initial stage, virtually vitiates everything that has been done by the trial Court. Secondly section 21(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure debars the Appellate and Revisional Court to entertain this objection regarding jurisdiction if no such objection is taken in the trial Court. 13. To repeat it once again, the amendment though innocuous at the initial stage, virtually vitiates everything that has been done by the trial Court. The amendment has the legal effect of vitiating the whole trial conducted before the Civil Judge, Junior Division and ultimately the District Judge by his order directed the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper Court, which ultimately means that the trial conducted by the trial Court and judgment and decree passed by him have been completely effected. This is the real effect of the amendment and as such amendment could not have been legitimately allowed by the learned District Judge. 14. The order passed by the learned District Judge in allowing the amendment on 3-10-1984 and the subsequent order passed on 20-10-1984 directing the return of the plaint to the proper Court are hereby set aside. The learned District Judge, Buldhana is directed to entertain the appeal (Regular Appeal No. 256/80) and decide it on merits according to law. The revision is thus allowed and the Rule is made absolute in terms above. The District Judge is directed to hear the appeal and disposed it of according to law. There shall no order as to costs. Revision allowed. -----